FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 40747/98 by Lars RENDAHL against Sweden

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fourth Section) , sitting on 10 December 2002 as a Chamber composed of

Sir Nicolas Bratza , President , Mr M. Pellonpää , Mr A. Pastor Ridruejo , Mrs E. Palm , Mr M. Fischbach , Mr J. Casadevall , Mr S. Pavlovschi , judges ,

and Mrs F. Elens-Passos , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 18 November 1997,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Lars Rendahl , is a Swedish national, who was born in 1946 and lives in Hestra .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant owned or partly owned several newspaper companies that went bankrupt in 1991 amidst considerable media attention. On behalf of two of these companies, Lokaltidningen i Finbergen AB and Kronobergaren , in April 1991 the applicant as the managing director applied for state subsidies from the Swedish Press Subsidies Board ( Presstödsnämnden ), a central Government authority responsible for safeguarding the diversity of Sweden’s daily newspapers by allocating state subsidies to the daily press. State subsidies were granted in the amount of maximum 966.975 Swedish kronor (SEK) and would be payable on the presentation of invoices proving that the investments for which the subsidies were applied were actually made. The applicant submitted an invoice of 3 May 1991 from a computer company, AboData AB (partly owned by applicant), to Lokaltidningen i Finbergen AB in the amount of SEK 1.243.120, and accordingly on 21 May 1991 state subsidies in the amount of SEK 932.340 were paid to the applicant. Kronobergaren went bankrupt on 1 November 1991 and Lokaltidningen i Finbergen AB went bankrupt on 16 December 1991.

In the meantime, on 4 December 1991 the Swedish Press Subsidies Board submitted a report to the police, indicating that the invoice of 3 May 1991 was false and that the applicant had therefore fraudulently appropriated the subsidies paid.

A police investigation commenced on 6 December 1991. Five witnesses were heard during the period of 20 May and 16 September 1992. On 23 November 1992 the applicant was questioned by the police and formally notified about the suspicions against him. He was re-interrogated on 19 May 1993. On 27 May 1993 the applicant’s counsel requested a meeting with the prosecutor before a decision whether to bring charges against the applicant be taken. During the meeting, which could not take place until 6 October 1993, due to the counsel’s tight schedule, the applicant asked that a named witness on his behalf be heard. This witness was interviewed on 15 November 1993. On 31 May 1994, having decided to bring charges against the applicant, the public prosecutor sent a summons application to the District Court of Värnamo ( Värnamo tingsrätt ).

On 13 June 1994 the trial was scheduled to take place on 25 August 1994, during which the applicant and five witnesses were heard. The applicant admitted that the invoice was false, he maintained however that subsequently he did invest the subsidies in the goods listed on the invoice.

Having found that it could not be established that the Swedish Press Subsidies Board had suffered a loss, the District Court acquitted the applicant by judgment pronounced on 8 September 1994.

On 26 September 1994 the prosecution lodged an appeal against the judgment to the Court of Appeal in Göta ( Göta Hovrätt ) and requested at the same time an extension of the time-limit to complete the appeal. A supplementary preliminary investigation was concluded by the prosecution on 24 October 1994, and on 8 November 1994 the prosecution’s appeal was completed entailing a request that six new witnesses be heard.

As the applicant objected to one of these witnesses being heard, in the period between 9 November 1994 and 23 February 1995 written pleadings were submitted concerning this procedural question. By decision of 9 June 1995 the Court of Appeal allowed the new evidence to be submitted.

On 30 August 1995 the trial was scheduled to take place on 17 and 18 October 1995.

By judgment pronounced on 8 November 1995 the Court of Appeal found it established that the invoice was false and that at the time of the payment, i.e. on 21 May 1991, the applicant had put the Swedish Press Subsidies Board at risk of suffering a loss. The applicant was accordingly convicted of aggravated fraud pursuant to the Criminal Code and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment.

His request for leave to appeal of 8 November 1995 was received in the Supreme Court ( Högsta domstolen ) on 11 December 1995, and having obtained an extension of the time-limit his request was completed on 5 March 1996.

On 4 June 1996 the Supreme Court requested that the Prosecutor General submit written observations within four weeks. On 11 December 1996 and on 31 January 1997 a reminder in this respect was sent to the Prosecutor General and on 24 February 1997 the observations were submitted. The applicant’s comments thereto were submitted on 21 March 1997. On 26 May 1997 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal charge against him was not determined within a reasonable time.

THE LAW

Complaining of the length of the criminal proceedings, the applicant invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...”

As regards the period to be considered the Government contend that the proceedings began on 23 November 1992, when the applicant was formally notified about the suspicions against him.

According to the applicant, the period to be considered started on 6 December 1991 when the police investigation commenced since from that date on he was substantially affected by the media’s interest in the case.

The Court recalls that according to its case-law the period to be taken into consideration under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be determined autonomously. It begins at the time when formal charges are brought against a person or when that person has otherwise been substantially affected by actions taken by the prosecuting authorities as a result of a suspicion against him (cf. e.g. the Hozee v. the Netherlands judgment of 22 May 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1100, § 43 with further references).

In the present case the bankruptcies of the numerous newspaper companies owned or partly owned by the applicant attracted a rather extensive press coverage. However, in the Court’s view the applicant has not submitted any persuasive evidence that he was thereby or otherwise substantially affected by the police investigation before he was formally notified about the suspicions against him.

Accordingly, on the material before it, the Court considers that the proceedings commenced on 23 November 1992 and ended on 26 May 1997 and thus lasted four years, six months and three days.

From a general point of view the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed with reference to the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the authorities before which the case was brought (cf. Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).

Complexity of the case

As to the complexity of the case, the Government maintain that the preliminary investigation and the court proceedings concerned matters of some complexity. The record of the preliminary investigation consisted mainly of invoices, leasing contracts and other correspondence, and in addition to what appears from the records, the police and the prosecution had to go into other matters since the applicant was partner in a large number of companies which were declared bankrupt prior to or during the preliminary investigation. Moreover, the examination involved the evaluation of extensive oral evidence.

The applicant disagrees.

The Court, noting that the case required extensive investigations involving hearing of several witnesses, considers that the case was of a certain complexity.

The applicant’s conduct

In the Government’s opinion the applicant contributed to prolonging the proceedings.

The applicant disagrees.

The Court recalls its case-law that the applicant is to be held responsible for possible delays caused by his representative (see e.g. Capuano v. Italy judgment of 25 June 1987, Series A no. 119, p.12, § 28).

In the present case on 27 May 1993 the applicant’s counsel requested a meeting with the prosecutor before a decision whether to bring charges against the applicant was taken. The meeting could not take place until 6 October 1993 due to counsel’s tight schedule.

Moreover, as to the proceedings before the Supreme Court the applicant’s did not complete his request for leave to appeal of 8 November 1995 until 5 March 1996.

Accordingly, in the Court’s opinion at least a delay of eight months can be attributed to the applicant’s conduct.

Conduct of the national authorities

As regards the conduct of the competent authorities the Government submit that the total duration of the proceedings did not go beyond what can be considered reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. As regards the proceedings before the Supreme Court, notably the fact that it took the Prosecutor General almost nine months to submit his observations, the Government draw attention to his special role as being not only the public prosecution before the Supreme Court, but also the chief prosecutor and, in this capacity responsible for and the head of the public prosecution service in Sweden. Because of this role, there are often special considerations to be taken when submitting responses to the Supreme Court.

The applicant maintains that the length of the proceedings was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

The Court reiterates that only delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of failure to comply with the “reasonable time” requirement (see e.g. Ciricosta and Viola v. Italy judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 337-A, p. 10, § 28).

The Court recalls that the applicant was formally notified about the suspicions against him on 23 November 1992 and that the investigation ended on 31 May 1994 when the public prosecutor sent a summons application to the District Court of Värnamo , that is a total of one year, six months and eight days.

In the Court’s view the facts of the case disclose no elements which could lead to conclude that the investigation authorities or the prosecutor acted inappropriately or otherwise failed to carry out their duties with due diligence.

In these circumstances, and having regard to the finding above this period cannot in the Court’s view entail criticism of the length of the proceedings.

The proceedings before the District Court lasted from 31 May 1994 until 8 September 1994, thus three months and eight days. The Court finds that the length of these proceedings respected the “reasonable time” requirement.

The same applies to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, which commenced on 26 September 1994 and ended in the judgment of 8 November 1995, accordingly lasting one year, one month and twelve days.

As to the Supreme Court proceedings the applicant’s request for leave to appeal was received on 11 December 1995 and completed on 5 March 1996. The proceedings ended on 26 May 1997 with the Supreme Court’s refusal to grant leave to appeal. Thus, the proceedings lasted one year, five months and fifteen days of which, as stated above, approximately four months was attributable to the applicant.

On 4 June 1996 the Supreme Court requested that the Prosecutor General submit written observations within four weeks. On 11 December 1996 and on 31 January 1997 a reminder in this respect was sent to the Prosecutor General and on 24 February 1997 the observations were submitted. Thus, although the Prosecutor General exceeded the set time-limit, more than five months went by before the Supreme Court reacted with a reminder.

However, taking account of the particularity of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the Court finds that this is not such an unacceptable period of inactivity as to give rise to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

Therefore, making an overall assessment, the length of the proceedings did not, in the Court’s view, go beyond what may be considered reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. The applicant’s complaints do not therefore, disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 34 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Françoise Elens-Passos Nicolas Bratza              Deputy Registrar President