DROSOPOULOS v. GREECE
Doc ref: 40442/98 • ECHR ID: 001-4923
Document date: November 18, 1999
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SECOND SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 40442/98 by George DROSOPOULOS against Greece
The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section ) sitting on 18 November 1999 as a Chamber composed of
Mr M. Fischbach, President , Mr C. Rozakis, Mr B. Conforti, Mrs V. Strážnická, Mr P. Lorenzen, Mr A.B. Baka, Mr A. Kovler, judges ,
and Mr E. Fribergh , Section Registrar ;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 26 December 1997 by George Drosopoulos against Greece and registered on 25 March 1998 under file no. 40442/98;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Greek national, born in 1938 and living in Athens . He is represented before the Court by Mr Th. Zigras , a lawyer practising in Athens .
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
In 1972 the applicant was appointed a notary public ( simvoleografos ) in Athens . He specialised in contracts for the sale of cars.
In 1995 disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the applicant for not having paid to the notaries' association ( simvoleografikos sillogos ) of Athens , Piraeus , the Aegean and the Dodecanese 30% of the fees he had received from contracts for the sale of cars and motorbikes between 10 March 1993 and 5 May 1994. According to the disciplinary charges the applicant had acted contrary to Article 102 § 4 of Law 670/1977.
The applicant appeared before the five-member Disciplinary Tribunal constituted within the Court of Appeal ( Pendameles Pitharhiko Dikastirio tu Efetiu ) of Athens on 14 December 1995. He argued, inter alia, that the obligation to pay 30% of his fees to the association amounted to a confiscation.
In a decision issued on the same date the disciplinary tribunal found that the obligation in question constituted a legitimate restriction of professional liberty. It also found that the applicant had indeed failed to pay to the notaries' association 30% of the fees he had received in connection with the sale of cars and motorbikes during the period in question. As a result, the tribunal decided, by majority, to strike the applicant out of the roll of the association.
On 2 February 1996 the applicant, who could not any longer practise as a notary public, appealed in cassation. On 9 May 1997 the Court of Cassation ( Arios Pagos ) rejected his appeal. The court considered that the limitation on professional freedom introduced by Article 102 § 4 of Law 670/1977 was justified in the public interest since its aim was to introduce a measure of fairness in the distribution of the earnings from the particular category of sales among the notaries public. It also considered that all notaries public were treated equally since they were subject to the same obligation. The applicant obtained a copy of the relevant decision on 27 June 1997.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains , under Articles 3 and 6 § 1 of the Convention, that, as a result of the decision of the Court of Cassation, he cannot any longer exercise his profession.
2. He also complains that the obligation to pay 30% of the fees he had earned amounts to an unjustified interference with his right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He points out that he had earned this money because of his professional efforts, that he had to pay 30 % of his gross earnings, which amounted to 60% of his profits, and that the obligation to pay 30% of the notaries' fees did not apply to other types of contracts, such as contracts for the sale of immovable property.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains , under Articles 3 and 6 § 1 of the Convention, that, as a result of the decision of the Court of Cassation, he cannot any longer exercise his profession.
Article 3 of the Convention prohibits torture. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair trial.
The Court recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, § 162). It considers that the treatment to which the applicant was subjected as a result of the disciplinary penalty imposed on him did not attain this level.
The Court also recalls that it is not competent to deal with applications alleging that errors of national law have been committed by the national courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Garcia Ruiz v. Spain judgment of 21 January 1999, to be published in Reports of Judgments and Decisions , § 28; Schenk v. Switzerland judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, § 45). Having examined the application, the Court considers that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the particular circumstances.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
2. The applicant complains that the obligation to pay 30% of the fees he had earned amounts to an unjustified interference with his right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the applicant 's complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Erik Fribergh Marc Fischbach Registrar President