THIRD SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 70826/01 by Günter REMY and Others against Germany

The European Court of Human Rights ( Third Section) , sitting on 16 September 2004 as a Chamber composed of

Mr I. Cabral Barreto , President , Mr G. Ress , Mr L. Caflisch , Mr B. Zupančič , Mr J. Hedigan , Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska , Mrs A. Gyulumyan, judges , and Mr V. Berger , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 12 June 2001 ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The six applicants, Günter Remy, Marianne Witte, Dieter Zentz, Ingrid Kahlert-Warmbold, Gustav Hebold and Michael Esche (on behalf of the deceased Ernst Esche) , are all German nationals. They are represented before the Court by the law firm Zuck and Quaas in Stuttgart .

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows .

The applicants are the owners of special social bonds ( Sozialpfandbriefe ) that the German Government issued in the 1950s. The interest rate of these social bonds is lower than the market interest rate, but the profits derived from the bonds were exempted from tax.

In 1992 the Government amended its tax laws and revoked the provision whereby the social bonds were tax-free.

On 17 February 1993 the applicants lodged a joint complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court . In this complaint, they argued that the revocation of their social bonds ' tax-free character and, as a consequence, the falling prices of their bonds would entail considerable financial losses for them. This violated their rights to property, their right to protection of their legitimate expectations and their right to equality under Articles 14, 2 in conjunction with Article s 20 and 3 of the German Basic Law.

Having received a great number of complaints on the same subject matter, the Federal Constitutional Court communicated two of these constitutional complaints to the Government as pilot cases.

Towards the end of 1994 the applicants asked the Federal Constitutional Court to send them the Government ' s submissions in the pilot cases. Their letter went without a response, despite several reminders.

On 5 February 2002 , in a leading decision, the Federal Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional complaints in the pilot cases, finding that the revocation of the tax subvention served a legitimate aim and complied with the principle of proportionality.

On 8 August 2002 th e Federal Constitutional Court , referring to its decision of 5 February 2002 , refused to entertain the applicants ' constitutional complaint.

COMPLAINT

The applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings before the Federal Constit utional Court .

THE LAW

The applicant s complain about the length of the proceedings on their constitutional complaint. They r ely on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government submit that this complaint should be declared inadmissible because Article 6 § 1 d id not apply to disputes relating to tax proceedings. They point out that the present case did not involve individual tax proceedings , but the reduction by law of tax subsidies, thus relating to the very core area of public law.

The applicants emphasise the pecuniary aspects of the subject matter of their constitutional complaint and maintain that the proceedings concerned “civil right s and obligations ” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 . They further contend that the obligation to pay taxes f ell within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 .

The Court reiterates that proceedings com e within the scope of Article 6 § 1 , even if they are conducted before a Cons titutional Court, where their outcome is decisive for civil rights and obligations ( see, among other authorities, Süßmann v. Germany , judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1171 , § 41 , and Klein v. Germany , no. 33379/96, § 29, 27 July 2000).

According to the Court ' s established case law, the concept of “civil rights and obligations” has to be interpreted autonomously within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see, among other authorities, König v. Germany , judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, pp . 29-30, §§ 88-89 , and Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], no. 44759/98, § 2 4, ECHR 2001 VII).

As the Court has found in the case of Ferrazzini v. Italy , tax mat ters form part of the hard core of public-authorities prerogatives, with the public nature of the relationship between the taxpayer and the community remaining predominant. Accordingly, tax disputes fall outside the scope of civil rights and obligations, despite the pecuniary effects the y necessarily pro duce for the tax payer (see Ferrazzini v. Italy , cited above, § 29).

Turning to the circumstances of the case, t he Court notes that the tax legislation which f ormed the subject matter of the applicant s ' constitutional complaint do es not comprise any criminal connotation which might lead to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its “criminal charge” head. The Court further finds that the applicants have not demonstrated the existence of a sufficient link between their constitutional complaint and the determination of any of their private law rights which might lead to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its “civil law” head (see in this respect National & Provincial Building Society and others v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 23 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ VII, p . 2359, § 98).   In so far as the new tax legislation entailed a loss of value to the applicants ' bonds, this consequence d id not exceed the necessary pecuniary effects of any tax legislation.

Ac co r dingly, Article 6 § 1 of the Conventions does not apply in the instant case.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Vincent Berger Ireneu Cabral Barreto Registrar President