FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 77370/16 I.I. and M.S. against Bulgaria

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 13 April 2021 as a Committee composed of:

Iulia Antoanella Motoc, President , Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Pere Pastor Vilanova, judges , Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to:

the above application lodged on 7 December 2016;

the decision to grant the applicants anonymity; and

the parties ’ observations,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1 . The two applicants, Ms I.I. and Ms M.S., were born in 1996 and 1959 respectively, and live, respectively, in Lovech and Pleven. They were represented by Mr N. Runevski, a lawyer practising in Sofia.

2 . The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms R. Nikolova of the Ministry of Justice.

3 . Following several instances of theft of electrical equipment near the village of Bohot, the Pleven police decided to send four officers to patrol the area where the thefts had taken place between 8 p.m. on 17 September and 4 a.m. on 18 September 2013. The plan of the operation said that the officers were to be equipped with “stop cartridges” [1] .

4 . Two of those officers, M.S. and R.I., set out in an unmarked police car. At about 8.15 p.m. they were alerted by a colleague that people stealing wood had been spotted in a nearby forest. (The information had come from two men from the local forest management cooperative.) Officer M.S. called one of those men and arranged to meet them at the edge of the forest. While then driving through the forest, the officers and the two men spotted headlights coming from a path extending from the paved road. The officers positioned their car in a way to block any vehicle coming from that path. Shortly after that, a van approached from the path. Officer R.I. waved at it to stop, but it accelerated instead and the officer had to jump aside in order not to be hit by it. The van ’ s driver – later identified as Mr I.I., born in 1968, father of the first applicant and brother of the second applicant, who had taken the van from a vehicle repair shop where he was working (it had been left there by a client) – drove off toward the primary road connecting Pleven and Lovech. Apart from Mr I.I., there were two men in the van, whom he had hired a couple of hours earlier to help him carry the wood.

5 . Officers M.S. and R.I. got into their car and gave chase; officer M.S. was driving. They switched on the police light and the siren, and officer R.I. used a megaphone to summon Mr I.I. repeatedly to pull over and stop. Mr I.I. did not comply, and each time when the officers tried to overtake the van, he swerved in an attempt to push their car off the road. Officer R.I. fired a warning shot, using a “stop cartridge” , [2] and then, when Mr I.I. still did not stop, fired several such shots at the van; he was shooting through the car ’ s right-hand window, resting his hand on the rear-view mirror. According to the two officers, officer R.I. was aiming for the van ’ s tyres. A ballistic report drawn up in the ensuing investigation (see paragraph 31 below) found that at least twelve projectiles had hit the van, mostly in its upper part. Mr I.I. ’ s two companions were begging him to stop or slow down, so that they could jump out of the vehicle. One of them twice called an acquaintance from the Lovech police; the latter told them to stop, get out of the van and surrender to the officers who were chasing them. For his part, Mr I.I. twice called a relative of his, asking for help, but the relative apparently likewise advised him to stop and surrender.

6 . At 8.58 p.m. officer R.I. called the Pleven police switchboard, and asked them to inform the Lovech police of the situation and request backup. At 9.01 p.m. the duty officer relayed that information to the Lovech police, who said that they would send a car to intercept the van near a petrol station at the entrance of Lovech. Officers M.S. and R.I. were informed of that at 9.04 p.m. However, when the van and their car passed near the petrol station, they were not met by anyone from the Lovech police. (It was later established that the two officers dispatched there had arrived a few minutes later). At 9.07 p.m. officer R.I. called the Pleven police switchboard again to tell them that. At that point, the van slowed down and Mr I.I. ’ s two companions jumped out of it. Mr I.I. then drove on. Officer R.I. informed the Pleven police switchboard of that at 9.10 p.m.

7 . Once inside Lovech, officers M.S. and R.I. again tried to intercept the van, but could not, owing to the way in which Mr I.I. was driving. Shortly after that, Mr I.I. stopped the van close to a railway, got out of it, and started running. The officers chased him on foot. Mr I.I. hid inside bushes close to a block of flats and a carwash. The officers began searching the area with their torchlights. At 9.14 p.m. officer R.I. called the Pleven police switchboard and asked them to call for backup from the Lovech police; that call was relayed to the Lovech police switchboard at 9.16 p.m.

8 . Moments after that officer R.I. spotted Mr I.I., who tried to push him and make off, but the officer seized him by the clothes. The two officers then struggled with Mr I.I., trying to handcuff him behind his back. They repeatedly admonished him to cease resistance. Startled by the noise, people living in the nearby block of flats started coming out on the windows and the balconies. Officer R.I. managed to put handcuffs on Mr I.I. ’ s left wrist and twisted his arm behind his back. Mr I.I. lost his balance and fell to the ground. According to the findings of the ensuing investigations, the officers tried to restrain Mr I.I. and put the handcuffs on his right wrist as well, but he was struggling fiercely, and even managed to lift himself off the ground several times, which prompted the officers to press his body to the ground with their knees. They then succeeded in handcuffing both of his hands behind his back. According to the findings of the ensuing investigations, at that point Mr I.I. screamed several times that he could not breathe, and the officers uncuffed one of his hands and turned him to one side; the applicants contest that account, and also express doubts that Mr I.I. was ill-treated. The officers asked Mr I.I. whether he suffered from any medical condition, but he did not answer. They checked his pulse. Officer M.S. fetched water from the police car and sprayed it on Mr I.I. ’ s face, and officer R.I. called (at 9.27 p.m.) the Pleven police switchboard to request an ambulance. At about the same time (or shortly before that), two police officers from Lovech arrived at the scene. They had been dispatched there following five calls to the national police emergency number made at 9.16 p.m., 9.18 p.m. and 9.21 p.m. by people living in the nearby block of flats, some apparently at the request of officers M.S. and R.I. The ambulance arrived about ten minutes later. The emergency medical doctor and nurse tried to resuscitate Mr I.I., but found that he was already dead. Officers M.S. and R.I. reported all that to the Pleven police switchboard at 9.45 p.m.

9 . Following a complaint from a friend of Mr I.I. to the prosecuting authorities in which he alleged that the shots fired at Mr I.I. ’ s van had been wholly unjustified and that Mr I.I. had been “savagely beaten to death”, in November 2013 an inspector of the complaints department of the General Directorate of National Police and an officer of the same Directorate ’ s criminal-police department carried out an internal investigation.

10 . The investigators interviewed the author of the allegations, who told them that those were based on conversations with Mr I.I. ’ s two companions on the evening of 17 September 2013. The investigators also obtained written depositions from those two men, two people living in the block of flats next to which Mr I.I. had died, the two men from the forest management cooperative, and seventeen police officers (including officers M.S. and R.I.), as well as materials from the concurrent criminal investigation into Mr I.I. ’ s death (see paragraphs 12 et seq. below). They also listened to the recordings of the police calls made in connection with the incident.

11 . In their report, filed on 29 November 2013, the investigators set out their findings of fact in some detail, and concluded that there was no evidence that officers M.S. and R.I. had used unlawful force during the chase. For their part, the allegations that they had “savagely beaten to death” Mr I.I. were being looked into in the concurrent criminal investigation (see paragraphs 12 et seq. below).

(a) Initial investigation

(i) First phase

12 . A few hours after the incident on 17 September 2013, at about midnight, an investigator from the investigation division of the Lovech regional prosecutor ’ s office and two forensic technicians inspected the scene. They took pictures of the van, the police car and the place where Mr I.I. had died. At about the same time another investigator inspected Mr I.I. ’ s body in the hospital in Lovech.

13 . The following day, 18 September 2013, a criminal investigation was formally opened against “an unknown perpetrator” on suspicion of causing Mr I.I. ’ s death while carrying out a risky activity, contrary to Article 123 §§ 1 and 4 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 68 below). It was assigned to the same investigator who had inspected the scene.

14 . The same day the investigator asked three medical experts – the head of the forensic department of the Lovech hospital, a forensic specialist from a hospital in Veliko Tarnovo, and a pathologist from the Lovech hospital – to perform an autopsy on Mr I.I. ’ s body, and (a) give an opinion about the cause of his death; (b) say whether he had any traumatic injuries and, if so, explain the manner in which those injuries had been sustained (in particular, whether they suggested a fight); and (c) specify whether Mr I.I. had taken alcohol or drugs before his death.

15 . The same day the investigator interviewed Mr I.I. ’ s two companions. Another investigator interviewed a man (Mr V.M.) living in the block of flats next to which Mr I.I. had died.

16 . The following day, 19 September 2013, the investigator again inspected the place where Mr I.I. had died, and interviewed officers M.S. and R.I. They stated, inter alia , that officer R.I. had fired nine shots at the van. They went on to say that after a prolonged struggle they had managed to overcome Mr I.I. ’ s fierce resistance, press him in the prone position against the ground, and handcuff him behind his back, even though he had kept on struggling. Mr I.I. had at that point screamed twice that he could not breathe, and they had immediately rolled him onto his side and uncuffed him. Noticing that he had loosened down, they had checked him for pulse and had called the Lovech police switchboard for backup and an ambulance. The two police officers from Lovech had arrived shortly after that, and the ambulance had arrived about ten minutes later.

17 . In late September 2013 the investigator interviewed (a) a woman living in the same block of flats; (b) an acquaintance of Mr I.I. (Mr E.K.) who had passed near the scene; (c) the relative whom Mr I.I. had called during the chase; (d) Mr I.I. ’ s personal physician; and (e) another woman living in the same block of flats.

18 . During the same time the investigator obtained medical documents relating to Mr I.I. as well as communications data about the calls made from his mobile telephone, and from the mobile telephones of officers M.S. and R.I. and of one of Mr I.I. ’ s companions.

19 . A couple of weeks later, during the course of October 2013, the investigator interviewed (a) Mr I.I. ’ s friend whose complaint had triggered the internal investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs; one of Mr I.I. ’ s companions (second interview); (c) a third woman (Ms B.P.) living in the block of flats near which Mr I.I. had died; and (d) the police officer from Lovech whom one of Mr I.I. ’ s companions had called during the chase. In her interview, Ms B.P. stated, inter alia , that from her balcony she had not directly seen Mr I.I. getting kicked, but that she had heard him scream that he could not breathe, and that according to her he had been beaten for about fifteen to twenty minutes, during which time he had kept screaming that he could not breathe. She also stated that the police car from Lovech had arrived before the ambulance.

20 . In mid-October 2013 the investigator obtained recordings from the calls (a) made by the four people living in the block of flats to the national emergency number; (b) between officer R.I. and the Pleven police switchboard; and (c) between the Pleven and Lovech police switchboards.

21 . The medical expert report was filed in mid-October 2013 (although the autopsy itself had been performed on 18 September 2013, the day after Mr I.I. had died). The three experts described their autopsy, histology and toxicology findings in detail, and stated that Mr I.I. had suffered cardiogenic shock which had caused a quick cardiac death, with an acute breakdown of the pumping function of the heart and an ensuing interruption of blood flow in the brain. Mr I.I. had experienced a reduced electrical conduction of the heart, which had resulted in atrial fibrillation. That had been due to emotional stress, which had caused an increase of the tonus of the sympathetic nervous system and a surge in the flow of noradrenaline from the sympathetic nerves into the myocardium and of adrenaline from the adrenal glands, resulting in a reduced capacity of the myocardium to use the oxygen flowing into it. The ensuing diffuse hypoxia of the myocardium had in turn led to atrial fibrillation and an inadequate blood supply, combined with an increased need for such blood supply. In their autopsy report, the experts also noted that Mr I.I. had suffered from left ventricular hypertrophy (thickening of the muscle of the heart ’ s left ventricle).

22 . The experts went on to say that the traumatic injuries to Mr I.I. ’ s face and limbs (laceration next to the left eyebrow; swelling of the eyelid and haemorrhage in the cornea of the left eye; bruise and an abrasion next to the right elbow; bruise and abrasion on the left arm; three linear bruises on the back; and bruises around the wrists) could have been caused by the impact of, or against, blunt objects, for instance a fall to the ground and pressing against it. None of those injuries had played a role in the fatal outcome. Two deep haemorrhages just below Mr I.I. ’ s scapulae could have been caused by someone pressing him with knees to the ground. There were also haemorrhages in Mr I.I. ’ s brain, which had not been caused by blows but by a sudden surge in his arterial pressure resulting from stress.

23 . In the experts ’ view, Mr I.I. would have died even if quickly given specialised medical care.

24 . On 21 October 2013 Mr I.I. ’ s mother intervened in the proceedings in her capacity as a victim.

25 . About two weeks later, on 3 and 4 December 2013, the investigator interviewed (a) one of the two police officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene; (b) the van ’ s owner; and (c) the emergency medical doctor and nurse who had arrived at the scene in the ambulance.

26 . On 16 December 2013 the investigator allowed the first applicant (who had apparently also intervened in the proceedings in her capacity as a victim) and Mr I.I. ’ s mother to inspect the case file. Having done so, they stated that the evidence of officers M.S. and R.I. was self-serving, and, as regards specifically the questions whether Mr I.I. had been rolled onto his side rather than left in the prone position and had had his handcuffs removed, were contradicted by the evidence of the acquaintance of Mr I.I. who had passed near the scene (Mr E.K.), of one of the two police officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene, and of the emergency nurse. Another point which called for further elucidation was whether the emotional stress which had apparently caused Mr I.I. ’ s death had resulted from the shots fired during the chase. It also had to be established whether Mr I.I. ’ s traumatic injuries had been caused by blows and whether the assertions of officers M.S. and R.I. that he had put up fierce resistance were true, perhaps through medical evidence about possible injuries suffered by the officers and by interviewing the woman from the nearby block of flats who had made the first emergency call. The first applicant and Mr I.I. ’ s mother also urged the authorities to: (a) interview the driver of the ambulance and the two men from the forest management cooperative who had alerted officers M.S. and R.I. of Mr I.I. ’ s presence in the forest; (b) interview again Mr I.I. ’ s friend whose complaint had triggered the investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs; (c) ask the experts about a possible causal link between the stress which had caused Mr I.I. ’ s death and the actions of officers M.S. and R.I.; (d) attempt to identify a taxi driver who had allegedly passed near the scene; and (e) obtain the clothes worn by Mr I.I. at the time of the incident.

27 . On 19 December 2013 the Lovech regional prosecutor ’ s office noted that there was indeed a discrepancy in the witness evidence about whether Mr I.I. had been left in the prone position and with handcuffs on; this called for a confrontation between the witnesses on that point. There was, however, no need to obtain a fresh expert report on a possible causal link between the actions of officers M.S. and R.I. and the stress endured by Mr I.I., since that link was obvious. It was a different matter whether the officers ’ actions had been lawful. Nor was there a need for a fresh medical expert report about the mechanism in which Mr I.I. ’ s traumatic injuries had been caused, as the first one had already clarified that. Further information was indeed needed about the exact number, distance and direction of the shots fired at the van, and about whether officer R.I. had used lethal ammunition. Evidence was also needed about any injuries suffered by the two officers. It was not, however, necessary to interview again I.I. ’ s friend whose complaint had triggered the internal investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, because his assertions had been based on statements by Mr I.I. ’ s two companions, who had already been interviewed. The requests for further witness evidence were, for their part, well-founded. Lastly, Mr I.I. ’ s clothes had to be obtained as well.

(ii) Second phase

28 . On 19 February 2014 the investigator and a forensic technician inspected the van and photographed it.

29 . On 24 February 2014 the investigator interviewed a taxi driver who had passed near the scene. He said that he had seen the beginning of the chase on foot, but had not managed to make out what had happened during the ensuing struggle between Mr I.I. and the two officers.

30 . The same month the investigator also obtained written evidence that officer M.S. had been examined by a medical doctor the day after the incident and that it had been noted that he had bruises on the lower lip, the right wrist and the left calf. There was no evidence that officer R.I. had undergone a medical examination. For their part, Mr I.I. ’ s clothes had not been preserved by the hospital where his body had been taken.

31 . In late February 2014 the investigator ordered an expert report on the shots fired at Mr I.I. ’ s van. In his report, submitted in late March 2014, the ballistic expert stated that (a) the shots had been fired using “stop cartridges” [3] ; (b) altogether twelve projectiles had hit the van (two in the back door windows, fired from a distance of less than twelve metres; seven more again in the back door windows but fired from a distance of more than twelve metres; and two more: one in the upper part of the rear left fender, and one in the left rear-view mirror, both fired from a distance of more than twelve metres); and (c) there was no method for establishing whether further shots had been fired.

32 . In early March 2014 the investigator asked a medical expert to explain the way in which the injuries suffered by officer M.S. had been inflicted. In her report, submitted three days later, the expert said that those injuries could have been sustained in the manner described by officer M.S. – in a struggle with Mr I.I.

33 . In mid-April 2014 the investigator carried out a confrontation between officers M.S. and R.I. and the emergency nurse. Officers M.S. and R.I. stated that they had unlocked Mr I.I. ’ s handcuffs, leaving them attached solely to his left hand, and had turned him to one side. The nurse stated that she did not recall whether Mr I.I. had had handcuffs on.

34 . In late April 2014 the investigator carried out a confrontation between officers M.S. and R.I. and Mr I.I. ’ s acquaintance who had passed near the scene (Mr E.K.). The latter stated that he had seen Mr I.I. lying in the prone position and with handcuffs on. The officers maintained that they had rolled Mr I.I. onto his side and had removed the handcuffs from one of his hands.

35 . In mid-May 2014 the investigator carried out a confrontation between officers M.S. and R.I. and one of two police officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene. The latter stated that he could not recall whether the handcuffs had been attached to Mr I.I. ’ s two hands, or one hand only. Officers M.S. and R.I. maintained their earlier statements.

36 . On 21 May 2014 the investigator again allowed the first applicant and Mr I.I. ’ s mother to inspect the case file. Having done so, they requested that (a) blood recovered from the scene be tested for whether it was a match for that of Mr I.I.; (b) the discrepancy between the evidence of officer R.I., who claimed that he had fired nine shots, and the expert report, which had noted twelve shots, be elucidated further; (c) the investigator interview again the emergency medical doctor and nurse who had arrived at the scene, as well as officers M.S. and R.I. and one of the two police officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene; (d) more information be gathered about what had become of Mr I.I. ’ s clothes; and (e) a fresh medical expert report be ordered on a possible causal link between the pressing of Mr I.I. face down against the ground and his heart failure.

37 . On 27 May 2014 the Lovech regional prosecutor ’ s office rejected those requests. It noted that (a) Mr I.I. ’ s traumatic injuries and the cause of his death had already been clarified; (b) the discrepancy between the ballistic report and officer R.I. ’ s evidence about the number of shots fired at the van was immaterial; (c) further interviews of the emergency medical doctor and nurse, officers M.S. and R.I., and the police officer from Lovech who had arrived at the scene would not yield more information; (d) the first medical expert report had sufficiently explained the cause of Mr I.I. ’ s death, without noting a possible link with him being pressed to the ground face down and with handcuffs on; and (e) Mr I.I. ’ s clothes had not been preserved, but that could not be undone.

(iii) Discontinuance

38 . On 18 July 2014 the Lovech regional prosecutor ’ s office discontinued the investigation. It set out its findings of fact, commented on some of the evidence, and noted that the police operation in which Mr I.I. had lost his life had been duly ordered and planned. Officers M.S. and R.I. had lawfully tried to stop the van and had then lawfully chased it. The force used by them had been fully in line with the relevant provisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 2014 (see paragraph 73 below). They had admonished Mr I.I. several times to stop, and had used force and a weapon only because Mr I.I. had at first tried to run one of them over, had then tried to push their car off the road, and had after that put up fierce resistance. By doing so, he had endangered both the officers and his two companions. Mr I.I. ’ s ensuing death had not had a direct or indeed any causal link with the officers ’ actions, which had at all times corresponded to the development of the situation and their powers. Mr I.I. had placed himself in a stressful situation which had caused his heart to fail.

(b) Judicial review of the discontinuance of the initial investigation

39 . The first applicant and Mr I.I. ’ s mother sought judicial review of the discontinuance. They submitted that the medical experts had not elucidated whether the manner in which Mr I.I. had been pressed to the ground had contributed to his death; it was hence necessary for experts from another judicial region to clarify the point, and also whether Mr I.I. ’ s injuries had been caused by his falling to the ground or by blows. In addition, when discontinuing the investigation the prosecutor had not analysed the evidence of officers M.S. and R.I. about their exact actions at that juncture. Nor was there any evidence of telephone calls between the Pleven and Lovech police switchboards in relation to the incident. The prosecutor had, moreover, not commented on Ms B.P. ’ s evidence (see paragraph 19 above), which suggested that the officers had used excessive force. Lastly, the evidence of injuries suffered by the officers was unconvincing. The force they had used had been unlawful and excessive.

40 . Having examined the claim on the papers, on 5 August 2014 the Lovech Regional Court quashed the discontinuance (see опр. № 285 от 05.08.2014 г. по ч. н. д. № 292/2014 г., ОС-Ловеч ).

41 . The court held that not all relevant evidence had been obtained, and that the investigation had been one-sided and formalistic, based on insufficiently comprehensive interviews and an inadequate analysis of some evidential discrepancies. In particular, Ms B.P. ’ s assertion that officers M.S. and R.I. had beaten Mr I.I. for fifteen to twenty minutes in spite of his pleas that he could not breathe, and that the police car from Lovech had arrived before the ambulance (see paragraph 19 above) had not been tested against the other evidence, in particular that of Mr V.M., whose account on that point somewhat differed. One of the officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene had, in particular, not been specifically asked whether upon his arrival Mr I.I. had still been alive. The discrepancies between the evidence of officer M.S. and of Mr E.K. had not been resolved either. Mr V.M. and Mr E.K. had mentioned the presence of a third officer at the scene, but that had not been followed upon. The two men from the forest management cooperative had not been questioned either, even though they had seen the beginning of the car chase.

42 . Moreover, the prosecutor had disregarded the provisions proscribing the use of weapons with respect to people suspected of non-violent offences and not posing a risk to anyone ’ s life or health (see paragraph 71 below). Officers M.S. and R.I. had been aware that they had been trying to arrest someone suspected of illegal logging, which was plainly a non-violent offence. It could not be accepted that Mr I.I. had posed a risk to the officers or his companions. The dangerous situation had been caused by the chase undertaken by the officers, and the risk had been not only to Mr I.I. but also to his companions. The use of “stop cartridges” [4] had to be looked at more carefully as well. Lastly, the medical experts had to be asked additionally whether (a) more timely medical attention could have saved Mr I.I. ’ s life, and (b) it had been possible for officer R.I. to observe breathing and pulse if Mr I.I. had, as stated by the experts, died suddenly from cardiogenic shock.

(c) Renewed investigation

(i) First phase

43 . In the renewed investigation, on 30 September 2014 the investigator asked the same experts who had performed the autopsy on Mr I.I. ’ s body (see paragraphs 14 and 21 above) to say whether: (a) he could have been saved if taken to a hospital immediately after saying that he was suffocating, and (b) it had been possible that he could have been still breathing and having a pulse, as asserted by officer R.I., even though he had, according to the experts, died suddenly form cardiogenic shock. In their report, which became ready in early October 2014, the experts stated that Mr I.I. ’ s death, due to heart failure resulting from stress, had been impossible to avert. The interval between the first acute symptoms and the death had been about five minutes. The death had not been caused by mechanical asphyxiation resulting from Mr I.I. ’ s body being pressed to the ground.

44 . In December 2014 the investigator interviewed a man from Bohot who had first heard the noises from the illegal logging carried out by Mr I.I., and the two men from the forest management cooperative who had been present at the beginning of the chase.

45 . In January 2015 the investigator interviewed again Ms B.P. (see paragraph 19 above), who stated, inter alia , that her impressions from the struggle beneath her balcony had been mostly auditory rather than visual. She went on to say that after she had been called for her first interview, she had been visited by Mr I.I. ’ s former wife, who had urged her to say that she had not merely heard the scene but also observed it.

46 . In late February 2015 the investigator interviewed again one of the two police officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene.

47 . On 3 June 2015 the investigator allowed the first applicant to inspect the case file. Having done so, she requested a fresh expert report, voicing doubts about the correctness of the existing ones.

48 . On 15 June 2015 the Lovech regional prosecutor ’ s office rejected the request, finding no reason to question the experts ’ professional competence and integrity, or the accuracy of their reports. It noted, however, that during Mr I.I. ’ s autopsy the medical experts had noted a possibly pre-existing heart condition (see paragraph 21 in fine above). They had to be asked to elaborate on that, and on the role of that condition in the fatal outcome. It went on to say that the repeat interviews carried out by the investigator had been too formalistic; it was hence necessary to interview some witnesses again, with specific questions, and if necessary organise confrontations between them.

(ii) Second phase

49 . In August 2015 the investigator asked the same medical experts (see paragraphs 14 , 21 and 43 above) to say whether: (a) Mr I.I. ’ s heart condition found during the autopsy had been pre-existing or had been triggered by the incident; (b) if pre-existing, that condition had played a role in the cardiogenic shock and the fatal outcome; (c) a healthy heart could have suffered such shock; and (d) such shock necessarily resulted in death. In their report, filed later in August 2015, the experts said that the autopsy had revealed abnormalities in Mr I.I. ’ s heart tissue. In a situation of physical effort, that pre-existing medical condition (left ventricular hypertrophy) had caused cardiogenic shock and death within a few minutes. If his heart had been healthy, the situation would not have produced these effects.

50 . In late September 2015 the investigator interviewed yet again the two officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene, as well as Mr E.K.

51 . On 19 October 2015 the Lovech regional prosecutor ’ s office referred the case back to the investigator, noting that she had failed to follow in full the Lovech Regional Court ’ s instructions. In particular, the investigator had not sufficiently analysed the discrepancies between Ms B.P. ’ s initial and subsequent evidence. Ms B.P. had to be questioned again in a structured way, and confronted with officers M.S. and R.I. and the two police officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene. Nor had the investigator done enough to trace Mr V.M. (who had apparently gone abroad after his first interview) so as to question him again. Mr E.K. had to be confronted with the four police officers as well, and asked specifically about Mr I.I. ’ s position (lying in the prone position or not, handcuffed or not, and so on). Lastly, the ballistic expert had to be asked whether the “stop cartridges” [5] used by the officers had been capable of punching the van ’ s tyres.

(iii) Third phase

52 . On 22 October 2015 the investigator interviewed Ms B.P. for a third time. She stated, inter alia , that from her balcony she had heard sounds which had resembled those produced by kicks, but that she had not really seen anything in the dark. She also stated that Mr I.I. ’ s former wife, who originated from the same village as her, had unexpectedly visited her shortly before her first interview (see paragraph 19 above) and had asked her to “beef things up a bit” and had given her 20 Bulgarian levs. Mr I.I. ’ s former mother-in-law had then called with the same request. Mr I.I. ’ s former wife had later said that she would “give money” to prove that he had been killed.

53 . In mid-November 2015 the investigator interviewed once more officers M.S. and R.I. They stated that during the chase officer R.I. had fired at the van from ten metres or more. The same day the investigator organised confrontations between, on the one hand, those two officers, and their two colleagues from Lovech, and, on the other hand, Mr E.K. and Ms B.P. In the course of those confrontations officers M.S. and R.I. stated that the noise which Ms B.P. had interpreted as coming from kicks could have been from the struggle in which they had tried to overcome Mr I.I. ’ s resistance. They denied having kicked Mr I.I.

54 . The additional ballistic report requested by the Lovech regional prosecutor ’ s office (see paragraph 51 in fine above) was apparently filed in late December 2015.

55 . On 16 February 2016 the investigator allowed the first applicant to inspect the case file. Having done so, she stated that officers M.S. and R.I. had caused Mr I.I. ’ s death, even though the experts had opined otherwise. The officers had used excessive force not only when tackling Mr I.I. but also earlier, during the chase.

(iv) Discontinuance

56 . On 1 April 2016 the Lovech regional prosecutor ’ s office discontinued the renewed investigation. It noted that according to the additional expert evidence report Mr I.I. had suffered from left ventricular hypertrophy, which had caused him to die within a few minutes, and that his death could not have been averted by more timely medical care. Ms B.P. ’ s evidence in the course of the renewed investigation had somewhat differed from her initial evidence. She had, moreover, admitted that before her first interview Mr I.I. ’ s former wife had influenced her. Officers M.S. and R.I. had been specifically asked about the distance from which they had fired the shots during the car chase. The fresh confrontations had not allowed all discrepancies in the witness evidence to be resolved. It had remained unclear whether the handcuffs had remained on Mr I.I. ’ s both hands and whether the noises heard by Ms B.P. had been from kicks. But those were, ultimately, unsubstantial details. What mattered was that the two officers had lawfully tried to stop and arrest Mr I.I. Their use of “stop cartridges” [6] – which were not a “weapon” within the meaning of section 74 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 2006 (see paragraph 71 below) – had also been lawful. The same went for the officers ’ efforts to restrain Mr I.I., who had put up fierce resistance. Mr I.I. ’ s sudden death had been non-violent, resulting from his left ventricular hypertrophy, and had not had a direct – indeed any – causal link with the officers ’ actions, which had at all times matched the development of the situation. Even if stress had contributed to Mr I.I. ’ s death, the officers could not be held liable for it, because the whole situation had been brought about by Mr I.I. ’ s own actions: his attempt to flee, his failure to heed the officers ’ orders, and his resistance against arrest.

(d) Judicial review of the discontinuance of the renewed investigation

(i) At first instance

57 . The first applicant sought judicial review of the discontinuance. She argued that the medical experts had not sufficiently elucidated whether the manner in which Mr I.I. had been pressed to the ground had contributed to his death; it was hence necessary for experts from another judicial region to clarify the point. In addition, when discontinuing the investigation the prosecutor had not analysed the evidence of officers M.S. and R.I. about their exact actions at that juncture. Nor was there any evidence of telephone calls between the Pleven and Lovech police switchboards in relation to the chase. The prosecutor had, moreover, been wrong to discount Ms B.P. ’ s evidence, which suggested that the officers had used excessive force. For its part, the evidence of Mr E.K. and of one of the two police officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene suggested that officers M.S. and R.I. had not removed Mr I.I. ’ s handcuffs. The evidence of injuries suffered by officers M.S. and R.I. was unconvincing.

58 . Having examined the claim on the papers, on 21 April 2016 the Lovech Regional Court upheld the discontinuance (see опр. № 134 от 21.04.2016 т. по ч. н. д. № 138/2016 г., ОС-Ловеч ).

59 . It noted that the medical experts had already noted that there was no direct causal link between the way in which Mr I.I. had been pressed to the ground and his death. There was, furthermore, evidence that the Pleven police had contacted the Lovech police about the chase. The prosecutor had been right to discount Ms B.P. ’ s evidence; it was internally contradictory, clashed with the expert evidence (in particular as regards the duration of the struggle between officers M.S. and R.I. and Mr I.I.), and had been unduly influenced by Mr I.I. ’ s former wife. There was enough evidence that officer M.S. had suffered injuries.

60 . The court went on to hold that the actions of officers M.S. and R.I. had been consistent with the applicable statutory provisions. In particular, they had been justified to use “stop cartridges” [7] during the chase, and resort to physical force and handcuffs when later tackling Mr I.I., who had put up fierce resistance, as attested by the injuries suffered by officer M.S. The question whether Mr I.I. had remained handcuffed was immaterial, as, according to the medical experts, this had no causal link with his death. The manner in which that death had occurred had been sufficiently elucidated by the experts, and it was hence not necessary to obtain further expert evidence on the point. The same went for the traumatic injuries suffered by Mr I.I. and the haemorrhages in his brain. It could not therefore be considered that officers M.S. and R.I. had committed an offence under Article 123 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 68 below).

(ii) On appeal

61 . The first applicant appealed. She reiterated that the causal link between Mr I.I. ’ s death and the way in which he had been pressed to the ground had not been sufficiently elucidated. The expert evidence obtained in the course of the renewed investigation had not properly addressed the point, and it was hence necessary for experts from another judicial region to clarify it. The findings about Ms B.P. ’ s evidence and the degree of force used by officers M.S. and R.I. were also erroneous.

62 . Having examined the appeal on the papers, in a final decision of 7 June 2016 ( опр. № 37 от 07.06.2016 г. по в. ч. н. д. № 148/2016 г., АС-Велико Търново) the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal upheld the lower court ’ s decision .

63 . The court held that the prosecuting authorities and the lower court had correctly analysed the evidence and established the facts – in particular, the cause of Mr I.I. ’ s death and the lack of a causal link between the actions of officers M.S. and R.I. and that death. The conclusion that the force used by the officers had been strictly necessary was also correct, in view of the evidence about the resistance put up by Mr I.I. The officers had had no other means of arresting him. The lower court ’ s findings about Ms B.P. ’ s evidence had been correct. There was no reason to seek further expert evidence, since the available expert evidence had dealt with all relevant points, and there were no grounds to doubt its accuracy or the experts ’ professional competence and objectivity. The prosecuting authorities and the lower court had been correct to find that officers M.S. and R.I. had not committed an offence under Article 123 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 68 below), or any other homicide offence. There was, moreover, no indication that they had had the requisite mens rea , since they had had no intention of killing Mr I.I. or a reason to suspect that he might die as a result of their actions. His death had been sudden and impossible to predict.

64 . The applicants submitted two opinions drawn up for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court by a forensic medical doctor and a cardiologist. The opinions did not contain any information about the credentials of the two experts. The first opinion did not feature a date either.

65 . The forensic medical doctor stated, in response to questions by the applicants ’ lawyer, that cardiac arrest occurred suddenly and without prior symptoms, with brain death taking place within three minutes from the moment when blood flow stopped. He also said that the prone position, in which Mr I.I. had been placed, could result in asphyxiation within about ten minutes, especially after the physical exertion immediately preceding his immobilisation, and that the autopsy ’ s findings were consistent with asphyxiation. Placement in another position would not have resulted in asphyxiation; it was well known that the prone position with pressure on the back could result in sudden death. If Mr I.I. had suffered a cardiogenic shock, the officers would not have been able to detect a pulse; that was more consistent with asphyxiation. An underlying heart condition had contributed to the fatal result. Cardiogenic shock was not a diagnose known to pathoanatomy; it was something to be diagnosed while a person was still alive. The acute symptoms of a cardiogenic shock could not last for five minutes, as found in the criminal investigation; it was much more sudden than that. The witness evidence that the incident had lasted ten to fifteen minutes and that Mr I.I. had complained of a lack of air was more consistent with asphyxiation due to immobilisation.

66 . The cardiologist stated that the interval between the first symptoms of a heart incident and cardiac arrest could be between minutes and days. Timely medical attention could be crucial, and could overcome even a cardiac arrest. The resuscitation procedures, which had to include defibrillation, had to last at least thirty minutes, since biological death within five minutes could not be absolutely certain. Pressing against the ground could aggravate the situation of someone experiencing cardiac arrest.

67 . In the Government ’ s view, that evidence was not to be taken into account, since it was too general (rather than geared towards the specific circumstances of the case), and since it came from experts who had not been properly identified, so as to enable an assessment of their credentials.

Relevant legal framework

68 . By Article 123 § 1 of the Criminal Code, it is an offence to cause death by performing negligently a dangerous regulated activity. Doing everything possible to save the victim afterwards is a statutory mitigating circumstance (Article 123 § 4).

69 . Section 72(1) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 2006, as worded until the end of June 2012, provided, so far as relevant, that in carrying out their duties the police could “use force and auxiliary means only if those duties [could not] be carried out in a different way”, in cases of (a) “resistance or refusal to obey a lawful order”, or (b) “arrest of an offender who [did] not obey or resist[ed]”. By section 73(2), the use of force or “auxiliary means” had to correspond to the specific circumstances, the character of the breach of public order and the offender ’ s personality. By section 73(3), when using force or “auxiliary means”, the police had to take all measures to protect the life and health of the people concerned.

70 . Section 72(2) defined “auxiliary means” to comprise handcuffs and rubber and plastic bullets.

71 . In July 2012 section 72(1) was amended to say that force and “auxiliary means” could be used only “if absolutely necessary”. A new section 73(3) stipulated that “police officers [could] only use the force absolutely necessary”; a new section 74(6) banned the use of “weapons” to arrest or prevent the flight of someone suspected of a non-violent offence and not posing a risk to the life or health of someone else; and a new section 74a mandated that “[t]he planning and control of the use of force, auxiliary means and firearms by the police ... [had to] include [the taking of] measures to attain the lawful aim at a minimal risk to the life and health of [those concerned]”.

72 . In the explanatory notes to the amendment bill the Government referred to the need to bring Bulgarian law fully into line with the applicable international standards and this Court ’ s case-law.

73 . In July 2014 all those provisions were superseded by the similarly worded sections 85(1), 86(3), 86(7) and 88 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 2014.

THE LAW

74 . The applicants complained that the police had caused the death of their father, respectively brother, and that the ensuing investigation into the circumstances of that death had been ineffective. They relied on Article 2 of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:

“1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. ...

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest ...”

75 . The Government argued that the second applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, since, unlike the first applicant and Mr I.I. ’ s mother, she had not taken part in the criminal investigation into her brother ’ s death, or at all approached the authorities in relation to it.

76 . The applicants replied that it had been up to the prosecuting authorities to decide whether to let someone take part in the investigation as a victim. Moreover, the courts had allowed siblings to seek non-pecuniary damages in relation to a death only in 2018. It had been sufficient for one of Mr I.I. ’ s relatives to participate in the investigation.

77 . The first applicant (Mr I.I. ’ s daughter) and Mr I.I. ’ s mother took part in the criminal investigation relating to his death and sought judicial review of its discontinuance (see paragraphs 26 , 36 , 39 , 47 , 55 , 57 and 61 above). When doing so, they were able to, and did, raise all relevant points. The second applicant (Mr I.I. ’ s sister) was hence absolved from the need herself to get involved in those proceedings (see Erdoğan v. Turkey , no. 19807/92, Commission decision of 16 January 1996, unreported; Yüksel Erdoğan and Others v. Turkey , no. 57049/00, § 75, 15 February 2007; Yıldız v. Turkey (dec.), no. 34442/12, § 47, 7 April 2015; Sultan Dölek and Others v. Turkey , no. 34902/10, § 44, 28 April 2015; Taş v. Turkey (dec.), no. 25690/08, § 61, 13 October 2015; Özpolat and Others v. Turkey , no. 23551/10, § 51, 27 October 2015; and Mızrak and Atay v. Turkey , no. 65146/12, § 48, 18 October 2016).

78 . The objection must therefore be rejected.

79 . In their additional submissions on the admissibility and merits of the case, the Government alleged that in their application the applicants had omitted to mention the two additional expert reports obtained in the course of the renewed investigation (see paragraphs 43 and 49 above). They referred in that respect to paragraph 9 of the annex to the application, in which the applicants had set out their complaints in more detail. On that basis, the Government argued that the applicants had tried to mislead the Court, and that their application was hence abusive.

80 . It is not necessary to decide whether the Government are estopped from raising that point, which they could have brought up in their initial observations on the admissibility and merits of the case (see, mutatis mutandis , G.S. v. Bulgaria , no. 36538/17, §§ 69-70, 4 April 2019), since their objection is in any event ill-founded.

81 . According to the Court ’ s case-law, an application is an “abuse” within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention if it is knowingly based on untruths, or if the applicants have submitted incomplete or misleading information, especially if that information concerns the very core of the case (see, among other authorities, Shalyavski and Others v. Bulgaria , no. 67608/11, § 44, 15 June 2017; S.F. and Others v. Bulgaria , no. 8138/16, § 63, 7 December 2017 ; Çölgeçen and Others v. Turkey , nos. 50124/07 and 7 others , § 41, 12 December 2017; Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya v. Russia , nos. 7549/09 and 33330/11 , § 99, 12 June 2018; and A and B v. Romania , nos. 48442/16 and 48831/16, § 93, 2 June 2020).

82 . In the present case, it is true that in paragraph 9 of the annex to their application, in which they elaborated on their complaints, the applicants stated that the authorities had obtained “one medical expert report” and had “refused to order a repeat or expanded expert report”. But these statements must be seen in context: in the main body of their application (paragraph 14 of their statement of facts), the applicants stated that in the course of the renewed investigation the prosecuting authorities had ordered a further medical expert report, which had, however, come to the same conclusions as the initial one. That further expert report was also mentioned in the prosecuting authorities ’ decision to discontinue the renewed investigation and the courts ’ decisions which upheld the discontinuance (see paragraphs 56 , 58 - 60 and 62 - 63 above), which the applicants had enclosed with their application. In those circumstances, it cannot be accepted that they tried to mislead the Court about the expert evidence obtained in the domestic investigation (see, mutatis mutandis , Çölgeçen and Others , cited above, § 42).

83 . This objection must therefore be rejected as well.

84 . In this case, it is more appropriate to first deal with the complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention (see Jabłońska v. Poland , no. 24913/15, § 63, 14 May 2020).

(a) The parties ’ submissions

85 . The applicants argued that the investigation of Mr I.I. ’ s death had been flawed, insufficiently independent and transparent, and not involving enough possibilities for his family to participate in it or influence it. Officers M.S. and R.I. had not been charged and the proceedings had instead been directed against “an unknown perpetrator”, thus giving their evidence undue weight. That evidence, regarded by the authorities as central, had not been corroborated by that of the other witnesses – in particular the two officers from Lovech who had arrived at the scene, the people living in the nearby block of flats, and Mr I.I. ’ s friend who had written to the prosecuting authorities. The investigator had not tried to interview more people from that block, whereas the woman living there (Ms B.P.) whose initial evidence had clashed most with that of officers M.S. and R.I. had undoubtedly been pressured by the authorities. The expert evidence had not clarified key points, such as the exact amount of time it had taken for Mr I.I. to die. None of the experts had been a cardiologist, and they had all been from the same judicial region, and could hence not be considered sufficiently independent. For its part, the ballistic evidence had clearly shown that officer R.I. had not aimed for the van ’ s tyres, and had thrown doubt on the accuracy of the officers ’ statements. The authorities had not commented on the causal link between the shots fired during the chase and the stress endured by Mr I.I. The courts had reviewed the investigation ’ s discontinuance on the papers only, and had not duly engaged with the arguments raised by the first applicant (in particular as regards the causal link between the actions of officers M.S. and R.I. and Mr I.I. ’ s death), instead siding with the account propounded by the officers.

86 . The Government submitted that the investigation of Mr I.I. ’ s death had been thorough and comprehensive, and had obtained and analysed properly all relevant evidence. It had been conducted by an independent investigator, and the first applicant and Mr I.I. ’ s mother had been able to take part in it. Some of their requests for further investigative steps had been allowed, and those that had been refused had been turned down with full reasons. All defects highlighted by the court which had quashed the first discontinuance had later been remedied, in particular with the gathering of additional expert evidence and the confrontation of witnesses. In their decision to discontinue the renewed investigation the prosecuting authorities had duly analysed all relevant bits of evidence – in particular the evidence of Ms B.P. – and in the ensuing judicial review proceedings the courts had properly engaged with the arguments raised by the first applicant. It was true that one of the people from the nearby block of flats who had called the national emergency number had not been interviewed, but that was an isolated omission which had not affected the investigation ’ s overall effectiveness. Nothing suggested that Ms B.P. had been pressured by the authorities; on the contrary, she had been suborned by Mr I.I. ’ s former wife. Nor was there anything to suggest lack of objectivity or partiality on the part of the medical experts, or an error in their conclusion about the cause of Mr I.I. ’ death.

(b) The Court ’ s assessment

(i) General principles

87 . It is settled that Article 2 of the Convention contains a procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation into an alleged breach of its substantive limb (see, among other authorities, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 298, ECHR 2011 (extracts); Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878/08, § 229, 30 March 2016; and Jabłońska , cited above, § 61). If it is not clear from the outset that the death has resulted from an accident or another unintentional act, and if a hypothesis of unlawful killing is at least arguable, Article 2 requires an investigation satisfying a minimum threshold of effectiveness (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 133, 14 April 2015).

88 . The characteristics which such an investigation must have to be seen as effective – including promptness, reasonable expedition, independence, adequacy, thoroughness, objectivity and sufficient involvement of the victim ’ s next of kin – have been set out in a number of judgments relating to such issues (see, for instance, Giuliani and Gaggio , §§ 300-06; Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç , §§ 172-81; and Armani Da Silva , §§ 232-39, all cited above ). The points which need to be emphasised in this case are that (a) the investigation ’ s conclusions must be based on a thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements, and that (b) its effectiveness is decisively undermined by a failure to pursue an obvious line of inquiry, but that (c) the authorities are not required to satisfy every request for a given investigative step (see Giuliani and Gaggio , §§ 302 and 304; Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç , §§ 175 and 180; and Armani Da Silva , §§ 234 and 236 in fine , all cited above ).

(ii) Application of those principles to the present case

89 . Even though it was at first unclear whether Mr I.I. ’ s death had been a result of the “the use of force” against him, the fact remains that he died in the course of a police operation for his arrest. It follows that the authorities were under a duty to investigate the circumstances of his death (see Jabłońska , cited above, § 64, and, mutatis mutandis , Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç , cited above, § 134 ).

90 . Indeed, they opened an investigation right away. Mr I.I. ’ s body and the scene were inspected just a few hours after his death, and an autopsy was performed the following day (see paragraphs 12 , 14 and 21 above). In the months that followed nearly all people involved in the events and a number of witnesses, including several people who lived in the nearby block of flats, were interviewed (see paragraphs 15 - 17 , 19 and 25 above). The investigator also obtained information about the telephone calls made in connection with the incident, both by Mr I.I. and one of his companions, and by the police (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above). Following requests by Mr I.I. ’ s mother and the first applicant, at the instructions of the prosecuting authorities the investigator obtained further evidence and organised confrontations between officers M.S. and R.I. and four witnesses with a view to elucidating the unfolding of the struggle which had immediately preceded Mr I.I. ’ s death, the question whether Mr I.I. had been left in the prone position and handcuffed behind his back, and the potential lethality of the shots fired during the earlier car chase (see paragraphs 28 to 35 above).

91 . It is true that the court which quashed the discontinuance of the initial investigation found that it had been deficient in some respects, in particular as regards the analysis of the evidence about Mr I.I. ’ s final moments, about the use of “stop cartridges” [8] during the car chase, and about the possibility of saving Mr I.I. ’ s life through quicker medical intervention (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above). But all those points were then looked into in the course of the renewed investigation (see, mutatis mutandis , Özcan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 41557/98, 9 November 2004).

92 . During that renewed investigation, the investigator obtained two additional expert reports which shed further light on the direct cause of Mr I.I. ’ s death and the amount of time between the development of acute symptoms and the death itself (see paragraphs 43 and 49 above). Contrary to what the applicants suggested, there is no indication that the experts were not suitably qualified (see paragraph 14 above), or that they were biased or perfunctory in their analysis. The mere fact that other experts later approached by the applicants did not come to the same conclusions (see paragraphs 65 and 66 above) is not evidence of that. It should moreover be noted that the applicants ’ experts framed their opinions in rather tentative terms, that it is unclear on the basis of what information they were proceeding, and that the applicants did not provide any information about their credentials.

93 . The investigator also obtained more evidence about the shots fired during the car chase, and carried out a number of repeat interviews and confrontations with a view to testing the accuracy of the assertions of officers M.S. and R.I. about the final moments of Mr I.I. (see paragraphs 46 , 50 , 53 and 54 above). Ms B.P., the witness whose initial evidence had thrown up the biggest misgivings about an excessive use of force against Mr I.I., was also interviewed two more times, and clarified her initial evidence and the reason why she had given it an incriminating slant (see paragraphs 45 and 52 above). There is no indication that she was somehow pressured by the authorities to do so.

94 . It is clear that none of those steps would have been taken if the hypothesis that officers M.S. and R.I. were liable for Mr I.I. ’ s death was not being seriously considered. Nor can it be said that the investigating authorities accepted their account uncritically, even if the possibility of them having unlawfully caused Mr I.I. ’ s death was ultimately dismissed.

95 . It is true that the authorities did not allow several evidential requests made by the first applicant. But they did so with full reasons, and it does not appear that those reasons were arbitrary or manifestly failed to take into account relevant elements (see paragraphs 27 , 37 and 48 above, and, mutatis mutandis , Grams v. Germany (dec.), no. 33677/96, ECHR 1999-VII; Al Fayed v. France (dec.), no. 38501/02, §§ 81-82, 27 September 2007; and Georgi Georgiev v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 34137/03, 11 January 2011).

96 . It cannot therefore be said that the authorities disregarded obvious lines of inquiry, or came to their conclusions hastily or on the basis of an arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable assessment of the evidence.

97 . The applicants ’ argument that the investigation lacked independence because the officials in charge of it failed to collect relevant evidence and discontinued the proceedings cannot be accepted, since it in essence concerns the investigation ’ s adequacy (see Tonkevi v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 21302/13, § 48, 30 September 2014). There is nothing to suggest a lack of independence on the part of those carrying out the investigation.

98 . As for the criticism that the courts reviewing the investigation ’ s discontinuance did so on the papers only (see paragraphs 40 , 58 and 62 above), it should be noted that the procedural obligations flowing from Article 2 do not require the holding of public hearings (see Giuliani and Gaggio , cited above, § 320, and Fountas v. Greece , no. 50283/13, § 88, 3 October 2019). The courts gave extensive reasons for their eventual decision to uphold the discontinuance (see paragraphs 59 - 60 and 63 above). Those reasons cannot be described as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.

99 . The applicants did not criticise the investigation in other respects, and the Court perceives nothing rendering it at odds with the remaining requirements of Article 2.

100 . It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

(a) The parties ’ submissions

101 . The applicants noted that their version of the facts and that accepted by the national authorities and put forward by the Government differed. It was clear that the police operation had been planned in advance, and it was odd that Mr I.I. had not been apprehended at its very outset. The ballistic evidence showed that the shots fired at the van during the chase could have hit him in the head. The medical evidence had revealed traumatic injuries all over his body, and there was witness evidence that he had been beaten for a long time and had not been provided with timely medical attention but kept pressed to the ground with handcuffs on. All that suggested that the police had used excessive force, and that their operation, meant to cut short a fairly minor offence, had been poorly organised. Regardless of whether Mr I.I. had been beaten to death or had indeed died of heart failure, the authorities were liable for his death.

102 . The Government submitted that officers M.S. and R.I. had not used excessive force. The evidence showed that Mr I.I. had been fully aware that he was being chased by the police, but had driven dangerously to avoid arrest. The “stop cartridges” [9] used by the officers had not been lethal, and had in any event not played a role in Mr I.I. ’ s death. The force used by the officers to then restrain Mr I.I. had been rendered necessary by his fierce resistance, but it was in any event not necessary to show that that force had been in pursuit of one of the aims under Article 2 § 2 of the Convention, since the medical evidence made it plain that Mr I.I. ’ s heart failure and death had not resulted from actions of the officers; he had not died of asphyxiation. Once aware of a risk to his life, the officers had immediately taken steps to avert the fatal outcome, including calling an ambulance. They had not been in a position to foresee that outcome, which had been due to a pre-existing medical condition rather than any inherent deadliness of the force used by them.

(b) The Court ’ s assessment

(i) General principles

103 . The principles governing the “use of force” by the authorities, the conduct and planning of police operations, and the legislative, administrative and regulatory measures that the Contracting States need to adopt to reduce as far as possible the adverse consequences of the use of force are settled. They have been set out in detail in Giuliani and Gaggio (cited above, §§ 174‑82, 208‑10 and 244‑50).

104 . For their part, the principles governing special arrest or immobilisation techniques used by the police – which, though not inherently lethal, may hasten the arrestee ’ s death, especially if he or she has an underlying medical condition – have been set out in Scavuzzo-Hager and Others v. Switzerland (no. 41773/98, § 61, 7 February 2006), Aydemir v. Turkey (no. 17811/04, § 72, 24 May 2011), Y ü ksel v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 49756/09, § 71, 1 October 2013) and Boukrourou and Others v. France (no. 30059/15 , § 61, 16 November 2017). The general proposition emerging from those rulings is that the arrestee ’ s death will be in breach of Article 2 only if the police resorted to such techniques even though they were aware, or could have reasonably been expected to know, that he or she was in a vulnerable state requiring a high degree of care in the choice and application of such techniques.

105 . It is also settled that the authorities have an obligation to protect the life and health of people who have just been arrested, and that this entails providing them with prompt medical attention if their state of health so requires, with a view to preventing a fatal outcome (see Saoud v. France , no. 9375/02, § 98, 9 October 2007; Yavuzkaplan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 13567/08, § 51, 4 September 2012; Yüksel , cited above, § 62; Tekın and Arslan v. Belgium , no. 37795/13 , § 85, 5 September 2017; Boukrourou and Others , cited above, § 63; and Jabłońska , cited above, § 81).

(ii) Application of those principles

106 . In view of how the situation evolved in this case, the Court must examine in turn three elements: (a) the shots fired during the car chase; (b) the physical force then used to restrain Mr I.I.; and (c) the efforts to save Mr I.I. ’ s life once it became apparent that he had a health issue.

(1) Shots fired during the car chase

107 . It is not necessary to decide whether the shots fired by officer R.I. when he and officer M.S. were chasing the van driven by Mr I.I. were “no more than absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 2 § 2. Those shots were not related to Mr I.I. ’ s subsequent death (see, mutatis mutandis , Ercan and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 21470/10, § 60, 16 December 2014), except perhaps in terms of being one of the factors causing the strong emotional stress which he experienced. The ammunition used for those shots – “stop cartridges” [10] – was not meant to be lethal and was not in the circumstances lethal, in view in particular of the distance and angle from which officer R.I. was firing (see paragraph 31 above). Moreover, none of those shots touched or injured Mr I.I. or his companions (see paragraph 5 above). Nor does it appear that the shots were intended to kill them, even if, in view of the dynamic manner in which the car chase was unfolding, officer R.I. did not manage to aim for the van ’ s tyres and hit the van higher up. The shots did not therefore amount to “force” within the meaning of Article 2 § 2 or, more generally, to force of a nature or degree capable of harming the interests protected by Article 2 (see, mutatis mutandis , Tzekov v. Bulgaria , no. 45500/99, § § 42-43, 23 February 2006). The assessment of this point in situations of that sort turns chiefly on the degree and type of force used and on the intention behind its use ( see Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, § 51, ECHR 2004-XI; Acar and Others v. Turkey , nos. 36088/97 and 38417/97, § 77, 24 May 2005; and Sašo Gorgiev v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 49382/06, § 36, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). Unlike in those three cases, here none of those factors points towards the applicability of Article 2 to the shots.

108 . It is therefore not necessary to consider whether the statutory provisions governing the use of firearms by the police in Bulgaria – which had been amended with a view to becoming fully compatible with the Court ’ s case-law just over a year before the incident at issue in this case (see paragraphs 69 to 72 above) – played a role in Mr I.I. ’ s death (see, mutatis mutandis , Mihaylova and Malinova v. Bulgaria , no . 36613/08, § 59, 24 February 2015).

(2) Physical force and handcuffs used to restrain Mr I.I.

109 . It must next be determined whether the physical force later used by officers M.S. and R.I. to restrain Mr I.I. fell afoul of the requirements of Article 2 § 2, given that he died almost immediately after that force had been administered.

110 . The medical expert evidence obtained in the course of the criminal investigation clearly stated that the traumatic injuries suffered by Mr I.I. were unrelated to his death (see paragraphs 22 and 43 above, and, mutatis mutandis , Saoud , cited above, § 92, and Batar v. Turkey (dec.), no. 63017/11, § 17, 16 September 2014). All of them are, moreover, consistent with a struggle between him and officers M.S. and R.I., handcuffing, and a fall face down to the ground (see paragraph 22 above, and, mutatis mutandis , Yüksel , cited above, § 72 ). There are no grounds to call into question the finding of the prosecuting authorities, upheld by the courts, that the officers had not hit or kicked Mr I.I. (see paragraphs 38 , 56 , 59 - 60 and 63 above). In particular, those authorities and courts gave enough reasons for discounting the initial evidence of Ms B.P., who was the only direct witness suggesting that (see, mutatis mutandis , Yavuzkaplan , cited above, § 61). Her initial assertion that the officers had brutalised Mr I.I. for fifteen to twenty minutes is further contradicted by the recorded police calls, set out in detail in the report of the internal investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (see paragraphs 10 in fine and 11 above). According to that report, the whole incident – from the time when officers M.S. and R.I. were trying to make out where Mr I.I. was hiding (9.14 p.m.) until the time when officer R.I. requested an ambulance (9.27 p.m.) – lasted thirteen minutes (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above).

111 . The medical experts who gave evidence in the course of the criminal investigation furthermore specifically stated that Mr I.I. had not died of mechanical asphyxiation (see paragraph 43 in fine above). The expert evidence provided by the applicants (see paragraphs 65 and 66 above) is not sufficient to rebut that conclusion. As already noted in paragraph 92 above, the applicants ’ experts framed their opinions in rather tentative terms, it is unclear on the basis of what information they were proceeding, and the applicants did not provide any information about their credentials. There is therefore no basis to accept that the pressing of Mr I.I. in the prone position against the ground amounted in itself to lethal force for the purposes of Article 2 § 2.

112 . Even assuming that, other than explained by the experts (see paragraph 43 above), the physical force used by officers M.S. and R.I. to restrain Mr I.I. and their previous actions – in particular the firing of shots during the car chase – may have contributed to his heart failure and death, which occurred while the officers were overpowering him or moments after that (contrast Batar , cited above, §§ 4 and 19), it cannot be overlooked that they had no way of knowing that Mr I.I. had a particular vulnerability resulting from his pre-existing medical condition (see, mutatis mutandis , Y ü ksel , § 71, and Boukrourou and Others , § 61, both cited above, and contrast Saoud , cited above, § 100). Their actions cannot therefore form a basis for holding the respondent State liable under Article 2 for his death.

(3) Provision of medical attention to Mr I.I.

113 . It must lastly be established whether the authorities met their obligation to protect Mr I.I. ’ s life once it became clear that he had a medical condition threatening his life.

114 . As noted in paragraph 110 in fine above, the whole incident lasted thirteen minutes. In those circumstances, having regard to the swift request for assistance made by officers M.S. and R.I., and to the relatively quick arrival of the ambulance, it cannot be said that the authorities failed to provide prompt medical attention to Mr I.I. with a view to saving his life (see, mutatis mutandis , Yavuzkaplan , § 60; Boukrourou and Others , § 66, and Jabłońska , § 83, all cited above, and contrast Saoud , cited above, §§ 101-02, and Semache v. France , no. 36083/16, § § 94-101, 21 June 2018 ). The experts who gave evidence in the criminal investigation were of the view that Mr I.I. ’ s death had occurred within a few minutes of the first symptoms and that even prompter medical attention would not have been able to avert it (see paragraphs 43 and 49 above).

(iii) Overall conclusion

115 . It follows that this complaint is likewise manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 20 May 2021 .

Ilse Freiwirth Iulia Antoanella Motoc Deputy Registrar President

[1] A “stop cartridge” (the term used in Bulgaria for such ammunition) has a projectile consisting of a textile sack normally full of small lead pellets. The projectile has a plastic cover and has four lead plates placed underneath it. When a shot is fired, the plastic cover gets destroyed and releases the textile sack. The plastic cover and the lead plates also fly out of the firearm’s muzzle. If a shot from a “stop-cartridge” hits a human body from a distance of less than eleven metres, it can cause serious damage to the internal organs.

[2] See footnote 1 above.

[3] See footnote 2 above.

[4] See footnote 2 above.

[5] See footnote 2 above.

[6] See footnote 2 above.

[7] See footnote 2 above.

[8] See footnote 2 above.

[9] See footnote 2 above.

[10] See footnote 2 above.