SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 31561/96 by G éza FARKAS against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section ), sitting on 2 March 2000 as a Chamber composed of

Mr B. Conforti, President , Mr G. Bonello, Mrs V. Strážnická, Mr P. Lorenzen, Mr A.B. Baka, Mr A. Kovler, Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska, judges ,

and Mr E. Fribergh , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 29 January 1996 and registered on22 May 1996,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Hungarian national born in 1965 and living in Kunszentmiklós , Hungary. He is a businessman. He is represented before the Court by Mr. J. Somogyi , a lawyer practising in Budapest.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

A. Particular circumstances of the case

The application concerns the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest by four members of the Kunszentmiklós Police on 29 April 1995 and his alleged ill-treatment subsequently at the Kunszentmiklós police station. As to the actual course of these events, the Government and the applicant submitted conflicting versions.

a.              The applicant’s account of the relevant events

On 29 April 1995, at about 6 p.m., the applicant was working in the yard of his house, when he saw Mr. R. approach, running on the street. Two police officers wearing uniforms and holding guns were chasing Mr. R. The applicant asked one of the policemen why they were chasing Mr. R. In response the policemen ordered the applicant to drop the wooden bar he was holding in his hand. He complied with the order. Thereupon he was ordered to lie down on the ground. He, being afraid, attempted to run away, during the course of which the other policeman present hit him in the face. He nevertheless managed to break free and escape to the neighbouring gardens. Realising that two further police officers had meanwhile arrived on the premises, he eventually went out on the street again and lay down on the ground. Subsequently he was handcuffed and brought to the Kunszentmiklós police station. He alleges that during the drive to the police station Police Officer F. hit him once in the stomach.

             At the police station his hands were handcuffed behind his back and, subsequently, Police Officer F. and the police officer who had previously taken the action against him in front of his house systematically beat him up. During the beating he fell on the floor, where he was kicked several times and his head was banged against the floor, which resulted in a bleeding bruise on his forehead. A person wearing plain clothes stepped on his dislocated foot. Thereupon he was instructed to wash himself, go outside and tell his relatives waiting there that he had not been hurt and that they should leave. He did not comply with this instruction.

b. The Government’s account of the events

On 29 April 1995 Police Officers R. and F. were on duty in Kunszentmiklós . They halted a car for an identity check of the driver and his passenger. This latter person, however, did not comply with the police officers’ instruction but jumped out of the car and started to run away. While chasing him, the police officers reached the street where the applicant lives. Here the applicant appeared, holding a wooden bar in his hands.

According to the police officers and a civil guard present, the applicant yelled at them, blocked their way and hit with the wooden bar in the direction of Police Officer R.’s head. Thereupon Police Officer F. took out his service gun and ordered the applicant to drop the wooden bar. He dropped the wooden bar and ran away. Police Officer R. ran after him, caught him and attempted to stop him grasping him by his left shoulder. The applicant turned around and, with his right fist, he hit Police Officer R. on the left cheek. Thereupon the police officer tried to push the applicant down on the ground, but the latter hit him again on the left cheek twice, managed to break free and ran away. In this moment the applicant’s relatives and neighbours showed up in the street; the preceding events had consequently not been eye-witnessed by anyone other than the police officers and the civil guard. Police Officer R. went on trying to subdue and hand-cuff the applicant in order to prevent further violence but he could not overcome his resistance.

Eventually, the applicant broke free and ran into the spectators’ crowd where he disappeared. Police Officer R. followed the applicant into the crowd and saw him fall on the ground accidentally. By the time he got near the applicant lying on the ground in order to handcuff him, several women - some relatives and acquaintances of the applicant - leant over the applicant, covering him with their bodies and preventing his handcuffing. While the police officers were trying to pull these women away, the applicant broke free again and ran away. Jumping over several fences, he soon reappeared in another direction in the street.

In this moment two further policemen arrived on the premises upon the acting police officers’ call for back-up. Presumably owing to exhaustion, the applicant meanwhile lay down on the stony earth road further down the street, where the above-mentioned women leant over him again, covering him with their bodies. The proceeding police officers finally managed to handcuff the applicant, whom they brought to the Kunszentmiklós police station.

According to the testimonies given in the course of the ensuing investigations by the police officers involved and the civil guard present, the applicant had injuries on his face when handcuffed; in turn, he was not ill-treated at the police station.

c. Subsequent events on 29 April 1995

Later that day Dr. F. was called to the Kunszentmiklós police station, who, at 10.35 p.m., examined the applicant and prepared a medical report on his injuries. Subsequently he left to fetch his instruments in order to suture the applicant’s wound on the forehead. The applicant alleges that thereupon a police officer handcuffed him again and went on hitting and kicking him.

             After Dr. F. had returned and sutured the applicant’s wound over the eye, the latter was brought to the Bács-Kiskun County Police Department’s Prison in Kecskemét .

d. Medical reports and opinions evaluating the applicant’s injuries

In his report of 29 April 1995, Dr. F. stated that the applicant had the following injuries: abrasions, bruises and suffusions of the face, the forehead, the neck, the shoulders, the right upper arm, the chest and the back, a swollen reddish discoloration and suffusion in the upper stomach region, as well as a ruptured wound over the right eye. In Dr. F.’s opinion, these injuries were to heal within seven days.

On 2 May 1995 Dr. T. examined the applicant in the Kecskemét prison. In his report Dr. T. described altogether nineteen counts of contusions and abrasions scattered on the applicant’s head, arms, chest, back, trunk and legs.

On 28 May 1995 the Bács-Kiskun County Police Department appointed a medical expert to give his opinion on the previous medical reports concerning the applicant’s injuries. The expert found that the applicant’s injuries, as described by Dr. F. on 29 April and by Dr. T. on 2 May, could be due to the struggle between the applicant and the police officers and the applicant’s falling down on harsh ground in the context of his arrest. In turn, the expert found no reference in the reports to any injury, which could be attributed to any brutality other than the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest.

On 10 August 1995 Professor D., a forensic pathologist appointed by the Kecskemét Branch Office of the Szeged Prosecution’s Department of Investigation (“the Branch Office”), issued an opinion as to the nature of the applicant’s injuries. He found that the contusions and abrasions on the applicant’s body, as described in the medical reports of 29 April and 2 May, could be due to punches or to falling down on harsh ground. The swollen lesion in the gastric area had been likely to derive from a punch on the applicant’s stomach. The injuries altogether could be the consequences of the applicant’s forcible immobilisation and handcuffing. From a forensic medical aspect it could not be proven if the injuries had been suffered in the context of the applicant’s arrest or of any potential subsequent ill-treatment.

On 20 September 1995 the Forensic Pathology Department of the Semmelweis Medical University issued a forensic medical opinion in the case. According to this opinion, the applicant’s injuries must have been due to at least eighteen counts of forcible impact and it could not be excluded that these impacts had been punches. However, in the Forensic Pathology Department’s view, the medical report prepared by Dr. F. on 29 April 1995 was not precise enough to underlie a forensic opinion as to the cause of the applicant’s injuries.

e. Proceedings in pursuit of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment

On 9 and 11 May 1995, respectively, the applicant laid charges of ill-treatment and of light bodily assault against the police officers involved. The ensuing proceedings took place before the Branch Office.

             On 6 September 1995 the Branch Office discontinued the investigation upon the charges laid by the applicant. The Branch Office, relying on forensic medical expertise and witness evidence - given by the police officers and the civil guard present at the incident -, found that the applicant’s injuries could be due to the fight between the police officers and the applicant upon the occasion of the latter’s arrest, when hindering the lawfully proceeding police officers in arresting Mr. R. The Branch Office held that it could not be proven beyond doubt that the applicant’s injuries had been caused by ill-treatment rather than in the course of his lawful arrest.

             On 27 September 1995 the applicant lodged a complaint against the decision of 6 September 1995. He criticised the fact that the Branch Office had held no hearing in the case. Moreover, he submitted the forensic medical opinion prepared by the Forensic Pathology Department of the Semmelweis Medical University on 20 September 1995.

             On 13 October 1995 the Kunszentmiklós District Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The Prosecutor’s Office pointed out that it had not been possible to prove beyond doubt that his injuries had been caused as alleged and that the investigation had been, therefore, lawfully discontinued. To the extent that the decision of the Branch Office had concerned the applicant’s charges of light bodily assault, the Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 6 September 1995 and transferred the case to the Kunszentmiklós District Court in order that it should proceed with the applicant’s charges in private prosecution proceedings.

             On 9 November 1995 the applicant lodged a revisionary complaint with the Attorney General’s Office. In January 1996 the Attorney General’s Office dismissed this complaint.

             On 29 February 1996 the Kunszentmiklós District Court, in preparatory proceedings, discontinued the private prosecution proceedings against Police Officers F., R. and S. The District Court found unsubstantiated the applicant’s charge of light bodily assault brought against the police officers.

             On 16 April 1996 the Bács-Kiskun County Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The Regional Court, while upholding the discontinuation of the proceedings, quashed the reasoning of the first-instance decision on the ground that it had constituted a pre-judgment of the case in breach of Article 10 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Regional Court held that the original charges laid by the applicant, namely those of ill-treatment and of light bodily assault, concerned one and the same event. His charge of ill-treatment was to be pursued in public prosecution proceedings but the relevant investigation had been discontinued and no indictment had been brought against the police officers on this account. In the instant private prosecution proceedings, however, the unlawful origins of the injuries inflicted in the context of the police action against him could not be established. A decision on this question having been a pre-requisite of examining the merits of the charge of light bodily assault, the proceedings were without an object.

f. Criminal proceedings against the applicant

Shortly after the events of 29 April 1995 the Head of the Kunszentmiklós Police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant, charging him with having violently hindered the arrest of Mr. R. Subsequently the Branch Office prosecuted the applicant on account of the offence of violence against persons acting in official capacity.

On 30 April 1995 an investigator of the Branch Office heard the applicant as defendant concerning the circumstances of his arrest the day before. On this occasion the applicant did not allege that, subsequent to his arrest, he had been ill-treated at the police station.

On 3 May 1995 the Branch Office heard Police Officer R. and Mr. S., the civil guard involved in the events of 29 April 1995. Police Officer R. who stated that the applicant’s injuries had been due solely to the struggle in the context of his arrest. Mr. S. stated that, when handcuffed, the applicant had already had some abrasions on the face and that between the applicant’s arrival at the police station and his own departure therefrom at about 8 p.m. he had witnessed no ill-treatment of the applicant.

On 11 May 1995 the applicant was heard again in the presence of his lawyer. On this occasion the applicant stated that during the drive from the premises of his arrest to the police station, Police Officer F. had hit him once in the stomach, and that on his arrival at the police station, the police officer had poured some water on him. When in the building, Police Officer R. had sprayed some tear-gas in his eyes and then together with Police Officer F. he had started to hit and kick him. Subsequently he had been forced to wash himself. In a few minutes Dr. F. had arrived who had not examined him, but had had a look at his face and had stated that the wound over his eye needed to be sutured. After the doctor’s departure, Police Officer S. had kept on kicking him.

Also on 11 May 1995 the Branch Office heard Dr. F. who stated that when he had examined the applicant on 29 April 1995 between approximately 8 p.m. and 10 p.m., the latter had made no reference to any ill-treatment suffered at the police station. Dr. F. also stated that when having examined the applicant, he had observed no trace of wetness on the applicant’s clothes, neither had he seen any sign of a conjunctivitis due to contamination by tear-gas.

Moreover, on 11 and 26 May and 15 June 1995 four relatives of Mr. R. were heard as eye-witnesses. These persons stated that, when arrested in front of his house on 29 April, the applicant had not had any injuries.

On 11 August 1995 the Branch Office heard Police Officer O. who had arrived on the premises of the applicant’s arrest upon the call for back-up. He reinforced the above testimonies of Police Officer R. and Mr. S. and stated that, when handcuffed, the applicant had already had some bleeding injuries on the face.

On 26, 27 and 28 August, 30 September, 7 and 28 November 1997 the Kecskemét District Court held hearings in the case. When heard as a witness on 27 August 1997, Dr. F. stated that in his view the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted before he had first seen him on 29 April 1995, rather than during the interval between this inspection and the examination at about 10 p.m. Moreover, when heard as a witness on 28 August 1997, the author of the forensic medical opinion of 28 May 1995 sustained his earlier opinion in the sense that from a medical aspect it could neither be verified nor excluded that the applicant’s injuries had been due to punches.

On 28 November 1997 the Kecskemét District Court convicted the applicant of the offences of violence against persons acting in official capacity and of light bodily assault. It sentenced the applicant to one year’s imprisonment, the execution of which was suspended for three years. As to the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, the District Court noted that thirteen counts of his fifteen injuries were due to the struggle in the context of his arrest, whereas the cause for the remaining two injuries, namely a wound on his right eyelid and an abrasion on the left side of his forehead, remained unclear. Since, however, the medical reports had identified no injuries typical of physical abuse and no other evidence had emerged in support of the applicant’s allegations, the District Court found them unsubstantiated.

On 29 June 1998 the Bács-Kiskun County Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, while reducing the probationary period to one year.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

According to Article 349 of the Civil Code, official liability [of the State administration] may be established only if the relevant ordinary remedies have been exhausted or have not been fit to prevent damages.

In its decision no. Pf.I.20.128/1992, the Supreme Court held that inappropriate police measures may give rise to official liability under Article 349.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains that the ill-treatment he suffered when committed to the Kunszentmiklós police station amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

2.              He also complains under Article 6 of the Convention that, in the course of the proceedings upon his charges against the police officers involved, he had no access to an independent and impartial tribunal.

3.              Moreover, he complains under Article 13 of the Convention that he could not have an effective remedy before the national authorities in that his allegations of ill-treatment were only examined by the prosecution authorities.

4.              Finally, the applicant complains that his ill-treatment and the ensuing proceedings of the authorities reflected discrimination against him on account of his ethnic origin, contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention.

PROCEDURE

The application was introduced on 29 January 1996 and registered on 22 May 1996.

On 10 April 1997 the European Commission of Human Rights decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.

The Government’s written observations were submitted on 9 June 1997. The applicant replied on 29 August 1997. On 14 October 1997 and 17 March 1998 the Government submitted supplementary observations. On 23 January, 30 April and 31 July 1998 and 27 January 2000 the applicant submitted supplementary observations.

On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that the ill-treatment he suffered when committed to the Kunszentmiklós police station on 29 April 1995 amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which states:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

The Government submit that the prosecution authorities performed a comprehensive and impartial investigation into the applicant’s allegations. Relying on the findings of this investigation, the Government are convinced that the applicant’s injuries derived from his struggle with the lawfully proceeding police officers and from his having repeatedly fallen down on harsh ground. None of the several medical reports prepared in the course of the investigations pointed to any injury, which could be attributed to ill-treatment. The applicant’s allegations about having been ill-treated at the police station are not supported by any witnesses. It is also to be noted that, when heard by the Branch Office for the first time on 30 April 1995, the applicant himself did not complain of any police abuse and that the relatives of Mr. R., who in their testimonies denied that the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted in the course of the struggle to arrest him, had in fact not been present during the initial stage of the police action against Mr. R. and the applicant.

The applicant submits that it is clear from the medical reports as well as from the findings of the              Kecskemét District Court’s judgment of 28 November 1997 that at least two of his injuries, namely a wound on his right eyelid and an abrasion on the left side of his forehead, were not attributed by the experts to the circumstances of his arrest. In these circumstances, it is for the Government to explain these injuries, the failure whereof should result in a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

The Court recalls that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and/or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see the Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, p. 3288, § 94).

In the Court’s view, the injuries described by the doctor who examined the applicant at the police station, whether deriving from the struggle in the context of the latter’s arrest or from subsequent hitting and kicking by policemen, were sufficiently serious to amount to ill-treatment within the scope of Article 3.

It remains to be considered whether the State should be held responsible under Article 3 in respect of these injuries.              The Court notes that several medical opinions were presented in the case, none of which was, however, conclusive as to the origins of the injuries. The testimonies obtained from the policemen, the civil guard and some relatives of Mr. R. - all involved in the events - are controversial as to whether the applicant had already had the injuries complained of when brought to the police station. On the basis of the evidence in the case-file, the Court finds no reason to depart from the national authorities’ conclusions in the matter, these authorities having been better positioned to evaluate the applicant’s allegations, and is not convinced that the applicant’s injuries were indeed due to ill-treatment on the part of the police.

Furthermore, the Court recalls that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in … [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. This investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see the above-mentioned Assenov and Others judgment, p. 3290, § 102).

             The Court notes that altogether three prosecution instances, including the Attorney General’s Office, dealt with the applicant’s complaints. In connection with these proceedings, three forensic pathology experts issued opinions on the applicant’s injuries as they had been described in two medical reports. Furthermore, in the context of the simultaneous criminal proceedings against the applicant before the Branch Office, several witnesses - both supporting and opposing the applicant’s version of the events - were heard as to the circumstances of the origins of his injuries. On the basis of the evidence thus collected, the prosecution authorities found that it could not be proven beyond doubt that the applicant’s injuries had been caused by ill-treatment rather than in the course of his lawful arrest. The Kunszentmiklós District Court in its decision of 29 February 1996, whose reasoning was later quashed only on procedural grounds, reached a similar conclusion.

In these circumstances, the Court finds that the authorities carried out an investigation sufficiently thorough and effective to meet the above requirements of Article 3. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

2. The applicant also complains under Article 6 of the Convention that, in the course of the proceedings upon his charges against the police officers involved, he had no access to an independent and impartial tribunal. He submits that both the prosecution authorities and the courts discontinued the relevant criminal proceedings.

Article 6, in so far as relevant, provides:

“1.              In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal … .”

             The Court recalls the Convention organs’ established case-law according to which the Convention does not guarantee the right to pursue criminal proceedings against third persons (see, e.g., No. 10877/84, Dec. 16.5.85, D.R. 43, p. 185) and that Article 6 does not apply to proceedings aimed at instituting criminal proceedings against third persons.

It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4.

3.              The applicant complains under Article 13 of the Convention that he could not have an effective remedy before the national authorities in that his allegations of ill-treatment were only examined by the prosecution authorities.

Article 13 states:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

The Government submit that, beside the possibilities of bringing an official liability action against the police under Article 349 of the Civil Code and/or of filing a complaint with the competent public prosecutor about the allegedly unlawful police measures inflicted upon him, the applicant was free to lay charges of ill-treatment against the police officers concerned. He availed himself of this latter option, in the pursuit whereof criminal proceedings were conducted against the police officers. In compliance with the principle in dubio pro reo , however, these investigations were discontinued, since it could not be proven beyond doubt that the applicant’s injuries had been due to ill-treatment.

As regards the court proceedings following the applicant’s charges, the Government point out that his charges of ill-treatment and light bodily assault had concerned identical events; while the public-prosecution investigation into the charge of ill-treatment had been discontinued, his allegations of light bodily assault could not be adjudged in the private prosecution proceedings, given the lack of indictment to that effect against the police officers. In the Government’s view, however, the fact that the remedies at the applicant’s disposal did not lead to a favourable outcome for him, cannot imply the conclusion that the remedies were not effective as such.

The applicant submits that the proceedings before the prosecution authorities did not meet the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention on account of their inquisitorial nature: the competent public prosecutor is a member of a hierarchical organisation whose proceedings are not public and do not provide for any implementation of the principle of “equality of arms”. Given the public prosecution’s monopoly to prefer an indictment in cases of charges of offences committed by officials, its negative decision prevents citizens from having an access to a court in such matters.

The Court recalls that Article 13 guarantees the availability of a remedy at national level to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. Its effect is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent “national authority” both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief (see the Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 39, § 122). The scope of the national authorities’ obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under the Convention. Where an individual has an arguable claim that he has been ill-treated in breach of Article 3, the notion of an effective remedy entails, in addition to a thorough and effective investigation of the kind also required by Article 3, effective access for the complainant to the investigatory procedure and the payment of compensation where appropriate (see the above-mentioned Assenov and Others judgment, p. 3293, §§ 117 and 118).

However, Article 13 does not go so far as to require any particular form of remedy, Contracting States being afforded a margin of discretion in conforming to their obligations under this provision. Nor does the effectiveness of a remedy for the purposes of Article 13 depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see the above-mentioned Vilvarajah and Others judgment, loc. cit. ).

In the present case, the Court notes that three prosecution authorities examined the applicant’s complaints and that these proceedings were eventually discontinued for lack of proof. The Court cannot speculate about the result of these investigations, had they been furthered. However, it transpires from the Regional Court’s reasoning in its decision of 16 April 1996 and from the Government’s submission concerning official liability under Article 349 of the Civil Code, that a favourable outcome of these examinations might have secured - in addition to the indictment for ill-treatment of the police officers concerned - the applicant’s access to court in regard to his charge of light bodily assault or to any potential official liability claim. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant had available to him an effective remedy in relation to his complaint under Article 3.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

4.              Finally, the applicant complains that his ill-treatment and the ensuing proceedings of the authorities reflected discrimination against him on account of his ethnic origin, contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention.

Article 14 provides that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.

The Court finds that the applicant has failed to substantiate his allegations of discrimination on account of his ethnic origin.

It follows that this complaint is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .

Erik Fribergh Benedetto Conforti   Registrar President