FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 25149/13 Mato MRAZOVIĆ and O thers against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 17 December 2019 as a Committee composed of:

Aleš Pejchal, President,

Tim Eicke,

Raffaele Sabato, judges,

and Abel Campos , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 20 March 2013,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, having been informed of their right to intervene (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court), did not avail themselves of this right,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. They were all represented before the Court by Ms G. Vodopivec, a lawyer practising in Zagreb.

2 . The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . In 1984 the applicants brought a civil action in the Zagreb Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Zagrebu ) against company T., their employer, seeking payment of salary arrears in United States dollars (USD).

5 . By a judgment of 1 October 2002 the Zagreb Municipal Court allowed the applicants ’ claim in part, ordering the defendant to pay their salary arrears, together with the accrued statutory default interest.

6 . On 28 December 2005 the Zagreb Municipal Court adopted a supplementary judgment, ordering the defendant to pay the applicants 72,102 Croatian kunas (HRK) [1] for the costs of the proceedings, together with the statutory default interest accrued on those costs. The remainder of the applicants ’ claim for costs exceeding that amount was dismissed.

7 . On 6 June 2006 the Zagreb County Court ( Županijski sud u Zagrebu ), dismissed an appeal by the defendant and upheld the first-instance jud gment of 1 October 2002 (see paragraph 5 above). It also dismissed an appeal by the defendant against the supplementary judgment of 28 December 2005 (see paragraph 6 above), and upheld the part of the judgment whereby the applicants had been awarded HRK 72,102 in costs together with the accrued statutory default interest. However, the court allowed an appeal by the applicants and quashed the part of the supplementary judgment whereby their claim for costs exceeding the awarded amount had been dismissed. It held that the first-instance court had wrongly calculated the value of the subject matter of the dispute, and consequently the costs of the proceedings. In particular, the first-instance court should have applied the USD exchange rate which had been valid on the date when the decision on costs had been adopted, and not a different rate for each procedural action. Accordingly, the case was remitted to the first-instance court for fresh examination, with regard to the costs of the proceedings.

8 . By a decision of 4 May 2007 the Zagreb Municipal Court ordered company T. to pay the applicants a further sum of HRK 32,123.11 [2] in respect of the costs of the proceedings.

9 . Following an appeal by the applicants, on 24 July 2007 the Zagreb County Court quashed the decision of the Zagreb Municipal Court and remitted the case, instructing the first-instance court to apply the USD exchange rate which had been valid on the date when the main hearing had been concluded , rather than a different rate for each procedural action.

10 . By a decision of 12 April 2011 the Zagreb Municipal Court dismissed a claim by the applicants for an additional HRK 472,798.92 in costs. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ), it held that the relevant daily exchange rate should be applied for each procedural action, rather than the exchange rate which had been valid on the date when the main hearing had been concluded, as the County Court had instructed (see paragraph 9 above). Therefore, the amount paid to the applicants thus far (HRK 104,225.11) in respect of the litigation costs had been sufficient.

11 . On 13 September 2011 the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants and upheld the first-instance decision of 12 April 2011 (see paragraph 10 above). It held that the Municipal Court had erred again as regards the relevant exchange rate. Relying on different decisions of the Supreme Court, it found that the relevant exchange rate was the one which had been valid on the date when the applicants had lodged their civil action. After applying that rate, the County Court established that the applicants were not entitled to any further award in respect of the costs of the proceedings.

12 . The applicants then lodged an ordinary appeal on points of law under subparagraph 1 of section 381(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, as well as a so-called extraordinary appeal on points of law under section 382(2) of the same Act (see paragraph 20 below). In their extraordinary appeal, the applicants raised the following points of law:

“ I The question of the exchange rate, that is determining the value of the subject matter of the dispute in a case where the claim concerns the payment of a sum of money in a foreign currency and a debt from 1980s ...

II The question of the court ’ s departure from a previously expressed legal view.

III Questions related to the method of assessing which [procedural] actions were necessary, and consequently which costs incurred during the proceedings were justified.”

13 . These questions were followed by a four-page-long detailed explanation. As regards the first question, the applicants argued that the case-law which applied in their case, that dated back to the 1980s, should be revisited, because it was at odds with the changes in the legal system effected by new legislation related to foreign-exchange operations adopted in the meantime, and by the Convention ’ s entry into force in respect of Croatia, as well as by the Court ’ s and the Constitutional Court ’ s decisions finding violations of the right to a fair hearing.

14 . As regards the second question, the applicants asserted that the Zagreb County Court ’ s departure from the legal view it had expressed earlier in their case was contrary to the principle of the rule of law and the principle of legal certainty derived from it, contained in the Convention. They therefore considered that it was necessary that the Supreme Court, unless it had already done so, rule on that procedural point of law in order to prevent conflicting decisions being adopted in the same case and thereby ensure the uniform application of the law.

15 . As regards the third question, the applicants contended that the domestic courts ’ finding in their case that certain costs had not been necessary and thus should not be reimbursed had constituted a departure from the existing case-law and placed them at a disadvantage in comparison with other litigants in similar cases.

16 . The applicants concluded by stating that the points of law which they had raised were important for the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application. That was so because the following could lead to arbitrary interpretation of the law and ultimately result in a violation of the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by the Croatian Constitution and the Convention:

- different legal views regarding the exchange rate in cases where the subject matter of the dispute was expressed in foreign currency;

- different legal views regarding the question of which procedural actions were necessary; and

- a court departing from its previously expressed legal view without giving reasons.

17 . By a decision of 27 March 2012 the Supreme Court declared the applicants ’ appeals on points of law inadmissible, and served its decision on their representative on 27 April 2012. The ordinary appeal was declared inadmissible ratione valoris , that is, because the value of the claim did not reach the statutory threshold. The Supreme Court gave detailed reasons for that decision. On the other hand, in declaring the applicants ’ extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible, the Supreme Court merely referred to section 392b(2) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 20 below) as follows:

“On the basis of section 392b( 2) and (3) of the CPA [Civil Procedure Act], the appeal on points of law lodged under section 382(2) of the CPA is inadmissible.

In view of the above, [and] on the basis of section 400(1) read in conjunction with section ... 392b(4) of the CPA, [the case has been] decided as indicated in the operative provisions of this decision.”

18 . On 24 May 2012 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court ’ s decision, alleging, inter alia , a violation of their constitutional right to fair proceedings. They complained that the Supreme Court had declared their extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible, even though they had complied with the formal requirements for lodging that remedy. Moreover, the Supreme Court had done so without giving any reasons for its decision and by referring to two different paragraphs of section 392b of the Civil Procedure Act, which contained two different grounds for inadmissibility which were mutually exclusive.

19 . By a decision of 13 September 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicants ’ constitutional complaint inadmissible, and on 1 October 2012 it served its decision on their representative. It held that decisions concerning the costs of proceedings were not open to constitutional review, as such decisions did not concern the determination of parties ’ rights or obligations, that is, they did not concern the merits of a case.

20 . The relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act ( Zakon o parničnom postupku , Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 4/77 with subsequent amendments, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 53/91, with subsequent amendments), which has been in force since 1 July 1977, read as follows at the material time:

1. Appeal on points of law

Section 382

“(1) Parties may lodge an appeal on points of law ( revizija ) against a second-instance judgment:

- if the value of the subject matter of the dispute of the contested part of the judgment exceeds HRK 200,000,

- [in certain employment disputes],

- if the second-instance judgment was adopted in accordance with section 373a or 373b of this Act [that is, if the second-instance court assessed the evidence and/or established the facts differently from the first-instance court or held a hearing].

(2) In cases where the parties are not entitled to lodge an appeal on points of law in accordance with paragraph 1 of this section, they may [nevertheless] do so if a decision in the dispute depends on the resolution of a point of substantive or procedural law [that is] important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application, for example:

- if the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the point ... in respect of which there is divergent case-law of the second-instance courts,

- if the Supreme Court has already ruled on that point, but the decision of the second-instance court is not in conformity with that ruling,

- if the Supreme Court has already ruled on that point and the decision of the second-instance court is in conformity with that ruling, but ... the case-law should be revisited in view of changes in the legal system occasioned by new legislation, international treaties or decisions of the Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights or the Court of Justice of the European Union.

(3) In the [extraordinary] appeal on points of law referred to in paragraph 2 of this section, the appellants must specify the point of law which is the grounds for their appeal, [together] with specific reference to legislation and other sources of law related thereto, and [must] give reasons as to why they find that point important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application.

(4) An appeal on points of law must be lodged within thirty days of the second-instance judgment being served.”

Section 392b

“(1) A panel composed of five judges of the Supreme Court shall declare an incomplete, inadmissible [in the strict sense] or belated [extraordinary] appeal on points of law inadmissible, unless the first-instance court has not already done so. Such a decision shall be reasoned.

(2) The panel referred to in paragraph 1 of this section shall, by a decision, declare an [extraordinary] appeal on points of law inadmissible if it does not specify the point of law which is the grounds for the appeal, [together] with specific reference to legislation and other sources of law related thereto, or if it does not give specific reasons as to why the appellant finds that point important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application.

(3) The panel referred to in paragraph 1 of this section shall declare an [extraordinary] appeal on points of law inadmissible if it finds that the point of law which is the grounds for the appeal is not important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application.

(4) The statement of reasons of the decision referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this section shall only refer to paragraphs 2 or 3 of this section, which provide for the inadmissibility of such an appeal on the grounds stated therein. If it considers it appropriate, the panel may decide to give specific reasons for such a decision.

(5) ...”

21 . By decision no. U-I-885/2013 of 11 July 2014 the Constitutional Court invalidated section 392b( 4) of the Civil Procedure Act as incompatible with the Croatian Constitution. It held that the impugned provision was contrary to: (a) the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 29 § 1 of the Croatian Constitution and by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; and (b) Article 116 of the Croatian Constitution, which defines the role of the Supreme Court as that of ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application. The Constitutional Court ’ s decision came into effect on 24 July 2014 when it was published in the Official Gazette. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:

“11.3. Examining the disputed paragraph 4 of section 392b of the CPA in relation to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the same section, the Constitutional Court finds such a regulatory solution constitutionally unacceptable, in so far as it entitles the Supreme Court not to state reasons for a decision declaring an extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible. In particular, the Constitutional Court sees no objective or relevant [justification for a situation where] there is an obligation to state reasons for a decision declaring an extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible on the grounds provided for in paragraph 1 of section 392b of the CPA, yet no such obligation exists when declaring an extraordinary appeal on points of law referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same section inadmissible.

12. Moreover, the situation referred to in paragraph 3 of section 392b of the CPA is not only about a party being deprived of the right to be informed of the reasons why his or her legal remedy – to which he or she is entitled and which fulfils all formal requirements – is declared inadmissible. It is also about all of the general public, including the entire [judicial] system ..., as well as the Constitutional Court, being precluded from finding out [what the legal] views of the highest court in the country [are] ... In particular, the Supreme Court ’ s decision on whether or not a certain point of law is important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application indicates most clearly how the Supreme Court ... ensures [the uniform application of the law and] equality of citizens within the meaning of Article 116 § 1 of the Constitution.

This is why sufficient and relevant reasons must b e stated for a decision whereby the Supreme Court declares an extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible (because it found that the underlying point of law was not important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application).

The extent of the reasoning and how detailed it is may vary, depending on the given point of law. Therefore, the reasons for declaring an appeal on points of law inadmissible within the meaning of section 392b(3) of the CPA may even be summarised into ‘ a single sentence ’ if the reasons why the point of law is not important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application are clearly indicated. However, to state no reasons (even though it is a matter of public or general interest) and to have statutory authority to do so, points to a profound incompatibility between section 392b( 4) of the CPA and Article 116 § 1 of the Constitution. Such a statutory provision denies the very meaning and purpose of the constitutional role of the Supreme Court as defined in Article 116 § 1 of the Constitution.

The Constitutional Court also notes that section 392b( 4) of the CPA and its application may give the public the impression that the Supreme Court acts arbitrarily when, without stating reasons for its decision, it declares an extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible in the event that it considers that the underlying point of law is not important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application. The requirements associated with the ‘ external appearances ’ of the proper functioning of the courts, which are inherent to the right to a fair hearing, but also the proper functioning of the judiciary, do not allow for an extraordinary appeal on points of law to be declared inadmissible without reasons for such a judicial decision being given.”

COMPLAINT

22 . The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that their right to a fair hearing, in particular their right of access to a court, had been violated on account of the Supreme Court ’ s failure to give reasons for declaring their extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible.

THE LAW

23 . The applicants complained that, by declaring their extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible without giving adequate reasons, the Supreme Court had violated their right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

24 . The Government contested the admissibility of the application on two grounds. Firstly, they argued that the application was inadmissible for non-compliance with the six-month rule, and secondly, they argued that it was in any event manifestly ill-founded.

(a) Compliance with the six-month rule

25 . The Government argued that the applicants had failed to comply with the six-month rule, because the constitutional complaint which they had lodged on 24 May 2012 (see paragraph 18 above) was not an effective remedy to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and thus was not capable of interrupting th e running of the six-month time ‑ limit prescribed in that Article. They explained that under the longstanding case-law of the Constitutional Court, a constitutional complaint could not be lodged against a decision concerning the costs of proceedings. The Constitutional Court had already adopted that view in decision U-III-4020/2003 of 30 June 2004, which had been published in the Official Gazette on 9 July 2004, and had never departed from it. [3] The applicants ’ legal representative had been aware of that. Consequently, the final decision within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, for the purposes of calculating the six-month time-limit in the applicants ’ case, was not the Constitutional Court ’ s decision of 13 September 2012 (see paragraph 19 above), but the Supreme Court ’ s decision of 27 March 2012 , which had been served on their representative on 27 April 2012 (see paragraph 17 above). However, their application to the Court had been lodged on 20 March 2013, that is, more than six months later.

26 . The applicants admitted that they had been aware of the Constitutional Court ’ s longstanding practice cited by the Government, but that did not mean that the practice and the thinking behind it were correct and did not need to be changed. They had therefore nevertheless lodged a constitutional complaint in an attempt to change that practice. The applicants had considered that the case warranted such a course of action, and that the Constitutional Court ’ s view was arbitrary. In particular, there was nothing in the wording of the relevant provision of the Constitutional Court Act to suggest that decisions on the costs of proceedings would not be amenable to a constitutional complaint. Moreover, even though, in theory, a claim for reimbursement of litigation costs was considered to be ancillary to the main claim in any proceedings, in reality, there was no substantial difference between a decision on costs and a decision on the merits ordering one party to pay another a certain sum of money.

27 . In reply to the applicants ’ submissions (see paragraph 26 above), the Government submitted that the applicants had failed to put forward any argument to that effect in their constitutional complaint. Thus, they had given no reasons for the Constitutional Court to depart from its earlier case ‑ law, and consequently could not have expected that its decision in their case would be different.

(b) Whether the application is manifestly ill-founded

(i) The Government

28 . In their initial observations of 11 February 2016 the Government submitted that the applicants had not complied with the formal requirements for lodging an extraordinary appeal on points of law. The admissibility of that remedy was subject to certain statutory requirements, all of which had to be met in a given case. Notably, appellants had to specify the point of law which was the grounds for their appeal and give reasons as to why they considered it important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all before the law (see section 382(3) of the Civil Procedure Act, quoted in paragraph 20 above). The Supreme Court was not entitled to raise such a point of law of its own motion or speculate on the reasons why an appellant considered the raised point important, as that would be contrary to one of the fundamental principles of civil procedure, namely the principle of party disposition.

29 . In its case-law, [4] the Supreme Court had clarified that in order for it to be able to decide if a point of law was indeed of the required importance, appellants had to specify the point of law in such a way that the Supreme Court could give a specific answer. This meant that: (a) the point of law had to be raised in the form of a question which had to be specific, that is, “clearly presented, individualised and well-defined”; (b) the point of law had to be directly decisive for the outcome of the case; (c) appellants had to refer to the relevant legislation and other sources of law; and (d) appellants had to give specific reasons as to why that particular point of law was important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application. If those requirements were not met, the Supreme Court would declare such an extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible.

30 . In the present case, in their extraordinary appeal on points of law (see paragraphs 12-16 above), the applicants had:

- raised three points of law, but none of them in the form of a question to which the Supreme Court could give an unequivocal answer;

- failed to refer to the relevant legislation and other sources of law in respect of each point; and

- failed to give reasons as to why those points were important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application.

31 . In other words, even though they had been represented by a qualified representative (an attorney), the applicants had lodged a clearly inadmissible extraordinary appeal on points of law, and thus could and should have expected that the Supreme Court would reject it as such. In those circumstances, it was enough for the Supreme Court to refer to the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act setting out the formal requirements for lodging such an appeal (see paragraph 17 above, and section 392b(2) quoted in paragraph 20 above), because a more extensive statement of reasons had not been necessary.

32 . The Government further explained that when the Supreme Court had applied paragraph 4 of section 392b of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraphs 20-21 above), which was now invalidated, that had not meant that it had not given any reasons for its decisions to declare extraordinary appeals on points of law inadmissible. In such decisions, the Supreme Court had always had to refer to paragraph 2 of the same section (see paragraph 20 above). Moreover, the application of paragraph 4 of section 392b of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 20 above) had been a signal to the appellants that their extraordinary appeal on points of law was clearly inadmissible, that is, that it was not even compliant with the formal requirements.

33 . Lastly, the Government submitted that they had been aware of the fact that the Constitutional Court had invalidated the provision in question as unconstitutional more than two years after the Supreme Court had adopted its decision in the applicants ’ case (see paragraph 21 above). However, they argued that this fact did not automatically constitute a violation of the right to a reasoned decision in the present case.

34 . In reply to the applicants ’ argument (see paragraph 36 below) that the Supreme Court had declared their extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible by referring to both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 392b, which was contradictory, the Government, in their comments of 19 April 2016 on the applicants ’ observations, presented arguments which were somewhat different from those summarised above (see paragraphs 30-31).

35 . In particular, this time the Government submitted that the first of the three points of law raised by the applicants (the date on which a foreign currency exchange rate should be calculated, see paragraph 12 above) could have been construed as a question. Since the Supreme Court had already ruled on that first point of law and the lower courts ’ decisions had been in line with the Supreme Court ’ s view adopted in this regard, that point was evidently not important for ensuring the uniform application of the law and the equality of all in its application. Accordingly, the Supreme Court had applied section 392b( 3) of the Civil Procedure Act (see pa ragraph 17 above). The two remaining points of law had not been raised in the form of a question, and the applicants had not even tried to explain why the importance of those points went beyond their own case. Thus, the Supreme Court had applied section 392b( 2) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 17 above) in respect of those points.

(ii) The applicants

36 . The applicants reiterated that the Supreme Court had declared their extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible without giving any reasons for that decision. They stressed that in so doing, the court had referred to both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 392b (see paragraph 20 above). However, the grounds set out in those two paragraphs for declaring an extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible were different and mutually exclusive. In particular, the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of that section related to non-compliance with the formal requirements for lodging that remedy, whereas paragraph 3 entitled the Supreme Court to declare an extraordinary appeal inadmissible if the point of law raised in such an appeal was not important for the uniform application of the law. The Supreme Court ’ s finding in their case – that the points of law raised in their extraordinary appeal were not important for the uniform application of the law – necessarily contradicted the concurrent finding and the Government ’ s argument (see paragraph 30 above) that the applicants had not (properly) specified the points of law constituting the grounds for that appeal.

37 . The applicants further contested the Government ’ s argument that their extraordinary appeal on points of law had not met the formal requirements for lodging that remedy (see paragraphs 28-31 above). The applicants emphasised they had raised three specific points of law formulated as questions, indicated relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act, and explained why they considered those points important for ensuring the uniform application of law and the equality of all in its application (see paragraphs 12-16 above). The fact that they had perhaps not formulated those questions in a specific way required by the Supreme Court did not mean that they had not complied with the requirement to specify the points of law constituting the grounds for their extraordinary appeal, as required by section 382(3) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 20 below). To insist that parties formulate their questions by using a strict formula, in exactly the same way as the Supreme Court imagined it, amounted to excessive formalism restricting the right of access to a court.

38 . Likewise, in the applicants ’ view, the further requirement set out in the same provision – that parties make specific reference to legislation and other sources of law related to the point of law raised in their extraordinary appeal – could not be construed so as to require verbatim quoting of the relevant provisions.

39 . Lastly, the applicants argued that the Supreme Court ’ s assessment of whether or not a given point of law was important for ensuring the uniform application of law and the equality of all in its application should not depend on the style of arguments, the manner in which they were presented, or how convincing or attractive they were. Rather, such an assessment should be the result of a careful, profound and comprehensive analysis of the essence of the points raised. The Supreme Court should be able to recognise the importance of the raised points of law and the need to rule on them itself, without appellants having to convince it or submit decisions where lower courts had adopted different views. In any event, that had not been possible in the case at hand. In particular, the applicants ’ case and other similar cases dated back to the 1980s (see paragraph 4 above). Judgments in similar cases had been adopted long before the judgment in the applicants ’ case, that is, at a time when such judgments had not been published. The applicants could therefore not have provided the Supreme Court with case-law examples to prove that, in their case, the County Court had departed from the existing case-law.

40 . The relevant principles emerging from the Court ’ s case-law concerning the right of access to a court and, in particular, access to superior courts, are summarised in Zubac v. Croatia (GC], no. 40160/12, § § 76-86, 5 April 2018, whereas those concerning the right to a reasoned decision are summarised in Hansen v. Norway no. 15319/09 , § § 71-74, 2 October 2014. More specific principles concerning the right to a reasoned decision, applicable in the context of leave-to-appeal proceedings and other preliminary procedures for the examination and admission of appeals on points of law, are summarised in Nersesyan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 15371/07, § 23, 19 January 2010, and Talmane v. Latvia , no. 47938/07, § § 28-29, 13 October 2016 .

41 . In particular, the Court reiterates that if the relevant domestic law authorises a superior court to reject an appeal by mere reference to the relevant legal provisions governing the admissibility of such appeals, it may be sufficient for that court to simply refer, without further reasoning, to the provision authorising that procedure, if the appeal raises no legal issue of fundamental importance (see John v. Germany (dec.), no. 15073/03, 13 February 2007; Nersesyan , cited above, loc. cit. and the cases cited therein; and Talmane , cited above, § 29 ). The Court has also held that refusing leave to appeal without giving specific reasons did not infringe the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Sawoniuk v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 63716/00, 29 May 2001).

42 . The Court considers that these principles apply in the present case. The applicants ’ case was examined at two levels of court with full jurisdiction which gave detailed reasons for their decisions (see paragraphs 5-11 above). The procedure before the Supreme Court, whose jurisdiction is limited only to points of law, and whose role is to ensure the uniform application of the law and equality of all in its application, was a preliminary admissibility procedure which concerned the question of whether the applicants ’ extraordinary appeal on points of law met the statutory requirements prescribed by section 382(3) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 20 above) to be admitted for an examination on the merits. In its decision of 27 March 2012 the Supreme Court declared the applicants ’ extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible on the basis of paragraph 4 of section 392b of the Civil Procedure Act, by referring to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same section (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above). Having regard to its case-law o n the matter (see paragraphs 40 ‑ 41 above), the Court finds that by so doing, the Supreme Court sufficiently indicated the reasons for its decision for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

43 . The Court takes note of the fact that by its decision of 11 July 2014 the Constitutional Court invalidated paragraph 4 of section 392b of the Civil Procedure Act as incompatible with the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 21 above).

44 . Having established that the Supreme Court ’ s decision declaring the applicants ’ extraordinary appeal on points of law inadmissible was sufficiently reasoned, the Court further notes that the Supreme Court adopted such a decision because the applicants had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of domestic law set out in section 392(2) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above).

45 . Having regard to its case-law on the matter (see Trevisanato v. Italy , no. 32610/07, §§ 32-47, 15 September 2016; Krpić v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 75012/12, §§ 39, 41 and 44, 31 May 2016; Dunn v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 62793/10, §§ 37-38, 23 October 2012; Wells v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 37794/05, 16 January 2007; and R.M.B. v. the United Kingdom , no. 37120/97, Commission decision of 9 September 1998, unpublished), the Court considers that, in the given circumstances, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court ’ s decision in the present case amounted to excessive formalism involving an unreasonable and particularly strict application of procedural rules or otherwise unjustifiably restricting the applicants ’ access to its jurisdiction.

46 . It follows that the present application is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.

47 . In view of this conclusion, the Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government ’ s remaining preliminary objection based on the applicants ’ alleged non-compliance with the six-month rule (see paragraphs 24-25 and 27 above).

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 16 January 2020 .

Abel Campos Aleš Pejchal Registrar President

Appendix

No.

Applicant ’ s Name

Birth date

Nationality

Place of residence

1Mato MRAZOVIĆ

18/01/1955

Croatian

Zagreb

2Ankica BEKINA

18/09/1948

Croatian

Gornja Stubica

3Nezir CEROVAC

18/09/1956

of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mrkoti ć , Teš anj

4Mustafa HAMIDOVIĆ

15/02/1972

of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Međiđa Gornja

5Osman HAMIDOVIĆ

03/01/1967

of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Međiđa Gornja

6Hasan IMŠIROVIĆ

10/03/1979

of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Međiđa Gornja

7Jasmin KEČANOVIĆ

25/01/1969

Croatian

Zagreb

8Jasminka KEČANOVIĆ

13/08/1964

Croatian

Zagreb

9Stjepan KRZNARIĆ

11/08/1956

Croatian

Lučko

10Petko MILINČIĆ

02/04/1954

Croatian

Križ evci

11Jozo TOMAÅ

25/06/1942

Croatian

Brinje

12Ivan UGARKOVIĆ

14/04/1942

Croatian

Brinje

[1] . Approximately 9,935 euros (EUR) at the time.

[2] . Approximately EUR 4,368 euros at the time.

[3] . A s an example the Government referred to decisions nos. U-III-3097/2005 and U-III-3159/2005 of 25 October 2007

[4] . The Government referred to the Supreme Court decisions nos. Rev-x 361/10-2 of 25 August 2010, Rev-x 875/11-2 of 25 January 2012 , Re v 1013/11-2 of 21 August 2012, and Rev 775/10-2 of 10 December 2013 .