FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 34447/97 by Marek SZOFER against Poland

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) , sitting on 14 September 2000 as a Chamber composed of

Mr G. Ress, President , Mr A. Pastor Ridruejo, Mr L. Caflisch, Mr J. Makarczyk, Mr V. Butkevych, Mr J. Hedigan, Mrs S. Botoucharova , judges , [Note1]

and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 31 March 1996 and registered on 10 January 1997,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Polish national, born in 1961 and living in Sieradz .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows:

A. The circumstances of the case

1. Criminal proceedings against the applicant

On 16 October 1995 the applicant was arrested. On 18 October 1995 he was brought before the Sieradz District Prosecutor and detained on remand on charges of forgery, committed in an organised group of six persons, including the applicant’s wife, in that they had forged numerous official documents. The commission of the alleged offence had been substantiated by evidence in the case-file, and the acts with which the applicant was charged were of a significant danger.

On 3 November 1995 the applicant’s motion to be released was dismissed by the Sieradz District Prosecutor. The applicant appealed to the Sieradz District Court requesting his release as his detention entailed particular hardship for his family.

On 8 November 1995 the Sieradz District Court upheld the applicant’s detention on remand, considering that the commission of a dangerous offence had been sufficiently corroborated by evidence gathered so far, and that the applicant had not shown that his detention entailed particular hardship, within the meaning of Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”), for him or for his family.

On 13 November 1995 the Sieradz District Prosecutor prolonged the applicant’s detention until 16 January 1996, as the investigations had not been finished and further investigative measures had to be taken.

On 24 November 1995 the Sieradz District Court upheld the prosecutor’s decision of 13 November 1995, considering that evidence against the applicant pointed to his guilt, and that the charges against him had a serious character, as shown in particular by the fact that the alleged offences had been committed in an organised group, and that a very significant number of documents seemed to have been forged by the suspects. There were no grounds for the applicant’s release under Article 218 CCP.

On 5 January 1996 the Sieradz District Court, at the prosecutor’s request, prolonged the applicant’s detention until 16 April 1996, as the case was  complex and further investigative measures had to be taken.

The applicant filed with the Sieradz District Court an appeal against this decision. On 17 January 1996 that court refused to allow the applicant’s appeal ex officio and ordered that their appeal be transferred to the Sieradz Regional Court. The District Court observed that the circumstances relevant for the assessment of the applicant’s situation under Article 218 of CPP did not obtain, and that the circumstances of the case - the seriousness of the charges, the organised modus operandi of the suspects and a significant number of forged documents filed as evidence in the case-file justified the continued detention.

On 24 January 1996 the Sieradz Regional Court examined the applicant’s appeal and upheld the contested decision of 5 January 1996, taking into consideration that the evidence strongly supported charges against the applicant and that the scope of the alleged criminal activity was significant. Moreover, new suspicions had been emerging in the course of the proceedings. There was need to question a significant number of persons whose names had been found on forged stamps seized as evidence. Moreover, these persons had to be confronted with the suspects, and the identity of a certain F. had to be established, as well as the character of his links with the alleged offence considered in the present case. In view of the above, a prolongation of the applicant’s detention was necessary and justified.

On 12 February 1996 and  5 March 1996 the Sieradz District Prosecutor refused to release the applicant, considering that the requirements of Article 218 CCP were not satisfied.

On 8 March 1996 the Sieradz Regional Prosecutor upheld the decision of 12 February 1996, considering that the requirements of Article 218 were not fulfilled, that there was a risk of collusion in the case, and that the applicant’s continued detention was necessary in order to secure the proper course of the investigations.

On 15 and 22 March 1996, 3 April 1996, 9 April 1996 the applicant’s requests for release for family reasons were dismissed, the District Prosecutor considering that the requirements of Article 218 CCP were not met. On 9 April 1996 the Sieradz Regional Prosecutor upheld the decision of 15 March 1996, pointing out that the character and scope of the acts with which the applicant had been charged necessitated his further detention in order to prevent him from contacting other suspects. The conditions of Article 218 CCP were not satisfied.

On 10 April 1996 the Sieradz District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention, at the prosecutor’s request, until 16 June 1996. The court noted that the number of suspects had grown to ten, that the case-file numbered at present six volumes and that the case was complex. Thus, it had proved impossible to terminate the investigations within a period fixed for that purpose. During the three months for which the investigations had previously been extended, the investigating authorities had questioned 32 witnesses and again heard the suspects. As three further persons had been charged in the case, a further investigative measure, including a graphological analysis of a certain document, had to be taken. No new circumstances of Article 218 CCP had come to light. The applicant’s wife who was also one of the suspects, had had a car accident which had prolonged the proceedings for reasons which obviously could not be attributed to the prosecuting authorities as certain steps with her participation could not be taken.

By decisions of 16, 17 and 25 April 1996 the Sieradz District Prosecutor ordered that three expert opinions be prepared, concerning various typographical material seized in the case.

On 24 April 1996 the Sieradz Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 10 April 1996, considering that the evidence against the applicant fully supported charges laid against him, regardless of the fact that the applicant either did not comprehend this, or minimised the probative value of evidence pointing to his guilt. It was true that the applicant’s wife had been injured in a car accident, but her medical records had not shown that she had to be under the continuous care of her family.

On 11 June 1996 the Sieradz Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 July 1996, considering that due to the complexity of the case and the need to obtain expert opinions, the applicant’s detention had to be maintained. No grounds on which to envisage release under Article 218 CCP had come to light.

On 29 July 1996 the bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Sieradz District Court. The first hearing was scheduled for 3 October 1996.

On 9 August 1996 the Sieradz District Court refused to alter the preventive measure imposed on the applicant from a detention on remand into police supervision, considering that the situation of the applicant’s wife did not fulfil the requirements laid down by Article 218 CCP.

On 4 September 1996 the Sieradz Regional Court upheld the decision of 9 August 1996, considering that the applicant’s detention had already been examined on numerous occasions, and that it remained justified in view of a serious character of charges against him and regard also being had to the likelihood of his guilt, strongly supported by evidence gathered so far in the proceedings.

On 3 October 1996 a hearing was held. On the same day the Sieradz District Court refused to quash the applicant’s detention. On 16 October the Sieradz Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, considering that no new circumstances had arisen such as to justify his release. 

On 24 December 1996 the Sieradz District Court refused to release the applicant. The court considered that there were no new circumstances, which would justify his release.  It was likely that the applicant, if released, would try to exert pressure on witnesses, which suspicion was further supported by the fact that the applicant had been charged with being the leader of the group of offenders. A number of witnesses still had to be questioned. Moreover, most of these witnesses had given evidence pointing to the applicant’s guilt.  A significant number of criminal offences with which the applicant had been charged and the wide scope of the criminal activity of the offenders, further supported the fears of collusion.

On 10 January 1997 a further hearing was held.

On 25 February 1997 a bill of indictment against the applicant and two other accused in the principal case was submitted to the Sieradz District Court. They were charged with criminal libel against the Prosecutor E. S.-S., conducting the case concerning charges of forgery.

On 26 February 1997 a hearing in the proceedings concerning forgery charges was adjourned, apparently as certain accused had failed to comply with the summonses. 

By a further decision of 6 March 1997, the District Court refused to release the applicant.

On 1 and 7 April 1997 further hearings were held and certain witnesses were questioned. On the same date the court allowed the prosecutor’s request that a motion be submitted to the Supreme Court for the prolongation of the applicant’s detention. The court considered that certain evidence should still be taken in respect of charges against the applicant, i.e. an expert should be questioned at a hearing and witnesses M.W. and Z.M. should also give testimony. The court emphasised that the case was particularly complex, as shown not only by the voluminous evidence gathered so far, but also by the complexity of factual and legal issues involved in the case.  The court further observed that following the failure of certain of the accused to attend some of the hearings, some evidence could not have been taken by the court. The court referred to a hearing of 26 February 1997, when it could not question one of the experts. Similarly, on 7 April 1997, in the absence of one of the accused,  the court could not hear witness J.M.

The court noted that the grounds on which the detention had been maintained had not ceased to exist. The grounds for the applicant’s detention had repeatedly been examined by the courts and found adequate. The court further emphasised that it was likely that the applicant, if released, would go into hiding or otherwise jeopardise the proceedings against him by bringing pressure to bear on witnesses. This was in particular likely in the light of the applicant’s admission that he  had contacts with groups of organised crime, and also in the light of his past criminal conviction for forgery.  The court further noted that the applicant was involved in divorce proceedings. Therefore his insistence that he should be released in order to take care of his wife could not be considered credible, and in any event, there were no indications that the requirements of Article 218 CCP were met in his case.

On 22 April 1997 the Sieradz Regional Prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s appeal against a decision of the District Prosecutor of 21 February 1997 by which the applicant had requested that prosecutor E.S.S. step down for alleged lack of impartiality.

A further hearing was held on 20 June 1997.

On 27 August 1997 the Supreme Court allowed the request of the Sieradz District Court for the prolongation of the applicant’s detention until 16 October 1997, considering that in view of the complexity of the case the proceedings could not have been terminated earlier, in particular as on numerous occasions the accused or various witnesses had failed to attend hearings. The court also noted that the grounds on which the detention had been ordered had not ceased to exist.

Further hearings were held on 23 September 1997 and on 7 October 1997. At the latter date, the Court examined the prosecutor’s request that a motion for the prolongation of the applicant’s detention until 16 May 1998 be submitted to the Supreme Court, and allowed it. The court noted that most of the evidence had already been taken, but that the court could not terminate the taking of evidence as the applicant had objected to the testimony of witness Z.M. being read out in the court.  He also had submitted further requests for evidence to be taken. Accordingly, the court had to fix a date for a further hearing which would fall, in view of the listing of the cases on the court’s agenda, after 16 October 1997, the date up to which the prolongation of the applicant’s detention had been allowed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, as the further evidence requested by the applicant would be examined by the court at one or, at most, two hearings, the prolongation of the applicant’s detention was necessary.

Also on 7 October 1997 the applicant requested that a certain G.C. be questioned as a witness, and requested that expert opinion be sollicited as to whether handwriting found on certain documents serving as evidence was his, since two expert opinions given on this respect had been divergent. He also submitted pleadings, calling into question the quality of the expert report submitted by A.S.

On 17 and 21 October 1997 further hearings were held.

On 24 March 1998 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 16 April 1998, finding that the applicant continued detention was necessary in the interest of the proper course of the proceedings.

On 15 April 1998 the hearing was adjourned as the witnesses summoned for that date failed to attend. Subsequently, a hearing scheduled in July 1998 likewise had to be adjourned. By a decision of the same day the Sieradz District Court altered the preventive measure imposed on the applicant from detention to police supervision and the applicant was released.

Subsequently, hearings fixed for: 7 September 1998, 28 September 1998, 19 October 1998 and 9 November 1998 were likewise adjourned, apparently because the witnesses failed to comply with the summonses. A further hearing was fixed for 30 November 1998.

On 5 July 1999 the Sieradz District Court convicted the applicant of several counts of forgery and sentenced him to two years and eight months of imprisonment.

By a judgment of 21 March 2000 the Sieradz Regional Court confirmed this judgment.     

2. Intercepting of the applicant’s correspondence

The following letters of the applicant to the Secretariat of the European Commission of Human Rights were subject to censorship, as shown by a stamp certifying this: 24 July 1996, 6 November 1996, 7 and 15 November 1996, 2 December 1996.

Further, the application form submitted by the applicant to the Commission on 2 January 1997 has also been subjected to censorship.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. Evolution of Polish criminal law in the relevant period

Polish criminal legislation was amended several times during the relevant period. The Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 1973 (“old” Code) was replaced by a new Code of Criminal Procedure, adopted by Parliament ( Sejm ) on 6 June 1997, and which entered into force on 1 September 1998.

The “old” Code was significantly amended by the Law of 29 June 1995 on Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and Other Criminal Statutes. This Law entered into force on 1 January 1996. However, the entry into force of the provisions concerning imposition of detention on remand was postponed until 4 August 1996. In pursuance with these provisions, detention on remand was imposed by a judge (whereas before it was imposed by a prosecutor - see section 2 below).

The second amendment, effected by the Law of 1 December 1995 on Amendments to the Law of 29 June 1995 (commonly referred to as “the Interim Law of 1 December 1995”) entered into force on 1 January 1996.

2. Preventive measures

The Code of Criminal Procedure (“old”), applicable at the relevant time, listed as "preventive measures", inter alia , detention on remand, bail and police supervision.

Articles 210 and 212 of the “old” Code of Criminal Procedure applicable at the relevant time provided that before the bill of indictment was transmitted to the court, detention on remand was imposed by the prosecutor. The decision to impose detention on remand could be appealed against, within a seven-day time-limit, to the court competent to deal with the merits of the case.  In pursuance of  Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor could order detention on remand for a period not exceeding three months. When, in view of the particular circumstances of the case, the investigations could not be terminated within this period, detention on remand could, if necessary, be prolonged by the court competent to deal with the merits of the case, upon the prosecutor's request, for a period not exceeding one year. This decision could be appealed against to a higher court.

After the bill of indictment was transmitted to the court, relevant orders were to be made by the court. A decision concerning preventive measures could be appealed to a higher court.

3. Grounds for detention on remand

Article 217 of the “old” Code of Criminal Procedure, as applicable at the relevant time, provided that a person could be held in detention on remand if there were serious grounds for believing that he or she would abscond, in particular when he or she did not have a permanent address or his/her identity could not be established. Further, detention could be imposed if there were serious grounds for believing that there was a risk of collusion or that an accused would otherwise jeopardise criminal proceedings. Finally, alternative grounds for detention on remand were either the fact that an accused was charged with an offence of a particular danger to society (“ wysokie spo ł eczne niebezpiecze ń stwo czynu ”), or that he was a recidivist (“ recydywa ”) within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The notion of “danger to society” as set out in the Criminal Code related to the assessment of the seriousness of the criminal offences concerned.

Pursuant to Article 218 of the “old” Code of Criminal Procedure, if there were no special considerations to the contrary, detention on remand should not be imposed or should be lifted, if it involved danger to life or limb or entailed particular hardship for a suspect or his family.

After the Interim Law of 1 December 1995 entered into force on 1 January 1996, grounds of imposition of detention on remand were restricted to situations in which there was a reasonable risk of absconding, or that a suspect would go into hiding, in particular when his identity could not be established or he had no permanent domicile. Secondly, detention could be imposed if there was a reasonable risk that the suspect would attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or to hinder the proper course of proceedings by any other unlawful means.

4. Proceedings to examine the lawfulness of detention on remand

At the material time there were three types of proceedings enabling a detainee to challenge the lawfulness of his detention and thus possibly obtain release. Under Article 221 § 2 of the “old” Code of Criminal Procedure he could appeal to a court against a detention order made by a prosecutor (see above). Under Article 222 §§ 2(1) and 3 he could appeal against a further decision by that court prolonging his detention on a prosecutor's request. Lastly, under Article 214 an accused could at any time request the competent authority to quash or alter the preventive measure applied in his case. Such an application had to be decided by the prosecutor or, after the bill of indictment had been lodged with the court competent to deal with the case, by that court, within three days.

5. Statutory time-limits for detention on remand

Until 4 August 1996 the law did not fix any time-limits concerning detention on remand in judicial proceedings. During the investigations, the prosecutor could order detention for up to three months. Prolongation of this period was possible by a court order, for a period not exceeding one year, and for any further periods, by a decision of the Supreme Court given upon a request of the Prosecutor General

Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as applicable from 4 August 1996, provided insofar as relevant:

"3. The whole period of detention on remand until the date on which the first-instance court gives judgment may not exceed one year and six months in cases concerning offences. In cases concerning serious offences this period may not exceed two years.

4. In particularly justified cases the Supreme Court may, upon the request of the court competent to deal with the merits of the case, ... prolong detention on remand for a further fixed period exceeding the periods referred to § ... 3, when it is necessary in connection with a suspension of the proceedings, a prolonged psychiatric observation of the accused, when evidence needs to be obtained from abroad or when the accused has deliberately obstructed the termination of the proceedings within the time-limits set out in § 3.”

However, under Section 10 (a) of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995 different rules applied in respect of persons whose detention on remand started prior to 4 August 1996. This section provided:

“1. In cases where the total period of detention on remand which started prior to 1 August 1996 exceeds the [maximum] time-limits referred to in Article 222 §§ ... and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [as amended by the Law of 29 June 1995 on Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and Other Criminal Statutes], the accused shall be maintained in detention until the Supreme Court gives a decision on a request for prolongation of such detention under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. In cases referred to in § 1, if no [such] request has been lodged, detention shall be lifted not later than 1 January 1997.”

Under all the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure read together, a detainee was entitled to appeal against any decision prolonging his detention on remand, regardless of whether it had been made at the investigative or judicial stage of proceedings.  However, no appeal lay in law either against a decision containing a request under Article 222 § 4, or against a decision of the Supreme Court granting such a request.

6. Correspondence of persons detained on remand

At the relevant time the situation of persons detained on remand was governed by the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences of 19 April 1969. Under Article 89 of that Code, all correspondence of a person detained on remand was subject to censorship, unless a prosecutor and a court decided otherwise. No provision of the Code provided for any remedy to contest the manner or scope of the censorship of a detainee’s correspondence.

The rights of persons detained on remand regarding their correspondence were further set out in Rule 33 of the Rules on Detention on Remand, adopted in 1989. They provided that the correspondence of persons detained on remand was subject to censorship by the authority conducting the criminal proceedings, i.e. either a public prosecutor or a court, depending on the stage reached in the proceedings.

On 6 July 1997 a new Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences was enacted by parliament. Article 102 of this Code, which entered into force on 1 January 1998, provides that the convicted persons are entitled to uncensored correspondence with the State authorities and with the Ombudsman. Article 103 of the Code further provides that convicted persons and their lawyers may lodge complaints with the international agencies established under international treaties on protection of human rights, ratified by Poland. Prisoners’ correspondence in such cases shall be dispatched with no delay and is not subject to censorship.

Pursuant to Article 512 of the new Code, the rights of persons detained on remand shall, in principle, be at least equal with those of persons convicted by a final judgment.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 5 of the Convention, about the length of the criminal proceedings and the length of his detention on remand. He further complains that the decisions prolonging the detention were not served on him.

The applicant finally complains under Article 8 of the Convention that while detained, he was refused permission to see his lady friend.

He also complains that the experts in his case were at the same time working for the police and that they therefore lacked objectivity.

THE LAW

1 . The applicant complains, invoking Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, about the length of his detention on remand.

Article 5 § 3, insofar as relevant, reads:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time ...”

The Court firstly notes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 16 October 1995, the date on which the applicant was arrested, and ended on 15 April 1998, when he was released following a decision that detention on remand should be replaced by other preventive measure. It therefore lasted two years, five months and twenty-nine days.

The Court recalls in this connection that it falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty and set them out in their decisions on the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the true facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals, that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see, inter alia , the Neumeister v. Austria judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 8, p. 37, §§ 4-5).

The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the continued detention (see the Stögmüller v. Austria judgment of 10 November 1969, Series A no. 9, p. 40, § 4), but, after a certain lapse of time, it no longer suffices; the Court must then establish whether the other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continue to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are "relevant" and "sufficient", the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings (see, among other authorities, the W. v. Switzerland judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A no. 254-A, p. 15, § 30; the I.A. v. France judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII,  p. 2978, § 102).

In the present case the applicant's detention on remand was based on the strong suspicion that he had committed several counts of forgery. In order to justify their refusal to release the applicant, the national courts repeatedly emphasised that the guilt of the applicant had been rendered plausible by the evidence gathered by the investigating authorities. For instance, in its decision of 24 December 1996 the Sieradz District Court indicated that the evidence given in the investigations by most of the witnesses pointed to the applicant’s guilt. The existence of this suspicion and of the grounds justifying it were examined by the prosecuting authorities of both first and second instance, by the Sieradz District Court and Regional Court and answered in the affirmative.

The prosecuting authorities and the courts further invoked the dangerous character of the offences concerned, shown in particular by the fact that they were likely to have been committed by an organised group, and also, as pointed out by the documentary evidence, by a very significant number of documents likely to have been forged by the perpetrators. The authorities further relied on a need to secure the proper course of the proceedings and referred to the danger of absconding, taking into account the applicant’s admission of links with groups of organised crime, and also his previous conviction for a similar offence. In its decision of 24 December 1996 the Sieradz District Court had also regard to the fact that the applicant had been charged with being the leader of a group of offenders.

In respect of the danger of absconding, the Court recalls that it must be assessed with reference to a number of different factors, including the character of the person involved, his morals, his assets, his links with the State in which he is being prosecuted and his international contacts (see the W. v. Switzerland judgment cited above, p. 16, § 33).In the present case, the national courts in their carefully reasoned decisions attached great importance to characteristics of the offences of forgery with which the applicant had been charged, and in particular to his involvement in organised crime, which would make it easy for him to abscond. The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion and accepts that the factors specified by the national courts could legitimately suffice to demonstrate that such a danger existed in the present case.

To sum up, the two above-mentioned dangers were relevant and sufficient reasons in this case. It remains to be ascertained whether the conduct of the authorities was in compliance with the requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

In this connection, the Court firstly notes that the proceedings in question concerned a case of economic crime of significant complexity, as shown, for instance, by the relevant considerations in the decision of the Sieradz District Court of 10 April 1996 as to the growing number of suspects. During the investigations the prosecuting authorities questioned not less than thirty-two witnesses. It should be noted that on 27 August 1997 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 16 October 1997, considering that in view of the complexity of the case the proceedings could not have been terminated earlier. The Court further notes the significant number of forged documents seized in the case, which were analysed by at least three experts who were also questioned by the court. In the Court’s view, this complexity constitutes a circumstance which in itself considerably contributed to the length of the applicant’s detention on remand.

The Court also points out that, in the investigative stage of the proceedings, the applicant lodged seven requests for release with the competent prosecutors and two appeals against refusals of first-instance prosecutors. He also lodged four appeals against decisions to prolong his detention at this stage. After the bill of indictment was submitted to the court, the applicant further lodged three requests for release with the competent court. As a result, his detention was repeatedly examined by both prosecuting and judicial authorities and pertinent considerations were made as to its justified character.

Finally, the Court notes that the investigations were terminated within eight months and thirteen days.

Assessing the above elements as a whole and in view, in particular, of the overall length of the applicant’s detention on remand, the Court does not consider that the facts of the case disclose a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, within the meaning of this provision of the Convention.

2. The Court further notes that the applicant complains about the length of the criminal proceedings against him. It also observes that while the applicant was detained, part of his correspondence to the Convention organs was subject to censorship.

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

3. Insofar as the applicant’s complaint about the alleged lack of objectivity on the part of the experts assigned to give their opinions in his case, it has not been shown that, firstly, the applicant raised this complaint in his appeal against the first-instance judgment, and secondly, that he lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court against the second-instance judgment. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicant has not exhausted relevant domestic remedies.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

4. Insofar as the applicant complains that he was not allowed to see his lady friend during the criminal proceedings, the Court first notes that, even assuming that he exhausted domestic remedies in this respect, the applicant in his requests for release repeatedly relied on his wife’s bad health and invoked Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a legal basis for his release. He argued in particular that he should be released as in view of his wife’s bad health his continued detention entailed particular hardship for his family. In the Court’s view the applicant’s submissions to the domestic authorities seem not to be wholly consistent with the complaint he has submitted to the Court under Article 8 of the Convention. In any event, the Court finds that in the particular circumstances of the case that this complaint has not been substantiated and that it does do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the complaint [Note2] about the length of criminal proceedings against him and also the part of the application concerning  censorship of the applicant’s correspondence to the Convention organs;

DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Vincent Berger Georg Ress Registrar President

[Note1] Judges names are to be followed by a COMMA and a MANUAL LINE BREAK ( Shift+Enter ). When inserting names via AltS please remove the substitute judge’s name, if necessary, and the extra paragraph return(s). (There is to be no extra space between the judges’ names and that of the Section Registrar.)

[Note2] Summarise the complaints without necessarily citing the invoked Convention Articles.