AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY

Application No. 11882/85

by C.

against the United Kingdom

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

7 October 1987, the following members being present:

                MM.  C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                     S. TRECHSEL

                     F. ERMACORA

                     M.A. TRIANTAFYLLIDES

                     E. BUSUTTIL

                     A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                     A. WEITZEL

                     H.G. SCHERMERS

                     H. DANELIUS

                     G. BATLINER

                     H. VANDENBERGHE

                Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

                Sir  Basil HALL

                MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                     C.L. ROZAKIS

                Mr.  J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 2 September

1985 by M.C. against the United Kingdom and registered on

2 December 1985 under file No. 11882/85;

        Having regard to

  -     the reports provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure

        of the Commission;

  -     the Commission's decision of 18 July 1986 to bring the

        application to the notice of the respondent Government and

        invite them to submit written observations on its

        admissibility and merits;

  -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

        18 November 1986 and the observations in reply submitted by

        the applicant on 24 March 1987;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1922, and resident

in Glasgow.  He is represented before the Commission by Mr Paul Burns,

a solicitor practising in Glasgow.  The facts as agreed by the parties

may be summarised as follows:

        From August 1982, the applicant was employed as an assistant

janitor of Boclair Academy by Strathclyde Regional Council.  After a

series of thefts in the school, the headmaster, with the aid of the

police, set a trap for the thief by placing in a drawer a £1 note

impregnated with a substance only visible under ultra violet light.

Left in an envelope in the drawer in the school office over a weekend,

it was found to be missing on Monday, 26 March 1983 with no apparent

sign of a break-in.  The applicant had been on duty during that period

and was requested by the police to place his hands under an ultra

violet lamp.  The applicant agreed to do so.  The police officer

claimed to see specks of the powder on the applicant's fingers and

cautioned the applicant, asking whether he had been in the school.  The

applicant replied that he had been in the school office to obtain an

envelope from another drawer in the office.  The applicant alleged he

could see no traces at all on his fingers.

        The applicant was charged with theft of the pound note.  He

was suspended from work and, after a disciplinary hearing held on

29 March 1984 before the Education Officer and the Headmaster, was

dismissed from the school on 5 April 1984.  The applicant had already

been summoned before a disciplinary hearing in June 1983.  He had been

unable to attend due to illness and on 21 June 1983 the Education

Officer had issued a final written warning in respect of severe

misconduct in that the applicant had knowingly submitted an overtime

claim form for a time when he had not worked and on which a signature

had been forged.  The applicant had not appealed this warning.

        On 15 November 1984, the applicant pleaded not guilty to theft

at Dumbarton Sheriff Court.  The case was dismissed on the basis of no

case to answer and the applicant acquitted.  It appeared from the

evidence that the police officers had not been present when the note

had been treated and that they had had no training in the use of the

substance.  It also was not established that any traces found on the

applicant's fingers could not have been caused by another substance.

It also emerged that it could not be established whether a £1 note had

been left there at all, or if there was, where it was placed, and

whether the substance had been allowed to contaminate other parts of

the room.  In an attempt to regain his job and the tied accommodation

which accompanied it, the applicant applied on 8 June 1984 to an

Industrial Tribunal claiming unfair dismissal.

       It emerged at the tribunal hearing that, when the Council

dismissed the applicant, they had been mistaken as to certain facts

which further investigation could have clarified.  In particular, it

appeared that the signature allegedly forged in the previous incident,

which gave rise to the final warning, was in fact authentic.  The

tribunal found however that the dismissal was not affected by this

mistake, since in relation to the other matter to which the warning

related, the false claim for overtime, the final warning was still

valid.  The tribunal also found the whole evidence before the

disciplinary hearing was such that new evidence, concerning the

possibility of entry to the school without leaving evidence of a

break-in, would not have affected the outcome.  The tribunal concluded

therefore on 7 May 1985 that the applicant had not been unfairly

dismissed.  By a letter of 31 July 1985, the Registrar of the

Employment Appeal Tribunal (Scotland) informed the applicant that the

appeal tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain his appeal against

this decision as his Notice of Appeal did not raise any question of

law.  The applicant has since suffered a heart-attack which he

attributes to the stress caused by the case.

        In Scots common law, employment is a contractual relationship

in which dismissal, with due notice, is entirely lawful.  It is a well

established principle of law that any conduct by an employee which is

in breach of the contract, such as dishonesty, may, depending on its

circumstances and gravity, merit dismissal without notice.  The case

of Maxwell v Buchanan (1776) Mor 593 App, decided more than two

centuries ago and still representative of the law, illustrates that

instant dismissal on the grounds of theft is justified whether or not

a conviction for the offence of theft in the criminal courts ensues.

        That position remains unchanged.  However, under the

Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 a dismissed employee

may generally complain to an industrial tribunal that his dismissal

was "unfair" (sections 54 and 67).  If the tribunal so decides, it may

award him compensation or, in specified circumstances, order his

reinstatement or re-engagement (sections 68 to 70).  If this order is

not complied with additional compensation may be awarded (section 71).

The legislation however merely provides a remedy for certain

dismissals which under the Act are "unfair"; it does not prohibit

them.

        Industrial tribunals are judicial bodies set up under statute

(section 128 of the 1978 Act) to adjudicate on various employment

matters including the question of unfair dismissal.  There is a right

of appeal against their decisions on a point of law to the Employment

Appeal Tribunal (section 136) and then to the Court of Appeal and the

House of Lords.

        For a dismissal to be fair the employer must show that there

was a reason for it and that this reason was one of those specified in

the statute, being a reason connected with the conduct of the employee

(section 57 (1) and (2) of the 1978 Act).  Section 57 (3) goes on to

provide that the determination of the question whether the dismissal

was fair or unfair, having regard to the reason shown by the employer,

depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and

administrative resources of the employer's undertakings) the employer

acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason

for dismissing the employee; and that question shall be determined in

accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.

        The case-law of the English Courts establishes that the

question which has to be addressed by the employer when considering

dismissal (and by the tribunal when considering whether a dismissal is

fair) is not whether the employee is guilty, in terms of the criminal

law, but the question of what, given the information available to the

employer at the time when he addresses the question and in the

circumstances of the case, it is reasonable for the employer to do.  It

is not sufficient for an employer to rely on an honest belief in the

employee's guilt:  there must be reasonable grounds and the employer

must act reasonably in all the circumstances.  An employer must also

have sufficient information to enable him reasonably to assume guilt

on the part of the employee  and must have carried out such

investigation as was reasonable.  The standard of proof by which these

matters are to be determined at a hearing before an industrial

tribunal is that applicable in a civil case, that is, proof on the

balance of probabilities.

        Where the grounds for dismissal are misconduct which might

amount also to a criminal offence such as theft, the employer is not

required to have satisfied himself as to the existence of these

grounds on the same standard of proof as is required for the proof of

guilt in criminal cases - proof beyond reasonable doubt - and it has

even been questioned in one case (Lees v The Orchard (1978) IRLR

20, Annex E) whether the standard of proof required is as high as that

required for proof of facts in civil cases - proof on the balance of

probabilities.  The standard required in unfair dismissal cases is

that which has been described as justifying a "reasonable conclusion

of management".  There is also a related but separate distinction in

Scots law between what is sufficient evidence of a fact in industrial

tribunal proceedings and what is sufficient evidence of a fact in

criminal proceedings.  A judicial tribunal or court may not take facts

into consideration until these facts are supported by sufficient

evidence.  In civil proceedings and, in particular, proceedings before

industrial tribunals (which in any event are not bound by the

strict rules of evidence), evidence is sufficient even if it is

uncorroborated by other evidence: in a simple case, one witness is

sufficient.  In Scottish criminal cases, however, the general rule is

that evidence is not sufficient unless corroborated: in a simple case,

two witnesses are required.  It follows from that distinction that

evidence of a fact may be entertained by an industrial tribunal on the

testimony of one witness but evidence of the same fact may not be

entertained by a criminal court in Scotland unless that evidence has

been corroborated by the evidence of another witness.

COMPLAINTS

        The applicant complains that in being dismissed from his

employment before his trial he has not been presumed innocent till

proved guilty.  He also complains that he did not receive a fair

hearing before the industrial tribunal in that they refused to hear

evidence from the criminal proceedings, in which he was acquitted, or

evidence of the series of break-ins which took place in the school

prior to the incident.

        He finally complains that he has lost his home and has had

much distress caused to himself and his family.

        The applicant invokes Articles 6 paras. 1 and 2 and 8 para. 1

of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 2 September 1985 and

registered on 2 December 1985.  On 18 July 1986 the Commission decided

to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government

and to invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility

and merits on the issues concerning Article 6 paras. 1 and 2.

        The Government's observations were submitted on 18 November

1986 and the reply thereto was submitted by the applicant on 24 March

1987, after an extension of the time-limit of two months.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

        A.  The Government

        a.  The facts

        The Government submit that the industrial tribunal did hear

evidence from the headmaster, the head janitor, another janitor and

the applicant that there had been other thefts in the school, both

before and after the applicant's dismissal.  The tribunal referred to

these thefts in their written decision and there is no reason to

suppose that the tribunal failed to give due consideration to that

evidence.  Detailed evidence of what happened in the criminal

proceedings was not heard because the tribunal was required only to

deal with the manner on the basis of what the employers knew or ought

to have known at the time of the dismissal.  The exclusion of this

latter evidence was accepted by both the applicant and his solicitor.

        b.  Admissibility and merits

            Article 6 para. 2

            i.  Article 26

        In this context the Government note that the matter of which

the applicant complains, namely his dismissal, occurred on 4 April

1984, and that the criminal proceedings in which the applicant was

acquitted were concluded on 15 November 1984.  The date of the

subsequent proceedings for unfair dismissal is not relevant to the

complaint in relation to Article 6 para. 2.  The present application

was, however, not made until 2 September 1985.  In these

circumstances, the Government submit that the application was not made

within the period of six months from the date on which the final

decision was taken, and that it is therefore inadmissible.

            ii. Other considerations

        The Government further submit that in applying Article 6 to

the circumstances of the present case, it is important to distinguish

between, on the one hand, the considerations relevant to the criminal

proceedings in respect of the offence with which the applicant was

charged and, on the other, the considerations which are relevant to

the actions of public officials other than in relation to the

proceedings.  The Government rely on the Commission's decision

Krause v.  Switzerland, Application No. 7986/77 (Dec. 3.10.78,

Yearbook 21 p. 516) and also on Applications Nos. 7950/77,

(Dec. 4.3.80, D.R. 19, p. 213) and 8361/78 (Dec. 17.12.81, D.R. 27

p. 37).

        The Government submit that the dismissal of the applicant for

theft by Strathclyde Regional Council did not constitute a violation

of Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention as interpreted in these cases.

The dismissal of the applicant clearly was not a criminal procedure,

nor was it a matter that was in any way related, as a matter of

procedure, to the criminal charges brought against him; the two

matters were quite separate.  The dismissal did not therefore fall

within the area - that is, criminal procedure - in which Article 6

para. 2 has its primary application.  Nor can it be said that in

this case there has been any "formal declaration" that the applicant

was guilty of any criminal offence of the type referred to in the

cases cited.  The dismissal of the applicant was, on the contrary, a

matter between the Strathclyde Regional Council and the applicant

which was not announced to the public at large in any formal way.  It

was a matter related solely to the employment relationship between the

applicant and the Council, and had no direct connection with the

criminal prosecution.  It did not constitute an action by any person or

body who was, or who would be understood by the public to be,

connected with the prosecution process.  Nor can it be said, on the

evidence in this case, that the actions of the Council in any way

prejudiced the right of the applicant to be considered innocent until

proved guilty in the criminal proceedings brought against him.  The

criminal court acted properly and impartially throughout and in fact

did not find the applicant guilty of the offence charged.

        Article 6 para. 1

        First the Government would point out that the post from which

the applicant was dismissed was that of a janitor with the Strathclyde

Regional Council, a department of local government in Scotland.  In

this context, the Government would refer to the consistent case-law of

the Commission which indicates that litigation concerning dismissal

from public service does not involve the determination of "civil

rights or obligations" and therefore falls outside the scope of

Article 6 para. 1.  The Government refer in particular to Application

Nos. 3937/69, X v.  Belgium (Dec. 12.12.69, Collection 32 p. 61);

8469/79, X v.  U.K. (Dec. 8.10.80.  D.R. 21 p. 168)); 8686/79,

X v.  Italy (Dec. 10.10.80, D.R. 21 p. 208) and 9801/81, X v.  FRG

(Dec. 7.12.81.  D.R. 27 p. 249).  The fact that the the applicant was

serving under a contract of employment does not affect the public

character of his duties (Application No. 8496/79).  The Government

therefore submit that, as the applicant's complaint is in relation to

his dismissal from a public service post, the proceedings relating to

that dismissal did not amount to a "determination of his civil rights

and obligations" and that Article 6 para. 1 therefore has no

application to this case.

        The Government note that it is well-established in the

jurisprudence of the Commission that the question whether a trial

conforms to the standard laid down in Article 6 para. 1 must not be

decided on the basis of an isolated consideration of one particular

aspect of the trial or incident.  See for example the Commission's

decisions on Applications Nos. 343//57, Nielsen v.  Denmark

(Dec. 2.9.59, Yearbook 4 p. 548), 5574/72 (Dec. 21.3.75, D.R. 3

p. 10), 7306/75 (Dec. 6.10.76, D.R. 7 p. 115) and 8744/79 (Dec. 2.3.83,

D.R. 32 p. 141).

        Furthermore, it has also been the view of the Commission that

in any case the right to receive a fair hearing under Article 6 para.

1 of the Convention does not entail as a consequence the unrestricted

right to present evidence, irrespective of its relevance (See e.g.

Eur.  Court H.R., Engel and others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A

no. 22).  The Government submit that this principle is relevant to

Article 6 as a whole.  The fact that the applicant was not found

guilty of the charge in question is irrelevant to the questions which

had to be determined by the domestic tribunal.  In particular, the

fact of the applicant's acquittal was not relevant, since the tribunal

did not have to consider whether it was satisfied that the offence was

committed, but rather had to investigate the state of mind and

knowledge of the employer.

        The Government further submit that, since the purpose and

effect of proceedings before the industrial tribunal and the matters

addressed and legal criteria applied in these proceedings are so

materially different from those in the criminal proceedings, evidence

concerning the applicant's acquittal for theft in the criminal

proceedings could be properly excluded from the industrial proceedings

which appears to have been directly relevant to the acquittal -

evidence, for example, of the absence of the two police officers when

the pound note was treated and as to their lack of expertise about the

substance would not have been relevant to the questions before the

industrial tribunal, questions which might reasonably be summarised as

follows - "Given the information which is available to the employer,

or which he ought to have known, at the time of the dismissal and the

circumstances of the case, what was it reasonable for the employer to

do?"

        The Government submit that the evidence of the applicant's

acquittal was irrelevant for yet another reason, namely the difference

in the standard of proof required in criminal and civil proceedings.

The acquittal of the applicant in criminal proceedings indicated that

his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.  The standard

of proof of facts in civil cases is lower, and the fact that the

applicant's guilt could not be established according to a different,

higher standard of proof is clearly not decisive of the same issue in

civil proceedings.

        The applicant has also referred to the evidence which was

before the criminal court as to subsequent thefts at the school.  The

facts of the case show that the industrial tribunal did not refuse,

during the hearing of the applicant's complaint of unfair dismissal,

to hear evidence of the other thefts including subsequent thefts at

the school; and indeed such evidence was in fact heard by the

tribunal.

        B.  The applicant

        a.  The facts

        The industrial tribunal refused to allow evidence of what

happened at the criminal trial.  This was to the detriment of the

applicant since the evidence of witnesses at the tribunal was

different from the evidence which they rendered at the criminal trial

and the applicant was thereby denied the opportunity of

cross-examining them upon the inconsistencies.  It is agreed that the

tribunal had evidence of theft subsequent to the applicant's

dismissal.  The tribunal should however have looked at the

reasonable investigations which the employers should have made.

        b.  Admissibility and merits

            Article 6 para. 2

            i.  Article 26

        The applicant received his copy of the tribunal's judgment on

9 May 1985 and thereafter applied to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

The Commission was not competent until the applicant has exhausted

these local remedies.

            ii. Other considerations

        The letter dismissing the applicant stated "the reasons for

your dismissal are the theft from the school office ...".  In

determining whether or not the dismissal for alleged theft was a

violation of Article 6 para. 2, consideration should be given to the

terms of his dismissal which were stated to be for theft, not for

alleged theft.  The local authority clearly dismissed the application

on the assumption of his guilt.  Had they not made that assumption, it

is clear from their own submissions that they would not have dismissed

him.  Had they not dismissed him pending outcome of the prosecution

against him, it is clear that matter would then have emerged which

would have shown the unreasonableness of their decision to dismiss.

        Article 6 para. 1

        The applicant held a relatively menial post under a contract

of employment.  The nature of that employment was such that it is

a matter of no consequence that his employer happened to be a division

of local government.  The applicant's dismissal therefore falls to be

distinguished from cases restricting access to government or special

professions or excluding parties from the same on grounds of some defect.

        The applicant also submits that the tribunal, being an

informal body, would have been entitled to look at the evidence

pleaded in the criminal case and was under the obligation to hear all

relevant evidence.  By excluding the most important evidence, the

tribunal itself ceased to provide a fair hearing both under domestic

law and under the Convention.

        The applicant further submits that the difference in the

standard of proof required in criminal and civil proceedings is

irrelevant.  The tribunal's duty was to look at all of the evidence

which had a bearing on the matter before it could assess whether the

statutory test of reasonableness and fairness of the applicant's

dismissal had been reached.  By excluding important evidence from its

consideration, the tribunal acted unfairly to the applicant to the

extent of depriving him of a fair hearing within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1.

THE LAW

1.      The applicant has complained that, in being dismissed for

theft from his post as a school janitor before criminal proceedings

against him were completed (by his acquittal), his employer, the state

local education authority, violated the presumption of innocence laid

down in Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention.

        The Government have contended that this aspect of the

application is either inadmissible for non-observance of the six

months' rule, or for being manifestly ill-founded, the employer's

disciplinary proceedings not being a criminal prosecution.

        As regards the observance of the six months' rule laid down in

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the Commission finds that the final

effective decision in the present case was that of the industrial

tribunal on 7 May 1985, for it was not until the tribunal had decided

that the applicant had been fairly dismissed by  his employer that the

full effects of the applicant's prejudice could be assessed.  As he

introduced the application to the Commission on 2 September 1985,

within six months of that decision, he has respected the requirements

of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.

        As to the substance of the applicant's complaint, the Commission refers

to the terms of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) which ensures that "everyone

charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty

according to law".

        The Commission also refers to its previous case-law: In the

case of Krause v.  Switzerland (No. 7986/77, Dec. 3.10.78, D.R. 13

p. 73) the Head of the Federal Department of Justice and the Police

gave a television interview in which he stated that a person, albeit

awaiting trial, had committed criminal offences.  On the facts of the

case the Commission found that the presumption of innocence had not

been breached, but affirmed the general principle that Article 6 para.

being guilty of an offence before this is established according to law

by a competent court.  Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2), therefore, may be violated

by public officials if they declare that somebody is responsible for

criminal acts without a court having found so.

        The Commission finds, however, that a distinction must be made

between civil proceedings and criminal proceedings arising out of the

same events.  It is a general feature of legal systems in States which

are Parties to the Convention that parallel civil and criminal

proceedings may be initiated against a person and, by virtue of the

different standards of proof normally observed in such proceedings,

acquittal at the end of a criminal trial, because the accused has not

been shown to be guilty of an offence beyond all reasonable doubt,

does not necessarily preclude that same person's civil liability on

the balance of probabilities (cf. criminal proceedings for a road

traffic offence and civil proceedings for negligence following a car

accident).  Whilst State officials are under an obligation to observe

scrupulously the presumption of innocence with regard to pending

criminal proceedings, particularly those officials involved in the

prosecution, trial or appeal, such an obligation does not generally

arise in respect of a person's civil obligations vis-à-vis the State,

as in the present case with a contract of employment in the State

public service.

        An examination of the facts of the present case reveals that

the assessment by the applicant's employer of the applicant's honesty

and his fitness for further service was communicated to the applicant

only by way of his notice of dismissal.  This assessment was not

publicly communicated.  The proceedings before the industrial tribunal

were of a civil nature and did not determine whether a criminal

offence had been committed.  They rather determined whether the

employer had acted reasonably at the material time and whether the

applicant's dismissal had been fair.

        The Commission finds that the aforementioned factors did not

involve determinations of any criminal charge to which the presumption

of innocence would have attached, nor have they been shown to have had

any influence on the course of the subsequent criminal proceedings

against the applicant.  The Commission concludes, therefore, that the

facts of the present case do not raise an issue falling within the

scope of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention.  It follows that this

aspect of the applicant's case is incompatible ratione materiae

with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

2.      The applicant has next complained that the proceedings before the

industrial tribunal were unfair, contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention.

        The Government have contended that questions concerning the

dismissal of persons in public service do not involve the

determination of civil rights and obligations within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

        The relevant part of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

provides as follows:

        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations...

        everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

        reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

        established by law..."

        The Commission finds that whilst internal professional

disciplinary proceedings against persons employed in public service may not

attract the guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, when

a contract of employment, albeit in the public service, permits access to the

civil courts to determine the respective civil liabilities of the parties, the

proceedings before the normal courts may usually be said to determine civil

rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of

the Convention and, therefore, enjoy the guarantees laid down in this provision

(cf.  No. 6504/74, Dec. 7.12.77, D.R. 12 p. 5 at p. 8).

        The applicant's specific complaint concerning the industrial

tribunal proceedings was that evidence of the criminal trial, at which

he was acquitted, was excluded.  The Government contended, however,

that certain evidence about the trial was before the industrial

tribunal and that the exclusion of other evidence was accepted by the

applicant and his solicitor.

        The Commission notes that the industrial tribunal heard the

school's headmaster and other janitors.  There is no evidence in

the case to suggest that the applicant was not able to challenge their

testimony, call his own evidence or put his case fully to the

tribunal.  In particular, contrary to the applicant's original

assertion, it is clear that the tribunal did hear evidence concerning

earlier thefts at the school.  In these circumstances, the Commission

concludes that this aspect of the applicant's case is unsubstantiated.

His complaint of an unfair hearing before the industrial tribunal is,

therefore, manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.      Finally the applicant has complained that his dismissal from

his employment caused the loss of his home (being tied to the job)

and much distress to himself and his family.

        He has invoked Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides as

follows:

        "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

        family life, his home...

        There shall be no interference by a public authority with

        the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance

        with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in

        the interests of national security, public safety or the

        economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of

        disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,

        or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

        The Commission finds that, even assuming that the present case

could be said to have involved an interference with the applicant's

Article 8 (Art. 8) rights, that interference was justified as being "necessary

in a democratic society... for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others", namely the applicant's employer.  This aspect of

the applicant's case is, therefore, also manifestly ill-founded, within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   Deputy Secretary to the Commission        President of the Commission

              (J. RAYMOND)                         (C.A. NØRGAARD)