FOURTH SECTION

FINAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 45402/99 by Josefin HALLGREN against Sweden

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fourth Section) , sitting on 20 May 2003 as a Chamber composed of

Sir Nicolas Bratza , President , Mrs E. Palm , Mrs V. Strážnická , Mr M. Fischbach , Mr J. Casadevall , Mr R. Maruste , Mr L. Garlicki , judges , and Ms F. Elens-Passos , Deputy Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 2 June 1998,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the Section’s partial decision of 3 October 2000,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Ms Josefin Hallgren , is a Swedish national, who was born in 1974 and lives in Enskede , Sweden. She is represented before the Court by Mrs R. Harrold-Claesson , a lawyer practising in Olofstorp , Sweden.

The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mrs Eva Jagander of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 1 April 1994, when the applicant was 19 years old, she moved from her mother’s house to an apartment of her own. At that time the applicant had finished school and had a temporary job as a trainee at a radio station. On 5 April 1994 she lodged an application with the Social District Council ( sociala distriktnämnden -hereinafter “the Council”) of Kungsbacka , requesting a supplementary social allowance under section 6 of the Social Services Act ( Socialtjänstlagen , lag 1980:620) for her living expenses and for her rent.

On 20 April 1994 the Council rejected her request, finding that the applicant’s mother, who stood surety for the applicant on her rental contract, could provide for her needs or else the applicant could return to live at her mother’s home. She appealed against this decision to the County Administrative Court ( länsrätten ) of the County of Halland . Before transmitting the appeal to the court, the Council, on 25 May 1994, reviewed its decision without, however, coming to a different conclusion.

By a judgment of 1 September 1994 the County Administrative Court found for the applicant. It observed that, since she had attained the age of majority and was not studying anymore, her parents were not obliged to support her financially. Moreover, her trainee salary did not give her a reasonable standard of living.

The Council appealed against the judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal ( kammarrätten ) of Gothenburg and also requested it to stay the enforcement of the County Administrative Court’s judgment , which was granted on 29 September 1994. On 7 November 1994, after having held an oral hearing on 29 October 1994, the Administrative Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s decision and upheld the Council’s rejection.

On 18 November 1994 the applicant submitted an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court ( regeringsrätten ) which received it on 2 December 1994. The court noted that the case was not of an urgent nature since the social welfare assistance requested by the applicant concerned only the period from April to August 1994; thereafter the applicant had been able to support herself. Thus, the case was not given priority according to the court’s rules of procedure.

On 12 June 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court received another case involving a very similar issue. On 21 November 1996 and 9 January 1997 it received two further such cases. It was decided that these three cases and the applicant’s case should be examined simultaneously, in order to ensure a uniform development of the Supreme Administrative Court’s case-law.

On 28 January 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court granted the applicant leave to appeal and, on 27 February 1997, it ordered the Council to submit its observations on the appeal. The Council, by letter of 26 March 1997, contested the appeal. The court then, on 8 April 1997, invited the applicant to respond to the Council’s observations, which she did by 23 April 1997. On 26 May 1997 the applicant’s observations were transmitted to the Council for information.

On 11 December 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Administrative Court of Appeal’s judgment rejecting the applicant’s request. The court found that her financial problems had started when she moved to an apartment of her own and that, at the relevant time, such a move had not been necessary in order to ensure her a reasonable standard of living. Therefore, the applicant was not entitled to social welfare assistance under section 6 of the Social Services Act.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the case concerning her right to social welfare assistance was not determined within a reasonable time. In particular, the length of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, which lasted more than three years, was excessive.

THE LAW

The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention since she did not raise, not even in substance, her Article 6 complaint before the Supreme Administrative Court. For instance she could have done so in her letter of 23 April 1997 to the Supreme Administrative Court. Nor did she at any time -either before or after she was granted leave to appeal - ask when a judgment could be expected.

The applicant maintained that she had exhausted domestic remedies as required under the Convention.

The Court observes that the applicant only complains about the length of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court, acting as the final instance in her case. The latter had in its possession all the information it needed to address the reasonableness of the duration of the proceedings in the applicant’s case and made a deliberate choice to deal with it simultaneously with other cases lodged after her appeal. In these circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant did not make a request to expedite the proceedings, the Supreme Administrative Court cannot be said to have been denied the opportunity which the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is designed to afford to States, namely to put right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, inter alia , Selmouni v. France , [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR 1999-V).

It follows that the application cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

In any event, the Government submitted that the application should be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. Although they agreed that Article 6 was applicable to the proceedings before the national administrative courts in the applicant’s case, they claimed that they had clearly not been of excessive length. The Government maintained that the length was due to an increase in the Supreme Administrative Court’s already heavy workload and to the fact that it decided to deal with the applicant’s case simultaneously with three other cases concerning similar issues, lodged after the applicant’s case. The reason for this was that the legal situation of the issue in question was unclear, as demonstrated by the fact that the lower courts had reached different conclusions. Furthermore, they contend that the matter was of less significance to the applicant as soon as the period for which she had applied for social welfare assistance had passed, i.e. after August 1994. After that time the applicant had stated that she had been able to support herself. Thus, in the Government’s view the length of the proceedings was not excessive when making an overall assessment of the case, where the applicant’s case was examined by altogether four different instances within a period of little more than three years and eight months, including an examination on the merits by the Supreme Administrative Court and its development of new domestic case-law in the field concerned by the applicant’s case and three other, similar cases.

The applicant maintained that the length of the proceedings was excessive and that the application should be declared admissible. According to her, neither the Supreme Administrative Court’s heavy workload nor its decision to deal with her case simultaneously with three other cases concerning similar issues could justify the period of three years during which the case was pending before that court.

The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Humen v. Poland [GC], no. 26614/95, § 60, 15 October 1999).

The Court considers that, although the case was not complex on the facts, the position under the relevant national law was unclear, as demonstrated by the diverging conclusions reached by the lower courts. It must therefore have been of importance that the Supreme Administrative Court clarify the situation and elaborate jurisprudence on the matter.

As regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court observes that it is undisputed that no delays in the proceedings were attributable to her and that she bore no responsibility for the length of the proceedings.

As to the conduct of the authorities, the Court first notes that no criticism can be directed against the lower instances as the case was dealt with by one administrative and two judicial levels during a period of less than seven months. On the other hand, an issue may arise with regard to the duration of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court.

In this respect the Court observes that the Supreme Administrative Court’s chief responsibility was to develop jurisprudence in the area of administrative law and to provide guidance where the legal situation was unclear. The Court finds that what was at stake in the dispute had ceased to be of an urgent and important nature for the applicant after August 1994 when she could pay her rent and living expenses herself. This is borne out by the fact that she did not request the Supreme Administrative Court to expedite the proceedings. In these circumstances, the national court in question can hardly be criticised for having grouped together several comparable or similar cases in order to gain a broader view of the issues to be determined. Once leave to appeal had been granted, the parties submitted written observations and the judgment was pronounced within less than one year.

Thus, the impugned proceedings were completed within three years, eight months and six days and involved no less than one administrative and three judicial levels. As the legal situation was unclear and needed to be clarified by the Supreme Administrative Court, the Court does not find that the delay in question could warrant the conclusion that the procedure, seen as a whole, exceeded a reasonable time (see, Kroenitz v. Poland , no. 77746/01, § 22, 25 February 2003).

It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

For these reasons, the Court by a majority

Declares the application inadmissible.

Françoise Elens-Passos Nicolas BRATZA                    Deputy Registrar President