THIRD SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 32263/96 by Jean HARRISON against the United Kingdom

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting on 3 May 2001 as a Chamber composed of

Mr J.-P. Costa , President , Mr W. Fuhrmann , Mr L. Loucaides , Sir Nicolas Bratza , Mrs H.S. Greve , Mr K. Traja , Mr M. Ugrekhelidze , judges ,

and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 9 July 1996 and registered on 16 July 1996,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Jean Harrison, is a United Kingdom national , born in 1946 and living in Christchurch. She is represented before the Court by Mr M. Murdoch, a lawyer practising in Birmingham. The respondent Government are represented by Mr H. Llewellyn of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant is a Romany traveller or gypsy. In 1985 she purchased her plot of land at 22E Dudmoor Farm Road, Christchurch, County Dorset and since then she has lived in a caravan or caravans on the plot with her aged mother and the applicant's three grandchildren who attend local schools. The applicant's mother suffers from poor health and requires constant attention. She has lived in caravans all her life. The applicant at the time of introducing the applicant had employment in a local supermarket, but herself also has difficulty reading and writing. A number of other gypsy families lived in caravans in adjacent sites. The Dudmoor Valley had been used by gypsies for at least 40 years and the group resident there were known as the “Dudmoor gypsies”.

The applicant's request to Christchurch Borough Council (the “Council”) for planning permission to station her caravans on her land was refused sometime in 1986. The reasons given for the refusal were:

1. that the site fell within an area designated as Green Belt and was therefore contrary to the South East Dorset Structure Plan;

2. that a residential caravan as proposed was considered to be visually damaging to the landscape and was therefore contrary to the South East Dorset Structure Plan;

3. that the proposed development would be contrary to the provisions of the Country Conservation Policy as adopted by the Local Planning Authority for this area, and

4. that, whilst the foul water drainage arrangements were considered to be adequate for the proposed development, the Authority was concerned about the proliferation of such facilities in the immediately surrounding area which might ultimately cause environmental problems and necessitate a marine drainage scheme.

An enforcement notice was issued on 29 October 1986 concluding that there had been a breach of planning control due to a material change of use of land from uncultivated and uninhabited land to use for stationing a caravan for the purposes of human habitation. The notice required that the land be reverted to former use as uncultivated and uninhabited land by removing the caravan from the land within a period of six months.

An appeal was made to the Secretary of State for the Environment against the refusal of planning permission (under section 36 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 as amended by the Local Government and Planning (Amendment) Act 1981) and the enforcement notice (under s. 88(2)(a) and (h) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 as amended). An Inspector was appointed and he held a local public inquiry into the appeals on 5 and 6 February 1987. Having visited the site and having heard submissions for the applicant, the Council and third parties, the Inspector concluded that there was a “small but identifiable need for accommodation in the area”. However in respect to the impact of the unauthorised development, the Inspector stated:

“The buildings, caravans and rectangular shaped plots are out of keeping with the area and considerably detract from its rural character and appearance ... [T]hey have, in my opinion, a suburban appearance, quite alien in this setting, that unacceptably harms the visual quality of the area and serves to undermine the aims and application of the prevailing restrictive policies.”

Placing considerable weight on the serious harm that the sites caused to the area and the strong policy and amenity objections to the site, the Inspector concluded that on balance the use of the sites should not continue. Recognising that the applicant had local links of some longstanding to the extent that she was considered to be “resident in the area”, the Inspector concluded that the question of proliferation and precedent were of particular importance given that, if the present appeal were allowed, future requests would be difficult to refuse. As a result, the Inspector found that the appeal should be dismissed and, recommending that the enforcement notice should be upheld, he proposed extending the period for compliance to 12 months.

The Secretary of State accepted the Inspector's recommendations on 30 June 1987 and his conclusion that the appearance of the appeal sites was “out of character with the generally rural nature of the area”. He acknowledged that there was a need to provide accommodation for travelling families in Dorset, but considered that in this case the objections put forward against the proposal outweighed that need. Furthermore, the Secretary of State reiterated the conclusions of the Inspector in relation to the proposal to develop the area for leisure activities, in particular that although this development would substantially alter the area, he did not believe that the proposal would be incompatible with the status of the area as Green Belt, nor would it erode its visual qualities or conflict with its amenity value. The Secretary of State also agreed with the extension of the period for compliance on the grounds that the applicant had nowhere else to go.

An offer of sites at Mannings Heath was made to the applicant and other gypsies in or about 1991-1992. It was considered by them to be unacceptable. While the applicant's husband moved to the site after separating from her, she did not believe that he stayed more than a few weeks. Her son took his wife and family to Mannings Heath after she had been scared by council officials but had only stayed there a few weeks.

In 1994, complaints were made by the applicant and her neighbours to the Local Authority Ombudsman alleging that the County Council had not fulfilled its statutory obligations to them and that it had not dealt properly with their proposals for resolving the situation.

By letter dated May 1994, the Ombudsman noted that the County Council had been attempting to find alternative sites for the complainants for some four years and had offered a number of solutions which the complainants had refused. She concluded:

“Having considered the evidence, I am not persuaded that the County Council have failed in their statutory duty to provide adequate accommodation for [the complainants]. I am more inclined to commend the Council for the considerable efforts that they made to try and ensure that [the complainants] were able to remain in Christchurch. ...The offers of accommodation which the Council made... appear to me to be reasonable and consistent with their statutory obligations. ”

Proceedings were instituted in the Bournemouth County Court by the Council in April 1995 and they resulted in an injunction being made on 9 October 1995 that the applicant remove her caravan from her land by 9 April 1996. The applicant sought to vary this order by extending the time for compliance pending the decision by the European Court of Human Rights in Buckley v United Kingdom (judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1271). This application was opposed by the Council and the Bournemouth County Court dismissed the application on 26 March 1996 on the ground that the injunction was a final order under the Town and County Planning Act 1971 and the judge had no power to alter it.

Subsequent appeal to the High Court was available, but the applicant declined to appeal on the advice that such an appeal was bound to fail. In mid-1996, the Council made an application to commit the applicant for contempt of court. On 22 January 1997, the County Court dismissed the order for committal against the applicant and ordered costs in her favour. By letter dated 3 February 1997, the applicant's solicitor informed the European Commission of Human Rights that the application for committal failed on a technicality, namely, that the local authority had failed to ensure that the documentation was adequately and properly served on the applicant.

The Council recommenced proceedings in the County Court. An order was made by consent under which the applicant was given six months to vacate the land. The County Council had given notice that they were prepared to re-open a former gypsy site for the applicant and others. The six month period in the order was renewable until the site opened.

In February 1998, the site at Mannings Heath was inspected by the applicant and others with representatives of the County Council and District Council. The applicant stated that the warden's office had been destroyed by vandalism and fire; no site warden had been appointed; the site itself was in very poor condition and, when transient gypsy families left, reoccupation of their vacated sites was not being permitted. She alleged that there was a general consensus that she and the other gypsies could not be reasonably expected to move from a rural location to a site which was the equivalent of an inner city sink estate.

The applicant's further application for planning permission, along with other Dudmoor gypsies who occupied adjacent sites, concerning altogether 7 residential caravans, 5 touring caravans and associated structures, was refused by the Council during 1997.

A public local inquiry concerning their appeals was held before an Inspector on 25 and 26 November 1997.

In his report dated 23 November 1998, the Inspector stated:

“7.3 It is a matter of agreement that the appeal site and the surrounding area is within the Green Belt and the proposal is contrary to Green Belt policies of the statutory and emerging Developments Plans for the area.

7.4 The area is remote, being accessed over a long partly unmade country lane, but there are views over it from the adjacent St Catherine's Hill which is a popular recreation area. Despite a scatter of buildings the area retains a predominantly rural appearance.

7.5 In my view the cluster of mobile homes the subject of this appeal form an obtrusive feature, harmful to the predominantly rural character and appearance of the area particularly when viewed from St Catherine's Hill and from Dudmoor Farm Road. Despite the long history of the plots, screening has not been effective and in my view the mobile homes are not acceptable in terms of gypsy sites or affordable housing.

7.6. Two earlier appeals in 1987 and 1992 were dismissed and efforts to relocate the appellants and others have been going on since at least the late 1980s. A number of other gypsies have been relocated.

7.7 Despite the appellants' protestations that the alternative sites offered were either unsuitable or unavailable, it seems to me that the evidence of the considerable efforts made to relocate them is much stronger. This was recognised by the Local Authority Ombudsman in 1994 and I find no reason to disagree with his findings.

7.8 The resident gypsies are acknowledged to be hard working families and there is no animosity towards them from local people. However there have been problems arising from the use of the plots as transit sites.

7.9 I am mindful of the disturbance and stress likely to be caused to the appellants and their relatives, particularly the very old, the frail and the young. However, in all the circumstances of this case I conclude that this is not sufficient to justify setting aside the Green Belt and country protection policies ... or outweigh the harm the presence of the mobile homes do to the predominantly rural character and appearance of this area...”

In his letter of 25 February 1999, the Secretary of State for the Environment accepted the Inspector's recommendation to refuse the appeals. He considered that considerable efforts had been made to find alternatives for the applicant, including reasonable offers of accommodation at Mannings Heath which were not taken up. He noted that the applicant had stated that she would move to the Mannington Park site (temporarily closed) if that was reopened under suitable conditions and in a suitable state of repair.

Offers of sites at Thornicombe and Coldharbour were made to the applicant. She refused them as inappropriate and unacceptable, as they were outside the Christchurch area with which she had long associations and where she had employment and her children had schools. There was no direct public transport and she could not drive.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. General planning law

The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991) (“the 1990 Act”) consolidated pre-existing planning law. It provides that planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land (section 57 of the 1990 Act). A change in the use of land for the stationing of caravans can constitute a development ( Restormel Borough Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Rabey [1982] Journal of Planning Law 785; John Davies v. Secretary of State for the Environment and South Hertfordshire District Council [1989] Journal of Planning Law 601).

An application for planning permission must be made to the local planning authority, which has to determine the application in accordance with the local development plan, unless material considerations indicate otherwise (section 54A of the 1990 Act).

The 1990 Act provides for an appeal to the Secretary of State in the event of a refusal of permission (section 78). With immaterial exceptions, the Secretary of State must, if either the appellant or the authority so desire, give each of them the opportunity of making representations to an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State. It is established practice that each inspector must exercise independent judgment and must not be subject to any improper influence (see the Bryan v. the United Kingdom judgment of 22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A, p. 11, § 21). There is a further appeal to the High Court on the ground that the Secretary of State's decision was not within the powers conferred by the 1990 Act, or that the relevant requirements of the 1990 Act were not complied with (section 288).

If a development is carried out without the grant of the required planning permission, the local authority may issue an “enforcement notice” if it considers it expedient to do so having regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations (section 172 (1) of the 1990 Act).

There is a right of appeal against an enforcement notice to the Secretary of State on the grounds, inter alia , that planning permission ought to be granted for the development in question (section 174). As with the appeal against refusal of permission, the Secretary of State must give each of the parties the opportunity of making representations to an inspector.

Again there is a further right of appeal on a point of law to the High Court against a decision of the Secretary of State under section 174 (section 289). Such an appeal may be brought on grounds identical to an application for judicial review. It therefore includes a review as to whether a decision or inference based on a finding of fact is perverse or irrational ( R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] Appeal Cases 696, 764 H-765 D). The High Court will also grant a remedy if the inspector's decision was such that there was no evidence to support a particular finding of fact; or the decision was made by reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors; or made for an improper purpose, in a procedurally unfair manner or in a manner which breached any governing legislation or statutory instrument. However, the court of review cannot substitute its own decision on the merits of the case for that of the decision-making authority.

Where any steps required by an enforcement notice to be taken are not taken within the period for compliance with the notice, the local authority may enter the land and take the steps and recover from the person who is then the owner of the land any expenses reasonably incurred by them in doing so (section 178 of the 1990 Act).

2. Green Belt policy

The purpose of Green Belts and the operation of the policy to protect them is set out in the national policy document PPG 2 (January 1995).

“1.1. The Government attaches great importance to Green Belts, which have been an essential element of planning policy for some four decades. ...

1.4. The fundamental aim of Green Belt policy is to prevent urban sprawl by keeping land permanently open; the most important attribute of Green Belts is their openness. Green Belts can shape patterns of urban development at sub-regional and regional scale, and help to ensure that development occurs in locations allocated in development plans. They help to protect the countryside, be it in agricultural, forestry or other use. They can assist in moving towards more sustainable patterns of urban development.

1.5. There are five purposes in Green Belts:

– to check the unrestricted sprawl of large built-up areas;

– to prevent neighbouring towns from merging into one another;

– to assist in safeguarding the countryside from encroachment;

– to preserve the setting and special character of historic towns; and

– to assist in urban regeneration by encouraging the recycling of derelict and other urban land. ...

2.1. The essential characteristic of Green Belts is their permanence. Their protection must be maintained as far as can be seen ahead. ...

3.1. The general policies controlling development in the countryside apply with equal force in Green Belts but there is, in addition, a general presumption against inappropriate development within them. Such development should not be approved, except in very special circumstances. ...

3.2. Inappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt. It is for the applicant to show why permission should be granted. Very special circumstances to justify inappropriate development will not exist unless the harm by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, is clearly outweighed by other considerations. In view of the presumption against inappropriate development, the Secretary of State will attach substantial weight to the harm to the Green Belt when considering any planning application or appeal concerning such development.”

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains that she is prevented from living with her family in caravans on her own land and from following the traditional lifestyle of a gypsy, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention. She also complains of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention and invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that the refusal of planning permission to station and live in a caravan on her land and the enforcement measures implemented in respect of her occupation of her land disclose a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

The submissions of the parties

The Government submitted with reference to the Buckley case (judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, pp. 1291-2, §§ 74-75) that in the context of town and country planning, which involved the exercise of discretionary judgment in implementing policies in the interests of the community, national authorities were in a better position to evaluate local needs and conditions than an international court. It was not for the Court to substitute its view of what would be the best planning policy or the most appropriate measure in a particular case. While the applicants were entitled to have their interests carefully considered by the national authorities and weighed in the balance as against the needs of planning control, an examination of the applicable system, and the facts of this case, showed that the procedural safeguards contained in national law as to the way in which planning judgments were made (an assessment by a qualified independent expert, an Inspector, followed by judicial review in the High Court) were such as to give due respect to their interests. The Government pointed out that local planning authorities were encouraged to adopt a sympathetic approach to any question of enforcement action under Circular 18/94 (see Relevant Domestic Law and Practice above). However, gypsies could not claim the right to live wherever they liked in defiance of planning control, particularly when they were now seeking to live a settled existence indefinitely on their own land.

The Government submitted that the applicant had moved onto her land without planning permission and that two Inspectors had found that her site was damaging to the quality of the environment. The local authority had taken considerable steps to assist the applicant in finding a place to move to and due interest had therefore been given to her interests and needs. The measures were therefore necessary and proportionate in compliance with Article 8 of the Convention. While the applicant refers to permission being given to other developments in the area, they point out that this related to a golf course and use of land for equestrian purposes, which recreational use was consistent with applicable planning policies and not comparable with the applicant's residential development.

The applicant submits that there are no relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the measures taken against her occupation of her land in her caravan which interfered with her right to respect for her family life. There could be no serious objections on grounds of visual amenity since planning permission has been granted for other developments in the area. The measures were also disproportionate and placed an excessive burden on her.

The applicant argues that in her case the authorities should enjoy a narrow margin of appreciation. She refers inter alia to the long association that gypsies have had with the Dudmoor valley, the fact that she has no alternative site to move to, and the previous offers of sites would have required her family to split up. There is no other way of practically maintaining her lifestyle; it would be a criminal offence for her to station her caravans on the side of the road or other unoccupied land and, as most of the land in the area is Green Belt, any other site would be likely to be refused planning permission also.

The applicant further argues that the approach taken by the Court in the case of Chapman v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 27238/95, 18.01.01, to be published in ECHR 2001) fails to take into account the fact that gypsies do not cease to be gypsies when they take up residence on their own land, that it cannot be reasonably expected for gypsies to move from the place where they are part of the community to find accommodation outside the area, that the shortfall of gypsy provision is far greater than the Government's official statistics acknowledge and that the depth of prejudice against gypsies is such that no touring caravan site would allow them to stay.

The Court's assessment

The Court recalls that it has already examined complaints about the planning and enforcement measures imposed on a gypsy family who occupied their own land without planning permission in the case of Buckley v. the United Kingdom (judgment cited above, p. 1271). While the Court is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases. Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved (see, amongst other authorities, the Cossey v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 184, p. 14, § 35). In the more recent cases decided before the Grand Chamber, the Court was not persuaded that any emerging consensus concerning the special needs of minority groups was sufficiently concrete for it to derive any guidance as to the conduct or standards which Contracting States consider desirable in any particular situation. This reinforced the Court's view that the complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved in policies balancing the interests of the general population, in particular with regard to environmental protection and the interests of a minority with possibly conflicting requirements, rendered the Court's role a strictly supervisory one (see e.g. Chapman v. the United Kingdom , cited above, §§ 93-94).

Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court considers that the applicant's occupation of her caravan is an integral part of her ethnic identity as a gypsy, reflecting the long tradition of that minority of following a travelling lifestyle. Measures which affect the applicant's stationing of her caravans have therefore a wider impact than on the right to respect for home. They also affect her ability to maintain her identity as a gypsy and to lead her private and family life in accordance with that tradition. The applicant's right to respect for her private life, family life and home are therefore in issue in the present case (see Chapman v. the United Kingdom , cited above, §§ 73-74).

Having regard to the facts of this case, it finds that the decisions of the planning authorities, refusing to allow the applicant to remain on her land in a caravan and the measures of enforcement taken in respect of her continued occupation, constituted an interference with her right to respect for her private life, family life and home within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. It therefore examines below whether this interference was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 as being “in accordance with the law”, pursuing a legitimate aim or aims and as being “necessary in a democratic society” in pursuit of that aim or aims.

It was not contested by the applicant that the measures to which she was subjected were “in accordance with the law”. It is also apparent that the reasons given for the interferences in the planning procedures in this case were expressed primarily in terms of environmental policy. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the measures pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the “rights of others” through preservation of the environment.

As regards the necessity of the measures, an interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. While it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of necessity, the final evaluation as to whether the reasons cited for the interference are relevant and sufficient remains subject to review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention (see, amongst other authorities, Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom , [Section 3], nos. 33985/97 and 33986/97, 27.09.99, ECHR 1999- VI, § 88).

In this regard, a margin of appreciation must, inevitably, be left to the national authorities, who by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. This margin will vary according to the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature of the activities restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued by the restrictions (see Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom judgment 22 October 1982, Series A no. 45, p. 21, § 52; Gillow v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55). Hence, as the Court observed in Buckley v. the United Kingdom (judgment cited above, p. 1292, § 75 in fine), “in so far as the exercise of discretion involving a multitude of local factors is inherent in the choice and implementation of planning policies, the national authorities in principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation”, although it remains open to the Court to conclude that there has been a manifest error of appreciation by the national authorities. In these circumstances, the procedural safeguards available to the individual applicant will be especially material in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory framework, remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, it must examine whether the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8 (see the Buckley judgment, cited above, pp. 1292-3, §§ 76-77).

Furthermore, although the fact of being a member of a minority with a traditional lifestyle different from that of the majority of a society does not confer an immunity from general laws intended to safeguard assets common to the whole society such as the environment, it may have an incidence on the manner in which such laws are to be implemented. As intimated in the Buckley judgment, the vulnerable position of gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in arriving at the decisions in particular cases (cited above, pp. 1292-95, §§ 76, 80, 84).

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court notes the seriousness of what is at stake for this applicant. She has a long association with the area and is well settled with her family. She took up residence on her own land by way of finding a long-term and secure place to station her caravan. Planning permission has however been refused for this and she has been required to leave. It would appear that the applicant does not in fact wish to pursue an itinerant lifestyle. She was resident on the site from about 1985 to date. Thus though it is accepted that the applicant is a gypsy, the present case is not concerned as such with traditional itinerant gypsy life styles.

The Court observes that the applicant moved onto her land in her caravan without obtaining the prior planning permission which she knew was necessary to render that occupation lawful. In accordance with the applicable procedures, the applicant's appeals against refusal of planning permission and enforcement notices were conducted in two public inquiries by Planning Inspectors, who were qualified independent experts. The applicant was provided with an opportunity to put before the Inspectors any material which she regarded as relevant to her arguments and in particular her personal, financial and other circumstances, her views as to the suitability of alternative sites and the length of time needed to find a suitable alternative site.

The Inspectors in both appeals saw the site themselves and considered the applicant's representations. As is evidenced by the extension of the time period for compliance in the decision of 1987, some notice was taken of the points which the applicant advanced. However, both Inspectors found that her use of the land was out of character with the rural nature of the area and that this obtrusion was harmful to the appearance of the land which was within a Green Belt area. The second Inspector who considered the case in 1998 found that the local authority had made not inconsiderable efforts to assist the applicant in relocating elsewhere. While he paid regard to the applicant's gypsy status, her association with the area and the stress of any move, her interests were not in the circumstances sufficient to outweigh the harm caused by the development to the countryside. The Inspectors' reports showed therefore that there were strong, environmental reasons for the refusal of planning permission and that the applicant's personal circumstances had been taken into account in the decision-making process. The Court also notes that appeal to the High Court was available in so far as the applicant felt that the Inspectors, or Secretary of State, had not taken into account a relevant consideration or had based the contested decision on irrelevant considerations.

Though it was acknowledged in the planning proceedings that it might not be easy for the applicant to find alternative accommodation, sites did exist and the Court is therefore not persuaded that there were no alternatives available to the applicant besides remaining in occupation on land without planning permission in a Green Belt area. As stated in the Buckley case, Article 8 does not necessarily go so far as to allow individuals' preferences as to their place of residence to override the general interest (judgment cited above, p. 1294, § 81).

In the circumstances, the Court considers that proper regard was had to the applicant's predicament both under the terms of the regulatory framework, which contained adequate procedural safeguards protecting her interests under Article 8, and by the responsible planning authorities when exercising their discretion in relation to the particular circumstances of her case. The decisions were reached by those authorities after weighing in the balance the various competing interests. It is not for this Court to sit in appeal on the merits of those decisions, which were based on reasons which were relevant and sufficient, for the purposes of Article 8, to justify the interferences with the exercise of the applicant's rights.

The humanitarian considerations which might have supported another outcome at national level cannot be used as the basis of a finding by the Court which would be tantamount to exempting the applicant from the implementation of the national planning laws and obliging governments to ensure that every gypsy family has available for its use accommodation appropriate to its needs (see the Chapman v. the United Kingdom case cited above, § 115). Furthermore, the effect of these decisions cannot on the facts of this case be regarded as disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued.

The Court accordingly finds that the measures may be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society for the purpose of protecting the rights of others. This part of the application must therefore be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

2. The applicant invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention which provides as relevant:

“No person shall be denied the right to education. ...”

The applicant refers to the fact that she has grandchildren living on her site and that they attend local schools.

The Court does not find it substantiated however that on the facts of this case the planning measures taken against the applicant have effectively denied the right to education to those children. There has, accordingly, been no appearance of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

3. The applicant claims that she has been discriminated against, invoking Article 14 of the Convention which provides:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

The Government submit that the applicant could not claim that others in a similar situation had been treated more preferentially than herself. In particular she could not compare her residential occupation with the recreational use of land for which planning permission had been granted in the area. The aim of the planning system was designed inter alia to protect the environment and this applied to anyone, gypsy or non-gypsy, who wished to settle in the countryside. To the extent that there was any difference in treatment, they argued that there would be a reasonable and objective justification, namely, the preservation of the countryside in Green Belt areas.

The applicant states that planning permission had been granted to commercial developments in the vicinity and that this showed that the refusal in her case was not motivated by any alleged visual amenity grounds. She refers to the prejudice which motivated attitudes and led to arbitrary distinctions between gypsy and non-gypsy occupation of land. In her view, local authorities interpreted planning policy as meaning that factors relating to the physical environment should take precedence over the needs and personal circumstances of gypsy travellers.

Having regard to its findings above under Article 8 of the Convention that any interference with the applicant's rights was proportionate to the legitimate aim of preservation of the environment, the Court concludes that there has been no discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. While discrimination may arise where States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different ( Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, ECHR 2000-IV, § 44), the Court does not find, in the circumstances of this case, any lack of objective and reasonable justification for the measures taken against the present applicants.

This part of the application must therefore also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

S. Dollé J.-P. Costa Registrar President