DOCEVSKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"
Doc ref: 66907/01 • ECHR ID: 001-22088
Document date: November 22, 2001
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THIRD SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 66907/01 by Tomislav DOCEVSKI against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 22 November 2001 as a Chamber composed of
Mr G. Ress , President , Mr I. Cabral Barreto , Mr P. Kūris , Mr B. Zupančič , Mr J. Hedigan , Mrs M. Tsatsa - Nikolovska , Mr K. Traja , judges , and Mr V. Berger , Section Registrar ,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 8 December 2000 and registered on 9 March 2001,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Tomislav Docevski, is a national of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He was born in 1933 and lives in Kumanovo.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 16 November 1994 the applicant retired. On 20 December 1994 he received a decision concerning the basis for the calculation of the amount of his pension from the Retirement and Disability Fund (hereinafter referred to as the Fund).
On 31 October 1996 the applicant asked the Fund to re-open the proceedings concerning the determination of the basis of the amount of his pension. He argued that the Constitutional Court had adopted a decision (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 28/96) under which he was entitled to a higher pension.
On 25 November 1996 the Fund rejected his request, holding that the Constitutional Court’s decision only concerned persons who fulfilled the criteria to receive pensions as from 1995. On 3 February 1997 the applicant’s appeal to the Second Instance Commission at the Fund was also rejected.
On 19 November 1997 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 3 February 1997 and referred the applicant’s case to the Second Instance Government Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) on the ground that only the Commission had jurisdiction to examine appeals against the Fund.
On 28 January 1998 the Commission rejected the applicant’s appeal against the Fund’s decision of 25 November 1996.
On 27 October 1999 the Supreme Court quashed the Commission’s decision of 28 January 1998 and remitted the applicant’s case to the Commission for re-examination. It held that there had been a breach of procedure, and that the Commission had not examined all the aspects of the applicant’s request.
On 12 June 2000 the Commission decided that the applicant’s pension should be increased in accordance with the relevant opinion on the matter given by the Plenary Session of the Constitutional Court.
On 22 June 2000 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court that the Commission had applied an incorrect basis for the calculation of the amount of his pension. On 7 September 2000 the applicant requested the Supreme Court to speed up the proceedings. The proceedings are still pending before the Supreme Court.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the civil proceedings to which he was a party were unreasonably long.
2. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that he was deprived of the part of his pension because the law was wrongly applied by the competent domestic bodies. He also invokes Article 14 of the Convention in this respect.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the civil proceedings to which he was a party were unreasonably long.
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case-file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
2. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that he was deprived of the part of his pension because the law was wrongly applied by the competent domestic bodies. He also invokes Article 14 of the Convention in this respect.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
Article 14 of the Convention provides as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The Court recalls that a complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 concerning deprivation of possessions or discrimination is in principle premature when the proceedings are still pending before the competent domestic bodies. An applicant cannot claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of a violation of these Articles in respect of proceedings which have not been concluded (see, mutatis mutandis , application no. 31195/96, decision of 27 February 1997, DR 88-A, p. 169).
The Court notes that in the instant case, the proceedings are still pending before the Supreme Court.
It follows that the applicant cannot, at this stage, claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded under Article 3 5 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaint that the civil proceedings to which he was a party were unreasonably long;
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Vincent Berger Georg Ress Registrar President
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