SECOND SECTION

FINAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 31777/04 by SZEMÉLY- ÉS VAGYONŐRÖK FÜGGETLEN SZAKSZERVEZETI SZÖVETSÉGE AND MR SÁNDOR CSÁNICS against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 27 November 2007 as a Chamber composed of:

Mrs F. Tulkens , President , Mr A.B. Baka , Mr I. Cabral Barreto , Mr V. Zagrebelsky , Mrs A. Mularoni , Mrs D. Jočienė , Mr D. Popović, judges , and Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar .

Having regard to the above application lodged on 8 July 2004,

Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,

Having regard to the partial decision of 13 February 2007,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant s ,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The first applicant, Személy- és Vagyonőrök Független Szakszervezeti Szövetsége , is an unregistered trade union. The second applicant, Mr Sándor Csánics, is a Hungarian national, who was born on 20 February 1955 and lives in Érd. He is the president of t he trade union. The applicants we re represented before the Court by Mr I. Barbalics, a lawyer practising in Nagyatád. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) we re represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicants ’ previous application (no. 70563/01) was declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention, on 19 November 2002. After having pursued a petition for review before the Supreme Court, the applicants renew ed their complaints. On 13 February 2007 the Second Section of the European C o urt of Human Rights declared the application partly in admissible.

On 13 February 1998 Mr Csánics and nineteen other individuals founded the applicant trade union. On 20 February 1998 Mr Csánics requested its registration. He submitted the articles of association, a list of the officers and other relevant documents.

On 27 February 1998 the Pest County Regional Court ordered the applicants to amend the articles of association and to submit further information. On 21 April 1998 the trade union modified its articles of association and submitted the new version to the Regional Court .

In the ensuing non-contentious ( nemperes ) proceedings, on 24 April 1998 the Regional Court held deliberations in camera and decided to refuse to register the trade union, since the applicants had failed to submit all the information required and therefore their request had not met the legal requirements. The Regional Court relied on the documents submitted by the applicants.

On 10 June 1998 the applicants retained Mr M.R., a lawyer, to represent them before the Supreme Court . His power of attorney was attached to the case file. This mandate has never been withdrawn.

On the applicants ’ appeal – which did not contain any argument concerning the Regional Court ’ s in camera deliberations – the Supreme Court, acting as a second-instance court, upheld the first-instance decision on 24 May 2000.

The applicants lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

On 27 October 2000 the applicants retained another lawyer, Ms E.D. to represent them before the review bench of the Supreme Court. Her power of attorney mandate was also attached to the case file.

On 14 December 2000 the Supreme Court ordered the applicants to amend the petition.

On 30 January 2001 the review bench of the Supreme Court upheld the second-instance decision. This decision was served on Mr M.R. on 14 March 2001. The Government submitted the acknowledgement of receipt which had been stamped at the despatching Post Office on 12 March 2001 and the handwritten note , indicating that it contained a copy of this decision , showing its receipt two days later by the addressee. It appears that Mr M.R. did not inform the applicants of the decision.

The decision of the review bench of the Supreme Court was handed over to the applicants, upon their request, on 9 February 2004.

B. Relevant domestic law

Act no. 3 of 1952 on the Code of Civil Procedure

Section 66

“ ... (2) If authori s ation s have been given to more than one person , the party may be represented by any of them; however, only one representative may proceed in each act of the lawsuit; a contrary stipulation is invalid ... ”

Section 70

“(1) An authori s ation may concern the entirety of the lawsuit or certain individual acts in the procedure.

(2) An authorisation which concerns the entirety of the proceedings entitles the representative to make any and all declarations and acts concerning the case ...”

(4) The restriction of an authori s ation is valid only if t his is evident from the mandate itself.”

Section 71

“The termination of the authoris ation flowing from withdrawal, repudiation or the death of the party shall have effect for the court from the date of its reporting, and it shall effect for the opponent from the date of its disclosure to him.

Section 97

“If the party authoris ed a representative to carry on the lawsuit, the judicial documents shall be ser ved on him instead of the party... ”

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the registration proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time. Moreover, they submitted that they had learnt only from the Government ’ s observations that the decision of the Supreme Court ’ s review bench had been served on Mr M.R. In their view, the latter had no longer been authorised to represent them and the service on him amounted to an infringe ment of th eir right to respect for their private life , in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicants complain ed that the registration proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long time. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convent ion which, in its relevant part , provides:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a... hearing within a reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government argue d that the application should be declared inadmissible as the applicants had failed to introduce their application within the six-month period required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In this connection they observe d that the decision of the Supreme Court ’ s review bench had been served on one of the applicants ’ authorised lawyer s on 14 March 2001, whereas the application was introduced only on 8 July 2004.

The applicants contest ed this argument . They allege d that their first lawyer ’ s authoris ation was valid only for the proceedings before the appellate bench of the Supreme Court and not before its review bench. Since they had retained another lawyer especially for that purpose, the review bench ’ s decision should have been served on this legal counsel or on the applicants themselves . The Supreme Court failed to do so and served its decision on them only upon their request , on 9 February 2004. Therefore, they complied with the six-month time-limit.

Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provides:

“The Court may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”

The Court recalls that the six months ’ rule, in reflecting the wish of the Contracting Parties to prevent past decisions being called into question, after an indefinite lapse of time, serves the interests not only of the respondent Government but also of legal certainty as a value in itself. It marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the organs of the Convention and signals to both individuals and State authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (see, for example, Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000-I).

The Court further recalls that where an applicant is entitled to be served ex officio with a written copy of the final domestic decision, the object and the purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention are best served by counting the six-month period as running from the date of service of the written judgment (see Worm v. Austria judgment of 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V, p. 1534, § 33). Where the applicant has designated a lawyer to represent him, as in the instant case, the six-month period runs from the date on which the applicant ’ s lawyer was served with the final decision, notwithstanding the fact that the decision might only have been notified personally to the applicant later.

In the instant case the Cou rt observes that the applicants authoris ed Mr M.R. to represent them before the Supreme Court . It notes that according to subparagraph 4 of s ection 70 of the Code of Civil Procedure , any restriction of the authori s ation must be evident from the mandate itself . Undisputedly, t he applicant s did not limit Mr M.R. ’ s authori s ation to the proceedings before the appellate bench of the Supreme Court , nor did they withdraw it. It transpires from the provisions of the relevant domestic law that t he mere fact that , subsequently, another lawyer was retained did not annul the previous authoris ation. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that the decision of the Supreme Court ’ s review bench was served on Mr. M.R. in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Government provide d evidence to support their submission that the decision was served on Mr M.R. on 14 March 2001. In particular, they submitted the acknowledgement of receipt which had been stamped at the despatching Post Office on 12 March 2001 , and the handwritten note showing its receipt two days later by the addressee.

The Court reiterates that in a situation when a final decision is served on the applicant ’ s counsel and not on the applicant, the six -month period runs from the date on which the applicant ’ s lawyer became aware of the decision , notwithstanding the fact that the applicant only became aware of the decision later (see Pejić v. Croatia (dec), no. 66894/01, 19 December 2002).

In these circumstances, the Court considers that the service of the final decision took place on 14 March 2001 and the six-month time-limit began to run on that date. However, the application was lodged only on 8 July 2004. It follows that the application has been introduced outside the six-month time-limit prescribed by Article 35 § 1 and must be rejected , pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

2. As to the applicants ’ complaint concerning Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the service of the impugned decision on a lawyer appointed by them does not raise any issue under that provision. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected , pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention to the case.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

S . Dollé F . Tulkens Registrar President