FOURTH SECTION

PARTIAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 51646/99 by Marcela TOMKOV Á against Slovakia

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) , sitting on 1 October 2002 as a Chamber composed of

Sir Nicolas Bratza , President ,

Mrs E. Palm ,

Mrs V. Strážnická ,

Mr M. Fischbach ,

Mr J. Casadevall , Mr R. Maruste ,

Mr L. Garlicki , judges , and Mrs F. Elens-Passos , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 February 1999,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Ms Marcela Tomková, is a Slovakian national, who was born in 1945 and lives in Trebi šov .

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows.

On 29 March 1993 the applicant was dismissed from employment at the Mining Faculty of the Technical University in Ko Å¡ice due to redundancy with reference to Section 46 (1) (c) of the Labour Code. The decision relied on orders of the rector of the university and of the dean of the faculty of 24 February 1993 and 11 March 1993 respectively to introduce a change in the structure of the university with a view to reducing the number of employees and thus rendering the activities of the university more efficient.

On 20 April 1993 the applicant challenged her dismissal before the Ko šice 1 District Court. She claimed, in particular, that the above rector’s and dean’s orders was not a relevant reason for her dismissal.

The first hearing was held on 2 February 1995. The applicant extended her action in that she also claimed compensation for lost income.

The District Court held two further hearings, and on 23 November 1995 it dismissed the applicant’s action. The District Court heard the parties, two witnesses, and had regard to documentary evidence submitted by the parties. It established that the reasons invoked in the above rector’s and dean’s orders as a result of which the applicant had been dismissed, namely that the efficiency of work within the university be increased, were relevant and fell under Section 46 (1) (c) of the Labour Act. The District Court further found that at the relevant time the employer had no other posts available which could be offered to the applicant.

On 16 January 1996 the applicant appealed. She submitted the reasons for her appeal on 11 February 1996 and on 10 March 1996. The applicant claimed, in particular, that the rector’s and dean’s orders of 24 February 1993 and 11 March 1993 respectively could not be qualified as a change in the structure of the organisation within the meaning of Section 46 (1) (c) of the Labour Code as such a change had not been approved by the Ministry of the Education. The applicant further alleged that the choice of employees to be dismissed had been arbitrary, and that the university had subsequently recruited new employees.

On 28 May 1998 the Ko Å¡ ice Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment after having taken additional evidence. The appellate court noted, with reference to the relevant provisions of the High Schools Act of 1990, that the Ministry of the Education had no power to interfere with the organisation of faculties within universities. Rectors of universities were free to decide on such questions and their decisions were subject to the approval by the academic senate of the university or faculty concerned. The Regional Court found that such an approval had been given on 23 February 1993 and on 8 March 1993 respectively. Furthermore, the restructuring challenged by the applicant had also been put before the trade-unions at the university.

The Regional Court established that there had been no suitable post free at the university at the time of the applicant’s dismissal. Finally, the judgment stated that there existed no evidence in support of the applicant’s allegation according to which new employees had been recruited following her dismissal.

On 21 August 1998 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law. She alleged that the appellate court had failed to assess the facts of the case correctly.

On 17 December 1998 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law without having examined the merits of the case. The decision stated that such a remedy was not available in the case.

Subsequently the applicant unsuccessfully requested the General Prosecutor to file an extraordinary appeal on points of law on her behalf.

B. Relevant domestic law

Section 46 (1) (c) of the Labour Code provides that an employee can be dismissed for redundancy following the employer’s decision to change the activities of the organisation or its technical equipment, to reduce the number of employees with a view to increasing the efficiency, or to carry out other changes in the structure of the organisation.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length and unfairness of the proceedings concerning the lawfulness of her dismissal. She alleges, in particular, that the courts failed to assess the facts of the case correctly and decided arbitrarily, and that she was deprived of access to the Supreme Court.

THE LAW

The applicant complains that the proceedings concerning her action were unfair and lasted an unreasonably long time. She alleges a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

a) To the extent that the applicant complains that the Slovakian courts failed to assess the facts of the case correctly and decided arbitrarily, the Court recalls that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see, e.g., the Schenk v. Switzerland judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, §§ 45-46, and the Garcia Ruiz v. Spain judgment of 21 January 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-I, § 28).

In the present case, both the Ko šice 1 District Court and the Košice Regional Court addressed the applicant’s arguments and gave sufficient and relevant reasons for their judgments which do not appear to be arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court finds no appearance of unfairness, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in the manner in which those courts dealt with the applicant’s case.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

b) As to the applicant’s complaint that she could not have the Regional Court’s judgment reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Court recalls that neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the Convention guarantees a right to appeal or to a second or third level of jurisdiction (see, e.g , Bullivant v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 45738/99, 28 March 2000 and Kopczynski v. Poland, application no. 28863/95, Commission decision of 1 July 1998, unpublished).

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

c) To the extent that the applicant complains about the length of the proceedings, the Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings;

Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.

Françoise Elens-Passos Nicolas Bratza Deputy Registrar President