THIRD SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 36256/97 by Albert THOMPSON against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 20 March 2001 as a Chamber composed of

Mr J.-P. Costa , President , Mr W. Fuhrmann , Mr L. Loucaides , Sir Nicolas Bratza , Mrs H.S. Greve , Mr K. Traja , Mr M. Ugrekhelidze , judges , and Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 16 May 1997 and registered on 27 May 1997,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British national, born in 1965 and living in Durham. He is represented before the Court by Mr J. Mackenzie, a lawyer practising in London. The Government are represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley , of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. In August 1996 the applicant, who was a Lance Corporal in the British Army stationed in Northern Ireland, was reported to his Commanding Officer in relation to a wounding charge, which incident had allegedly occurred in May 1996.

On 21 November 1996 he was arrested on two unrelated charges of failing to attend and disobeying a lawful command. On 22 November 1996 he appeared, on the orders of his Commanding Officer, on the latter two charges and he was reduced to the ranks. On the same day he was also remanded for an abstract of evidence to be compiled on a charge of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1981.

In or around 2 December 1996 the applicant went missing from his unit. He was arrested by the civilian police and charged with aggravated burglary on 22 January 1997. He was handed over to the military authorities when it was discovered that he was absent without leave from the army and he was then placed in close arrest in the guardroom of the Royal Irish Regiment, Catterick garrison. He was warned that he would be charged for being absent without leave. On 28 January 1997 the applicant was escorted under close arrest to Northern Ireland.

The Government allege that a copy of the information pamphlet entitled “The rights of a soldier charged with an offence under the Army Act 1955” (1994 edition) would have been available to the applicant in the guardroom at Catterick garrison and would have been provided to him under signature. Since the relevant disciplinary file is lost, the Government cannot provide a copy of the relevant form which would have been signed by the applicant confirming receipt of the pamphlet. The applicant accepts that he received a copy of the pamphlet while in close arrest in Northern Ireland and that it was likely to have been the 1994 version of the pamphlet.

On 30 January 1997 he appeared before his Commanding Officer who remanded him in close arrest and ordered an abstract of evidence to be compiled on the absence without leave charge, in accordance with Rule 11A of the Rules of Procedure 1972, with a view to that Officer applying for power to award extended detention. No such application was in fact made. The applicant was given a copy of the charge sheet relating to the absence without leave charge during that hearing.

The applicant asserts that he was also asked by the Commanding Officer at that hearing whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty and submits that he said that he pleaded guilty. The Government deny these assertions.

On 13 February 1997 the applicant appeared before his Commanding Officer when the latter read the charge of absence without leave to the applicant and asked the applicant whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty. The applicant pleaded guilty and was awarded 28 days’ military detention. On the same day the applicant was also remanded for trial in relation to the wounding charge.

The applicant says he was not given the option of a court-martial by his Commanding Officer whereas the Government maintain that he would have been given this option before the finding of guilty was recorded on 13 February 1997.

On 26 February 1997 the applicant appeared before a Magistrates’ Court in Newcastle (England) on the aggravated burglary charge and was remanded on bail until 28 March 1997. The applicant completed his military sentence of imprisonment on 7 March 1997. He was then informed by his Commanding Officer that he was to be retained in close arrest until his trial by court-martial on the wounding charge. He was released into open arrest on 12 March 1997 following representations by his current legal representative (a civilian solicitor).

On 13 March 1997 the civilian prosecuting authorities discontinued the burglary proceedings.              On 3 June 1997 a notice of temporary discontinuance was issued in relation to the court-martial proceedings on the wounding charge. No further action on the wounding charge has been taken against the applicant who was subsequently administratively discharged in August 1997 from the army for reasons not related to the afore-mentioned charges or conviction.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. Military detention

The relevant domestic law and practice contained in the Army Act 1955 (“the 1955 Act”), the Rules of Procedure (Army) 1972 and the Queen’s Regulations relating to military detention and procedures are outlined in the Hood v. the United Kingdom judgment ([GC], no. 27267/95, ECHR 1999-I, §§ 20-43).

Absence without leave constitutes an offence under the 1955 Act, the punishment for which includes imprisonment for a maximum of two years.

2. Summary trial

An allegation that a person subject to military law has committed an offence must be reported in the form of a charge to the Commanding Officer, who must investigate the charge. When a Commanding Officer does so, he must read and, if necessary, explain the charge to the accused and then either hear the evidence orally himself or cause it to be reduced to writing Written evidence is obligatory if it is considered that the matter may be dealt with summarily and extended detention awarded on any finding of guilt (see “summary punishment” below). Having heard the evidence, the Commanding Officer must determine whether the accused is guilty or not, and must either dismiss the charge, or record a finding of guilty in which case he may award one or more of the prescribed punishments.

Where in the course of dealing summarily with a charge, the Commanding Officer considers that the accused is guilty and on summary trial the accused would receive a punishment greater than a reprimand or a minor punishment or would involve a forfeiture of pay, he must not record a finding of guilty until he has afforded to the accused an opportunity of electing to be tried by court-martial. If the accused does so elect, the Commanding Officer must not record a finding, he must give the accused an opportunity to withdraw his election on the following day and if it is not so withdrawn, the accused will be remanded for trial on court-martial at the end of the following day.

3. Summary punishment

If an accused is a soldier, his Commanding Officer (not below the rank of Field Officer) may award detention for up to 28 days or, if extend powers are granted, for up to 60 days.

Paragraph 5.202 of the Queen’s Regulations is headed “summary punishment” and, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“5.202. When discipline fails and the punishment of offenders is necessary there are principles which must guide the authority in deciding the appropriate sentence. The guidance for Courts-Martial set out in the is generally applicable to officers awarding summary punishments, who should bear it in mind as well as the more particular guidance set out below.

a. Awarding punishment. It is important that offenders should know that they will be dealt with equitably and swiftly. The following precepts, correctly followed, are designed to ensure this. Punishment must:

(1) be just and not give any suggestion of vengeance.

(2) be appropriate to both offence and offender.

(3) Follow as swiftly as possible after the offences.

(4) Be an example and a deterrent to both the offender and others similarly inclined.

b. Kinds of summary punishment

(1) Detention . Whereas detention served at a military corrective training centre is intended to be remedial and to return a man to his unit a better soldier in every way, unit detention, due to the absence of appropriately qualified staff and adequate facilities, tends to be solely punitive in effect. Before awarding detention, therefore, a Commanding Officer must be sure that the punishment is both appropriate and essential. It should normally be used in the last resort when other lesser punishments have failed to take effect. ...”

4. Review of summary trials

(a) Section 181 of the 1955 Act (repealed on 1 October 1997)

Section 181 read, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“Complaints by warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

(2) If a ... soldier thinks himself wronged in any manner by his Commanding Officer, either by reason of redress not being given to his satisfaction on a complaint under the last foregoing sub-section or for any other reason, he may, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Queen’s Regulations, make a complaint with respect thereto to the Defence Council.

(3) It shall be the duty of a Commanding Officer or, as the case may be, the Defence Council to have any complaint received by him or them under this section investigated and to take any steps for redressing the matter complained of which appear to him or them to be necessary.”

(Section 180 of the 1955 Act made similar provision for complaints by officers.) No time-limit applied to complaints made under section 181 of the 1955 Act. However, the right to make such a complaint was retained only as long as the individual was subject to military law. It was, nevertheless, the policy of the army to consider such a complaint for a period of approximately three months after an individual had left the armed forces and ceased to be subject to military law.

(b) The Queen’s Regulations and section 181 of the 1955 Act

Paragraphs 5.204-5.206 of the Queen’s Regulations were headed “Redress of Complaints” and they set out the procedure to be followed for making a complaint under sections 180 and 181 of the 1955 Act:

“5.204 a. If an officer or soldier wishes to obtain redress for a wrong he believes he has suffered he is to follow the procedure set out in sections 180 and 181 of the Army Act 1955 and the instructions below:

b. Every complaint is to be fully and distinctly stated and any explanation or other evidence as may be necessary for the proper investigation and speedy determination of the complaint is to be annexed to it.

c. Alternatively, all ranks may bring such grievances to the notice of a senior visiting officer, and such an opportunity is to be given at least once annually. To this end, advance notices will be published in unit orders of appropriate visits on which the senior visiting officer will be prepared to see any officer or soldier wishing to air a grievance.

d. The attention of all officers and soldiers is to be drawn to the provisions of sections 180 and 181 of the Army Act 1955 in unit orders during the months of January and July each year. In every instance the complete text of each section is to be published.

e. Anonymous complaints are to be disregarded.

5.205. A complaint is to be submitted, in writing, to the complainant’s Commanding Officer no matter if the Commanding Officer has previously refused to redress the matter complained of; has not the power to grant the redress sought; or if the complaint has been made against the action or refusal of action by the Commanding Officer himself. Where a written complaint is to be submitted to authority above unit level, the Commanding Officer is to offer the complainant the services of an officer to assist in the written presentation of the complaint. The complainant is, however, under no obligation to accept such assistance.

5.206. Any complaint under section 180 or 181 (2) of the Army Act 1955 is, when received by the Commanding Officer, to be forwarded by him, with any comments, to his next higher authority. That authority is to examine the complaint and is himself to grant redress if he has the power to do so and thinks he should. If redress is not then granted, or is not granted to the complainant’s’ satisfaction, that authority is to forward the complaint, together with any comments by the Commanding Officer and himself, to the next higher authority, and the procedure repeated. In this way, unless full redress is granted at an intermediate level, the complaint will come up through the chain of command to the Ministry of Defence and will be presented to the Army Board of the Defence Council. The complainant is to be informed of progress at each stage and given the opportunity to withdraw his complaint if he wishes.”

(c) Section 115 of the 1955 Act (prior to 1 April 1997)

Section 115, in so far as relevant, read as follows:

“115. Review of summary findings and awards

(1) Where a charge has been dealt with summarily, otherwise than by the dismissal thereof, the authority hereinafter mentioned may at any time review the finding or award.

(2) The said authority is –

(a) the Defence Council; or

(b) any military, naval or air-force officer superior in command to the officer who dealt summarily with the charge, or

(c) any other officer being –

( i ) a general officer or brigadier appointed by the Defence Council to act for the purposes of this section in any particular case, or

(ii) a general officer or brigadier, or general officer or brigadier of a class, so appointed for any class of cases.

(3) Where on a review under this section it appears to the said authority expedient so to do by reason of any mistake of law in the proceedings on the summary dealing with the charge or of anything occurring in those proceedings which in the opinion of the authority involved substantial injustice to the accused, the authority may quash the finding ...

(4) Where on a review under this section it appears to the said authority that a punishment awarded was invalid, or too severe, ... the authority may vary the award by substituting such punishment ... as the authority may think proper ... and not being in the opinion of the authority more severe than the punishment ... in the original award.”

(d) Section 115 of the 1955 Act (as amended on 1 April 1997 by the Armed Forces Act 1996)

Section 115 (as amended) reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“Review of summary findings and awards

115 (1) This section applies where a charge has been dealt with summarily and a finding has been recorded that the charge has been proved.

(2) The accused may at any time request a review of the finding or any punishment awarded (or both); and where he does so, the finding or punishment (or both) shall be reviewed.

(3) The finding or any punishment awarded (or both) may be reviewed at any other time.

(4) A review under this section shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Queen’s Regulations.

(5) A review under this section may be carried out by-

(a) the Defence Council;

(b) any military, naval or air-force officer superior in command to the officer who dealt summarily with the charge;

(c) a general officer or brigadier appointed by the Defence Council to carry out the review or any class of review which includes the review.

(6) Section 113AA of this Act shall apply to a review under this section by an authority mentioned in subsection (5) above as it applies to a review under section 113 of this Act by the reviewing authority.

(7) In the application of section 113AA to reviews under this section, that section shall have effect as if-

(a) references to the court-martial were references to the officer who dealt summarily with the charge;

(b) references to a finding of guilt were references to a finding that the charge has been proved;

(c) references to a sentence passed were references to a punishment awarded; ...”

Section 113AA(2)-(5) (as inserted by the Armed Forces Act 1996) sets out the powers of the reviewing authority when reviewing a finding of guilt, which powers include quashing the finding and related sentence and/or substituting a finding and related sentence. When reviewing a sentence only, that authority can, inter alia , quash or substitute a sentence and remit in whole or part any punishment awarded.

No time-limit applies to making a request for a review under section 115 of the 1955 Act (as amended). However, section 115 itself refers to the “accused” which term is defined by section 76 (1) of the 1955 Act (as amended) as a “person subject to military law”. An individual is no longer subject to military law after discharge from the armed forces.

(e) Information pamphlet provided to accused persons

The pamphlet entitled “The rights of a soldier charged with an offence under the Army Act 1955” (Army Code 12730 (revised 1994) refers to sections 181 and 115 of the 1955 Act and to Queen’s Regulations 5.204-5.206 and, in the same paragraph, provides as follows:

“16. Complaints . If, after a soldier has been dealt with summarily, he considers that he has been treated unjustly by his ..., he may submit a written complaint specifying his reasons and the matter will be reviewed by higher authority. The Accused’s Adviser will assist the soldier in deciding whether, and in what terms, a complaint should be submitted.”

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains that, for the purposes of his initial placement in close arrest in January 1997, and the continuation of close arrest in March 1997, his Commanding Officer was not a “judge or other officer” within the meaning of Article 5 § 3. He also complains under Article 5 § 3 that one week passed before he was brought before that Officer after his initial arrest. He also invokes Article 5 § 5 in respect of these alleged violations.

In addition, he complains under Article 5 § 4 submitting that there were no proceedings available to a soldier to challenge detention in close arrest. He also invokes Article 5 § 5 in relation to this alleged violation.

The applicant further complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he did not have a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, mainly submitting that the Commanding Officer who tried him represented the prosecution. He also complains under Article 6 § 3(a) about the alleged delay until 3 February 1997 in showing him the charge sheet; under Article 6 § 3(b) because he was allegedly shown the charge sheet two hours before his trial; and under Article 6 § 3(c) about the lack of legal representation for his summary trial. Finally, he complains under Article 13 of the Convention that the United Kingdom had not, at the relevant time, incorporated the Convention into domestic law.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that his Commanding Officer was not a “judge or other officer” within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 for the purposes of his close arrest from January to March 1997 and that one week passed before he was brought before that Officer after his initial arrest in January 1997. He invokes Article 5 §§ 3 and 5 of the Convention.

Article 5, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. ...

5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”

Referring to the above-cited judgment in the Hood case, the Government accept that the present applicant was detained in violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention during the periods of detention commencing on 27 January and 7 March 1997.

The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints raise serious issues under Article 5 §§ 3 and 5 of the Convention which require determination on the merits. It follows that these matters cannot be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the complaints inadmissible has been established.

2. The applicant also complains that there were no proceedings available to him to challenge his detention in close arrest and he invokes Article 5 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention. Article 5 § 4 reads as follows:

“4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

The Court recalls that the applicant in the Hood case had been detained by the military authorities between the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995. Mr Hood contended that military legal aid was not available for habeas corpus proceedings and that he would not have been granted legal aid from the civilian legal aid scheme for such proceedings. The Court found in Mr Hood’s case that a habeas corpus application to the High Court was available to persons in military custody. It further found that on such an application, the High Court would examine the legal validity of detention, whether there was sufficient evidence to detain, and, if the power to detain depended on the prior establishment of an objective fact, whether that fact existed. The Court also found that legal aid from the civilian authorities was available for such proceedings, as was the possibility of applying for such legal aid on an emergency basis.

The present applicant has not expanded upon his complaint about the lack of any remedy to challenge his detention. In particular, he has not submitted that a habeas corpus application was unavailable or ineffective when he was detained or that that procedure was otherwise deficient for the purposes of Article 5 § 4. He has not, therefore, demonstrated that he did not have available to him the guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question (the Megyeri v. Germany judgment of 12 May 1992, Series A no. 237-A, pp. 11-12, § 22).

The complaint under Article 5 § 4 and the associated complaint under Article 5 § 5 are therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

3. The applicant also complains under Article 6 § 1 that he did not have a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, mainly arguing that his Commanding Officer did not constitute an independent tribunal. He also invokes Article 6 § 3 (c) regarding the lack of legal representation for his summary trial. He further complains, under Article 6 § 3 (a), about the alleged delay in showing him the charge sheet and, under Article 6 § 3 (b), because he was allegedly shown the charge sheet two hours before his trial.

Article 6, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“1. In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal.    ...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ...

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;

The Government argue, in the first place, that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies. He did not complain under section 181 of the 1955 Act, which complaint would have been considered up to three months after discharge. In addition, he did not request a review under section 115 of the 1955 Act prior to his discharge in August 1997, which he could have done either prior to or after the section’s amendment on 1 April 1997 by the Armed Forces Act 1996. No formal procedure was required for this request, except that the request under the former section 115 was to be in writing.

The applicant disagrees. He considers that neither of the above constituted effective domestic remedies and that there was no formal right of appeal against summary procedures. The 1994 version of the information pamphlet did not explain how the review to which its paragraph 16 referred could be of any practical benefit to a soldier: there was no section headed “appeals” or “review”, rather it was entitled “complaints”. There was no suggestion that the soldier could appeal and seek a review as of right or that on such review there was the power to change the finding or reduce the sentence. The wording of the pamphlet may have been chosen to lead soldiers to believe that the procedures should be used only in extreme cases of unjust treatment, and no procedure was indicated in the pamphlet as to how a soldier could lodge his complaint. No fixed procedure existed at all and the applicant claims that that omission may have been deliberate.

As to section 181 of the 1955 Act specifically, the applicant submits that that section’s procedures were not available for appeals from summary findings. He considers that it is apparent from the wording of that section that the procedure was conceived as a manner of redressing administrative matters and not as a form of appeal against judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. In the present case, the Commanding Officer had the power to award 28 days’ imprisonment for absence without leave, so that there was no question of a “wrong” having been done within the meaning of the section.

He further points out that section 115 of the 1955 Act (as amended) provides that the form and procedure for a review under that section is to be outlined in the Queen’s Regulations. However, this has not been done and the section itself gives no indication as to how a request for a review is to be submitted. Moreover, he argues that between January 1997 and 12 March 1997 he was in detention and had no military adviser. Finally, a remedy brought into existence some two months after the impugned decision at a time when the applicant was already preparing his application to this Court, cannot be considered a remedy that the applicant was bound to exhaust.

As regards the merits of those complaints, the Government point out that after the summary trial but before the Commanding Officer announced his findings, the applicant would have been offered the option of electing to be tried by court-martial (section 78(5) of the 1955 Act). Had he so elected, he would have been tried by a court-martial conducted in accordance with the new court-martial system which fully complied with he requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and for which legal representation is allowed and legal aid available.

The applicant maintains that his summary trial did not comply with the requirements of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention. He denies that he was offered a trial by court-martial and, in any event, disputes that a court-martial convened under the Armed Forces Act 1996 complies with Article 6 of the Convention.

The Court recalls that, pursuant to Article 35 of the Convention, it is only competent to consider complaints after all effective remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and when the application has been introduced within six months of the final domestic decision.

(a) As to the applicant’s complaints about the lack of independence and impartiality of his Commanding Officer and about the lack of legal representation for his summary trial, the Court notes that the applicant is complaining about alleged deficiencies in the domestic provisions as opposed to their application in his case. The Court does not consider that the domestic remedies to which the Government refer can constitute effective remedies for complaints which essentially raise the compliance of the domestic summary trial provisions with Article 6 of the Convention.

The Court considers that these complaints of the applicant raise serious issues under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention which require determination on the merits. It follows that these matters cannot be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the complaints inadmissible has been established.

(b) In so far as the applicant’s complaints about the charge sheet amount to complaints about a failure to apply the relevant domestic provisions, the Court considers that those complaints are inadmissible on grounds of non-exhaustion.

In the first place, there is no indication that the applicant raised this matter during his hearing with his Commanding Officer. Secondly, and in any event, the Court considers that the applicant had the right, from the date he was sentenced (13 February 1997) to the date of his discharge (August 1997), to complain under section 181 of the 1955 Act if he felt that he had been wronged “in any manner” by his Commanding Officer. In addition, the relevant higher authority was bound to investigate any such complaint and to take the steps necessary for redressing the matter (section 181 § 3 of the 1955 Act). There is nothing to exclude from such steps the revision of the applicant’s sentence and the section 181 complaints procedure, as detailed in paragraphs 5.204-5.206 of the Queen’s Regulations, does not appear particularly complex.

Moreover, the applicant accepts that he was given a copy of the information pamphlet while in close arrest in Northern Ireland and that it was likely to have been the 1994 edition. That edition of the pamphlet refers to section 181 and to the Queen’s Regulations 5.204-5.206, clearly associates section 181 with complaints about summary findings and refers to the possibility of requesting and obtaining the assistance of a military adviser. The Court considers the applicant’s reference in his observations to his not having had a military adviser to be vague, and notes that the applicant has not demonstrated that he took all available steps to retain such an adviser but was refused such assistance. It is further noted that the applicant was, in any event, legally represented by his current legal representative from at least 12 March 1997 onwards.

In such circumstances, the Court considers that it would have been reasonable for the present applicant to have pursued his complaints about the charge sheet before his Commanding Officer and, in any event, under section 181 to the first relevant higher authority (No. 32821/96, Dec. 17.1.1997, unpublished). It is not therefore necessary to consider whether further complaints to the next higher authorities under section 181 of the 1955 Act or the further review procedures (under section 115 prior to and after amendment by the Armed Forces Act 1996) constituted additional remedies to have been exhausted as regards his charge sheet complaints.

The Court therefore concludes that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies as regards his complaints about the charge sheet under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention and that those complaints must therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

4. The applicant also complains under Article 13 of the Convention that at the material time the United Kingdom had not incorporated the Convention into domestic law. Article 13 reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ...”

However, the Court recalls that Article 13 does not require the incorporation of the Convention into domestic law (Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 42, § 12). This complaint is, accordingly, manifestly ill-founded and therefore also to be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaints about:

– his pre-trial detention between 27 January and 7 March 1997 (concerning the independence of his Commanding Officer and an alleged delay between the applicant’s arrest and his being brought before that Officer, together with the availability of an enforceable right to compensation in these respects); and

– his summary trial (concerning the independence and impartiality of the Commanding Officer and the availability of legal representation);

Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.

S. Dollé J.-P. Costa Registrar President