SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 80531/12 Anton AHAC and O thers against Slovenia

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 16 March 2021 as a Committee composed of:

Valeriu Griţco, President, Branko Lubarda, Pauliine Koskelo, judges, and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 17 December 2012,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . A list of the applicants and applicant companies (hereinafter jointly referred to as “the applicants”) is set out in the appendix. The applicants were represented initially by Odvetniška družba Ježek & Snoj, a law firm practising in Ljubljana, and later by Mr G. Snoj, a lawyer practising in Ljubljana.

2 . The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Ms T. Mihelič Žitko and Ms V. Klemenc, State Attorneys.

3 . The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

(a) Mutual funds in Slovenian context

4 . Mutual funds comprise assets consisting of investments in transferable securities which are financed with the money of natural or legal persons who buy a fund share and thus become the holder of a proportionate part of the fund (hereinafter “the holder of fund shares”). The assets of a mutual fund are divided into equal units. A mutual fund share is made up of one or more mutual fund units, the value of which is to be paid from those assets at the request of the holder.

5 . At the relevant time the Investment Funds and Management Companies Act (hereinafter “the IFMCA”, see paragraph 55 below) regulated mutual funds as open-end investment funds, meaning that there were no limitations as regards investments by means of the sale of fund shares or the buy-back of such shares, or the sale of securities. A fund share which was a registered non-transferable security (section 25 of the IFMCA) could only be sold to the asset management company (hereinafter “AMC”) that managed the fund. The paying out of fund shares, which the holder of fund shares had a right to ask for at any time, was to be effected by the AMC within five working days of receiving a request for the redemption of the value of the fund share (hereinafter a “redemption request”). The holder of fund shares had to have his or her investment paid back in accordance with the actual price of the unit, which was calculated daily and published in newspapers. The amount paid back depended on the value of the securities in the mutual fund. The IFMCA also set out strict rules concerning the investment policies of mutual funds and limited the size of loan which an AMC was allowed to take out on behalf of a mutual fund.

(b) Dadas funds

6 . In the period leading up to March 1996 the applicants bought fund shares and thereby became the owners of mutual fund units in (at least) one of the four mutual funds – namely Diver, Herman Celjski, Neli II and Rastko I (hereinafter “the Dadas funds”) – managed by the same AMC, Proficia Dadas. The Dadas funds were at the time the largest on the relevant market (of eighteen mutual funds), with approximately 3,500 holders of fund units (hereinafter “fund investors”). The total assets of the Dadas funds amounted to more than six billion Slovenian tolars (SIT), which corresponded to approximately 37 million euros (EUR).

7 . The last net asset value per unit (hereinafter “NAVPU”) of the Dadas funds, published on 26 March 1996 (see paragraph 16 below), amounted to: SIT 286.26 for Diver; SIT 1,486.41 for Herman Celjski; SIT 281.94 for Neli II; and SIT 391.92 for Rastko I. It was between 8.5 and 15.1% higher compared with 15 January 1996.

(c) Slovenian Stock Exchange Index

8 . The Slovenian Stock Exchange Index SBI started at 1,390 points in 1996, which was followed by a rapid fall to 1,300 points and continued growth until mid-March, when it reached its peak value for the year at 1,600 points. This growth coincided with the period of increased inflows into the Dadas funds, and increased demand by these funds for shares in Dadas, Primofin, Finmedia and SKB. In the period from mid-January to mid-March, prices of these shares, which accounted for 40% of the investments of the Dadas funds, increased significantly. In particular, the share prices of issuers (legal entities which issued securities) that were affiliated with the Dadas system (Finmedia and Primofin) and the price of Dadas shares increased by around 70%, while the SKB share price increased by 11%. In the above-mentioned period, the value of the SBI Index increased by 14%. According to the findings of the Securities Market Agency (hereinafter “the Agency”) published in its 1996 report on the situation in the securities market, the increase in the share prices of Dadas, Finmedia and Primofin was significantly influenced by transactions between legal entities that were associated with the DADAS Poslovni sistem group and the Dadas funds; once the Dadas funds’ demand for those shares dried up, other investors were not willing to buy them at those prices, and the prices consequently dropped, resulting in a decline in the SBI Index, which reached its lowest value of 892 points on 10 September 1996. However, by the end of the year its value stabilised at 1,200 points.

9 . On 7 and 19 March 1996 the Agency carried out inspections of Proficia Dadas, found numerous violations of the IFMCA, and subsequently implemented a number of measures against it.

(a) Order of 14 March 1996

10 . On 14 March 1996 the Agency ordered Proficia Dadas to improve the investment structure of the Dadas funds and call in the loans which the company PRIOM – which was owned by Mr D.S., the director of Proficia Dadas – had taken from those funds. It found that the loans, which amounted to SIT 1.3 billion and represented 22% of the total Dadas funds’ assets, had not been properly secured.

11 . In its letter of 15 March 1996, the Agency called upon PRIOM to provide access to business documents concerning the short-term loan agreements that it (as a borrower) had concluded with the Dadas funds (as lenders). The Agency claimed that the management of Proficia Dadas had not been able to provide evidence and data on PRIOM’s ability to repay the loan and the quality of the guarantees provided. On 19 March 1996 PRIOM informed the Agency that it was not going to allow it to inspect the relevant documents.

(b) Press release of 15 March 1996

12 . On 15 March 1996 the Agency published a press release entitled “Be cautious when investing in funds”, in which it explained the risks associated with investments in mutual funds. It also referred to the sharp increase in investments in mutual funds managed by the company Proficia Dadas which had occurred in February 1996, and noted that while the profits certainly appeared to be extraordinary, people should follow the maxim “if something seems too good to be true, then it probably is”.

(c) Compliance decree

13 . On 20 March 1996 the Agency issued a decree ordering Proficia Dadas to remedy the irregularities found with regard to the Dadas funds and to , inter alia : (i) ensure that the assets of each Dadas fund only comprised investments in securities and cash assets in the form of bank deposits; (ii) recover amounts owed to it within the usual time ‑ limits; (iii) ensure that the asset structure of each fund had at least 75% of securities listed on the stock exchange; (iv) ensure that the investments by mutual funds were changed in such a way that they complied with section 95(1), section 97 and section 99 of the IFMCA (see paragraph 55 below); and (v) remedy the irregularities arising from the keeping of books of account.

(d) Limiting Decree and subsequent events

14 . On 20 March 1996, on the basis of section 112 of the IFMCA (see paragraph 55 below), the Agency issued a decree limiting the total assets value of all mutual funds managed by one AMC to SIT 3.5 billion (hereinafter “the Limiting Decree”). It prohibited the AMCs that managed mutual funds whose total asset value exceeded that amount from accepting new payments of fund shares until the total asset value of those mutual funds went below that limit. The decree was published in the Official Gazette of 29 March 1996 and entered into force on 30 March 1996.

15 . On 22 March 1996 the Agency notified all AMCs of the Limiting Decree. The notice, together with enclosed clarifications on the application of individual provisions of the IFMCA, was served on Proficia Dadas on 25 March 1996. On 29 March 1996 the Agency also held a press conference, explaining the reasons for and consequences of the decree. It emphasised that the determination of the maximum value of assets held by mutual funds which could be managed by one AMC did not represent a prohibition on doing business, as its purpose was to invest and grow the money of savers, and to enable all managers to continue to manage assets that were already in the funds without hindrance. It also explained that the restriction regarding the acceptance of new payments stemmed from the legislative provision providing that each mutual fund should buy securities listed on the stock exchange amounting to at least 75% of the money received from investors, and that, according to the Agency, the increased inflows into the mutual funds were causing a shortage of long ‑ term securities on the stock market. In the Agency’s opinion, considerably higher inflows would trigger the inflation of share prices and, as a result, cause disturbances on the securities market, which was also evident from the monitoring of the operations of the funds, including the Dadas funds, and their investments.

16 . In the meantime, on 27 March 1996 Proficia Dadas had informed the Agency that it had, on the same day, transferred the assets and liabilities of the Dadas funds into the “temporary custody” of PRIOM, and thus temporarily suspended its management of those mutual funds. On the same day the Agency prohibited Proficia Dadas from publishing any further NAVPU. The last NAVPU of the Dadas funds was thus published on 26 March 1996 (see paragraph 7 above).

17 . On 28 March 1996 Proficia Dadas published a press release in the daily newspaper Delo , criticising the Limiting Decree and explaining that the transfer of funds to PRIOM was temporary and aimed at protecting the assets of investors, and that trading in fund units was temporarily suspended. Proficia Dadas also criticised the Agency for continuously carrying out inspections of the operations of mutual funds under its management, and for showing an obvious intention to destabilise its operations or the market and cause unease among investors.

18 . Subsequently, Proficia Dadas published another notice entitled “Proficia Dadas replies” in Delo , in which it contested the statements made by the Agency at its press conference (see paragraph 15 above) and criticised the Limiting Decree for debasing the value of investors’ assets and possibly leading to the withdrawal of investors, followed by the sale of securities and a drastic fall in their prices (and the value of fund units). It went on to explain that the Dadas funds would become insolvent, which would lead to their liquidation, reducing investors’ assets to 20-25% of the last published unit value, owing to their unavoidable sale on a destabilised market.

19 . On 1 April 1996 Proficia Dadas published a “Notice to investors” stating that in order to protect the assets of investors, custody of investors’ assets had been temporarily transferred to PRIOM. It further stated that if more than 30% of investors disagreed with the transfer, the assets would be returned to Proficia Dadas, liquidation proceedings would be initiated, and the value of the assets would decrease drastically.

20 . On 5 April 1996 the Agency replied via Delo , explaining that the Limiting Decree had not limited the operations and management of the assets already raised and had not concerned the rights of existing investors, but had restricted new investments. It further explained that the Limiting Decree had also been adopted because an extremely large number of new investments in February and March had not been invested in securities but had been given as a loan to PRIOM. The aim of the Limiting Decree had been to ensure that Proficia Dadas diligently managed assets and dispersed risks. Accordingly, the transfer of assets to PRIOM as announced in Proficia Dadas’s press release of 28 March 1996 could not have been aimed at protecting these assets from the Agency, since only the manager of those assets had announced the intention to liquidate and thereby put pressure on investors to raise deposits. The Agency also stated that if a portfolio was made up of appropriate investments with real value, there was no danger of the AMC not being able to cash in the portfolio over a longer period, and no danger of a substantial drop in value. The Agency further noted that PRIOM had not repaid the loans which it had received.

21 . On 9 April 1996 Proficia Dadas addressed to the Agency a “Proposal for resolving the current situation in mutual funds”, proposing, essentially, that the assets be transferred into the custody of one of the commercial banks and managed by a company which complied with the applicable legal provisions, with a partial moratorium on pay-outs from the fund assets for three months, and with further rules concerning pay-outs after that period.

22 . On 10 April 1996 the Agency considered Proficia Dadas’s proposal. It found it acceptable in principle if the owners of at least 70% of the units making up the Dadas funds agreed with it, and if the managing company in question was not directly or indirectly associated with persons in the Dadas system and also fulfilled the relevant legal conditions. The Agency also stated that the funds could operate with the level of assets which had already been achieved, without a limitation period, or could reduce the amount of assets to any level. It stressed that the concept of rapid reduction with an immediate sell-off of assets could not, as a rule, be in the interest of investors. On the same day it informed Proficia Dadas of its views and called on it to submit them to its investors.

23 . On 29 April 1996 Proficia Dadas published in Delo a “Notice to investors”, in which it stated that with respect to all the Dadas funds, owners holding more than 70% of the fund units had agreed that the management of assets should be transferred to PRIOM. It also stated that the following options were now available to fund investors: (i) they would be allowed to transfer their assets to another AMC licensed by the Agency, in which case Proficia Dadas and the committee of investors should each have one representative in the body dealing with the investments; or (ii) they would conclude agreements on fund share redemption and the method of repayment with Proficia Dadas as the debtor and DADAS Poslovni sistem as the transferee, with DADAS Poslovni sistem assuming the obligations to settle the claims arising from redemption requests submitted by the holders of fund shares as creditors. A claim would be recalculated in the following manner: the last published purchase price of fund units multiplied by the number of fund units recorded on the fund share. With the second option, claims (together with certain interest) should be settled within four years, with a one-year grace period on payment of the principal amount, and the transferee would guarantee to fulfil its payment obligations up to the value of all of its assets. Moreover, Mr D.S., as the president of the body dealing with investments, would develop an investment plan, and trading with the claims would soon be possible on a regulated market, which meant that each creditor could decide to sell its claim at the market price.

24 . On 17 May 1996 the Agency sent to Proficia Dadas a memo of a meeting held with Mr D.S. on 13 May 1996. The Agency noted that the settlements resulting from Proficia Dadas’s offer as published in Delo on 29 April 1996 were legally acceptable but did not bind those who did not accept the offer by signing the agreement. The Agency also clarified the legal position of the company DADAS Poslovni sistem and described the procedure for implementing the offer of Proficia Dadas of 29 April 1996 (partial “liquidation” with the simultaneous transfer of management to another AMC).

25 . In the meantime, the majority of investors in the Dadas Funds, including all the applicants, had started concluding agreements on fund share redemption and the method of repayment (see paragraph 23 above, hereinafter “repayment agreements”). At the same time, DADAS Poslovni sistem acquired assets from Proficia Dadas amounting to the value of the claims arising from the redemption of fund shares.

26 . Subsequently, the brokerage company DADAS BPH, which had been operating under the umbrella of DADAS Poslovni sistem, lost its licence for brokerage services (see paragraph 36 below) and, according to the applicants, it had to focus on other non-financial activities and eventually collapsed, leading to a loss of the applicants’ savings. At the beginning of 1997 the investors who had concluded repayment agreements (see paragraph 25 above) started entering into agreements with the company Fundus to swap 50% of their claims for ordinary shares in DADAS Poslovni sistem, which were listed on the Ljubljana Stock Exchange.

27 . Investors who had not concluded agreements on fund share redemption and the method of repayment or had not submitted fund shares for redemption had their remaining mutual fund assets managed by another AMC, Kmečka družba, which on 21 June 1996 obtained the Agency’s authorisation to take over management of the Dadas funds from Proficia Dadas. The Agency also granted Kmečka družba authorisation to merge the Dadas funds into one fund and simultaneously form two new funds: Rastko and KD Bond. On 3 July 1996 the Agency permitted the temporary suspension of pay-outs until 1 September 1996 at the latest, which was aimed at establishing the assets structure of the funds in accordance with the law. Prior to the merging of the Dadas funds, the NAVPU was recalculated on 23 August 1996 and amounted to: SIT 92.84 for Diver; SIT 720.49 for Herman Celjsk; SIT 121.12 for Neli П; and SIT 161.05 for Rastko I. On 23 August 1996 the total value of the units of all four funds amounted to SIT 1,095.50, representing on average 44.8% of the value of the mutual funds on 26 March 1996 (see paragraph 7 above). On 23 August 1996 the values of the newly formed mutual funds amounted to SIT 1,000 for KD Bond and SIT 1,000 for Rastko, and on 5 September 2001 the values amounted to SIT 2,008.97 for KD Bond and SIT 2,461.44 SIT for Rastko. The NAVPU of the Dadas funds reached the value of 26 March 1996 again on 5 September 2001.

(e) Review of the Limiting Decree by the Constitutional Court

28 . On 3 April 1996 Proficia Dadas initiated proceedings for a review of the legality and constitutionality of the Limiting Decree (see paragraph 14 above).

29 . On 16 May 1996 the Constitutional Court decided that the Agency had acted within its powers when issuing the Limiting Decree but had failed to temporarily restrict its validity. It ordered the Agency to remedy that failure within thirty days of the court’s decision being published (Official Gazette of 20 June 1996). It noted, inter alia , as follows:

“27. The Agency may issue an order only in the event of specific circumstances provided for by law. The existence of such circumstances is determined with regard to a particular situation existing on the securities market. The Agency substantiated the existence of such specific circumstances through extensive statements in its reply to the [application for a review of the legality and constitutionality of the Limiting Decree].

28. The decision adopted by the Agency essentially means a restriction of the operations of investment funds. Since, under subsection three of section 112 of the IFMCA, the Agency is authorised to issue a decision temporarily suspending the operations of investment funds, in full or in part, in the event of serious disturbances in foreign exchange or securities transactions or other similar serious disturbances, it [is also authorised] to adopt a more lenient measure by which it only restricts the operations of investment funds. This was precisely what the Agency did by means of the disputed [decree]. As has already been mentioned, this measure falls within the scope of statutory power.

29. Under subsection three of section 112 of the IFMCA, the Agency may ... temporarily suspend (in full or in part) the operations of investment funds; however, it is not authorised to adopt measures which would permanently restrict the operations of investment funds ...”

30 . On 20 June 1996 the Agency informed the Constitutional Court that it had amended the Limiting Decree by setting a time ‑ limit for its validity – it would be valid until 31 October 1996. The amendment, which had been adopted on 12 June 1996, was published in the Official Gazette of 14 June 1996.

(f) Statement of the President of the Agency’s Expert Council before the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy of the National Assembly

31 . At its 137th and 138th sessions on 22 and 25 October 1996, the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy of the National Assembly considered the report of the Agency for 1995, and during the discussion it also touched upon the issues concerning the Dadas funds. At the session on 22 October 1996 the then President of the Agency’s Expert Council, Mr Mramor, stated, inter alia , as follows:

“We do understand the problems that 3,505 people who invested their money in the Dadas funds are currently facing. It is not an easy decision when you find yourself in a situation where you have to make a decision in such a way that these people do not lose out; however, they will not lose out because of our decision, since the only question was how long such manipulation of people would last before it [failed]. All systems of acquiring money in an unlawful way [fail] sooner or later. This is a ‘cash for cash’ system, and all these systems are the same. When we received the indication, the question was how to react quickly, and we had also already discussed this with the investors in the Dadas funds, and the talks with them had been good and extensive. We have met many times. [We have] also met with the director and have talked to him many times, [and] the Council, so I understand their problems ... The Agency [responded] relatively quickly. Within fifteen days there were such inflows of money ... until we received all these solid arguments so that we could adopt the measure, which was subsequently also upheld by the Constitutional Court, namely [a measure] for a relatively limited period of time. Everybody admitted that we had acted extremely rapidly. But the investors must understand this. We did not take their money. Their money was taken by those who manipulated and presented to them a value which was fictitiously higher ... than the real one.”

(g) Withdrawal of the operating licence

32 . On 28 March 1996 the Agency initiated a procedure to withdraw Proficia Dadas’s authorisation to perform services relating to managing investment funds, on the suspicion that the company had transferred the assets of its mutual funds to PRIOM in violation of section 118 of the IFMCA (see paragraph 55 below). In its order of 3 April 1996, the Agency further accused Proficia Dadas of breaching the law by trading non ‑ marketable securities between the Dadas funds through the company PRIOM, which had been acting as a fictitious seller and buyer.

33 . On 9 May 1996 the Agency withdrew Proficia Dadas’s authorisation to manage investment funds. It established: that the assets of the Dadas funds had been transferred to PRIOM without the required consent of the holders of fund shares and the Agency’s authorisation; and that PRIOM had not had the Agency’s authorisation to manage mutual funds, and had failed to satisfy the conditions for obtaining such authorisation, since it had been deeply in debt and its share capital had been at least eighty ‑ three times smaller than the required level. The Agency also dismissed Proficia Dadas’s argument that the transfer had been necessary to protect the assets of investors, noting that the assets of existing investors and their management had not been affected by the Limiting Decree. By unlawfully transferring the assets to a company operating outside the regime provided for by the IFMCA, Proficia Dadas had clearly intended to avoid any supervision by the Agency. In this connection, the Agency explained that the prohibition on payments had not upset the balance between the diligent management of assets and the sources of funding for such assets, and that new monetary payments had meant the compulsory purchase of new securities, which had been another way to increase the assets of funds. If new payments had not led to an increase in the assets of a fund, this meant that investors’ money had not been managed economically. It was the duty of an AMC to ensure continuous liquidity (redeemability) by means of appropriate investments in securities.

34 . On the same day the Agency issued another decision, also withdrawing Proficia Dadas’s special authorisation to manage an authorised investment company. It found, inter alia , that Mr D.S. was the only partner and director of PRIOM. He and his wife, through another company which they owned called FUNDUS d.o.o., were the owners of 91% of the shares in Proficia Dadas and were making business decisions for both companies. The transactions relating to securities which had not been traded on a regulated market had been concluded between the Dadas funds in such a way that PRIOM had always acted as a fictitious purchaser or seller, selling the securities of one fund to another within the space of a few days at most, in violation of section 109 of the IFMCA (see paragraph 55 below).

35 . Proficia Dadas challenged both decisions before the Supreme Court. On 12 June 1996 the court dismissed the appeals, finding that the Agency had properly established the facts and applied the law.

36 . Subsequently, on 16 July 1996 the Agency withdrew from the brokerage company DADAS BPH its authorisation to carry out transactions relating to securities. It found that the company had participated in the manipulation of prices by, inter alia , assisting in fictitious transactions involving the resale of securities between the Dadas funds. The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.

(h) Parliamentary inquiry

37 . One of the applicants, Mr P. Glavič, who was a member of the National Council until 1997, requested a parliamentary inquiry into the events on the capital market in March 1996 and the activities of the Agency in the period 1995-1997. In 1998 a National Assembly Commission of Inquiry was set up for the purpose of investigating the matter, and experts were appointed. In September 2000 it issued a final report, which concluded: that the Agency’s press releases had been justified, adequate and timely; that the Limiting Decree (see paragraph 14 above) had been aimed at protecting existing investors and had not limited the existing assets of the funds which could have been used for the purchase of privatisation shares; and that no illegalities had been established as regards the Agency’s work during the period under investigation. That report was not adopted by the National Assembly Commission of Inquiry, which was unable to finish its work before the end of the relevant mandate. It was criticised in another report prepared by Mr P. Glavič and Mr Novšak (both applicants in the present case), who acted as experts on behalf of the National Council.

(a) First-instance proceedings

38 . On 18 May and 3 June 1999 respectively more than a thousand fund investors – making up two separate groups of claimants – lodged with the Ljubljana District Court two identical actions for compensation against the State (the first defendant) and the Agency (the second defendant). The claimants alleged, inter alia , that

(a) the Agency’s press release of 15 March 1996 had been inaccurate and misleading, and had led to investors requesting the redemption of their fund shares and a crash of the stock exchange market;

(b) the Limiting Decree had been unlawful, because there had been no extreme situation; it had prohibited payments into funds without prohibiting pay-outs as well, and had not been limited in time;

(c) the Agency had acted without due diligence, because it had revoked the business licence of Proficia Dadas without transferring management of the funds to another managing company and thereby protecting investors from their own naivety;

(d) the Agency had acted unlawfully, because it had allowed management of the Dadas funds to be transferred to DADAS Poslovni sistem and had revoked the licence of the brokerage company DADAS BPH; and

(e) the Agency had conducted several inspections in 1995 but had failed to report any problems or react to the existing irregularities in the portfolio of the Dadas funds and initiate liquidation proceedings in respect of those funds in January 1995.

39 . On 15 March 2001 the court decided that it had no jurisdiction ratione materiae to consider the civil claims of claimants whose claims did not exceed SIT 2,000,000, and that it would refer their civil claims to the Ljubljana Local Court for consideration. Claimants in both actions appealed against that decision to separate the claims, arguing that they were joint claimants within the meaning of section 191 of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 56 below), and that the subject matter of the dispute involved claims whose substance was the same and which relied on the same factual and legal grounds. By way of a decision of 13 June 2002 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the appeal in both actions, on the grounds that the claimants were joint litigants whose claims relied on the same factual and legal grounds, within the meaning of section 191(1) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 56 below). On 16 December 2004 the two cases were joined under case no. V Pg 16/2003.

40 . The parties lodged a number of written pleadings during the proceedings. The applicants relied on documentary evidence and, in relation to the question of the existence of a causal link between the alleged unlawful action on the part of the Agency and the destruction of the Dadas funds, suggested that an expert in economics be appointed. On 10 March 2005 the Ljubljana District Court held a hearing, rejecting non ‑ documentary evidence that was not in the case file as unnecessary, and proceeded to give judgment.

41 . The Ljubljana District Court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that there had been no wrongful conduct or unacceptable omission on the part of the defendants, and that therefore they could not be liable for the alleged damage. The court held, in particular, as follows.

(a) The Agency’s press release of 15 March 1996 (see paragraph 12 above) – warning investors to be more careful when investing in mutual funds, in accordance with section 6 of the IFMCA (see paragraph 55 below) – had been published only after the Agency had obtained the relevant data on price manipulations.

(b) The press releases issued by Proficia Dadas had incited fear in investors and had caused them to request the redemption of their fund shares.

(c) All the Agency’s measures had been lawful and had been upheld on appeal, except for the unlawful omission of a time ‑ limit with respect to the Limiting Decree, which had been remedied following the Constitutional Court’s decision.

(d) The allegations that investors would have acted differently had the Limitation Decree been constrained by a time-limit from the start had not been substantiated. Having regard to the public statements of Proficia Dadas and the unrealistic and unlawfully created NAVPU of the Dadas funds, setting a time-limit on the Limiting Decree at an earlier stage would not have stopped investors from requesting the redemption of their fund shares.

(e) The claimants’ allegations that the Agency’s measures had been unlawful and delayed were inconsistent.

(f) The Agency had acted lawfully with respect to DADAS BPH, as Proficia Dadas could have concluded stock exchange transactions via any other brokerage company.

(g) The Agency’s measures had been taken in response to the unlawful business operations of Proficia Dadas and companies connected to it, such as PRIOM, DADAS BPH and DADAS Poslovni sistem. The apparent high but unrealistic rate of return of the Dadas funds, which had resulted from the planned regulation of prices, had caused considerably higher inflows into those funds. From July 1995 to February 1996 the average monthly inflows into the Dadas funds had been very high (other funds had had net outflows) owing to Proficia Dadas’s manipulations in security-related trading with companies connected by capital and personal ties. This had led to a “spiral phenomenon”: considerably higher inflows of assets into mutual funds in the period from 1 January 1996 to 18 March 1996, when no new shares had been listed on the stock exchange, had increased the demand for securities, resulting in the artificial inflation of prices on the stock exchange so that they were constantly at a higher level.

(h) The Agency could not have transferred the assets of the Dadas funds in order for them to be managed by another AMC, because those assets had already been unlawfully transferred to PRIOM.

(i) The Agency had taken measures once it had detected irregularities in Proficia Dadas’s activities and had been able to establish that the company had acted unlawfully. At the time there had been no basis for initiating liquidation proceedings under section 145(2) of the IFMCA (see paragraph 55 below).

(b) Second-instance proceedings

42 . The claimants appealed but did not complain about the fact that their claims had been dealt with in the context of so-called “commercial dispute” proceedings.

43 . On 19 December 2007 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the appeal, and its decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 8 January 2008. It acknowledged that prior to the proceedings at issue the applicants had had no possibility of contesting the factual situation as established by the Agency in the Limiting Decree, namely the existence of serious disturbances in securities transactions or other similar serious disturbances under section 112(3) of the IFMCA (see paragraph 55 below). The applicants therefore had to be given the opportunity to establish, in civil proceedings, any unlawful conduct on the part of the Agency.

44 . The court reiterated that the growth in the NAVPU of the Dadas funds had been unrealistic, and the assets obviously overrated. It established that, with regard to the sequence of events, which had not been disputed, no damage had (yet) been caused to the applicants by the Limiting Decree, which had not led to the liquidation of funds or prevented the prudent distribution of risk. The Agency had only prohibited further payments into mutual funds, while Proficia Dadas could still operate and manage the existing assets of the Dadas funds. The claimants had not argued, let alone proved, that following the issuing of the Limiting Decree, investors had put pressure on the Dadas funds by requesting the redemption of their fund shares.

45 . Moreover, the court found that the Agency had had no choice but to take measures when on 27 March 1996 Proficia Dadas had transferred management of the mutual funds to PRIOM, a company which the Agency had not approved to manage mutual funds (see paragraph 16 above). It concluded that the withdrawal of Proficia Dadas’s operating licence on 9 May 1996 (see paragraph 33 above) had been justified and lawful. The Agency had not been able to take further measures to protect the interests of investors by liquidating the Dadas funds or transferring management of the funds to another managing company until after 12 June 1996, when the Supreme Court had upheld the withdrawal of the licence; however, the claimants had already signed the agreements on fund share redemption and the method of repayment in May 1996. The alleged damage had therefore resulted from the claimants’ poor financial decision to have their claims arising from the submission of the fund shares for redemption paid by the transferee, DADAS Poslovni sistem. In this connection, the court dismissed the allegation that the Agency should have warned investors about the danger that DADAS Poslovni sistem might not pay out on their claims, noting that the Agency had had no insight into its business operations. Fund investors could have adopted a moratorium on the paying out of fund shares if they had truly expected that pressure caused by such paying out could cause a depreciation in the NAVPU after the adoption of the Limiting Decree.

46 . The Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the lower court’s conclusion that there was no causal link between the initially unlimited temporal validity of the Limiting Decree and the alleged damage to fund investors. It was undisputed that the investors who had decided not to submit their fund shares for redemption and have DADAS Poslovni sistem assume the debt of Proficia Dadas, and had instead transferred their remaining assets in the Dadas funds to Kmečka družba (see paragraph 27 above), had not suffered any damage. As regards the alleged violation of the principle of proportionality, the court noted that the Constitutional Court had examined it when reviewing the Limiting Decree and the Supreme Court’s decision of 16 October 1996. Lastly, it noted that it was not bound by the conclusions of the National Council put forward by the applicants. The allegations of unlawful actions and omissions on the part of the State were also found to be ill ‑ founded.

(c) Proceedings before the Supreme Court

47 . The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the first ‑ instance court, at the relevant hearing, had reviewed the documentary evidence only pro forma , and had not allowed any of their requests for evidence.

48 . On 28 August 2008 the Ljubljana District Court rejected the appeal on points of law of seventy-seven claimants, including ten of the applicants (see table 1 in the appendix), who had failed to submit a power of attorney.

49 . On 5 July 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal on points of law of claimants, including 475 of the applicants (see table 2 in the appendix), whose claims did not reach the statutory threshold for commercial disputes. It held that a dispute between a company and the State or the Agency was a commercial dispute according to the subjective criterion under section 481(1) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 56 below). In accordance with section 484 of the Act, the rules of procedure in commercial disputes also applied to natural persons who were, as determined by the Ljubljana Higher Court (see paragraph 39 above), joint litigants with a company in such a dispute whose claims relied on the same factual and legal grounds. An appeal on points of law in commercial disputes was admissible only if the value of the matter in dispute exceeded SIT 5,000,000, a condition which had not been fulfilled in the case of the above claimants.

50 . The Supreme Court dismissed on the merits the appeal on points of law of the remaining claimants, including 107 of the applicants (see table 3 in the appendix). It rejected the claimants’ argument that the lower courts had not allowed any of their requests for evidence. It found that the claimants had failed to specify what this evidence was. A court was not required to allow requests for evidence if, in its view, such evidence was irrelevant for its decision, but had to provide appropriate grounds for refusing to allow such requests, which the first-instance court had done in the case at issue. As regards the lower courts’ reliance on decisions issued in other proceedings in which the claimants had not participated, the claimants had not demonstrated that they had unsuccessfully attempted to participate in the proceedings before the Agency or the Supreme Court, despite having been able to do so by law. Moreover, in their appeal, the claimants had not contested the facts established by the court of first instance on the basis of those decisions. Nor had they specified what statements they had been unable to make or what positions and evidence they had been unable to present.

51 . The Supreme Court reiterated that the Limiting Decree had been lawful and that the Agency had had the power to adopt it in order to protect investors and the securities market. The alleged damage had been caused by Proficia Dadas’s unlawful conduct and the economic decisions of the claimants, and not the initial lack of a time-limit as regards the validity of the Limiting Decree.

(d) Proceedings before the Constitutional Court

52 . The applicants whose appeal on points of law had been rejected by the Supreme Court for not complying with the statutory threshold (see paragraph 49 above) lodged a constitutional complaint and an application to review the constitutionality of section 484 of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 56 below). They alleged that the lower courts had failed to examine their claims separately from the claims of companies and had thereby deprived them of equal treatment in relation to other natural persons claiming their rights in civil proceedings. They had been aware of the Supreme Court’s statutory power to treat their claims in this manner, but the legislature had violated the right to equality before the law. The disputed statutory regulation, together with the interpretation of the Supreme Court, had enabled that court to deprive them of access to a court.

53 . The remaining applicants whose appeal on points of law had been dismissed as unfounded by the Supreme Court lodged a constitutional complaint, also alleging a violation of their property rights. They repeated their allegations from the appeal and the appeal on points of law.

54 . On 7 June 2012 the Constitutional Court decided not to consider the constitutional complaints, finding that the conditions set out in subsection two of section 55b of the Constitutional Court Act had not been met (see paragraph 57 below). On 18 June 2012 the decisions were served on the applicants’ lawyer.

55 . The relevant provisions of the IFMCA (Official Gazette no. ‑ 6/94 with relevant amendments), as in force at the relevant time, read as follows:

Mutual fund

Section 3

“(1) A mutual fund is made up of assets that consist of investments in transferable securities [that] have been financed with the money of natural or legal persons and is owned by these persons.

(2) The assets of investment funds shall be collected by way of a public sale of issued fund shares. The holder of a fund share shall be granted the right to sell the fund share at any time and thus withdraw from the mutual fund.”

Agency

Section 6

“The Securities Market Agency shall supervise compliance with the conditions for the formation of investment funds and the establishment of [both] management companies and the operations of investment funds and management companies ...”

Fund shares as securities

Section 25

“(1) The assets of a mutual fund shall be divided up into equal units. A mutual fund share may be made up of one or more mutual fund units.

(2) A fund share is a security made out to a specific name and is not transferable to another person, and confers upon the holder the following rights:

 the right to a proportionate part of the net profit from investments in the mutual fund;

 the right to a proportionate part of the value of assets upon the liquidation of the mutual fund;

 the right to be paid the value of the fund share by the management company upon request.”

Payment of fund share value

Section 29

“(1) A holder of a fund share may at any time make a written request to the management company for redemption of the value of the fund share.

...

(4) The payment of fund shares shall be effected by the management company in cash, in the manner determined by the rules for mutual fund management, within ... five working days of receiving the claim referred to in subsection one of this section.

...”

Section 30

“Only a management company may create mutual funds.”

Obligation to limit and spread risks

Section 38

“(1) In conducting operations related to the purchase and sale of securities, the management company shall ensure that the spreading of mutual fund securities complies with the provisions of this Act.

...”

Management transfer agreement

Section 46

“(1) An asset management company (the transferor company) may, by way of an agreement, transfer management of a mutual fund to another company (the transferee company), if the owners of 70% of the mutual fund units ... making up the fund shares in circulation agree, and if the transferee company obtains the Agency’s authorisation to assume management of the mutual fund.

...”

Grounds for initiating liquidation

Section 49

“(1) The liquidation of a mutual fund shall be initiated in the following cases:

 if the asset management company’s licence to carry out [its] activity has been withdrawn by way of a final decision of the Agency, or if an insolvency or liquidation procedure has been initiated against the asset management company,

...

Transfer of management of mutual fund in lieu of liquidation

Section 54

“(1) In cases referred to in indent one of subsection one of section 49 of this Act, the Agency may, in lieu of liquidating the fund, decide to transfer management of the fund to another asset management company that fulfils the conditions for managing a mutual fund, if that company agrees to assume management.

(2) In cases referred to in subsection one of this section, the Agency, by way of a decision on the transfer of management of the mutual fund in lieu of liquidation, authorises the bank referred to in section 18 of this Act to carry out all the tasks necessary for the transfer of management ...”

Limitations on investments

Section 94

(1) Investments of an investment fund in securities listed on the stock exchange must represent at least 75% of all investments of the investment fund ...”

Obligation to spread investment[s]

Section 95

“(1) An investment fund must have its investments spread out over the securities of different issuers and may not have more than 5% of its investments invested in the securities of the same issuer.

(2) An investment fund may not invest more than 10% of its investments in the securities of the same issuer and of issuers associated with that issuer, if the securities in question are securities listed on the stock exchange.

...”

Prohibition on investing in certain legal entities

Section 99

“An investment fund may not invest in the following legal entities:

 asset management companies,

...

 legal entities that are direct or indirect owners of 10% of the shares or shareholdings of the asset management company that manages the investment fund.”

Restrictions on mutual securities transactions

Section 109

“(1) Any sale or purchase transaction in securities or the lending of securities is prohibited between the following legal entities:

 the asset management company and the investment fund;

 the asset management company and any legal entity that directly or indirectly owns more than 10% of the shares or shareholdings of the asset management company;

 the investment fund and any legal entity that directly or indirectly owns more than 10% of the shares or shareholdings of the asset management company;

 investment funds managed by the same asset management company.

(2) The prohibition referred to in subsection one of this section shall not apply to sale and purchase transactions concluded on the stock exchange.

...”

Measures [which the] Agency [may employ]

Section 112

“(1) If, during an inspection, ... the Agency finds irregularities in the operation or keeping of books of account, it shall issue an order requiring that the irregularities be eliminated. ...

(3) In the event of a natural disaster, war, civil unrest, bank or stock exchange closure, severe disruption in foreign currency or securities transactions or other similar severe disruptions, the Agency may issue an order temporarily suspending in full or in part the operation of investment funds.

(4) In the [circumstances] referred to in subsection three of this section, the Agency may, by way of a decision, temporarily prohibit the purchase and sale of fund shares in a particular mutual fund or the trade in shares in a particular investment company.”

...

Reasons for withdrawing a licence

Section 118

“The Agency shall withdraw an asset management company’s licence to carry out activity in the following cases:

 if an asset management company fails to act in accordance with an order referred to in subsection one of section 112 of this Act;

 if, during an inspection of [an asset management company’s] operation or on the basis of other data at its disposal, the Agency finds that the asset management company is seriously violating the provisions of this Act concerning investments of investment funds, or the restrictions referred to in section 109 of this Act ;

 if the Agency finds that the conditions for carrying out the activity ... are no longer fulfilled, or that the restrictions referred to in sections 12 and 13 of this Act have been breached.”

56 . The relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act (Official Gazette no. 26/1999 with further amendments), as in force at the relevant time, read as follows:

Section 191

“More than one person may sue or be sued in the same action (joint litigants)

1. if they constitute a legal community with regard to the matter in dispute, or if their rights or obligations rely on the same factual and legal basis, and in the case of joint and several claims or obligations;

2. if the matter in dispute [involves] claims or obligations of the same kind that rely on substantially the same type of factual and legal basis, and the same court has jurisdiction – in terms of subject matter and territory – over each claim and each defendant;

...

Until the completion of the main hearing, and subject to the conditions provided for in subsection one of this section, the claimant may be joined by another claimant ...”

Section 367

“...

An appeal on points of law in pecuniary disputes is admissible if the value of the matter in dispute, in terms of the challenged part of the final judgment, exceeds SIT 1,000,000.

...”

Section 481

“The rules of procedure in commercial disputes apply

1. in disputes in which each of the parties is one of the following persons: a company, an institute (including a public institute), a co-operative, a state or a self ‑ governing local community;

...”

Section 484

“The rules of procedure in commercial disputes also apply when, in addition to the persons in the first subsection of section 481 of this Act, other persons are involved in the dispute as joint litigants whose claims rely on the same factual and legal grounds, [as described in] section 191 of this Act. ”

Section 490

“An appeal on points of law in commercial disputes is inadmissible if the value of the matter in dispute, in terms of the challenged part of the final judgment, does not exceed SIT 5,000,000.”

57 . Section 55b(2) of the Constitutional Court Act (Official Gazette no. 15/94 with relevant amendments) provides as follows:

“(2) A constitutional complaint shall be accepted for consideration

– if there has been a violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms which has had serious consequences for the complainant; or

– if it concerns an important constitutional issue which exceeds the importance of the particular case in question.”

COMPLAINTS

58 . The applicants complained under Article 13 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 6, that their right of access to a court had been violated because the Supreme Court had rejected their appeal on points of law for falling below the statutory threshold set for commercial disputes.

59 . They further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the domestic courts had not allowed any of their requests for evidence. Moreover, they complained that the courts had relied on the decisions issued in proceedings in which they had not been able to participate. The decisions of the Constitutional Court had also lacked reasons.

60 . The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the Dadas funds had become illiquid owing to the Agency’s measures, in particular the Limiting Decree, and that the Agency had not diligently preformed its regulatory and supervisory duties.

61 . Lastly, the applicants complained that they had been subjected to a difference in treatment on account of the Limiting Decree, in violation of Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

THE LAW

62 . The Court notes that thirty-five of the applicants (marked with an asterisk sign next to their names in tables below), died while the case was pending before the Court. One applicant company has been deleted from the registry of companies and has thereby ceased to exist.

63 . The Government invited the Court to strike the application out of its list of cases as regards the deceased applicants. The applicants argued that following the death of those applicants the power of attorney given to their representative remained valid under the domestic law, and that their heirs should be allowed to become involved in the proceedings. They also provided information about the heirs of thirty-two deceased applicants and attached the respective inheritance decisions.

64 . The Court has accepted on a number of occasions that close relatives of a deceased applicant are entitled to take his or her place (see, among many authorities, Albert and Others v. Hungary , no. 5294/14 , § 53, 29 January 2019). In view of the Court’s case law and the above information provided by the applicant’s lawyer, the Court is prepared to accept that the heirs of the thirty ‑ two deceased applicants who are indicated in the table below can pursue the application initially brought by the above ‑ mentioned applicants.

65 . As regards the remaining three deceased applicants, Mr Ivan Reberšek (no. 359), Mr Marjan Seliškar (no. 580), Mr Vinko Vodopivec (no. 453), and the applicant company that has ceased to exist, ENERGOREVIT d.o.o. (no. 501), the Court notes that no information has been provided about their heirs, relatives or legal successors (of the applicant company) or their wish to continue the proceedings before the Court. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that, in so far as the application concerns those applicants, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention (see, for example, Dinçer and Others v. Turkey , no. 10435/08, §§ 13 and 14, 3 November 2011). Furthermore, the Court finds no reasons of a general nature, as defined in Article 37 § 1 in fine , which would require the further examination of the application in so far as it concerns the complaints made on their behalf. Accordingly, this part of the application should be struck out of the list.

66 . The Government asserted that only 107 applicants (table 3 in the appendix), whose appeal on points of law had been considered and dismissed by the Supreme Court on the merits, had lodged their application within the six-month time-limit. For the remaining applicants, the six months had started to run when the Ljubljana Higher Court’s decision had been served on their lawyer (see paragraph 43 above).

67 . The applicants whose appeal on points of law had been rejected submitted that the Constitutional Court’s decision issued in their case was the final domestic decision, and that they had therefore lodged their application with the Court in time.

68 . The Court reiterates that the six-month period starts running from the date on which the applicant has sufficient knowledge of the final domestic decision (see Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 55, 11 December 2018). In the present case, the Constitutional Court’s decision not to accept the applicants’ constitutional complaint for consideration was rendered on 7 June 2012 and served on the applicants’ lawyer on 18 June 2012 (see paragraph 54 above). The applicants lodged their application with the Court on 17 December 2012, that is, within six months of the Constitutional Court’s decision being served.

69 . However, according to the Government, the date from which the six ‑ month time-limit should be calculated was 8 January 2008, the day on which the Ljubljana Higher Court’s decision had been served on the applicants’ lawyer (see paragraph 43 above). The Government’s argument implied that a constitutional complaint should not be regarded as an effective remedy in the circumstances of the present case. In this connection, the Court reiterates that, as regards applications against Slovenia, applicants are in principle required to lodge a constitutional complaint before applying to the Court (see Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 296, ECHR 2012 (extracts), and the references cited therein). Considering that, as a rule, a constitutional complaint is regarded as an effective remedy which has to be exhausted, in the absence of any arguments by the Government to the contrary in the present case, the Court cannot accept that the constitutional complaint should be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the six-month time-limit for lodging the application. The Court thus finds that the applicants complied with the six ‑ month time ‑ limit.

70 . The applicants complained of having been denied access to the Supreme Court. They relied on Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention. In the Court’s view, this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 alone, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

(a) The Government

71 . The Government submitted that the applicants whose appeal on points of law had been rejected for failure to submit a power of attorney (table 1 in the appendix) were not victims of the alleged violation. Moreover, the applicant companies were not victims, as they would in any event be subject to the statutory threshold of SIT 5,000,000 for appeals on points of law in commercial disputes, in accordance with section 481 of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 56 above).

72 . Furthermore, the Government pleaded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, submitting that the applicants had objected to the application of the “commercial dispute” procedure for the first time in their constitutional complaint.

73 . Lastly, the Government asserted that the handling of the applicants’ claims in accordance with the rules of procedure in commercial disputes had been a foreseeable and necessary consequence of the fact that the applicants, who were natural and legal persons, had submitted their claims against two legal persons in a joint action (section 484 of the Civil Procedure Act, see paragraph 56 above).

(b) The applicants

74 . The applicants argued that the courts should have considered their claims separately from those of corporate legal entities, and thus not within the commercial dispute procedure, which would have secured them access to the Supreme Court. In their view, the lower courts should have known that by allocating the case file to the division dealing with commercial disputes, the majority of the claimants would lose their chance to appeal on points of law. They acknowledged that their case had been registered as a commercial dispute by the court of first instance, and that they could, at least in theory, have criticised the application of such rules at the time. However, they had not acted because they had expected to win the case, and the provisions specific to commercial disputes had not negatively affected their rights until they had lodged an appeal on points of law. Moreover, the fact that their case had been dealt with within the commercial dispute procedure had been indicated in the first-instance court judgment, but no separate decision had been issued in this regard.

75 . As regards the Government’s objection to the applicants’ victim status (see paragraph 71 above), the Court notes that the applicants complained that their claims should not have been considered together with those of corporate legal entities under the rules applied to the commercial dispute procedure. Their complaint, in essence, concerned only the applicants who were natural persons and whose appeal on points of law had been rejected by the Supreme Court because the value of the dispute had fallen below the relevant threshold (see table 2 in the appendix). The victim status of these applicants was not in dispute between the parties, and the Court also has no reason to doubt it.

76 . Furthermore, the Court takes note of the objection of non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies raised by the Government (see paragraph 72 above). However, it does not consider it necessary to examine this, because this complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

77 . The relevant principles emerging from the Court’s case ‑ law concerning the right of access to a court and, in particular, access to superior courts, are summarised in the case of Zubac v. Croatia ([GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-86, 5 April 2018), where the Court was confronted with the issue of the operation of the ratione valoris restriction on access to such courts (§§ 80-96).

78 . In the instant case, the applicants did not complain about the ratione valoris restriction on access to the Supreme Court as such, but argued that the threshold of the value in dispute applied in their case should not have been the one set for commercial disputes. At the relevant time in Slovenia, in order for an appeal on points of law to be admissible, the value of its subject matter had to exceed a threshold defined by statute: for commercial disputes, the threshold (SIT 5,000,000) was set higher than it was for regular civil disputes (SIT 1,000,000) (sections 367 and 490 of the Civil Procedure Act respectively, see paragraph 56 above). If the rules for regular civil disputes had been applied to the respective applicants, their appeal on points of law might have been admissible.

79 . The Court observes that this complaint concerned a question of the application of domestic law to the circumstances of the case. Noting that the permissibility of the relevant ratione valoris restriction as such has not been called into question, the Court furthermore finds no indication that the courts’ application of the relevant legal provisions was unforeseeable, arbitrary or amounted to excessive formalism involving an unreasonable and particularly strict application of procedural rules unjustifiably restricting the applicants’ access to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (see Zubac , cited above, §§ 87-89 and 96-99). It notes that the decision by the lower courts to also apply the commercial dispute procedure in the case of the applicants who were natural persons was based on section 484 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Act provided that the rules of procedure in commercial disputes applied to natural persons who were involved in a dispute where corporate entities were their joint litigants whose claims relied on the same factual and legal grounds, under section 191 of the Act (see paragraph 56 above). The respective applicants did not object to the application of the above ‑ mentioned procedure to their claims before the lower courts. They complained about this issue belatedly, only before the Constitutional Court. Their argument that they had not objected earlier because they had not expected that they would one day need to lodge an appeal on points of law (see paragraph 74 above) falls short of showing any infringement on the part of the authorities. Moreover, throughout the proceedings the applicants were represented by a qualified lawyer who was or should have been aware of the fact that an appeal on points of law in commercial disputes was available to litigants only where the value in dispute exceeded SIT 5,000,000.

80 . There is nothing to suggest that the first-instance court could or should, of its own motion, have considered their claims separately in regular civil proceedings, as was argued by the applicants (see paragraph 74 above). The respective applicants lodged an action together with corporate entities and placed themselves in a position where their appeal on points of law would inevitably be considered under the commercial dispute procedure. Moreover, those applicants did not argue that they could not have lodged an action separately from the corporate entities, or that doing so would have put them at any considerable disadvantage. The reason for the application of the rules of commercial dispute to the applicants’ claims is thus objectively attributable to the applicants themselves, and the adverse consequences of those decisions rest on them (see, mutatis mutandis , Zubac , cited above, §§ 90-95).

81 . It should also be noted that the appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court was made after the respective applicants’ claims had been considered by two national levels of jurisdiction exercising full competence in the matter (see, mutatis mutandis , Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain , 19 December 1997, § 38, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ VIII), whose decisions do not appear to have been arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.

82 . Against the above background, the Court considers that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

(a) The Government

83 . The Government submitted that, as the first-instance court had considered the Agency’s actions lawful, it had not had any reason to investigate other elements of tort or evidence submitted only in that regard. Moreover, the statement of grounds for the judgment had been based on several pieces of documentary evidence showing that the courts, which had provided detailed grounds for the factual and legal basis of their conclusions, had taken note of and considered the arguments submitted by the applicants. Contrary to the applicants’ allegations, the courts had considered the conclusions of the National Council and the causal relationship between the Agency’s actions and the alleged damage. In any event, they had considered that the applicants’ allegations concerning the granting of requests for evidence had been too general.

84 . In relation to the applicants’ allegation that the domestic courts had relied on decisions issued in proceedings in which they had been unable to participate, the Government referred to the conclusions of the Ljubljana Higher Court and the Supreme Court made in that regard (see paragraphs 43 and 50 above).

85 . Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicants had failed to explain their complaint of inadequate reasoning by the Constitutional Court.

(b) The applicants

86 . The applicants argued that the domestic courts had not allowed any of their requests for evidence, such as their requests for the Agency’s Expert Council’s confidential report on possible measures to be taken with respect to Proficia Dadas and the National Council’s report to be adduced. They complained that at the main hearing the submitted documents had been examined only pro forma , and other evidence had been dismissed as irrelevant without reasons being given.

87 . Moreover, in assessing the illegal nature of the Agency’s actions, the courts had taken into account only decisions and orders issued in other proceedings to which the applicants could not have been party, in violation of the principle of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings.

88 . Lastly, the applicants argued that the decisions of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 54 above) had lacked reasons.

89 . At the outset, the Court reiterates that it is not a court of fourth instance and it is not its function to deal with alleged errors of fact or law committed by a national court, unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999 ‑ I). While Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way in which evidence should be assessed, these being primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts. Normally, issues such as the weight attached by the national courts to given items of evidence or to findings or assessments in issue before them for consideration are not for the Court to review (see, among many other authorities, Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015). The Court’s task is to ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the way in which evidence was permitted, were “fair” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands , 27 October 1993, § 21, Series A no. 274).

90 . Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the principal issue in the domestic proceedings was whether the authorities – in particular the Agency – and the measures they had adopted with respect to the Dadas funds had caused financial loss to the applicants. The domestic courts analysed the arguments put forward by the parties and took the view that the authorities had acted lawfully and that there was no causal link between their measures and the damage claimed by the applicants (see paragraphs 41 , 44 , 46 and 51 above). They based their findings on several pieces of documentary evidence, such as the relevant press releases, including those which had been relied on by the applicants themselves in their pleadings. They also provided reasons for not being bound by the findings of the National Council’s report (see paragraph 46 above).

91 . The Court observes that the first-instance court refused to admit additional evidence at the hearing because it considered it irrelevant for the case (see paragraph 40 above). It acknowledges that at first sight the court could have provided more details for such a decision. However, it notes that the applicants were able to raise that complaint before the Supreme Court, which found: (i) that the applicants had failed to specify which evidence should have been admitted and why; and (ii) that the applicants had not established how the missing evidence had been relevant for making out their case, which was the reason given by the first-instance court for refusing to admit the evidence (see paragraph 50 above).

92 . Similarly, in their application to the Court, the applicants complained in general terms that all their requests for evidence had been refused by the domestic courts. They did not explain in any detail which evidence in particular had not been considered by the domestic courts, or the relevance of the missing evidence for the proceedings. In these circumstances, the Court finds no reason to disagree with the findings of the domestic courts as regards the relevance of the evidence for the case, and no reason to consider such a decision arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. In view of the principles established in its case-law (see paragraph 89 above) and the factors considered above, the Court concludes that no arguable case has been made out that additional evidence could have influenced the outcome of the proceedings, or that the failure to examine such evidence prejudiced the fairness of those proceedings.

93 . As regards the applicants’ complaint that the courts of first and second instance – when assessing the unlawful conduct of the Agency – relied solely on the decisions adopted in other proceedings, the Court finds the following considerations of particular relevance. While it is true that the first-instance court refused to consider the lawfulness of the Agency’s decisions, deferring to the findings of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court in other proceedings, the Ljubljana Higher Court, on appeal, acknowledged that the applicants should be able to challenge the lawfulness of the Agency’s decisions (see paragraph 43 above). However, it considered that this could not lead to a different conclusion, noting that there was in any event no causal link between the impugned decisions of the Agency and the damage allegedly sustained by the applicants. It follows that the findings - of lawfulness - made in the proceedings in which the applicants did not participate were not important for the outcome of the present case (compare and contrast Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria , no. 49429/99, ECHR 2005 ‑ XII (extracts)).

94 . Moreover, the Court cannot ignore the Supreme Court’s unchallenged finding that the applicants could have participated in the proceedings before the Agency and the Supreme Court if they considered themselves affected by them, but had made no such attempt to do so (see paragraph 50 above). In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court thus cannot accept that the applicants were deprived of adversarial proceedings and were unable to submit the arguments they considered relevant to their case.

95 . As regards the applicants’ complaint of inadequate reasoning given by the Constitutional Court, the Court reiterates that for national superior courts – such as the Constitutional Court – it suffices, when declining to admit a complaint, to simply refer to the legal provisions governing that procedure if the questions raised by the complaint – as in the present case –are not of fundamental importance (see Gorou v. Greece (no. 2) [GC], no. 12686/03, § 41, 20 March 2009, and Suhadolc v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 57655/08, 17 May 2011).

96 . In conclusion, the Court finds that the requirements of fairness were complied with in the present case. This part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

97 . The applicants complained that their possessions had been destroyed as a result of the effects of the Limiting Decree on the liquidity of the Dadas funds and the Agency’s failure to exercise due care with respect to the repayment agreements. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

(a) The Government

98 . The Government argued that the applicants did not have victim status. They submitted that the applicants had failed to prove in their application that they had been the owners of fund shares in the Dadas funds or that they had concluded agreements on fund share redemption. They argued that the Limiting Decree had been of a general character and had not had any effect on the applicants’ rights. It had not reduced the assets of the funds or caused a loss of capital. Even if the Limiting Decree had affected the securities in the funds’ portfolio, it had not affected the rights of the owners of the fund shares, who had had no right to dispose of the assets of the funds. Furthermore, the agreements which the applicants had concluded with DADAS Poslovni sistem had been the result of their own decisions as investors, and not the Agency’s conduct (or omission). They had been based on the last published NAPVU (see paragraph 7 above), which meant that the subsequent decrease in the value of the assets could not have affected the applicants.

99 . Reiterating the arguments made in respect of the applicants’ victim status, the Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. In their opinion, the reasons for the alleged decline in value of the assets in the Dadas funds should have been sought by reference to the unlawful actions of Proficia Dadas and DADAS BPH.

100 . The Government submitted that the Limiting Decree had been issued in accordance with the law as a consequence of serious disturbances on the securities market caused by the inflated prices of the securities of the Dadas funds (the “spiral phenomenon”). It had been aimed at preventing the further spiralling of the prices of securities or their artificial inflation, which had been reflected in an artificially boosted demand for investment in mutual funds. The maximum number of fund assets managed by a single AMC had been determined on the basis of the market capitalisation of shares listed on the stock exchange and the number of AMCs, which had to be treated equally.

101 . The Government emphasised that the Limiting Decree had not required that existing assets decrease to come under the threshold, so Proficia Dadas could have continued to manage the existing assets and recall the loans given to PRIOM. Referring to the findings of the domestic courts, the Government argued that the applicants had failed to show that the loss in value of the Dadas funds’ assets had been caused by the measures taken by the Agency. The Government referred to the fact that the NAVPU of the Dadas funds had been increasing until 26 March 1996, refuting the applicants’ allegations that there had been depreciation in value before the publication of the Limiting Decree. Furthermore, since the assets had been transferred to PRIOM on 27 March 1996, they could not have been sold for low prices after the publication of the decree.

102 . The Government also disputed the applicants’ argument that the Agency had encouraged them to conclude agreements with DADAS Poslovni sistem by which they had become creditors of that company. The Agency had not had the power to supervise the operation of DADAS Poslovni sistem, and thus could not have known about its financial situation. Had the applicants not signed the repayment agreements, their assets in the Dadas funds would have been transferred to another AMC (see paragraph 27 above), which could have happened only once the withdrawal of Proficia Dadas’s licence had become final and the conditions for liquidating the funds had been fulfilled.

(b) The applicants

103 . The applicants argued that the securities, fund shares and their claims arising from their investments fell within the concept of property as defined by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Had the Agency not issued the Limiting Decree, the applicants would have maintained their investments in the Dadas funds and gained profit. However, after concluding the repayment agreements, they had lost everything. They had therefore incurred financial losses as a direct consequence of the impugned measures.

104 . Furthermore, the applicants argued that the Agency’s measures had been unlawful, in particular the Limiting Decree, which had violated section 112 as confirmed by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 54 above). Moreover, there had been no serious disturbances on the market as required by section 112(3) of the IFMCA; the events on the stock market and the transactions of Proficia Dadas in the period from January to March 1996 had been normal for a growing economy . The prices of the Dadas fund shares had not been inflated, and the prices of shares in companies unrelated to DADAS Poslovni sistem had also dropped significantly in the aftermath of the Agency’s measure. In their observations, they argued that subsequent changes to the legislation – ultimately, the removal of section 112 from the IFMCA – confirmed the inadequacy of the law applied in their case.

105 . They submitted that the aim of the measure – deciding who could invest in the stock market – ­ had not been legitimate and had led to the crash of the stock market.

106 . The applicants further argued that the Limiting Decree had been a disproportionate measure. After its publication it had been expected that investors would try to sell their units, which had led to the decrease in the prices of securities and units of assets in funds. This was proved by the decrease in the SBI Index and the record high daily turnover on the securities market on 20 March 1996. Proficia Dadas had tried to resolve the situation by having the assets transferred to PRIOM. Had the Limiting Decree also temporarily suspended pay-outs, the applicants would not have sustained financial damage. As only inflows into funds had been limited, this had had a catastrophic effect, especially as the market situation had been unfavourable at the time, with the prices of securities generally falling from 13 March 1996 onwards. Moreover, the maximum value had been set too low and had effectively destroyed assets of the funds amounting to SIT 2.6 billion. The applicants further alleged that the Agency’s press release of 15 March 1996 (see paragraph 12 above) and a leak of information before 20 March 1996 had led to their assets losing value even before the Limiting Decree had been published. According to the applicants, 800 investors had redeemed their fund shares before the Limiting Decree had been published. Between 18 and 27 March 1996 the value of the assets of the Dadas funds had dropped by SIT 371 million, leaving the remaining investors worse off.

107 . The applicants further argued that the Agency had encouraged them to sign repayment agreements with the company DADAS Poslovni sistem (see paragraph 25 above), even though it had known that the company would not be able to pay for the transferred claims. They submitted that the Agency had known that Proficia Dadas would be liquidated and that measures would be taken against DADAS BPH. The applicants had not expected that the transfer of assets to another AMC – which would have been a better solution that the Agency should have adopted – would be possible without a significant loss for them.

108 . As regards the Government’s questioning of the applicants’ ownership of the Dadas funds’ shares and the existence of the repayment agreements (see paragraph 98 above), the Court notes that the applicants submitted copies of those agreements, which indicate the value of their fund shares on 27 March 1996. It further notes that the domestic courts, in civil proceedings, examined the applicants’ claims on the merits and did not question their ownership of the Dadas funds’ shares at the time when the Limiting Decree had been adopted. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes that it has been demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that the applicants were the owners of the Dadas funds’ shares at the relevant time, and that they concluded the repayment agreements.

109 . The Court further notes that the applicants in the present case complained that the Agency had implemented a number of measures which had been detrimental to the Dadas funds and the value of their shares. The Government argued that the applicants lacked victim status and that, in any event, there had been no interference with the rights of the applicants as holders of fund shares, because the Limiting Decree had been a measure of a general character which had neither had any effect on the rights of the holders of fund shares nor had it reduced the funds’ assets or caused any loss of capital (see paragraphs 98 and 99 above). The Court considers that it is not necessary in the present case to definitely resolve these issues because, even assuming that the applicants could be accorded victim status and that the impugned measure were to be characterised as an interference with their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the complaints are inadmissible for the reasons set out below. Since the Limiting Decree was adopted as a measure to control the financial sector in the respondent State, and its implementation likewise amounted to such control, the Court will review the complaints raised in the light of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Capital Bank AD v . Bulgaria , no. 49429/99, § 131, ECHR 2005 ‑ XII (extracts), and Merkantil Car Zrt. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), no. 22853/15 and 4 other applications, § 97, 27 November 2018). The Court will thus turn to the questions of lawfulness, legitimate aim and “fair balance” regarding the conduct of the Slovenian authorities in relation to the Limiting Decree (see Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 146, ECHR 2004 ‑ V).

110 . Regarding the lawfulness of the interference complained of, the Court notes that the arguments submitted by the applicants in the domestic proceedings were very similar to those advanced before the Court. It reiterates that the power to review an impugned measure’s compliance with national law is limited, and its task is not to take the place of the domestic authorities in making such an assessment (see Malone v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, § 79; see also, as regards the wide margin of appreciation in cases such as the present one, Olczak v. Poland (dec.), no. 30417/96, § 85, ECHR 2002 X (extracts), and Capital Bank AD , cited above , § 136). In the present case, the questions raised by the applicants, including the question of whether circumstances on the market were such as to warrant the Agency’s adoption of the Limiting Decree, were considered by the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 29 and 94 above). It found that the Agency had adopted the decree within the scope of its statutory power in circumstances justifying its intervention (see paragraph 29 above), and the Court sees no reason to call that finding into question. There is also nothing to suggest that the Limiting Decree, as remedied following the Constitutional Court’s decision, was otherwise not in compliance with the IFMCA.

111 . In the light of the above, the Court considers that the impugned interference with the applicants’ rights complied with the requirement of “lawfulness”. It considers, in this connection, that the initial lack of a time ‑ limit in the Limiting Decree, which was remedied by the Agency, did not render the Limiting Decree unlawful in terms of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Its effects on the rights of the applicants (see paragraph 104 above) will be addressed when determining whether the authorities struck a fair balance between the interests involved.

112 . As to the aims pursued by the interference, the Court considers that the measures taken by the Agency were intended to protect the interests of the holders of fund shares in the Dadas funds and the financial markets in general. It refers in particular to the domestic courts’ findings: (i) that the NAVPU had been inflated due to fictitious transactions between companies affiliated with Dadas; and (ii) that Proficia Dadas was responsible for other serious irregularities, such as giving unsecured loans to PRIOM (see paragraph 41 above) – findings which have not been persuasively challenged by the applicants. Such a situation was unfavourable to not only the financial market, but also holders of fund shares, who were at risk of suffering heavy financial losses due to the continued spiralling of prices. Since the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies is wide, the Court will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is in the public interest, unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see Broniowski , cited above, § 149, with further references), which is clearly not the case in this instance. The Court therefore considers that the Limiting Decree pursued a legitimate aim.

113 . It remains to be determined whether the interference complained of struck a “fair balance” between the general interest of the community and the need to protect the individual’s fundamental rights. The Court reiterates that in such a sensitive economic area as the stability of financial markets, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (see, mutatis mutandis , Olczak v. Poland (dec.), no. 30417/96, § 85, ECHR 2002 ‑ X (extracts)), and that in certain situations there may be a paramount need for the State to act in order to avoid irreparable harm to mutual funds, their holders of fund shares, other shareholders, and the financial sector as a whole. Therefore, and in view of the sensitive nature of the social and financial issues involved in achieving a proper balance between the respective interests of those involved, the State must be considered to enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (see, mutatis mutandis , Merkantil Car Zrt. and Others , cited above, § 100).

114 . The Court finds the following facts and considerations relevant for the assessment of proportionality in the present case. It has not been disputed that the stock prices of Dadas-affiliated companies and the price of Dadas shares increased by around 70% between mid-January and mid ‑ March 1996, and that the increase in prices was influenced by transactions between legal entities associated with Proficia Dadas. The applicants did not challenge the findings of domestic authorities that such transactions were fictitious and that the capital profits obtained through them had manipulated the NAPVU. Moreover, they did not dispute the fact that before the Limiting Decree had been adopted, 22% of the total Dadas funds’ assets had been loaned to PRIOM, a company owned by the director of Proficia Dadas, without adequate guarantees, in direct violation of the IFMCA. The Court further observes that on 27 March 1996, that is before the Limiting Decree was published, Proficia Dadas transferred the assets and liabilities of the Dadas funds into the “temporary custody” of PRIOM, in violation of the IFMCA, and temporarily suspended its management of the funds (see paragraph 16 above). On 28 March 1996 it published a press release announcing that it was temporarily suspending trading in fund units (see paragraph 17 above). These facts clearly indicate the unlawful nature of the activities of Proficia Dadas and its associated entities, as well as the gravity of the problem the Agency was faced with.

115 . The Court takes note of the applicants’ main argument, namely that the Agency’s measures led to pressure being put on the Dadas funds as a result of increased requests for the redemption of fund shares in the aftermath of the Limiting Decree, which in turn led to the funds’ assets dropping in value. In the applicants’ view, this was a predictable consequence of the Limiting Decree, and one that should have been avoided by the adoption of other, more suitable, measures. In this connection, the Court observes the following.

116 . Firstly, the Limiting Decree was not the first measure applied by the Agency. In March 1996 the Agency carried out inspections at Proficia Dadas (see paragraph 9 above), and immediately thereafter, on 14 March 1996, it reacted to irregularities which had been identified in the way that Proficia Dadas was managing the Dadas funds. In particular, the Agency ordered Proficia Dadas to call in the loans to PRIOM and improve the investment structure of the Dadas funds (see paragraph 10 above). Subsequently, by way of the compliance decree of 20 March 1996, it ordered Proficia Dadas to remedy the irregularities related to the asset structure of the Dadas funds and its bookkeeping (see paragraph 13 above). The Court therefore finds that other options were considered and used by the Agency with a view to safeguarding the interests of the holders of fund shares in the Dadas funds and protecting the stability of the securities market (compare and contrast Capital Bank AD , cited above, § 138).

117 . Secondly, as regards the applicants’ argument that the Agency should also have suspended pay-outs, the Court refers to the conclusion of the Constitutional Court that the Limiting Decree had been a more lenient measure only restricting (and not suspending altogether) the operations of investment funds (compare and contrast Zelenchuk and Tsytsyura v. Ukraine , nos. 846/16 and 1075/16, § 122, 22 May 2018). The Court also notes that it has not been alleged by the applicants that neither they nor Proficia Dadas could request a moratorium on pay-outs from the Dadas funds, a measure similar to the one later requested by Kmečka Družba and approved by the Agency (see paragraph 27 above).

118 . Thirdly, as regards the applicants’ argument that the Agency should have transferred management of the funds to another AMC, the Court reiterates the Ljubljana Higher Court’s conclusions, which were not challenged by the applicants, that the Agency could only transfer management of the funds to another AMC after 12 June 1996, when the Supreme Court had upheld the withdrawal of the operating licence. However, by then, the applicants had already concluded repayment agreements. It is important to note that such a transfer was in fact presented to the holders of fund shares in the Dadas funds as one of the alternatives to repayment agreements (see paragraph 23 above). However, the applicants, of their own free will, opted for repayment agreements. The Court cannot accept the applicants’ argument that the State bears some responsibility for their decision and for DADAS Poslovni sistem’s failure to honour its obligations (see paragraphs 41 and 44 above).

119 . Above all, it cannot be ignored that the domestic courts, having examined the applicants’ submissions, considered that the applicants had failed to establish that they had actually suffered any significant financial loss because of the Limiting Decree or because of the initial lack of a time ‑ limit in that decree (see paragraphs 41 , 44 - 46 and 51 above). They considered, in particular, that the applicants, as claimants in contentious proceedings, had neither referred to, let alone proved, the extent of the pressure which investors had exerted by withdrawing their assets from the Dadas funds (see paragraph 44 above). The applicants did not submit any persuasive arguments which would call into question that finding. On the basis of all the material in its possession, and having regard to its considerations under Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraphs 96 above), the Court cannot find that the conclusion reached by the domestic courts, which are primarily called upon to establish the relevant facts, was in any way arbitrary.

120 . Lastly, the Court considers that the allegations of an alleged leak of information before 20 March 1996, and the effects of the press release of 15 March 1996 on the value of the applicants’ assets before the Limiting Decree was published, remained unsubstantiated, especially in the light of the Government’s argument that the NAVPU of the Dadas funds was actually rising until 26 March 1996.

121 . In view of the above considerations, and having regard to the margin of appreciation left to the States in respect of matters involving economic policy, the Court considers that the Limiting Decree and its effect on the applicants did not upset the balance which had to be struck between the protection of the applicants’ rights and the public interest.

It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

122 . The applicants argued that the Limiting Decree had, despite its general character, been aimed at the Dadas funds, as these had been the only funds exceeding the maximum value set out in the Limiting Decree. They also argued that the Agency had treated them differently, as it had allowed the AMC Kmečka Družba, which on 20 June 1996 had taken over 13% of the Dadas funds, to suspend the selling and purchasing of fund shares until 23 August 1996 (see paragraph 27 above).

123 . The Government emphasised that the restriction on the maximum value of assets held by funds had not applied to individual funds, but to all mutual funds managed by a single AMC. If the Agency’s decision had not applied to all the mutual funds managed by individual AMCs, the AMCs could have circumvented the decision by establishing a new mutual fund after the value of the portfolio of the mutual funds managed by them had reached the maximum value. They argued that different funds had been treated differently depending on their particular situation.

124 . The Court notes that the Limiting Decree set out the maximum value of assets of mutual funds which could be managed by a single AMC. The applicants have failed to show in what way the Limiting Decree treated them differently from other holders of fund shares in mutual funds in a comparable situation. As regards Kmečka Družba’s opportunity to suspend operations, the Court refers to its finding above that the applicants did not establish that they had been prevented from asking for a similar measure to be taken with respect to Proficia Dadas at the relevant time.

125 . It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Done in English and notified in writing on 8 April 2021 .

{signature_p_1} {signature_p_2}

Hasan Bakırcı Valeriu Griţco Deputy Registrar President

A PPENDIX

TABLE 1

No.

Applicant’s Name

Birth year

Place of residence

1Anton BENCE

1947Maribor

2Marija ML. BOVHA

1967Logatec

3Marija ST. BOVHA

1943Logatec

4Tone BOVHA

1967Logatec

5Boštjan BRANILOVIČ

1975Maribor

6Božidar BRANILOVIČ

1953Maribor

7Marija MARKOVIČ*

(heirs: Nedeljko Markovič, Nataša Marinšek, Jasmina Markovič, Tanja Markovič Hribernik)

1938Maribor

8Nedeljko MARKOVIČ

1933Maribor

9Romana Å KERL

1940Ljubljana

10Ivan VUK

1954Gornja Radgona

TABLE 2

No.

Applicant’s Name

Birth year

Place of residence

11Anton AHAC

1950Trbovlje

12Mirko AMBROŽIČ

1950Vremski Britof

13Aleš ANDREJKA

1968Lukovica

14Majda ANŽIN

1953Laško

15Ivan ARH

1961Izlake

16Aljaž BABIČ

1988Maribor

17Branko BABIČ

1957Maribor

18Petra BABIČ

1985Maribor

19Stanislav BAJC

1944Ljubljana

20Katarina BAJEC

1966Maribor

21Tomaž BAJEC

1967Maribor

22Taja BALOG

1955Radeče

23Brana BAÅ A MAÄŒEK

1939Ljubljana

24Milan BAŠKOVIČ

1956Ljubljana

25Marko BEDINA

1957Tržič

26Tomaž BERCE

1971Dornberk

27Vincencija BERČIČ

1947Ljubljana

28Igor BERGINC

1961Vodice

29Anton BERTONCELJ

1961Selca

30Miroslav BERTONCELJ

1960Maribor

31Irena BLAS

1966Ljubljana

32Marija BLAS

1941Ljubljana

33Rudolf BLAS

1940Ljubljana

34Roman BLATNIK

1964Ljubljana

35Boris BLAŽIČ

1961Trbovlje

36Marija BLAŽIČ*

(heir: Boris Blažič)

1929Trbovlje

37Vojko BLAŽIČ

1950Maribor

38Jernej BOC

1967Ljubljana

39Jurij BOC

1973Ljubljana

40Marija Magdalena BOC

1941Ljubljana

41Jadviga BOGATAJ

1952Šenčur

42Ivan BOLJEŠIČ

1958Vače

43Branko BOLJKO

1960Logatec

44Andrej BORÅ TNAR

1968Koper

45Aleš BOSTIČ

1973Tržič

46Aljaž BRATINA

1966Maribor

47Branislav Franc BREÄŒKO

1947Brežice

48Marko BRESKVAR

1957Ljubljana

49Stanislav BREZNIK

1962Lukovica

50Simon BREZNIKAR

1972Žalec

51Milan BUÄŒAR

1959Ljubljana

52Ivan Budja

1966Radenci

53Boris BUKOVEC

1961Novo Mesto

54BURJA d.o.o.

Ljubljana

55Ludvik ÄŒEHOVIN*

(heirs: Simon ÄŒehovin)

1927Nova Gorica

56Peter ÄŒELOFIGA

1963Maribor

57Hema ÄŒEÅ NOVAR

1934Ljubljana

58Jože ČEŠNOVAR

1936Ljubljana

59Marko ÄŒEÅ NOVAR

1974Ljubljana

60Martin ÄŒOP

1944Trbovlje

61Marjan ÄŒRNÄŒEC

1962Pesnica pri Mariboru

62Kristina Alojzija DEKLEVA

1941Ljubljana

63Božidar DEMŠAR

1960Ljubljana

64Majda Pavla DEMÅ AR

1939Ljubljana

65Matjaž DENAC

1968Maribor

66Miran DEVETAK

1948Maribor

67Lidija DIVJAK

1955Podkum

68Matej DOBRAVC VERBIČ

1985Ljubljana

69Tadej DOBRAVC VERBIČ

1982Ljubljana

70Alenka DOLANC*

(heir: Ciril Dolanc)

1941Trbovlje

71Borut DOLANC

1977Trbovlje

72Gregor DOLANC

1969Trbovlje

73Jožefa DOLANC

1949Trbovlje

74Ludvik DOLANC

1946Trbovlje

75Robert DOLENC

1966Ljubljana Å martno

76Marjan DOVČ

1968Ljubljana

77Alojzij DRNOVÅ EK

1940Å kofja Loka

78Ljudmila DRNOVÅ EK

1935Trbovlje

79Vanja DUJC

1948Koper

80Marjan FABRICI

1945Ruše

81Alojzij FAJDIGA

1940Notranje Gorice

82Anton FAJDIGA

1943Trbovlje

83Andrej FILIPIČ

1973Krka

84Katarina FILIPIČ

1975Trbovlje

85Matjaž FILIPIČ

1943Trbovlje

86Alenka FINK ARÄŒON

1930Ljubljana

87Ivana FLANDER

1944Laško

88Miloš FORTUNAT

1970Koper

89Ernest FRAS

1966Maribor

90Viktor FRELIH*

(heir: Ana Frelih)

1944Podnart

91Vojko FRELIH

1959Podnart

92Marjan FROL

1951Trbovlje

93Peter GLAS*

(heirs: Otilija Glas, Marko Glas)

1945Velenje

94Aleksandra GNAMUÅ

1982Slovenj Gradec

95Janez GNAMUÅ

1969Šentjanž pri Dravogradu

96Aleš GOBEC

1972Maribor

97Anton GOBEC

1943Maribor

98Borut GOBEC

1970Maribor

99Stanislav GOBEC

1928Podplat

100Marija GOMAZ*

(heirs: Mirjana Gomaz, Vera Gomaz Repovž)

1937Trbovlje

101Sašo GOVEKAR

1962Kranj

102Igor GRAÄŒNAR

1961Trbovlje

103Matilda GRANDA

1952Ljubljana

104Franc GREGOREVČIČ

1956Brežice

105Amalija GREÅ AK

1949Dol pri Hrastniku

106Damijan GRILC

1958Radovljica

107Primož GROS

1949Ljubljana

108Ela GRUBIŠIČ

1955Ljubljana

109Aleš HABICHT

1966Å kofja Loka

110Nevenka Sonja HABICHT

1937Å kofja Loka

111Stanislav HACIN

1939Trbovlje

112Milena HAFNER

1966Ljubljana

113Boštjan HARI

1973Limbuš

114Alenka HEDŽET

1974Teharje

115Emil HEDŽET

1937Celje

116Matjaž HEDŽET

1964Celje

117Karmen HLADNIK PROSENC

1955Trbovlje

118Aleš Mihael HODNIK

1953Ljubljana

119Iztok HOMAR

1971Kamnik

120Anuša Valentina HOMEC

1945Ljubljana

121Rok HOMEC*

(heir: Hedvika Rampre)

1929Gorenja vas

122Marko HOMÅ AK

1960Maribor

123Bogomir HORVAT*

(heirs: Irena Krajnc Horvat, Timotej Horvat, Matjaž Horvat)

1936Bresternica

124Janez HORVAT*

(heir: Silva Horvat)

1939Ljubljana

125Silva HORVAT

1940Ljubljana

126Janez HRENKO

1944Maribor

127Hinko HRIBAR

1934Ljubljana

128Matej HRIBAR

1969Grosuplje

129Peter HRIBAR

1974Ljubljana

130Tatjana HRIBAR

1963Trbovlje

131Damijan HVALA

1970Ljubljana

132IBT d.o.o.

Trbovlje

133Jožef IGLIČ

1948Trbovlje

134Primož INTIHAR

1969Ljubljana

135Matej IVANC

1962Ljubljana

136Robert IVANIČ

1966Lendava

137Andrej JAKLIČ

1963Ljubljana

138Bojan JAKLIČ

1962Ljubljana

139Aleksander JAKOPIN

1953Bresternica

140Mira JAKŠA RABIČ

1949Kranj

141Jože JAMNIK

1931Ljubljana

142Marijan JAMNIK

1950Å kofljica

143Marjan JAMNIK

1967Ljubljana

144Jože JAMŠEK

1957Zagorje ob Savi

145Renata JAN

1937Žiri

146Albina JANEC*

(heirs: Saša Janec, Štefan Klopčič)

1949Trbovlje

147Matjaž JANŠA

1966Ljubljana

148Igor JANŽOVNIK

1964Velenje

149Marija JARC

1940Radovljica

150Valentin JARC

1934Radovljica

151Martin JAUÅ OVEC*

(heirs: Klavdija Jaušovec, Dominik Jaušovec, Rene Jaušovec)

1968Jurovski Dol

152Ivan JAVORNIK

1933Å marje Sap

153Igor JENC

1963Ljubljana

154Peter JERIN

1941Ljubljana

155Tjaša JESENEC

1971Šmartno v Rožni dolini

156Vlasta Vida JESENEK

1946Šmartno v Rožni dolini

157Ivan JESENIK

1963Begunje na Gorenjskem

158Breda JESENÅ EK

1940Krško

159JEZERO d.o.o.

Most na Soči

160Marjan JORDAN

1959Trbovlje

161Gregor JURAK

1972Trzin

162Alojzij JURMAN

1962Medvode

163Melita JURMAN

1962Medvode

164Martin JUVAN

1966Ljubljana Polje

165Janja KALIN

1967Nova Gorica

166Mitja KALIN

1967Log pri Brezovici

167Ladislav KAMENIK

1954Velenje

168Mitja KAMENIK

1979Velenje

169Sebastijan KAPEL

1974Rače

170Mirko KATALENIČ

1961Puconci

171Katica KAVČIČ

1934Ljubljana Å entvid

172Stanislav KAVČIČ

1940Brezovica

173Tomaž KAVČIČ

1968Dol pri Ljubljani

174Jani KAVTIÄŒNIK

1950Maribor

175Adela KEPE

1942Maribor

176Ludvik KEPE

1939Maribor

177Biserka KIRN

1945Trbovlje

178Sava Marija KLABJAN PUST

1938Ljubljana

179Mirjam KLANÄŒAR

1972Turjak

180Albin KLANJÅ ÄŒEK

1959Å empeter pri Gorici

181Daniel KLANJÅ EK

1947Trbovlje

182Joža KLANJŠEK

1952Trbovlje

183Nejc KLANJÅ EK

1983Trbovlje

184Jožef KLAR

1945Nova cerkev

185Å tefan KLEMENT

1942Ljubljana

186Milan KLEP

1955Jarenina

187Alojz KMETIČ

1943Rače

188Ana KNAFLIČ

1945Bled

189Martina KODRIČ

1962Maribor

190Tomaž KODRIČ

1971Ljubljana

191Boris KOKOLE

1966Nova Gorica

192Draga KONCILJA

1956Trbovlje

193Dušan KONDA

1957Lukovica

194Edith KOPAČ

1968Stara cerkev

195Martin KOPRIVC

1952Å entjur

196Aleš KORELC

1972Ljubljana Å entvid

197Urška KORELC

1974Ljubljana Å entvid

198Ivanka KOREN

1956Vipava

199Marijan KOŠIČ

1934Ljubljana

Brod

200Borut KOÅ IR

1956Domžale

201Peter KOVAČ

1971Vrhnika

202Franc KOVAČIČ

1939Ptuj

203Franjo KOVAČIČ

1941Ljubljana Črnuče

204Karmen KOVAČIČ

1967Rogaška

Slatina

205Roman KOŽELJ

1967Ljubljana

206Mihael KRAJNC

1952Bistrica

ob Dravi

207Nuša KRAJŠEK PEČEK

1981Å kofljica

208Marija KRČ

1938Ljubljana

209Mihael KRČ*

(heirs: Marko Krč,

Mihael Krč, Irena Mehlitz)

1925Ljubljana

210Miomir KRIŽAJ

1943Ljubljana

211Mojca KRIŽAJ

1969Domžale

212Dominik KRSNIK

1938Miklavž na Dravskem polju

213Dominika KRSNIK

1971Miklavž na Dravskem polju

214Mario KRZYK

1961Kamnik

215Božidar KUKAR

1935Ljubljana

216Matjaž KUMELJ

1957Ljubljana

217Drago KUNAVER

1953Ljubljana

218Miha KUNTU

1977Maribor

219Metod KURENT

1971Trbovlje

220Vincenc KURENT

1944Trbovlje

221Barbara KUS

1971Å alovci

222Darinka KUS

1941Trbovlje

223Helena KUÅ EJ

1970Bleiburg

224Igor KUTOÅ

1968Murska Sobota

225Andreja KVAS

1966Mojstrana

226Tina LAPANJE PAVLIN

1974Nova Gorica

227Jožefa LAZNIK

1940Ljubljana

228Franko LEBAN

1958Tolmin

229Milojka LEBAN

1961Most na Soči

230Oton LEBAN

1956Most na Soči

231Marjan LEBIČ

1944Trbovlje

232Zoran LEBIČ

1971Trbovlje

233Mitja LESKOVAR

1963Ljubljana

234Ana LESKOVEC

1927Maribor

235Jelka LEVEC

1962Domžale

236Gorazd LEVSTEK

1956Ljubljana Črnuče

237Andrej LIKAR

1971Cerkno

238Dušan LIKAR

1952Lenart

239Marjan LIPEC

1955Radeče

240Janez LIPNIK

1951Ljubljana

241Jože LJUBIČ

1953Trbovlje

242Matej LOGAR

1968Žalec

243Marko LOGONDER

1974Ljubljana

244Matjaž MACERL

1969Zagorje ob Savi

245Uršula MAJCEN

1968Ljubljana Å entvid

246Janez MALENÅ EK

1941Ljubljana

247Andrej MALEŽIČ

1963Grosuplje

248MAP TRADE d.o.o.

Slovenska Bistrica

249Branka MARÄŒAN

1955Kranj

250Marjan MARTINC

1969Å kofljica

251Ivan MATEKOVIČ

1961Miklavž na Dravskem polju

252Marija MATEKOVIČ

1941Maribor

253Ana MATIJAŠEVIČ

1938Å empeter pri Novi Gorici

254Ivan MATIJAŠEVIČ*

(heirs: Ana Matijaševič, Boris Matjašič, Miro Matjašič)

1939Å empeter pri Novi Gorici

255Miro MATJAŠIČ

1966Å empeter pri Novi Gorici

256Edvard MATKO

1970Trbovlje

257Frančiška MATKO

1950Trbovlje

258Mateja MATKO

1976Trbovlje

259Marija MEDLE

1962Domžale

260Zmaga Linde MEDVED

1942Maribor

261Franc MEDVEÅ EK

1951Trbovlje

262Anica MEHLIN

1963Å kofljica

263Anka MEJAČ

1952Ljubljana

264Mirko MEJAČ

1957Borovnica

265Rafael MIHALIČ

1961Ljubljana

266Boštjan MIHELČIČ

1966Kamnik

267Tomaž MIHEVC

1956Ljubljana

268Matjaž MIKAC

1964Celje

269Andrej MIKOLAVČIČ

1966Brezovica

270Matjaž MIKOÅ

1959Log pod Mangrtom

271Draga MILENOVIČ

1947Maribor

272Goran MILOŠEVIČ

1968Murska Sobota

273Vladimir MILOŠEVIČ

1940Murska Sobota

274Dušica MOHORA

1950Maribor

275Vladimir MOHORA

1947Maribor

276MOJA MAKSIMA d.o.o.

Trbovlje

277Boris MOÅ KON

1965Trbovlje

278Jolanda MRAMOR

1965Rakek

279Uroš NAPRUDNIK

1952Trbovlje

280Boris NEMANIČ

1959Ljubljana

281Karel NEUBERG

1942Maribor

282Frančišek NOVAK*

(heirs:

Marija Novak, Milojka Novak, Vojka Novak)

1936Velenje

283Janez NOVAK

1976Grosuplje

284Miran NOVÅ AK

1944Ljubljana

285Drago NUČIČ

1932Trbovlje

286Uroš NUČIČ

1961Portorož

287Darko OBLAK

1967Višnja gora

288Jernej OBLAK

1960Ortnek

289Janez OCEPEK*

(heirs: Marjeta Ocepek, Alenka Stražišar, Janez Ocepek)

1932Trbovlje

290Matilda ODREITZ*

(heirs: Aleksander Odreitz, Ladislav Odreitz, Marjeta Urbas, Boris Odreitz)

1926Sv. Jurij ob Ščavnici

291Feliks OGRINC

1943Ljubljana Črnuče

292Stanislav OGRINC

1964Ljubljana Črnuče

293Janez OMAHEN

1964Višnja gora

294Stanko OPARA

1963Trebnje

295Pavel OREHEK

1955Dob pri Domžalah

296Igor OREL

1946Nova Gorica

297Anton OVEN

1954Veliki Gaber

298Marija OVEN*

(heir: Marija ml. Oven)

1924Veliki Gaber

299Alan PAVLIN

1968Nova Gorica

300Cecilija PAVLIN

1946Ljubljana

301Simona PEÄŒNIK POSEL

1964Maribor

302Jožica PERHAVC

1941Maribor

303Franci PESTOTNIK

1968Kamnik

304Marta PEÅ EC

1941Ljubljana

305Tomaž PEŠEC

1968Ljubljana

306Roman PEÅ ELJ

1952Trbovlje

307Franc Werner PETEK

1943Maribor

308Viktor PETEK

1970Maribor

309Gorazd PETROVIČ

1963Kranj

310Robert PIÄŒULIN

1974Kranj

311Å tefanija PIKO

1944Prevalje

312Valentin PIKO

1938Prevalje

313Andrej PIKON*

(heir: Boštjan Pikon)

1934Blejska Dobrava

314Antonija PIKON

1941Blejska Dobrava

315Albin PINTAR*

(heir: Jerica PINTAR)

1936Trbovlje

316Albin PINTAR

1967Ljubljana

317Janez PINTAR

1934Kranj

318Jerica PINTAR

1947Trbovlje

319Marija PLEÅ A

1943Kranj

320Majda PLESTENJAK

1944Kranj

321Helena PLUT

1964Ljubljana Polje

322Tadeja PLUT GRAD

1964Ljubljana Polje

323Igor POBERAJ

1950Notranje

Gorice

324Aleš POČIVALŠEK

1950Maribor

325Marija PODGORÅ EK

1953Komenda

326Ernest PODOBNIK

1949Cerkno

327Alenka POGAÄŒAR

1952Maribor

328Franc POGAÄŒNIK

1965Zgornja

Besnica

329Matjaž POHLIN

1968Ljubljana Črnuče

330Danijela POLJANÅ EK

1944Idrija

331Igor POLJANÅ EK

1975Idrija

332Jurij POLJANÅ EK

1943Idrija

333Miloš POLJANŠEK

1949Idrija

334Stane POPLAS*

(heir: Stanislava Savšek)

1934Trbovlje

335Elizabeta POSEL

1933Maribor

336Franc POSEL

1964Maribor

337Franjo POSEL

1939Maribor

338Marjan POTOÄŒAN

1967Lovrenc na Pohorju

339Srečko POTOČNIK

1947Loče pri Poljčanah

340Karol POŽUN

1953Trbovlje

341Breda PRAH

1962Zgornja Polskava

342Dejan PREDALIČ

1971Rakek

343Irma PREMUÅ

1950Radenci

344Robert PREMUÅ

1972Gornja Radgona

345Simon PREVODNIK

1952Å kofja Loka

346Jože PRIMOŽIČ

1943Maribor

347Projektivni biro Velenje d.d.

Velenje

348Aleš PROSENC

1971Loka pri Zidanem