THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 25835/10 Valentina Vladimirovna PAVLOVA against Russia

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 28 January 2020 as a Committee composed of:

Georgios A. Serghides, President, Erik Wennerström, Lorraine Schembri Orland, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 23 April 2010,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicant, Ms Valentina Vladimirovna Pavlova, is a Russian national, who was born in 1969 and lives in Chita. She was represented before the Court by Mr R.K. Akhmetgaliyev, a lawyer practising in Kazan.

2 . The Russian Government (“the Government”) were initially represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.

3 . In 2006 the applicant ’ s seventeen-year-old son, A.P., applied to enter the academy of the Federal Security Guard Service in Orel ( Федеральная служба охраны – hereinafter “the FSO” ). From 28 June to 6 July 2006 an admission committee examined his intellectual, professional and psychological abilities. A.P. showed impulsiveness and independence which could have caused problems at the initial stage of his adaptation to the new community.

4 . On 1 August 2006 A.P. became a cadet at the FSO Academy. During the first two years of his education, he was to live in the barracks of military unit no. 93872.

5 . On 18 October 2006 at about 9.30 p.m. A.P. fell from a window on the third floor of the barracks. Later that day a criminal case into the offence of incitement to suicide was opened. On 27 October 2006 at 11.30 p.m. A.P. died.

6 . On 28 October 2006 a forensic medical expert examined A.P. ’ s body. He held that injuries from the fall had caused A.P. ’ s death.

7 . On 28 November 2006 an expert prepared a report on A.P. ’ s psychological state ante mortem. She concluded that A.P. had had an adjustment disorder in the form of a bout of depression. In particular, he had been affected by his new environment and problems with his studies. His suicide had not been caused by the actions of third parties.

8 . On 12 December 2006 the criminal case was closed for lack of corpus delicti . The decision closing the case relied on the records of an on ‑ site inspection, a forensic medical examination report, and a psychological report. It also relied on statements of cadets and senior officers, and those of A.P. ’ s parents and school friends. According to the witnesses, about two weeks before the incident A.P. had become more distant and silent, fidgety and distracted. He had begun to worry a lot about his marks. The investigator thus concluded that A.P. ’ s death had resulted from his own actions.

9 . On 4 June 2008 the applicant requested that a criminal case be opened against the commanding officers and the psychologists of military unit no. 93872 for their failure to recognise A.P. ’ s suicidal tendencies and provide him with proper assistance.

10 . On 15 July 2008 the applicant ’ s request was refused. The investigator relied on the findings of the decision of 12 December 2006. He also considered that the military authorities had taken all required steps regarding the psychological well-being of cadets, including A.P.

11 . The applicant contested the refusal before a court. On 25 June 2009 the Bryansk Garrison Military Court (“the Garrison Court”) rejected her complaint. The Garrison Court found sufficient evidence that the military authorities had taken the necessary steps to ensure the psychological well ‑ being of A.P. On 3 November 2009 the Moscow Regional Military Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the Garrison Court.

COMPLAINTS

12 . The applicant complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the senior officers and the psychologists of her son ’ s academy had failed to recognise his suicidal tendencies and provide him with proper assistance. She also complained about the refusal to investigate the failure of the senior officers and the psychologists of A.P. ’ s academy to take steps to safeguard the life of her son. The relevant part of Article 2 of the Convention provides as follows:

“1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

...”

THE LAW

13 . The applicant asserted that, for the following reasons, the military authorities should have recognised that her son had been suicidal but had failed to do so. Firstly, his initial psychological assessment had showed that he could have problems in adapting to a new environment. Secondly, other cadets and senior officers had noticed that A.P. had become distant and silent, fidgety and distracted, and anxious about his grades. The applicant therefore considered that the authorities had known about the risk to her son ’ s life, but had failed to take any operative measures to protect his life. Mere discussions with A.P. had obviously been insufficient. No other real psychological assistance had been provided to him.

14 . The applicant considered that the investigation into her son ’ s suicide had not been thorough and prompt. The investigating authorities had only opened a criminal investigation into the offence of incitement to suicide, but they had not investigated A.P. ’ s having inadequate psychological assistance until she had made a request in that regard. The ensuing investigation had also been inadequate, as it had not resolved inconsistencies between the statements of witnesses and psychologists, and had not assessed the perfunctory nature of the psychological assistance provided to A.P.

15 . The Government submitted that according to psychological tests, the applicant ’ s son had not shown any suicidal tendencies. After those tests had been completed, his senior officers had not observed any changes in his behaviour. He had had no complaints and had not asked for psychological assistance. A.P. had not been subjected to any form of bullying or unlawful violence. The investigation had established that he had committed suicide. Thus, the authorities had complied with their positive obligations to protect A.P. ’ s life.

16 . The Government further submitted that the investigation into A.P. ’ s death had been effective. The criminal case had been closed as no corpus delicti had been established. The investigation had concluded that A.P. had committed suicide in the context of a temporary adjustment disorder in the form of a bout of depression. The conclusion had relied on inspections of the scene of the incident and the deceased ’ s body, the statements of other cadets and senior officers, and forensic examinations. The investigator had also examined the actions of senior officers responsible for A.P. He had found that the obligations to perform psychological testing and provide further monitoring had been complied with. Therefore, the Government believed that they had complied with the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention.

17 . The Court has to examine whether the authorities knew or should have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk that A.P. would commit suicide, and, if so, whether they did all that could reasonably have been expected of them to avoid that risk materialising (see Malik Babayev v. Azerbaijan , no. 30500/11, § 67, 1 June 2 017 ).

18 . The Court notes that prior to his admission to the academy, the applicant ’ s son underwent psychological tests which revealed no suicide risk. During the two months before the incident, A.P. did not ask for psychological assistance and did not inform senior officers about any complaints or difficulties. Even if his behaviour changed, it appears that there were no particular instances which could have alerted the military authorities to the fact that that change was so radical as to endanger his life. The Court reiterates that in this type of case, the unpredictability of human conduct must not be ignored, and the State ’ s positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (see, as a recent authority, Malik Babayev , cited above , § 74 ). In the circumstances, there is no sufficient evidence for the Court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to A.P. ’ s life (see Tikhonova v. Russia , no. 13596/05, § 75 , 30 April 2014). The Court therefore finds that the particular circumstances leading to A.P. ’ s death were not foreseeable to the domestic authorities. Thus, no obligation to take operational measures to prevent a risk to life arose in the present case.

19 . As for the effectiveness of the investigation into A.P. ’ s death, the Court notes that the applicant was mostly dissatisfied about there being no criminal prosecution of psychologists and senior officers from A.P. ’ s academy. However, other than that, she did not indicate any particular omissions or deficiencies which could have rendered the investigation inadequate (see Baklanov v. Ukraine , no. 44425/08 , § 88, 24 October 2013 ).

20 . The Court reiterates that where a positive obligation to safeguard the life of persons in custody or in the army is at stake, the system required by Article 2 must provide for an independent and impartial official investigation that satisfies certain minimum standards as to effectiveness. In such cases, the competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and promptness, and must, of their own motion, initiate investigations capable of, firstly, ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident took place and any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system and, secondly, identifying the State officials or authorities involved. The requirement of public scrutiny is also relevant in this context (see, for instance, Marina Alekseyeva v. Russia , no. 22490/05, § 126, with further references, 19 December 2013 ). However, Article 2 does not entail the right for an applicant to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence, or an absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or a particular sentence (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 96, ECHR 2004 ‑ XII).

21 . In the present case, the authorities immediately opened a criminal investigation into A.P. ’ s death, questioned a significant number of witnesses, and obtained relevant forensic examinations. The investigation established no elements of a criminal offence in the circumstances of A.P. ’ s death, and the case was closed about five months after being initiated. Thus, the investigation was sufficiently prompt. It established the relevant facts, and there is no reason to doubt the conclusions which it reached. There is no reason to question the independence of the investigation either. It appears that the applicant had no issues in accessing the material of the criminal investigation.

22 . Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the investigation into A.P. ’ s death was effective.

23 . In view of the above, the Court finds that the applicant ’ s complaints under Article 2 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 27 February 2020 .

Stephen Phillips Georgios A. Serghides Registrar President