SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 19686/03 by Gülcan YILMAZ against Turkey

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 18 March 2008 as a Chamber composed of:

Françoise Tulkens , President, Antonella Mularoni , Ireneu Cabral Barreto , Rıza Türmen , Danutė Jočienė , Dragoljub Popović , Nona Tsotsoria , judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 26 May 2003,

Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Ms Gülcan Y ı lmaz, is a Turkish national who was born in 1948 and lives in Uşak . She was rep resented before the Court by Mr Atak, a lawyer practising in U ş ak. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant was the owner of a building in Uşak. On an unspecified date, she agreed to sell this building to B.Ç. and in exchange she received a certain amount of cash and two bonds dated 23 November 1997 and 23 December 1997 respectively. She accordingly transferred the title deed to B.Ç. ’ s name. Shortly after this transaction, B.Ç. sold the building to a certain A.G. and the title was registered in the latter ’ s name.

On 11 August 1997 the applicant ’ s lawyer filed an action before the Uşak Civil Court of General Jurisdiction against B.Ç. and A.G., arguing that B.Ç. had deceived the applicant during the transaction, and thus the transfer of the title deed should be annulled and the title re-registered in her name. In this respect, she claimed that B.Ç. had committed fraud during the purchase of the land. In the meantime, the applicant also initiated criminal proceedings against B.Ç. in the Uşak Criminal Court, accusing him of fraud (case no. 1997/691).

On 18 December 1997 the Uşak Civil Court of General Jurisdiction held its first hearing and took statements from several witnesses. The court also took note of the fact that there were three separate criminal proceedings pending against B.Ç. on charges of fraud (namely case no. 1997/691 initiated by the applicant before the Uşak Criminal Court; case no. 1997/630 initiated by a certain D.D. before the Uşak Criminal Court and case no. 1997/160 before the Uşak Assize Court). It therefore decided to request copies of these case files which were found to be relevant to the instant case.

Thereafter, the civil court awaited the outcome of these criminal proceedings, each time adjourning the hearings to a later date and without taking any decision on the merits of the case.

B.Ç. was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him in all three cases and the Uşak Civil Court of General Jurisdiction received copies of the relevant case files and judgments on 5 March 2001, 27 November 2001 and 5 March 2002 respectively.

On 13 March 2002 the Uşak Civil Court of General Jurisdiction dismissed the applicant ’ s case. In taking this decision, the court based itself on the acquittal decision delivered by the criminal court in case no. 1997/691. The court also held that there was nothing in the case file to suggest that the defendants had not acted in good faith during the transaction.

On 12 November 2002 the Court of Cassation, after holding a hearing on the merits of the case, upheld the judgment of 13 March 2002.

On 24 February 2003 the Court of Cassation further dismissed the applicant ’ s request for rectification.

CO MPLAINTS

1. The applicant allege d under Article 6 of the Convention that the national courts ha d erred in the evaluation of facts and therefore breached h er right to a fair hearing.

2. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 about the excessive length of the proceedings.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the decisions of the domestic courts had been arbitrary. In her view, the UÅŸak Civil Court of General Jurisdiction erred in the evaluation of the evidence.

The Court recalls that it is not its task to act as an appeal court of “fourth instance” by calling into question the outcome of the domestic proceedings. The domestic courts are best placed for assessing the relevance of evidence to the issues in the case and for interpreting and applying rules of substantive and procedural law (see, amongst many authorities, Vidal v. Belgium , judgment of 22 April 1992, Series A no. 235-B, pp. 32 ‑ 33, § 32).

During the proceedings, the applicant was afforded ample opportunities before the courts at three levels of jurisdiction, personally and through her lawyer, to state her case and challenge evidence that she considered false. There is no indication to conclude that the national courts ’ decisions were not given on the basis of domestic law and the particular circumstances of the case. The Court therefore finds no element to conclude that the domestic courts acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner in establishing the facts or interpreting the domestic law. There is therefore no appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 in this respect.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that this part of the application should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention .

2. The applicant further complain ed about the excessive length of the proceedings, which lasted for almost five years and seven months . In this respect, s he invoke d Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

In so far as the applicant complains that the proceedings were not conducted within a reasonable time, the Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be considered with regard to the circumstances of the particular case in the light of the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and the conduct of the authorities dealing with the case and what was at stake in the litigation for the applicant (see Styranowski v. Poland , judgment of 30 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ VIII, § 47). Moreover, the Court reiterates that only delays for which the State can be held responsible may justify a finding that a “reasonable time” has been exceeded (see Papachelas v. Greece [GC], no. 31423/96, § 40, ECHR 1999 ‑ II).

The Court finds that the proceedings in the present case commenced on 11 August 1997 and ended on 24 February 2003. The period under consideration thus lasted over 5 years and 6 months. During this period, the case was examined by the domestic courts at three levels of jurisdiction.

The Court notes that the proceedings before the first instance court (approximately 4 years and 7 months) were rather lengthy. Nevertheless, it considers that a waiting the outcome of the criminal proceedings which had been brought against B. Ç . was required for the proper administration of justice, given that the proceedings in question were closely linked to the case pending before the U ş ak Civil Court of General Jurisdiction. Furthermore, there was no period of inactivity during th ose criminal proceedings . The Court also observes that there was no excessive delay in the proceedings before the higher courts as well. It therefore does not find that the conduct of the first instance court led to significant and unreasonable delays in the proceedings as a whole (see, mutatis mutandis, Jakesevic v. Croatia , ( dec ) . no. 18584/05, 10 January 2008) .

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must also be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

3. Accordingly, Article 29 § 3 of the Convention should no longer apply to the case.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

             Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise Tulkens Deputy Registrar President