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GREGORIOU v. CYPRUS

Doc ref: 62242/00 • ECHR ID: 001-22476

Document date: June 4, 2002

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  • Cited paragraphs: 0
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GREGORIOU v. CYPRUS

Doc ref: 62242/00 • ECHR ID: 001-22476

Document date: June 4, 2002

Cited paragraphs only

SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 62242/00 by Andreas GREGORIOU against Cyprus

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section) , sitting on 4 June 2002 as a Chamber composed of

Mr J.-P. Costa , President , Mr L. Loucaides , Mr C. Bîrsan , Mr K. Jungwiert , Mr V. Butkevych , Mrs W. Thomassen , Mrs A. Mularoni , judges , and Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced on 18 May 2000 and registered on 26 October 2000,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Andreas Gregoriou , is a Cypriot national, who was born in 1928 and lives in Nicosia.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. Background to the case

The applicant was recruited in September 1946 by the Bank of Cyprus. He retired from the Bank on 31 December 1988. To enhance his career prospects, he continued his studies while working, studying through distance learning programmes run by British colleges. In 1960 he was granted two-years’ unpaid educational leave to study in London. When he returned he was promoted deputy to the Chief Inspector with the prospect of succeeding him. In 1963 the Government established the Central Bank (the State issuing Bank), which published its vacant posts. Interested in one of the four managerial posts, the applicant applied by contacting the Bank’s Governor who offered him the post of Banking Operations.

On hearing about the Central Bank’s offer, the applicant’s Bank, in 1964, offered him orally the post of Chief Inspector on condition that he follow a six-month training course in London. When the applicant returned from his training, the Bank promoted him to the lower post of Head of Department. In 1967 the Bank amended its Conditions of Service. The applicant was kept in the same grade. In the same year the applicant was transferred on promotion to take charge of the Paphos Branch. In 1969 he was again promoted (but not to the allegedly agreed post) and in 1970 he was transferred back to the Head Office, where he alleges he was given various duties below managerial status.

The applicant alleges that in 1983 the Chairman of the Bank, in the course of a private meeting, stated that the reason for not promoting him to the post agreed in 1964 was that the Board of Directors had received from a group of shareholders a number of anonymous letters which criticised it for bad administration. The Board suspected that these letters had been sent by the applicant. The applicant further alleges that, following this information, he tried hard for almost two years to convince the Bank of his innocence, but to no avail.

The applicant alleges that in 1987, nineteen months before his retirement, the Bank offered him 32,000 Cypriot pounds with a year’s increment in his salary and threatened him that, if he did not accept, the Bank would demote him from Sub-Manager to Head of Department. The applicant refused the offer.

In 1988 the Disciplinary Committee of the Bank ordered the applicant’s dismissal with stay of execution.

Considering that the Bank did not respect its commitment to appoint him to a senior management position, the applicant instituted proceedings before the District Court of Nicosia claiming damages.

2. The proceedings before the District Court of Nicosia and the Supreme Court sitting as an appeal court

(a) The hearing of the action

The applicant lodged an action for damages (n° 7439/85) with the District Court of Nicosia on 12 August 1985. On 22 October 1985 he filed his statement of claim and on 15 April 1986 he filed an amended version.

On 27 June 1986 the applicant applied for the action to be fixed for hearing. The hearing was fixed for 7 October 1986. One month before the hearing the applicant replaced his lawyer and, after a request by both parties, the hearing was adjourned to 19 February 1987 and then to 10 June 1987. On 3 March 1987 the applicant filed an application to amend further his statement of claim, which was granted on 23 May 1987.

On 6 June 1987 the applicant filed his amended statement of claim, but on 3 July 1987 the defendants filed an application for the striking out of certain parts of it.  The application was fixed for hearing on 21 September 1987 but the hearing was adjourned to 20 October 1987 because the applicant failed to file his opposition. On that date it was adjourned again because, in the meantime, the applicant had replaced his lawyer. On 14 December 1987 the District Court ordered the striking out of certain parts of the statement of claim. On 5 January 1988 the defendants filed their statement of defence. The action was fixed for hearing on 10 March 1988. On 6 February 1988 the applicant’s lawyer withdrew from the case and thus the hearing was adjourned again to 4 May 1988. The applicant appeared in person and on 16 May 1988 he applied for a further adjournment in order to appoint a lawyer. On 6 June 1988 the new lawyer applied for a further adjournment in order to study the file. On 8 August 1988 the applicant’s lawyer applied for a further adjournment because the applicant was ill, but the Court dismissed the request. The applicant’s lawyer withdrew from the case.

On 30 July 1988 the District Court delivered judgment and dismissed the action.

(b) The appeal

The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Court. He alleged a violation of Article 30 of the Constitution and of Article 6 of the Convention.

The appeal was fixed for hearing on 25 November 1991 but adjourned to 12 January 1992 because the applicant was ill, and then to 20 March 1992 because the applicant’s lawyer had other commitments.

On 20 March 1992 the applicant informed the Court that he had dismissed his lawyer and requested a three-month adjournment of the hearing. The hearing was adjourned to 15 October 1992 and, on that date, the applicant appeared in person.

On 10 November 1992 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment . It held that the failure of the trial court to grant the adjournment which the applicant had requested on 8 July 1988 had, in the circumstances, led to a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing.

The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 30 July 1988 and ordered a re-trial by another District Court.

(c) The second hearing

The action was fixed for hearing on 14 December 1992 but on that date the applicant applied for an adjournment in order to appoint another lawyer. On 16 March 1993 the hearing was adjourned to 2 July 1993 with the consent of both parties, and then to 29 October 1993 at the request of the applicant. On that date the court did not proceed with the hearing because the applicant had filed an application for the production of documents which had to be determined first. The defendants objected to that application but their objection was dismissed on 7 December 1993. On 17 December 1993 the applicant applied for an amendment of the statement of claim, which was granted.

On 25 January 1994 the applicant filed an application for disclosure of documents by the defendants. The application was fixed for directions on 21 February 1994. As the defendants objected to the application, a hearing was fixed and on 20 April 1994 the court granted the application.

The hearing of the action commenced on 21 June 1994. The applicant applied for an adjournment because he intended to file an application for amendment of his statement of claim. As a result, the hearing was adjourned to 20 September 1994, and then to 17 October 1994 and 28 November 1994. The application was granted on 19 January 1995 and the hearing of the action continued on 6 February 1995.

During the hearing the court issued two interlocutory rulings on procedural matters. On 27 March 1995 the applicant filed two appeals against these rulings with the Supreme Court. He also filed an application for a stay of the proceedings until the determination of the appeals and the conclusion of the investigation of a complaint he had made against the defendants to the police. On 8 May 1995 the court dismissed both applications for a stay of the proceedings. The hearing of the action continued on 17 May 1995.

On 11 June 1995 judgment was reserved. However, at that time one of the judges of the bench retired and thus the action had to be re-heard by another bench.

(d) The third hearing

On 28 March 1996 the hearing of the action started again before another bench of the court. However, on 6 May 1996 one of the judges was appointed as a member of the Supreme Court and thus the hearing was adjourned to 1 July 1996 in order to start again before a different bench.

(e) The fourth hearing

The hearing before a different bench was fixed for 12 September 1996 but was adjourned to 22 October 1996.

On 11 October 1996 the applicant filed an application to stay the hearing of the action until certain private criminal proceedings he had initiated against the defendants had been determined. On 11 November 1996 the court dismissed the application.

On 23 December 1996 the hearing of the action was concluded and the court reserved its judgment .

On 14 January 1997 the applicant filed an application for the re-opening of the action in order to submit further arguments. On 24 January 1997 the court dismissed the application.

On 20 March 1997 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s civil claims.

2. The proceedings before the Supreme Court

On 15 April 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. The hearing was fixed for 18 July 1997 but it was adjourned to 24 September 1997, and then to 25 November 1997 and 28 January 1998 because the transcript of the trial was not ready yet. The written addresses of both parties were submitted on 17 June 1998 The hearing took place on 22 September 1998 and was terminated on 24 March 1999. Judgment was reserved. However, as one of the judges resigned, the appeal was taken up by another bench of the Supreme Court, which re-heard the case and delivered judgment on 29 November 1999.

The introductory paragraph of the judgment provided as follows:

“The action, which resulted in the judgment from which appeal is made, was filed in August 1985. The course of the case was exceptionally unfortunate. The responsibility lies, to a much greater extent, upon the court. The trial commenced three times before different benches of the Full Court without resulting in a determination of the dispute. Here we have the appeal against the judgment in the fourth trial”.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings before the Nicosia District Court and the Supreme Court.

THE LAW

The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government admit that in the present case the length of the proceedings amounted to a breach of the “reasonable” time requirement. However, they allege that the applicant is not entitled to any award by way of just satisfaction because of his own dilatory conduct throughout the proceedings.

The applicant contests his responsibility for the length of the proceedings. He claims that the defendants, the largest bank on the island, succeeded in depriving him of consistent legal representation because of a conflict of interest, so that eventually he had to handle his case personally. They also succeeded in making matters worse by influencing the Attorney General and the courts. The defendants had every reason to impede the normal judicial procedure with the ultimate intention of making him give up his judicial struggle through psychological and financial pressure. As regards his applications to amend his statement of claims, he submits that they had to be made for two reasons: firstly because of the passage of time and, secondly, because of his constant change of lawyers due to the reprehensible conduct of the defendants. The request for the adjournment of the hearing of 19 February 1987 was made by the defendants and not by both sides. On 12 October 1993 he had filed an application for the production of documents by the defendants from his personal employment file, to which they had strenuously objected.

The Court notes that the proceedings commenced on 12 August 1985, when the applicant lodged an action for damages with the District Court of Nicosia, and ended on 29 November 1999, with the judgment of the Supreme Court. They lasted fourteen years three months and seventeen days, over three levels of jurisdiction.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the application raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.

S. Dollé J.-P. Costa Registrar President

© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu, 1998 - 2026

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