SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 9477/12 Zü lf i AKBULUT and Fatma AKBULUT against Turkey

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 7 July 2020 as a Committee composed of:

Valeriu Griţco , President, Arnfinn Bårdsen , Peeter Roosma , judges, and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 23 December 2011,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The applicants, Mr Zülfi Akbulut and Ms Fatma Akbulut, are Turkish nationals, who were born in 1961 and 1962, respectively, and live in Diyarbak ı r. They were represented before the Court by Ms R. Yalçındağ Baydemir and Mr S. Çelebi , lawyers practising in Diyarbakır.

2 . The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

The circumstances of the case

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4 . Following the death of fourteen members of a terrorist organisation during an armed confrontation on 24 March 2006, several demonstrations were organised in Diyarbakır between 28 and 31 March 2006.

5 . On 28 March 2006 the applicants ’ son was shot, allegedly, by members of security forces while covering the events in the vicinity of a police station. On 31 March 2006 he died in a hospital.

6 . According to the autopsy report, the applicants ’ son had died due to internal bleeding caused by a bullet injury.

7 . On an unspecified date a criminal investigation was commenced into the killing of the applicants ’ son.

8 . On 19 March 2006 the applicants filed an official complaint with the public prosecutor concerning the killing of their son.

9 . On unspecified dates in 2007, the applicants ’ two other children and their neighbour were heard by the prosecutor. No other witness statement appears to have been collected by the prosecutor ’ s office.

10 . On 14 June 2007 Diyarbakır Security Forces informed the Diyarbakır Prosecutor ’ s Office that on 28 March 2006 illegal demonstrations had taken place in the vicinity of the 10 April Police Station, however the security officials had not used live ammunition against the public.

11 . On an unspecified date the prosecutor ’ s office requested the ballistic examination of the bullet recovered from the body of the applicants ’ son.

12 . On 15 March 2010 a summary report established that the applicants ’ son had been shot by a 9 mm bullet. The Diyarbakır Prosecutor requested a comparative ballistic examination to be undertaken and, according to the information in the file, this examination had been carried out on 30 July 2013, namely after the lodging of the present application. The expert report concluded that the firearms possessed by the police officers did not match the bullet recovered from the body.

13 . On an unspecified date, the applicants lodged a civil claim for damages with the administrative courts. At the time of their application, the case was still pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.

COMPLAINTS

14 . The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention, in conjunction with Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention, that the security forces had killed their son by an intentional and targeted act of violence because he was of Kurdish origin. They alleged under the same heading that the respondent Government had breached their positive obligation to protect their son ’ s life.

15 . The applicants further maintained under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention that the national authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the killing of their son .

16 . Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, they complained about the treatment that they themselves had suffered as a result of the killing of their son, and the ensuing failure on the side of the authorities to identify his killer.

THE LAW

17 . The applicants complained that their son had been killed by the security forces and the authorities had failed in their obligation to protect their son ’ s life, and to investigate his killing.

18 . The applicants further alleged that losing their son at an early age, coupled with the failure to identify the perpetrators, had caused them great pain. They invoked Articles 2, 3, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention.

19 . The Government raised a number of preliminary objections and argued that the application at issue was inadmissible. In particular, they stated that the application had been lodged out of the six-month time-limit as the applicants should have become aware of the ineffectiveness of the proceedings at an earlier stage. The Court does not deem it necessary to examine the remainder of the Government ’ s preliminary objections as, for the reasons stated below, the application is inadmissible for being introduced out of time.

20 . At the outset, the Court reiterates that the purpose of the six-month rule is to promote security of law and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time. Furthermore, it ought also to protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being under any uncertainty for a prolonged period of time (see Torlak and Others v. Turkey ( dec. ), nos 48176/11, 13669/12, 62981/12, § 40, 29 May 2018; Bulut and Yavuz v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 73065/01, 28 May 2002; and Bayram and Yıldırım v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 38587/97, ECHR 2002-III).

21 . As a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In cases concerning deprivation of life, if no remedies are available or if they are judged to be ineffective, the six-month time-limit in principle runs from the date of the act complained about by the applicant. Special considerations may apply in exceptional cases where applicants first avail themselves of a domestic remedy and only at a later stage become aware, or should have become aware, of circumstances which make that remedy ineffective. In such a situation, the six-month period might be calculated from the time when the applicant becomes aware, or should have become aware, of these circumstances (see also Han v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 31248/09, 15 January 2013).

22 . In this connection, in a number of cases concerning the death of the applicants ’ relatives, the Court has examined the period of time from which the applicant could or should have started doubting the effectiveness of a domestic remedy. Although the Court refrained from indicating a specific period for establishing when an investigation has become ineffective for the purposes of assessing when the six-month period begins to run, the determination of such a period by the Court depended on the circumstances of each case and other factors such as the diligence and interest displayed by the applicants as well as the adequacy of the investigation in question (see Acar v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 33614/10, § 26, 10 December 2013).

23 . In the present application, the applicant ’ s son was shot on 28 March 2006. He died on 31 March 2006. The Court notes that in 2007 the Diyarbakır Prosecutor ’ s Office took a few steps of investigation in response to the applicants ’ petitions. However no action was taken for two consecutive years, in 2008 and 2009. According to the case file, new steps were taken in 2010 and, subsequently, in 2013. These developments, however, were merely follow-up actions concerning the outcome of already initiated correspondence and failed to identify any potential perpetrators.

24 . In view of the above, the Court considers that the absence of a meaningful investigation must have been apparent to the applicants long before they have applied to the Court in December 2011 (see Torlak and Others v. Turkey ( dec. ), nos 48176/11, 13669/12, 62981/12, § 40, 29 May 2018).

25 . Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the applicants, who waited for more than five years following the killing of their son, although the criminal investigation had apparently been ineffective, failed to comply with the six-month time-limit. The Court reiterates that it has already examined similar complaints arising out of the same incidents in March 2006 in Diyarbakır in the case of Torlak and others (cited above) and declared those applications inadmissible due to non-compliance with the six-month time-limit. It has also examined the present case and finds no particular circumstances which would require it to depart from its findings in those cases.

26 . In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the application has been introduced out of time and should be declared inadmissible as a whole under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 17 September 2020 .

Hasan Bakırcı Valeriu Griţco Deputy Registrar President