SECOND SECTION

PARTIAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 21322/02 by Andreas TSAGGARIS against Cyprus

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section) , sitting on 21 January 2003 as a Chamber composed of

Mr J.-P. Costa , President , Mr A.B. Baka , Mr Gaukur Jörundsson , Mr L. Loucaides , Mr C. Bîrsan , Mr M. Ugrekhelidze , M rs A. Mularoni, Judges , and Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced on 21 May 2002,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Andreas Tsaggaris, is a Cypriot national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Limassol. He is represented before the Court by Mr C. Clerides, a lawyer practising in Nicosia.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows.

On 13 April 1979 the applicant bought an apartment in the Golden Beach complex near Limassol . The apartment should have been delivered in April 1980. However, the building company was behind schedule in completing the works and in dispute with the owners of the land on which the complex was being built.

On 10 February 1986 the applicant lodged an action for damages with the Nicosia District Court against the building company and the owners of the land. On 28 February 1986 he filed his claims.

On 23 April 1986 the defendants filed their defence.

On 10 December 1986 the applicant asked the District Court to fix a date for the hearing.

On 29 January 1987 the defendants submitted a request to modify their defence. On 10 March 1987 the District Court granted the request.

The defendants submitted their modified defence on 4 May 1987 and two days later the applicant asked the District Court to fix a hearing date.

On 29 October 1987 the building company informed the court that it had been wound-up by order of the court on account of its inability to meet its obligations and its heavy debts.

On 19 March 1988 the liquidator asked the court to delay the proceedings because the matter was being examined by him.

On 11 January 1996 the District Court authorised the applicant to revise his claims and decided to resume the proceedings.

The hearing started on 28 April 1998. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for an adjournment. However, as the liquidator’s lawyer has withdrawn from the proceedings, the District Court adjourned the hearing until 8 May 1998. On that date the court again adjourned the proceedings because the applicant had engaged a new lawyer who had submitted a request to file a revised version of the applicant’s claims. The court fixed 12 May 1998 as the date on which to examine the lawyer’s request. However, the hearing had to be adjourned until 20 May 1998, and subsequently until 5 June 1998, 26 June 1998, 13 July 1998, 22 September 1998 and 18 November 1998.

On 10 July 1998 the applicant applied to the Supreme Court to have the order of 11 January 1996 of the District Court authorising the continuation of the proceedings quashed in spite of the liquidation order. On 18 March 1999 the Supreme Court accepted partly the application in question and issued an order for certiorari and prohibition, which prohibited the continuation of the proceedings as regarded the building company, on the ground that the above-mentioned order of the District Court was null and void. On 27 April 1999 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Supreme Court. He maintained that the entire proceedings should have been quashed. However, on 19 June 2000 the applicant withdrew his appeal due to an agreement reached with the other party in the proceedings.

In the meantime, the hearing on the applicant’s request to file a revised version of his claims had to be adjourned so that it could be heard by another judge on 9 November 2000. However, on that latter date the hearing had to be adjourned again until 17 January 2001 and subsequently until18 January 2001.

On 25 January 2001 the District Court decided to dismiss the applicant’s request on the ground that it had been filed belatedly and that, if granted, there would be a breach of the right to a fair hearing. On 6 February 2001 the applicant appealed against this decision and on 1 March 2001 the defendants filed a counter-appeal. The Supreme Court examined the appeal on 17 December 2001 and delivered its decision on 8 February 2002. On the one hand, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the ground that the request for revision was too broad and amounted to a request to lodge a new action (in order to counter-balance his original inadequate and unfounded pleadings). On the other hand, the Supreme Court blamed the applicant for the delay in the proceedings. The Supreme Court further held that the District Court had not discriminated against the applicant because the latter court had allowed the requests lodged by other plaintiffs – purchasers of apartments in another action filed against the building company and the owners of the land – to submit a revised version of their claims. The Supreme Court observed in this connection that the applicant’s case was examined on its own merits.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings.

2. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his right to a fair hearing has been violated.

3. Finally, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 14 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant alleges two violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal...”

Firstly, the proceedings he had brought against the building company and the owners of the land had taken more than a “reasonable time”.

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

Secondly, the applicant alleges that his right to a fair hearing was violated because the District Court and the Supreme Court did not grant his request to submit a revised version of his claims.

The Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts ( García Ruiz v. Spain [GC] n o 30544/96, 21 January 1999, CEDH 1999-I, § 28).

In the present case the Court notes that the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request on the ground that the terms of the request were too broad and amounted in effect to a tactic on his part to have his case examined on a completely new basis with a view to redressing the unfounded original claims. The Supreme Court further held that the applicant’s request had been filed belatedly and that this had been due to the applicant’s own conduct.

In conclusion, the Court considers that the applicant is merely dissatisfied with the outcome of his request and has failed to raise any arguable claim of a breach of his right to a fair hearing on this point.

It follows that the applicant’s complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

2. The applicant further alleges a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, which provides:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

The applicant alleges that he has been discriminated against because a different composition of the District Court authorised other plaintiffs in another action against the building company and the owners of the land to modify their claims in the same manner as had sought.

According to the Court’s case-law, Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the “rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of one or more of such provisions ‑ and to this extent it is autonomous ‑ , there can be no room for its application unless the facts of the case fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see, among many other authorities, the Inze v. Austria judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 17, § 36).

The Court has held that in the instant case there is no appearance of a violation of Articles 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention taken alone. It remains therefore to be examined whether there is a violation of this provision read in conjunction with Article 14.

The Court recalls that Article 14 will be breached where, without objective and reasonable justification, persons in “relevantly” similar situations are treated differently. It has therefore to be established, inter alia , that the situation of the alleged victim can be considered similar to that of persons who have been better treated (see the Spadea and Scalabrino v. Italy judgment of 28 September 1995, Series A no. 315-B, p. 28, § 45).

In the present case, the Court notes that the domestic courts, exercising their discretionary power of appreciating the facts of the case, considered that the applicant’s case was different from that of the other plaintiffs and that to allow the applicant’s request would have further delayed proceedings which had already lasted a long time due to the applicant’s conduct.

It therefore follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaint concerning the length of the domestic proceedings;

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

S. Dollé J.-P. Costa Registrar President