FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 28490/03 Krzysztof and Karol OGÓREK against Poland

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 18 September 2012 as a Chamber composed of:

David Thór Björgvinsson , President, Lech Garlicki , Päivi Hirvelä , George Nicolaou , Ledi Bianku , Nebojša Vučinić , Vincent A. D e Gaetano , judges, and Lawrence Early , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 29 August 2003,

Having regard to the decision to examine the case simultaneously with the case of Pikielny and Others v. Poland (no. 3524/05), pursuant to Rule 42 § 2 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicants, Mr Krzysztof Ogórek and Mr Karol Ogórek (the applicants”), are Polish nationals, who were born in 1929 and 1928 respectively and live in Tarnów Opolski. They were represented before the Court by Mr J. Forystek, a lawyer practising in Kraków.

The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz , succeeded by Ms J. Chrzanowska , of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A. The circumstances of the case

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. Background

3. Before the Second World War the applicants ’ father, Paweł Ogórek, owned a limestone plant which operated under the name “Limestone Plant Ogórek and Co.” ( Zakłady Wapienne Ogórek i Spółka ). The company also had a German name “ Kalwerke Ogórek et Co.” It was run by the applicants ’ father before and during the war, until 1945.

In 1945 the plant consisted of two furnaces, one limestone plant, a smithy, an outhouse, office premises and 32 hectares of land, which included limestone deposits.

2. Facts before 10 October 1994 [1]

4. On 14 June 1948 the plant was nationalised by virtue of the Minister of Industry and Commerce ’ s ( Minister Przemysłu i Handlu ) decision (“the 1948 decision”) issued pursuant to section 3(1) and (5) of the Law of 3 January 1946 on the nationalisation of basic branches of the State economy ( Ustawa o przejęciu na własność Państwa podstawowych gałęzi gospodarki narodowej ) (“the 1946 Act”). The decision was published in the Cabinet ’ s Official Gazette ( Monitor Polski ) no. 58 of 26 June 1948 and took effect on that date. It was issued together with an annex listing companies, including the one belonging to the applicants ’ father, which were subject to nationalisation and stipulated that “ ... enterprises listed in the annex thereto shall be taken over by the State in return for compensation”.

5. On 30 December 1990 the applicants asked the Minister for Economy ( Minister Gospodarki ) to declare the 1948 decision null and void.

3. Facts after 10 October 1994

(a) Proceedings for the annulment of the 1948 decision

6. On 19 December 2001 the Minister for Economy refused the applicants ’ request of 30 December 1990. On 15 May 2002, following the applicants ’ application for the matter to be reconsidered, the Minister upheld the original refusal.

7. On 14 June 2002 the applicants challenged the above decision before the Supreme Administrative Court ( Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny ). On an unspecified date the case was referred to the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court ( Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny ).

8. On 10 February 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court quashed the contested decision and the preceding decision of 19 December 2001 as being issued in breach of the law. It was stressed, in particular, that the Minister had failed to establish whether the nationalised enterprise had been capable of employing more than 50 persons on one shift, which was an indispensable legal basis for nationalisation pursuant to section 3(1) B of the 1946 Act (see also paragraph 38 below).

9. On 30 July 2007 the Minister for Economy declared null and void the 1948 decision, finding that it had been issued in flagrant beach of the law since at the material time there had been no legal basis for the nationalisation of the applicants ’ property. In the course of the proceedings, the authorities obtained expert reports determining the enterprise ’ s potential employment capacity on one shift vis-à-vis the technical equipment and its condition at the material time, bearing in mind war damage. It emerged from those reports that the plant had been partly destroyed and its potential production capacity had been severely limited due to the lack of electricity. This, in turn, justified the conclusion that its real employment capacity at the material time had been not more that 42 people on one shift, not from 70 to 213 as estimated for the purposes of the 1948 decision. Consequently, nationalisation of the plant had been unlawful as, pursuant to section 3(1) B of the 1946 Act, it could only be effected in respect of enterprises employing a minimum of 50 persons on one shift.

10. On 6 August 2007, relying on the above decision, the applicants asked the Minister for Infrastructure to annul the decision validating the acceptance protocol on taking over the nationalised property ( orzeczenie o zatwierdzeniu protokołu zdawczo-odbiorczego ), issued by the Minister for Construction and Building Materials Industry ( Minister Budownictwa i Przemysłu Materiałów Budowlanych ) on 29 November 1961.

11. Since no action had been taken for some 17 months, on 21 January 2009 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court, alleging inactivity on the part of the Minister for Infrastructure.

12. On 23 February 2009 the Minister for Infrastructure declared the contested decision null and void, concluding that it had been issued in flagrant breach of the law because it had been based on the 1948 decision found to have been ab initio unlawful.

(b) The proceedings concerning the alleged normative inactivity on the part of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet

(i) Administrative proceedings

13. On 11 February 2003 the applicants issued the Prime Minister a legal notice, summoning him to “remove the state of infringement of a law” ( wezwanie do usunięcia naruszenia prawa ) by enacting the Cabinet ’ s ordinance ensuring the proper implementation of the 1946 Act within 30 days from the date of service of that notice.

The applicants relied on section 7 of the 1946 Act, by virtue of which a Cabinet ’ s ordinance was to be issued in order to determine the rules governing the calculation and means of payment of compensation for nationalised property (see also paragraphs 39-40 below). They stressed that, despite the fact that although by that stage 57 years had elapsed from the date of entry into force of the 1946 Act and despite the State ’ s legal duty to implement fully its provisions, the Cabinet had not yet enacted the ordinance, thus making it impossible for the former owners to receive the promised compensation. They further maintained that the State authorities ’ failure to act amounted to a constitutional tort ( delikt konstutucyjny ) in the form of a legislative omission ( zaniechanie legislacyjne ) – for which both the former Prime Ministers of Poland and the current one had been responsible. Simultaneously, the applicants summoned the Prime Minister to pay them compensation in an amount of 30,000,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) [2] for the nationalised plant, together with statutory interest from 1 July 1949 (one year after the 1948 decision had taken effect) until the date of settlement.

14. On 26 February 2003 the Prime Minister ’ s Chancellery, in its reply to the applicants ’ notice, stated, among other things, the following:

“In connection with [your legal notice] and acting on the Prime Minister ’ s instruction, I should inform you that there is no legal basis for the issuance of the ordinances referred to in sections 6 and 7 of the 1946 Act by the Cabinet.

...

The statutory authorisation ( upoważnienie ustawowe ) to issue ordinances referred to in section 7(4) and (6) [of the 1946 Act] sets out a range of matters for regulation. These are: the composition of the [compensation] commission, the rules for the appointment of its members, the quorum, the rules of procedure before the commission, the rules for appeals against its decisions, the assessment of circumstances relevant for compensation, the means of payment of compensation and determination of the amortisation of securities.

It must be noted that the enactment of ordinances governing most of the above matters would be incompatible with the laws applicable at present. ... The matters regulated by [the 1946 Act] and [to be regulated] by the prospective ordinances relate to the constitutional right of property, a matter which is particularly designated for regulation in the form of a statute. It is therefore doubtful that any statutory authorisation to issue an ordinance could transfer [to the Cabinet] the entirety of the matters included in the authorisation, the more so as there are already in place and in force statutory provisions enacted after the entry into force of [the 1946 Act]. Issuing today, on the basis of this Act, ordinances under its section 7(4) and (6) could lead to the incompatibility of statutory solutions (subsequent to the Act) with ordinances.

...

[P]ursuant to Article 92 § 1 of the Polish Constitution, ... the enactment of an ordinance is admissible only on the basis of a detailed authorisation included in a statute and in order to implement that statute. This authorisation must be of a detailed nature in terms of the subject (must state an authority competent to issue an ordinance), the object (must state the range of matters delegated for regulation) and its content (must state the directions as to the content of an [ordinance]) ... . Pursuant to the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law, the absence of directions is sufficient to consider the authorisation unconstitutional, even if the remaining requirements are met.

...

First of all, the matters delegated in the [relevant] authorisation should have been addressed in [the 1946 Act] itself. The matter left by the legislature for regulation by ordinances (e.g. the procedure for the appointment of members of the commission, the procedure for appeals, the amortisation of securities, questions of compensation) are of such importance for an individual and his or her constitutional rights and guarantees that they cannot be regulated by any means other than a statute. ... Moreover, the statutory authorisation in [the 1946 Act] does not contain directions.

In sum, it should be concluded that in the light of the above arguments, it would not be legally admissible to issue the Cabinet ’ s ordinances on the basis of section 7(4) and (6) of [the 1946 Act].”

15. On 11 March 2003 the applicants lodged a complaint under the provisions of the law of 11 May 1995 on the Supreme Administrative Court (“the 1995 Act”) ( ustawa o Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym) , alleging inactivity on the part of the Prime Minister in that the Cabinet had failed to issue an ordinance enabling the full implementation of the 1946 Act. This, in their submission, was in breach of several provisions of the Constitution.

16. On 21 May 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the complaint as being inadmissible in law. It stated that under the applicable laws its scope of jurisdiction over the State authorities ’ actions or inactions was limited to their duties with respect to public administration and did not encompass any control of their competence in the sphere of the issuing of normative acts.

(ii) Proceedings before the Constitutional Court

17. On 27 June 2003 the applicant ’ s lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Administrative Court ’ s decision of 21 May 2003. They challenged the constitutionality of section 16(1) (1)-(4) of the 1995 Act in so far as this provision denied them access to a court to seek compensation granted under the 1946 Act, in particular as it excluded the possibility of lodging a complaint about the inactivity of the Prime Minister, i.e. the legislative omission consisting in the failure to enact the relevant ordinance, as required by the 1946 Act.

They further asked the Constitutional Court to declare unconstitutional section 7(1) (6) of the 1946 Act, in so far as it left to the Cabinet full discretion as to the date of payment and detailed procedure for compensation and thereby deprived them of access to a court in order to seek compensation for their nationalise d property. Alternatively, they asked the court to declare that 7(1) (6) of the 1946 Act was an illusory provision and as such could not be consider ed part of the legal order and, on the basis of this declaration, to disc ontinue the proceedings in this part.

They invoked, in particular, Article 2 (rule of law), Article 21 (protection of ownership), Article 45 (right of fair trial), Article 64 (right of ownership) and Article 77 (right to compensation for unlawful action of public authority) of the Constitution and Article § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

18. On 8 September 2004 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings. As regards the first limb o f the complaint, it ruled so on account of the fact that section 16(1) (1)-(4) of the 1995 Act had lost its binding force. As regards secti on 7(1) (6) of the 1946 Act, it discontinued the proceedings holding that ruling on the merits of this part of the complaint was inadmissible in law. In particular, it held that it could not review the constitutionality of section 7(1) (6) of the 1946 Act since, pursuant to Article 79 § 1 of the Constitution, a constitutional complaint could only be directed against provisions on the basis of which the courts or administrative authorities gave a final decision on rights, freedoms or obligations of the complainant. The contested provision was not a legal basis for the final decision examined by the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, it was prevented from dealing with the merits of this part of the complaint.

(iii) Application to the Prime Minister for implementation of the 1946 Act or decision

19. On 20 October 2004 the applicants asked the Prime Minister to ensure the enactment of an ordinance for the proper implementation of the 1946 Act by the Cabinet or, alternatively, in case of his refusal to do so, to issue an individual, appealable administrative decision refusing to see to the enactment of that ordinance.

20. On 20 November 2004 the Prime Minister gave a decision discontinuing the proceedings, relying on section 105 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure ( Kodeks postÄ™powania administracyjnego ) by virtue of which an administrative authority should discontinue proceedings if, for any reason, they had become devoid of purpose. In essence, the reasoning was two-fold. First, the Prime Minister found that it was inadmissible in law to regulate the public authorities ’ normative activity by means of administrative decisions. Such decisions could be given only in the context of the application of the law, whereas normative acts were created in the completely distinct sphere of law ‑ making. Secondly, the public authorities ’ normative activity was their exclusive and, at the same time, sovereign competence and there were no grounds for interfering with this activity because, in his view, it would infringe the fundamental constitutional principles of the division of powers and the rule of law, as well as the competences of the constitutional authorities of Poland, namely the Cabinet.

21. The applicants asked for the matter to be reconsidered. On 11 January 2005 the Prime Minister upheld the contested decision, reiterating that the issues raised by the applicants could not be addressed by an individual administrative decision.

22. The applicants appealed to the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court.

23. On 12 August 2005 the court heard, and dismissed, the appeal. It upheld the grounds given in the previous decisions, holding that an administrative decision could be issued only in an individual case concerning a specific person and his or her concrete rights or obligations but not to compel an authority to enact a normative act, which in a general and abstract way regulates the legal situation of an unqualified number of persons. It also held the following:

“It should be stressed that the Supreme Court ’ s case-law underlines that the Cabinet ’ s failure to discharge its duty arising from its competence to enact an ordinance ensuring the proper implementation of a statute infringes the constitutional principles of the functioning of a democratic state ruled by law (Articles 2 and 7 of the Constitution) and, accordingly, may constitute a constitutional tort. ...

This court is of the opinion that the proper judicial protection of the applicants ’ interests is secured in the provisions of the Civil Code. Article 417 1 of the Code invoked in the appeal makes it possible [for them ] to seek damages caused by the legislative omission of the State Treasury.”

24. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court ( Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny ), alleging a number of procedural shortcomings on the part of the first-instance court and the Prime Minister and a breach of Article 77 of the Constitution in that the contested decisions had prevented them from pursuing their claim for damages arising from the state authorities ’ unlawful acts – most notably their failure to enact the ordinance implementing fully the 1946 Act.

On 8 November 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal as lacking any legal basis.

(c) The applicants ’ first claim for damages

25. On 8 September 2003 the applicants sued the State Treasury, statio fisci the Prime Minister, before the Warsaw Regional Court ( Sąd Okręgowy ) for unpaid compensation for the nationalised company. They sought PLN 30,000,000 in damages, with statutory interest from 1 July 1949 until settlement, and PLN 24,000 by way of costs and expenses. They relied on Article 77 of the Constitution and Article 417 of the Civil Code as applicable on that date (see paragraphs 41-44 below).

26. On 8 June 2004 the court gave judgment in default and granted the applicants ’ claims in their entirety.

27. Following the defendant ’ s opposition, the case was reconsidered by the Regional Court . The defendant asked the court to quash the judgment in default and to dismiss the applicants ’ claims.

28. On 9 December 2004 the applicants modified their claim for payment of statutory interest, seeking payment only from 1 September 2004 until the date of settlement.

29. On 21 February 2005 the court summoned the Minister for the Treasury to take part in the proceedings as the second defendant.

30. In their pleading of 2 March 2006 the applicants altered the legal basis for their claims, stating that as those claims were based on a legislative omission on the part of the authorities consisting in their failure to enact an ordinance pursuant to section 7(4) and (6) of the 1946 Act, they should be based on Article 417 1 § 4 of the Civil Code, which entered into force on 1 September 2004 (see paragraphs 42-43 below).

31. On 14 March 2006 the Regional Court quashed the judgment in default. It dismissed the applicants ’ claims for PLN 30,000,000 in damages and for costs and discontinued the proceedings in respect of their claim for payment of statutory interest.

The reasoning for the judgment was in essence based on the Supreme Court ’ s resolution of 24 November 2005 (cited below, see paragraphs 45-47 below). It read, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“There is no dispute [between the parties] over the facts of the case ... The dispute is limited solely to [the question] whether the claims brought in this case are well ‑ founded in the light of the factual and legal bases relied on by the plaintiffs and to the amount of [compensation].

...

Considering the legal and factual basis invoked by the plaintiffs, their claims should be dismissed.

Section 7 of the 1946 Act, on which they rely, in its original version provided that an owner of an enterprise taken over by the State would receive compensation from the State Treasury within 1 year from the date on which a notice of final determination of the amount of compensation due had been served on him. Such compensation was to be paid in securities, although in exceptional circumstances also in cash or other values, and its amount was to be determined by special commissions. ...

Pursuant to section 7(4) and (6) the composition of the commissions, the rules for the appointment of their members, the quorum, the rules of procedure and rules for appeals against their decisions and the detailed rules for the calculation of compensation and means of its payment and depreciation of securities were to be determined by the Cabinet ’ s ordinance.

Despite [this] statutory authorisation, the above-mentioned ordinance (the failure to enact it, which was to be the cause of the loss sustained by the plaintiffs) has never been enacted which, in consequence, made it impossible [for the authorities] to establish the relevant commissions and to set up the procedure for the determination of the amount of compensation and its payment.

Accordingly, this legislative omission, which has been relied on by the plaintiffs as the cause of their loss, occurred in 1946 or, at the latest in 1947, assuming that in general the absence of any time-limit for the enactment (a specific action) is tantamount to a duty to enact an act implementing the law without undue delay. This opinion is supported by [the fact] that at the material time the Cabinet issued ordinances implementing other provisions of the 1946 Act. The same point of view was expressed by the Supreme Court in a resolution of 24 November 2005 ... [;] this court shares this point of view, and the applicants, when justifying their claims, have so far done the same.

The provisions of the civil law as applicable at the material time, preceding the entry into force of the Civil Code, did not provide for the State Treasury ’ s liability for legislative activity [or inactivity] of its agents. This situation did not change after the entry into force of the Civil Code on 1 January 1965, providing, in its Articles 417 and 418, for the State Treasury ’ s [ tortious ] liability, the scope of which did not encompass the State authorities ’ legislative activity.

...

By the same token, it cannot be assumed that the defendant ’ s civil liability for the consequences of the so-called legislative omission is based on Article 417, which, in contrast to what the plaintiffs tried to plead, does not embody the State ’ s legislative activity.

This situation did not change radically on 17 October 1997, the date of entry into force of the new Constitution which, in Article 77 § 1, proclaimed the right to compensation for any harm caused by an act of a pu blic authority in breach of the law and the possibility of its direct application. While the above-mentioned provision of the Constitution undoubtedly refers to civil liability including the State authorities ’ normative activity ... , this liability cannot be taken in the abstract from regulations concerning civil claims laid down in the Civil Code and specific statutes and, accordingly, cannot be an autonomous legal basis for this kind of claims.

...

In view of the foregoing, the plaintiffs ’ claims cannot be justified under Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution.

...

Article 417 1 of the Civil Code, introduced ... on 1 September 2004 and invoked by the plaintiffs could be a legal basis for their claim.

This provision includes the defendant ’ s civil liability for the consequences of the so ‑ called legislative omission in case of a failure to enact a normative act, where there is a statutory duty to do so. However, pursuant to section 5 of [the relevant law amending the Civil Code], setting out the temporal scope of the operation of [ Article 417 1 ], excludes the possibility of its application to events and situations that occurred before the date of its entry into force, requiring [the courts] to apply in that regard the hitherto applicable provisions, including Article 417, which was repealed by that law.

It should therefore be concluded that both Article 417 and Article 417 1 of the Civil Code read in conjunction with Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution cannot be legal bases for granting the plaintiffs ’ claims.

... ”

32. The applicants appealed to the Warsaw Court of Appeal ( SÄ…d Apelacyjny ). On 5 December 2006 the appeal was dismissed.

(d) The applicants ’ second claim for compensation for nationalised property

33. On 8 April 2009 the applicants sued the State Treasury staciones fisci the Minister for Economy and the Minister for Infrastructure before the Warsaw Regional Court, seeking damages arising from the nationalisation of the limestone plant. They sought 26,000,000 [3] Polish zlotys (PLN) each and the costs of the proceedings. Later, they limited the claim to PLN 16,756,228.50 [4] , an amount corresponding to the damage as determined by experts appointed by the court. This sum included PLN 12,634,426.05 [5] for damage caused by exploitation of the limestone deposits by the State and PLN 3,895,607.25 [6] for damage caused by nationalisation of the enterprise ’ s buildings, machines and technical equipment.

34. On 20 June 2011 the Regional Court , relying on Article 160 §§ 1 and 2 of the CAP granted the applicants ’ claim in its entirety. It awarded each applicant PLN 8,378,114.25 (i.e. the whole amount jointly claimed) with interest from 21 June 2011 and PLN 2,228 for the costs incurred. The court held that there was no doubt that the applicants had sustained loss that should be compensated by the State. That loss consisted in the value of the plant on the date of its nationalisation, the value of the limestone deposits exploited by the State and the costs involved in the rehabilitation of the nationalised land.

35. The State Treasury appealed against the judgment

The Court of Appeal postponed the examination of the remainder of the claim (compensation amounting to PLN 12,634,426.05 for damage caused by exploitation of the limestone deposits by the State). In that respect, it decided to obtain a fresh expert report in order to determine the value of the loss actually sustained. The expert was appointed on 12 July 2012. The proceedings are pending.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. The 1946 Act

37. Following the establishment of the communist regime in Poland nearly all branches of industry, as well as banking, insurance, transport and commercial companies were taken over by the State under the 1946 Act which, in its section 1, stated the purposes of nationalisation as follows:

“ In order to ensure the planned rebuilding of the state economy, the economic sovereignty of the State and to foster the general well-being, the State shall take over ownership of enterprises on the conditions laid down in this law.”

Pursuant to section 2(1), only those industrial, mining, transport, banking, insurance and commercial enterprises that belonged to the Third Reich and the former Free City of Gdańsk, their citizens (except for those of Polish or other nationality who had been persecuted by the Germans), German and Gdańsk legal persons (except for those set up under public law), companies controlled by German or Gdańsk citizens or administration or those owned by persons who had defected to the enemy were to be taken over by the State without payment of compensation.

38. Section 3(1) of the 1946 Act (as amended) states that the owners of the remaining enterprises were to be compensated for their nationalised property. That provision reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. The State shall compensate [the owners] for taking over ownership of the following:

A. Mining and industrial enterprises in the following sectors of State economy:

1) mines and mining leases subject to mining law;

2) oil and gas industry, including mines, refineries, gasoline production and other processing plants, gas pipes and synthetic fuel industry;

3) companies that generate, process, transmit or distribute electricity ... ;

4) companies that generate, process, transmit or distribute gas ... ;

5) water supply companies serving more than one municipality ... ;

7) armaments, aviation and explosives industry;

8) coking plants;

9) sugar factories and refineries;

10) industrial distilleries, spirit refineries and vodka production plants;

11) breweries with an annual output exceeding 15,000 hectolitres;

13) grain plants with a daily output exceeding 15 tons of grain ... ;

14) oil plants with an annual output exceeding 500 tons and all refineries of edible fats;

15) cold stores;

16) large and medium textile industry;

17) printing industry and printing houses;

...

B. Industrial enterprises not listed in subsection “A” if they are capable of employing in the production more than 50 persons on one shift.

...

C.

1) Transport enterprises (standard gauge and narrow-gauge railways, electric railways and aviation transport enterprises);

2) communication enterprises (telephone, telegraph and radio enterprises).

39. Section 7 lays down general principles for compensation to be paid for nationalised property. It states, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. The owner of an enterprise whose ownership has been taken over by the State (section 3) shall receive compensation from the State Treasury within one year from the date on which a notice of final determination of the amount of compensation due has been served on him.

2. Such compensation shall in principle be paid in securities; however, in exceptional and economically justified cases it may also be paid in cash or other values.

3. The amount of compensation due shall be determined by special commissions. The persons concerned shall have the right to participate in proceedings before those commissions. If need be and in any case if so requested by the persons concerned, the commission shall appoint appropriate experts.

4. The composition of the commissions, the rules for the appointment of their members, the quorum, the rules of procedure before the commissions and rules for appeals against their decisions shall be determined by an ordinance issued by the Cabinet.

5. The following factors shall be taken into account in determining compensation:

a) general deterioration of the value of State property;

b) net value of the corporate property on the date of nationalisation;

c) deterioration of the value of the enterprise cause by war losses or losses incurred by the enterprise in connection with the war, occupation in the period from 1 September 1939 to the date of nationalisation;

d) value of expenditures made after 1 September 1939;

e) special circumstances affecting the value of the enterprise (concession terms, licenses etc.).

6. A Cabinet ’ s ordinance shall determine detailed rules governing the calculation of compensation, assessment of the circumstances listed in subsection 5 and means of payment of compensation (subsection 2) and depreciation of securities.”

40. Pursuant to section 10, the Cabinet and the relevant Ministers shall be entrusted with the implementation of the 1946 Act. However, since 5 February 1946, the date of entry into force of the 1946 Act, until the present day the Cabinet has not yet issued an ordinance on the organisation of the compensation commissions and determination of compensation referred to in section 7(4) and (6).

2. The State ’ s liability in tort

(a) Provisions of the Civil Code applicable from 10 October 1994 to 1 September 2004

41. Articles 417 et seq. of the Civil Code ( Kodeks cywilny ) provide for the State ’ s liability in tort.

In the version applicable until 1 September 2004, Article 417 § 1, which lays down a general rule, read as follows:

“1. The State Treasury shall be liable for damage caused by a State official in the performance of the duties entrusted to him.”

(b) Provisions of the Civil Code applicable from 1 September 2004

42. On 1 September 2004 the Law of 17 June 2004 on amendments to the Civil Code and other statutes ( Ustawa o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks cywilny oraz niektórych innych ustaw ) (“the 2004 Amendment”) entered into force. The relevant amendments were in essence aimed at enlarging the scope of the State Treasury ’ s liability in tort under Article 417 of the Civil Code – including the addition of a new Article 417 1 and provision being made for the State ’ s tortious liability for failure to enact legislation, a concept known as “legislative omission” ( zaniechanie legislacyjne ).

43. Following the 2004 Amendment, Article 417 1 , in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“4. If damage has been caused by failure to enact a law [ akt normatywny ] where there is a statutory duty to do so, the incompatibility of the failure to enact that law shall be established by the court dealing with the claim for damages.”

However, under the transitional provisions of section 5 of the 2004 Amendment, Article 417 as applicable before 1 September 2004 applies to all events and legal situations that subsisted before that date.

(c) Constitutional tort

44. The concept of the State ’ s civil liability for a constitutional tort was introduced into the Polish legal order on 17 October 1997, the date of entry into force of the 1997 Polish Constitution.

Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution states, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“Everyone shall have the right to compensation for any harm done to him by any act of a public authority in breach of the law.”

(d) The Supreme Court ’ s case-law on compensation for legislative omission in nationalisation cases

(i) The 2005 Resolution (no. III CZP 82/05)

45. In its resolution of 24 November 2005 (“the 2005 Resolution”), the Supreme Court ( Sąd Najwyższy ), sitting as a bench of three judges, dealt with the following legal questions submitted to it by the Warsaw Court of Appeal ( Sąd Apelacyjny ):

“ Is the State Treasury liable for damage caused by failure to enact a law [ akt normatywny ] if the duty to enact that law, laid down in section 7(4) and (6) of [the 1946 Act] was not fulfilled until the date of entry into force of [the 2004 Amendment],

and, if so,

When this duty should have been performed and whether damages for failure to enact the above law corresponds to unreceived compensation for the enterprise nationalised by the State, determined in accordance with the principles laid down in section 7(2) and (5) of [the 1946 Act]?”.

The question arose in the context of a case brought by a certain E.K., who sought damages for the nationalisation of her family ’ s printing house and, as one of the basis for her claim, invoked Article 417 1 of the Civil Code, relying on the State ’ s legislative omission consisting in its failure to issue the relevant ordinance.

46. The Supreme Court ’ s answer in the operative part of the resolution reads:

“Until the date of entry into force of [the 2004 Amendment] the Cabinet ’ s failure to issue an ordinance foreseen in section 7(4) and (6) of [the 1946 Act] did not constitute a basis for a claim by an owner of the nationalised enterprise for damages arising from [nationalisation].”

47. The resolution contains extensive reasoning, the main thrust of which reads as follows:

“[As regards the time-frame for the issue of the ordinance]. The determination of the beginning of that situation carries with it a certain element of arbitrariness since [the 1946 Act] does not lay down any term within which the ordinance referred to in section [7] (4) and (6) should be issued. Assuming that in general the absence of a term is tantamount to a duty to enact a law without undue delay, it can be considered that the discharge of the statutory authorisation, assuming the existence of willingness of the authorised body (the Cabinet) should have taken place in 1946 or in 1947 at the latest. This is supported by the fact that the Cabinet issued ordinances implementing other provisions (including section 2(7) of the Act, a fundamental provision for the interest of the State).

[As regards the State ’ s civil liability for legislative omission], ... it should be concluded that before the entry into force of the 1997 Constitution the State had not been liable under civil law for the consequences of its legislative inactivity. ...

17 October 1997, marking the entry into force of the Constitution is the relevant date as its constitutes the beginning of the existence in the legal order of, inter alia , Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution, proclaiming the right of “everyone” to compensation for any harm done to him by any act of a public authority in breach of the law ... .

Assuming that Article 77 § 1 does not contain a provision making it possible to draw from it a direct basis for a claim for damages for the legislature ’ s inactivity, it must be said that the rules for the State ’ s liability in the sphere of law-making should be established by means of an ordinary statute, determining in a more detailed manner than Article 77 §1 premises for an effective claim. ...

Article 417 1 § 4 of the Civil Code, as introduced by [the 2004 Amendment] satisfies the requirement of detailed premises. The relevant temporal consequences have been clearly set out in its section 5, evidently indicating the prospective operation of Article 417 1 § 4 of the Civil Code. A formulation laying down a non-retroactive character of the provision is telling in that it refers to “events and legal situation that subsisted before its entry into force” ... In consequence, the assessment of the effects of legislative omission subsisting before 1 September 2004 was governed by [earlier provisions]. The relevant Article 417, in its version before the amendment, did not include legislative omission as it was based on a completely different premise, namely, the absence of the State ’ s civil liability for the legislature ’ s acts. ... “

(ii) The 2007 Judgment (no. I CSK 273/07)

48. On 5 December 2007 the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, dealt with a cassation appeal ( kasacja ) lodged by Lubelska Fabryka Maszyn i Narzędzi Rolniczych “Plon” , [8] a limited liability company which was at that time subject to a winding-up procedure. The appellant contested the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 2 February 2007, rejecting its appeal ( apelacja ) against the judgment of the Warsaw Regional Court of 30 May 2006 whereby its claim for damages arising from the State ’ s failure to issue the relevant ordinance, pursuant to section 7(2) and (5) of the 1946 Act, had been dismissed. The claim was based on Article 77 of the Constitution and Articles 417 and 417 1 § 4 of the Civil Code.

In dismissing the cassation appeal, the Supreme Court essentially reiterated the grounds stated in the 2005 Resolution (see paragraph 25 above), stressing that the impugned legislative omission occurred in 1946 or, at the latest in 1947 and since then had continued. However, Article 77 § 1 of the Constitution could not be considered a legal basis for a claim deriving from an “omission” by public authorities since that provision clearly covered only their “acts”. The provision of Article 417 1 , enabling a plaintiff to seek damages for legislative omission, had been introduced only on 1 September 2004 by virtue of the 2004 Amendment. The terms of section 5 of the Amendment 2004 were unambiguous: Article 417 1 of the Civil Code did not apply to events and situations that had subsisted before its entry into force. Consequently, its operation was excluded in respect of legislative omissions that originated in facts that had occurred earlier, even if this state of affairs continually existed until the present day.

(e) The Constitutional Court ’ s case-law on compensation for legislative omission in nationalisation cases

49. On 13 June 2011 the Constitutional Court ( Trybunał Konstytucyjny ) heard a constitutional complaint lodged by a company Elektrownia w Kielcach spółka akcyjna , challenging the constitutionality of section 5 of the 2004 Amendment in so far as it excluded the application of Article 417 1 of the Civil Code to situations that had subsisted before the entry into force of that Amendment, i.e. 1 September 2004 (see also paragraphs 20-26 above). The claimant invoked, in particular, Article 77 § 1 of (right to compensation for unlawful action of public authority) read in conjunction with Article 2 (rule of law), Article 64 §§ 1 and 2 (right of ownership) read in conjunction with Article 21 §§ 1 and 2 (protection of ownership) and Article 32 § 1 (equality before the law) and Article 45 § 1 (right of fair trial) of the Constitution.

Before lodging the complaint, the company, which had been nationalised under the 1946 Act, unsuccessfully sought compensation for the Prime Minister ’ s legislative inactivity in that he had failed to enact an ordinance on rules for compensation as required by the 1946 Act. On 4 April 2008 the claim was finally rejected by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on the grounds stated in the 2005 Resolution (see paragraphs 23-25 above).

The Constitutional Court ’ s decision (no. SK 26/09), in its relevant part, reads as follows:

“4.7. ... Consequently, in the light of the provisions of the Constitution it is difficult to assume that non-fulfilment of the duty to enact an ordinance on compensation for nationalised property derived from [the 1946 Act] amounted to “[an] act of a public authority in breach of the law” linked with the State ’ s liability for [constitutional] tort under the Constitution. Even assuming that the state of legislative omission still persists, it should at the same time be concluded that the duty is non-enforceable. Thus, it is evident that on the basis of the applicable laws only a statute could regulate compensation for the claimant ’ s nationalised property. ... Accordingly, the Constitutional Court considers that the assumption that a legislative omission “in breach of the law” still continues is unwarranted, in particular after the entry into force of the Constitution, in the light of its standards. ... In the light of the constitutional standards as applicable at present it is difficult to accept that there is any legal force attached to the duty imposed on the Cabinet by section 7 of the 1946 Act.

3. Code of Administrative Procedure

(a) Annulment of final administrative decision

“1. A public administration authority shall declare a decision null and void if:

1) it has been issued in breach of the rules governing competence;

2) it has been issued without a legal basis or in flagrant breach of the law;

3) concerns a case already decided by means of another final decision;

4) it has been addressed to a person who is not a party to the case;

5) it was unenforceable on the date of its issuance and its unenforceability is of a permanent nature;

6) it would give rise to a punishable offence in the event that it has been enforced;

7) it has a flaw making it null and void by the force of law.

There is no time-limit for a party ’ s request to have an administrative decision declared null and void under Article 156 § 1.

However, there are situations where, even if certain grounds listed in Article 156 § 1 exist, the lapse of time or irreversible effects of the contested decision have consequences for the formula used in a decision given in the annulment procedure. Article 156 § 2 provides for the following exceptions:

“ A decision shall not be declared null and void on the grounds listed in paragraph 1 (1), (3), (4) and (7) if 10 years have expired from the date of its service or promulgation, as well as if the decision has produced irreversible legal effects.”

Article 158 reads as follows:

“1. A ruling on annulment of a decision shall be given by means of a decision.

2. If it is impossible to declare a decision null and void because of the circumstances referred to in Article 156 § 2, a public administration authority shall only declare that the contested decision has been issued contrary to the law and indicate circumstances because of which it has not declared the decision null and void.”

For the purposes of compensation, the effects of declaring the original administrative decision “null and void” or “issued contrary to the law” are the same.

51. Article 160 set out principles for compensation for loss caused by the issuance of an administrative decision subsequently annulled on the grounds listed in Article 156 § 1.

This provision was repealed by the 2004 Amendment with effect from 1 September 2004 (see also paragraphs 42-43 above) and replaced by new Article 417 1 § 2 of the Civil Code. However, under section 5 of the 2004 Amendment, which sets out transitional rules, Article 160, in the version applicable on the repeal date, still applies to “events and legal situations” that subsisted before the entry into force of the 2004 Amendment.

Article 160, in the version applicable on the relevant date, read as follows:

“1. A party who has suffered a loss on account of the issuance of a decision in breach of Article 156 § 1 or on account of annulment of such a decision shall have a claim for compensation for actual damage, unless he has culpably caused the circumstances mentioned in this provision.

2. The provisions of the Civil Code, except for Article 418 [provision repealed], shall apply to [such] compensation.

3. Compensation is due from an authority that issued a decision in breach of Article 156 § 1, unless the other party to the proceedings concerning the decision culpably caused the circumstances mentioned in this provision; in the latter case a claim for compensation shall be directed against the culpable party.

4. A public administration authority that has declared a decision null and void or declared, pursuant to Article 158 § 2, that it has been issued contrary to the law shall rule on compensation due from the authority referred to in § 1. The vindication of compensation from a person who has culpably caused the circumstances mentioned in Article 156 §1, shall be effected before a court of law.

5. A party who is not satisfied with compensation granted by a public administration authority referred to in § 4, may lodge a claim with a court of law within 30 days from the date of service of a decision given on that matter.

6. A claim for compensation shall be time-barred after 3 years from the date on which has become final the decision declaring null and void the decision issued in breach of Article 156 § 1 or decision whereby an authority has declared, pursuant to Article 158 § 2, that the contested decision has been issued in breach of Article 156 § 1.”

(b) Supreme Court ’ s resolution on the application of Article 160 of the CAP to compensation claims for issuance of defective administrative decision

52. On 30 March 2011 the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, sitting in plenary, gave a resolution (no. III CZP 112/10) on the application of Article 160 of the CAP and rules regarding compensation. The resolution was given in response to legal questions submitted by the First President of the Supreme Court in connection with certain problems and divergences arising in judicial practice, in particular in respect of the temporal effects of Article 160 as determined in section 5 of the 2004 Amendment, the application of Article 417 1 § 2 of the Civil Code which replaced Article 160 (see paragraphs 42-43 and 51 above) and rules for adjudicating compensation.

The resolution contains an extensive reasoning which, in so far as relevant, may be summarised as follows:

1) Article 160 §§ 1,2,3 and 6 of the CAP applies to all claims for damages arising from an issuance of a final administrative decision given before 1 September 2004, which has been declared null and void or has been declared as being issued in breach of Article 156 § 1 of the CAP. In contrast, paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 160, setting out the procedure for vindicating such claims, should be considered as no longer applicable. Consequently, a party seeking compensation under this provision should file an action directly with a civil court.

2) Where an annulled administrative decision has been given before the entry into force of the Constitution (17 October 1997), compensation defined in Article 160 of the CAP shall not include loss of profits sustained in consequence of its issuance, even if such loss has occurred after this date.

4. Legislative initiatives concerning restitution and compensation for property taken under the communist regime

(a) From 1990 to 2005

Each of those bills, although they differed in specific modalities, contained provisions for compensation for nationalisation of property under the 1946 Act.

(b) From 2006 until the present

54. In 2007 the Polish Parliament started the first reading of the Government ’ s bill on compensation for property or other assets taken over by the State ( projekt ustawy o rekompensatach za przejęte przez państwo nieruchomosci oraz inne składniki mienia ) (“the 2006 Compensation Bill”). In general, compensation claims were to be subject to a statutory ceiling of 15% of the value of the original property taken over by the State. The claims of the owners of property nationalised under the provisions of the 1946 Act were included in the list of claimants entitled to compensation. The work on the 2006 Compensation Bill was discontinued in September 2007 since snap parliamentary elections were called following the collapse of the government coalition.

55. In 2008 the new Government started preparatory work on fresh restitution legislation, i.e. the “Bill on pecuniary benefits to be granted to some persons who were subject to nationalisation procedures” ( projekt ustawy o świadczeniach pieniężnych przyznawanych niektórym osobom, których dotyczyły procesy nacjonalizacji ) (“the 2008 Compensation Bill”).

56. The 2008 Compensation Bill provided for no restitution of nationalised properties and was based on the principle of limited compensation, corresponding to a certain – not stipulated in the bill but to be determined in the Minister for Treasury ’ s future ordinance – percentage of the value of the property in question on the date of its nationalisation.

57. In the Minster for Finance ’ s report on the assessment of the budgetary impact of the implementation of the 2008 Compensation Bill (drawn up in 2008) the total value of the claims to be covered by the 2008 Compensation Bill was estimated at PLN 100,000,000,000 [9] .

It was expected that some 80,000 applications for compensation will be submitted under the provisions of the new legislation. The process of the realisation of cash payments was to be spread over the period of 15 years and instalments were to be indexed each year in accordance with the consumer price index.

The entry into force of the bill was tentatively foreseen for 2012.

58. In February 2010 the Minister f or Finance was asked to make an analysis of the conseq uences of the implementation of the 2008 Compensation Bill.

59. On 5 March 2010 the Minister for Finance submitted a report stating that if the bill entered into force in 2012, there would be an abrupt increase in the public debt by PLN 18,000,000,000 [10] which would correspond to 1.00 ‑ 1.10% of the Gross National Product (GNP). In the circumstances, the allocation of PLN 20,000,000,000 [11] for securing nationalisation claims might result in Poland ’ s exceeding the permissible limits of the national debt in relation to GNP as set by the European Union.

“In view of the considerable savings that have been made in recent years, connected with the global financial crisis in many sectors of our social and economic life and the large financial burden resulting from the planned legislation, in the present economic situation, [the 2008 Compensation Bill] cannot be enacted.”

COMPLAINTS

61. The applicants first alleged a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the State authorities ’ continued failure to issue an ordinance determining compensation for nationalised property, which made it impossible for them to enforce the right to compensation accorded to them by virtue of the 1946 Act, a statute which was still in force.

62. They further invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and submitted that the continued legislative and normative inactivity on the part of the State had in effect deprived them of their right to have their civil claim submitted for judicial determination within a reasonable time. In this regard, they maintained that the lack of any regulatory framework for compensation and of any time-frame for the State to discharge its duty to legislate made it impossible for them to receive any compensation either from the compensation commissions referred to in the 1946 Act or from the civil courts.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL N o . 1 TO THE CONVENTION

63. The applicants first alleged a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They maintained that Poland ’ s continued failure to issue an ordinance determining compensation for nationalised property made it impossible for them to enforce the right to compensation accorded to them by virtue of the 1946 Act.

A. The Government ’ s preliminary objections in general

64. The Government made a number of preliminary objections to the admissibility of the application. They submitted that it was incompatible ratione temporis , ratione personae and rationae materiae with the provisions of the Convention. Lastly, they asked the Court to reject the application for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

However, the Court finds it unnecessary to deal in detail with each and every objection since it considers that the application should in any event be rejected in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity for non-compliance with the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. This Article states, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law ... .”

B. Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies

1. The parties ’ arguments

65. The Government submitted that the application had been introduced before the applicants had made full use of all the available domestic remedies. In their view, substantive examination of the applicants ’ complaint was premature given the result of the proceedings relating to the annulment of the 1948 decision and the fact that the compensation procedure under Article 160 of the CAP had not yet been terminated. They asked the Court to reject the application as inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

66. The applicants disagreed and maintained that their application was not premature. Under the 1946 Act they were entitled to compensation for the nationalised enterprise and this right had been denied by the Polish State for many years, since at least 1948. The authorities, by their inaction and failure to pay compensation due to them had continually violated their right of property. Given that the situation giving rise to the breach of the Convention had still not been remedied despite the applicants ’ repeated and sustained attempts to put it right through the domestic legal system, they invited the Court to reject the Government ’ s preliminary objection and find a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) Principles deriving from the Court ’ s case-law

67. It is primordial that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. This Court is concerned with the supervision of the implementation by Contracting States of their obligations under the Convention. It cannot, and must not, usurp the role of Contracting States whose responsibility it is to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined therein are respected and protected on a domestic level. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is therefore an indispensable part of the functioning of this system of protection. States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system and those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system (see, Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey [GC], (dec.) no. 46113/99, ECHR 2010- ... , § 69; and Akdivar and Others v. Turkey , 16 September 1996, § 65, Reports 1996 ‑ IV ).

In line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is best for the facts of cases to be investigated and issues to be resolved in so far as possible at the domestic level. It is in the interests of the applicant, and the efficacy of the Convention system, that the domestic authorities, who are best placed to do so, act to put right any alleged breaches of the Convention (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 164, ECHR 2009)

68. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies contained in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires that normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness.

In the area of the exhaustion of domestic remedies there is a distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non ‑ exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant ’ s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement. The mere doubts regarding the effectiveness of the relevant remedy, if not supported by material evidence, in particular examples from the established domestic practice, are not sufficient to absolve an applicant from his duty under Article 35 § 1 ( ibid .; see also, mutatis mutandis , Krasuski v. Poland , no. 61444/00, 14 June 2005, §§ 68-72).

(b) Application of the above principles to the present case

69. In the present case the applicants were awarded partial compensation for the actual damage caused by the nationalisation of their enterprise, corresponding to the value of the limestone plant, i.e. destroyed buildings, machines and technical equipment. The proceedings concerning the remainder of their claim are still pending before the Warsaw Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 33-36 above).

In these circumstances, the Court finds that the application is premature and that, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, it cannot accept it for substantive examination. This ruling is without prejudice to the applicants ’ right to lodge a fresh application under Article 34 of the Convention if they are unable to obtain appropriate redress in the domestic proceedings.

70. It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

71. The applicants further alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, they maintained that they were deprived of their right to have their civil claim submitted for judicial determination within a reasonable time due to the lack of any regulatory framework for compensation for nationalisation and of any time-frame for the State to discharge its duty to remove this lacuna.

Article 6 § 1 states, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ... .”

72. The Court notes that the applicants twice brought their claims for compensation for nationalisation of their enterprise to the Warsaw Regional Court. After the first proceedings were terminated on 5 December 2006, they brought a fresh civil action on 8 April 2009. As noted above, that claim was granted at first instance, partly upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 28 February 2012 and the remainder of that claim is still being examined (see paragraphs 25-36 and 69 above). It cannot therefore be said that the applicants, in vindicating a claim for damages against the State, were in any way denied, or unduly hindered in the exercise of their right of access to a court, as defined by the Court (see, among many other examples, Kreuz v. Poland , no. 28249/95, § 52 ECHR 2001 ‑ VI, with further references). Consequently, the applicants lack victim status for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention.

73. It follows that the remainder of the application is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Lawrence Early David Thór Björgvinsson Registrar President

[1] . The date on which Protocol No. 1 to the Convention entered into force in respect to Poland .

[2] . Approximately 7,180,000 euros (EUR).

[3] . Approximately EUR 6,220,000.

[4] . Approximately EUR 4,008,000.

[5] . Approximately EUR 3,022,000.

[6] . Approximately EUR 932,000.

[7] . Approximately EUR 466,000.

[8] . The company lodged a similar application (no. 1680/08) with the Court on 7 December 2007.

[9] . Approximately EUR 24,000,000,000.

[10] . Approximately EUR 4,306,000,000.

[11] . Approximately EUR 4,800,000,000.

[12] . www.msp.gov.pl