THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 56783/11 Miroslav KRÁĽ against Slovakia

The European Court of Human Rights ( Third Section ), sitting on 2 December 2014 as a Chamber composed of:

Josep Casadevall , President, Luis López Guerra , Ján Šikuta , Dragoljub Popović , Johannes Silvis , Valeriu Griţco , Iulia Antoanella Motoc , judges, and Stephen Phillips , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 30 August 2011 ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Mr Miroslav Kráľ , is a Slovak national, who was born in 1976, habitually resides in Ru ž omberok , and is currently detained in the Leopoldov prison . He was represented before the Court by Mr J. Čierny , a lawyer practising in Martin .

The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Piro šíková .

A. The circumstances of the case

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. Charges and trial

3. On 25 October 1999 the applicant and five others were charged with aggravated robbery on the basis of the suspicion that, on 5 September 1999, as an organised group, they had forcibly entered private forest grounds , inflicted injuries to a guard to which he later succumbed , appropri ated two tractors and attempted to appropri ate a third , and fled the crime scene once it had prove d impossible to load the first two tractors onto a lorry.

4. On 28 January 2000 the applicant and the others were indicted to stand trial on the above charges in the Žilina Regional Court ( Krajský súd ). At the same time, a warrant was issued for the applicant ’ s arrest , which was followed by a nother similar warrant o n 27 March 2000.

5 . At an unspecified time, the Regional Court was sent a letter dated 19 December 2000 which was purportedly written and signed by the applicant, in which the author described what may be surmised to be the applicant ’ s version of events. The charges against the applicant were denied ‒ their factual basis , in particular , being disput ed ‒ and it was alleged that the applicant had gone into hiding out of fear for his life. In his submission to the Court, the applicant has denied the authenticity of this document.

6. On 5 March 2001 the decision was taken that the applicant, who was still missing, sh ould be tried in his absence ( konanie proti ušlému ).

7. Between 21 March 2001 and 4 March 2002 the Regional Court held ten hearings at which it took and assessed complex written, oral and expert evidence, including a pre-trial deposition by one of the applicant ’ s co ‑ accused (A.) incriminating the applicant. The applicant ’ s court-appointed lawyer inspected the case file on her own initiative and attended all but the first of these hearings.

8. Following the hearing of 4 March 2002 , on the same day the Regional Court found the applicant and his co ‑ accused guilty.

The pre-trial deposition of A. was instrumental in establishing the guilt of the applicant and he was sentenced for thirteen and a half years ’ imprisonment .

9. All parties appealed ( odvolanie ) to the Supreme Court ( Najvyšší súd ).

In the applicant ’ s case , his lawyer appealed on his behalf, arguing inter alia that the first-instance court had failed to take any not ic e of the applicant ’ s letter of 19 December 2000 , that A. was not a credible witness, that two of the remaining co-accused had merely presumed that the applicant had been presen t at the crime scene , and that the other two had not seen him there.

The applicant ’ s lawyer also filed observations in reply to the appeal by the prosecution, in which she addressed the evidentiary situation and submitted that they had misconstrued it to the applicant ’ s disadvantage.

10. The Supreme Court heard the appeals on 26 September 2002, in the presence of the applicant ’ s lawyer. Following the hearing, on the same day, it corrected certain technical errors in the first-instance judgment and reduc ed the applicant ’ s sentence to twelve and a half years on the ground s that, combined with a previous sentence, the penalty imposed by the Regional Court w as in excess of t hat permitted by statute.

11. On 21 January 2003 the Regional Court issued a warrant against the applicant for the enforcement of his sentence and ordered that he be taken to prison.

2. A rrest and detention in the Czech Republic pending extradition to Slovakia

12. On 7 July 2004 the applicant was arrested in the Czech Republic and on 9 July 2004 was remanded by the Prague City Court ( Městský soud ) pending extradition to Slovakia in connection with the above proceedings and conviction.

13. On 5 January 2006 the Minister of Justice of the Czech Republic allowed the applicant ’ s extradition but at the same time suspended its implementation pending the outcome of unrelated criminal proceedings against him in the Czech Republic and, potentially, the service of his sentence imposed in those proceedings.

14. Later in 2006 the Czech courts found the applicant guilty and sentenced to ten years ’ imprisonment, following which a new decision was taken to suspend his extradition to Slovakia pending service of this sentence.

3. Remedies used by the applicant while he was still in the Czech Republic in respect of his conviction in Slovakia

15 . According to the applicant, between 3 April 2005 and 14 May 2007 ‒ while still detained in the Czech Republic ‒ he had asked the Czech prison authorities four times to provide him with Slovak criminal legislation, but to no avail. In support of this allegation, he submitted four original hand ‑ written requests. These indicate neither any addressee nor anything to show that they were actually submitted and duly received.

16 . On 25 April 2005 the applicant requested that he be served with a copy of t h e first ‑ instance judgment. So he was, on 24 May 2005, albeit with no instructions ( poučenie ) regarding any possible remedies available to him in the specific circumstances of his case.

17 . On 30 May 2005 the applicant made a submission to the Žilina Regional Court formulated as an appeal , only to have it dismissed by the Supreme Court of Slovakia on 22 June 2005 as out of time.

In that respect, the Supreme Court observed that the applicant had been convicted in his absence, that the conviction had become final and binding and that, under the Code of Criminal Procedu re applicable at that time (Law no. 141/1961 Coll., as amended - “the 1961 CCP”), person s convicted in their absence by a final and binding judgment had no right of appeal.

At the same time, the Supreme Court noted that the applicant was at liberty to assert his rights by way of a n application for a complaint in the interest of the law ( sťažnosť pre porušenie zákona ) to be lodged on h is b ehalf by the Prosecutor General or the Minister of Justice and by a request for re opening of proceedings ( obnova konania ).

18 . According to the applicant, a written version of the Supreme Court ’ s decision of 22 June 2005 was not served on him until 5 October 2011 .

However, according to a postal delivery confirmation slip submitted by the Government, which bears the applicant ’ s signature, that decision was served on and received by him on 25 July 2005.

19 . O n 19 June 2006 the applicant made a request for re opening of proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable at that time (Law no. 301/2005 Coll., as amended ‒ “the 2005 CCP”) (see paragraph 35 below) , which he and his lawyer amend ed on 11 July 2006 and 3 May 2010, respectively. They submitted that the applicant had only learned about the events underlying the charges from television reports ; that he had not been present at the crime scene; that at the request of one of his associates he had only acted as a lookout nearby; that at the time of the impugned events he had not known the remaining four co-accused; that they had implicated him to serv e their own interests ; and that he had left Slovakia in fear for his life after he had learned that two of his co-accused had been planning to “ take out ” a witness.

In addition, the applicant submitted that at no stage of the proceedings had he been heard , and that although legal representation was mandatory , he had had none at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, which was in violation of his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.

Moreover, he argued that the sentence had been disproportionate to his actual involvement , and that the submissions of A. made at pre-trial stage should be re ‑ examined before a court.

In terms of new evidence, the applicant identified a fresh witness and asked that he undergo polygraph testing, and he requested a face-to-face confrontation ( konfrontácia ) with the other co-accused.

20 . The request was dismissed by the Regional Court in a public session ( verejné zasadnutie ) held on 19 May 2010 and, following the applicant ’ s interlocutory appeal ( s ťažnosť ) , by the Supreme Court on 1 February 2011.

Both courts noted that the applicant was serving a ten-year sentence in the Czech Republic, which was why he could not be present in person. Under the applicable statutory rules, a re opening of proceedings would be warranted only if there was new evidence that could bring about a different outcome. Although the applicant ’ s testimony would constitute evidence which was new, in view of the evidential situation as a whole , no other outcome could be expected.

T he courts also concluded that, since the witness identified by the applicant had refused to give evidence at the original trial, his testimony did not constitute new evidence , nor would there be any new evidence as a result of the face-to - face confrontation . Moreover, results of polygraph testing were not recognised as evidence under the 2005 CCP.

Lastly, it was not new to the court that the applicant had lacked legal representation at the pre-trial stage. However, any objection in this respect should have ‒ but had not ‒ been raised by his State-appointed lawyer at the trial stage and on appeal.

There w ere therefore no ground s for reopen ing the proceedings.

4. Extradition to and subsequent detention in Slovakia

21. Meanwhile, the applicant ’ s conviction and sentencing by the Czech courts had been recognised in Slovakia with a view to having the applicant serve the remainder of his sentence there.

22. The applicant ’ s extradition was implemented and he was actually transferred to Slovakia on 19 November 2010 .

23. The Slovakian courts then commuted the ten-year sentence imposed on the applicant in the Czech Republic to two years and ten months because, in combination with the twelve and a half year sentence previously imposed in Slovakia, the overall pe nalty w as in excess of that permitted by statute.

24. The applicant is now serving the reduced sentence in Slovakia.

5. Final decision on reopening in Slovakia

25. On 20 March 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution ( Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) with the Constitutional Court ( Ústavný súd ). At the same time, he requested that a legal-aid lawyer be appointed to represent him.

As for the substance, the applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention and challenged the dismissal of his request for re opening of proceedings (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above) arguing that he had never been heard , that he had not had legal representation at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings ‒ despite such representation being mandatory ‒ and that the principle of equality of arms had been disre gard ed.

26. On 15 April 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible, essentially relying on its doctrine that the application of a statute in judicial proceedings in a manner consistent with the applicable procedural rules can not amount to a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. The complaint was thus manifestly ill-founded and there was no purpose in examining the applicant ’ s legal-aid request.

6. Other attempts at obtaining redress

27 . On an unspecified date the applicant also requested protection of his rights by means of an appeal on points of law ( dovolanie ) to be lodged on his behalf by the Minist er of Justice.

In a letter of 6 October 2011 the Ministry informed him that his case was not amenable to the temporal application of the rules of the 2005 CCP on appeals on points of law and that, therefore, no such appeal was available.

28 . The ap plicant also requested leave to appeal against the judgment of 4 March 2002 out side the time -limit. His request was dismissed by the Supreme Court as unfounded on 20 October 2011.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

1. Constitution

29 . Article 127 reads:

“1. The Constitutional Court shall decide on complaints by natural or legal persons alleging a violation of their fundamental rights or freedoms ... unless the protection of such rights and freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different court.

2. If the Constitutional Court finds a complaint to be justified, it shall deliver a decision stating that the person ’ s rights or freedoms as set out in paragraph 1 have been violated by a final decision, specific measure or other act and shall quash that decision, measure or act. If the violation that has been found is the result of a failure to act, the Constitutional Court may order [the authority] which has violated the [person ’ s] rights or freedoms to take the necessary action. At the same time it may remit the case to the authority concerned for further proceedings, order that authority to refrain from violating the [person ’ s] fundamental rights and freedoms ... or, where appropriate, order those who have violated the rights or freedoms set out in paragraph 1 to restore the situation to that existing prior to the violation.

3. In its decision on a complaint , the Constitutional Court may grant appropriate financial compensation to a person whose rights under paragraph 1 have been violated.

4. The liability for damage or other loss of a person who has violated the rights or freedoms as referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be affected by the Constitutional Court ’ s decision.”

2. Constitutional Court Act

30 . The implementation of the above provision of Article 127 of the Constitution is set out in more detail in sections 49 to 56 of the Constitutional Court Act (Law n o. 38/1993 Coll., as amended ) . Pursuant to its s ection 53(3):

“A constitutional complaint shall be lodged within a period of two months from the date on which the decision in question has become final and binding or on which a measure has been notified or on which a notice of other interference has been given. As regards the measures and other interferences, the above period shall commence when the complainant could have become aware of them.”

3. Code of Criminal Procedure of 1961

31. The relevant provisions of the 1961 CCP are summarised in Šupák v. Slovakia (( dec. ), no. 4973/03, 23 February 2010).

4 . Code of Criminal Procedure of 2005

32 . The 2005 CCP entered into force on 1 January 2006 and wholly replaced the 1961 CCP.

33. Under Article 62 § 1 submissions are always to be interpreted according to their content even if they have been given a misleading or erroneous heading . A similar provision existed under the 1961 CCP (Article 59 § 1).

34 . The rules concerning proceedings against absent defendants are contained in Section ( Oddiel ) 5 of Chapter 7 ( Hlava ) in Part 3 ( Časť ).

Under these rules, convicted fugitives have the right to request, within a period of six months from the da te on which they learn ed of their prosecution or conviction, but in any event within the applicable period of limitation, that their case be re- examined ( op ätovné prejednanie ) by a court in their presence (Article 362 § 1).

If these conditions are met, the previous decision must be quashed and the case re-examined on the basis of the original bill of indictment (Article 362 § 2 ).

35 . Requests for re opening of proceedings are governed by the provisions of Section 3 of Chapter 8 in Part 3.

In particular, an order to reopen proceedings concluded with the force of final and binding judgment may be issued if there emerge facts or evidence not know n to the court in the original trial which ‒ either in themselves or in conjunction with facts and evidence known to the court at the original trial ‒ may result in a different decision as to the accused ’ s guilt or render the punishment imposed manifestly disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the circumstances of the offender (Article 394 § 1).

5. Supreme Court ’ s practice

36 . In a decision of 7 November 2000 in appeal no. 6To 46/2000, the Supreme Court held that if a criminal trial against an absent defendant ended with a final and binding judgment, the guilty party had no right to have the judgment served on him or her and that, if he or she challenged that judgment by way of an appeal, the appeal was to be rejected as out of time.

6. Constitutional Court ’ s practice

37 . In a judgment of 3 December 2002 in case no. III. ÚS 133/02, the Constitutional Court found that a criminal court had breached Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention in that it had tried and convicted the complainant in absentia without having proper ly established whether or not he could be considered a fugitive.

The Constitutional Court quashed the conviction , re mitted the case to the criminal court for re-examination, ordered the complainant ’ s immediate release , and awarded him compensation.

As regards the statutory two-month period for introducing a complaint, the Constitutional Court held specifically that this period may only commence once the contested decision has been properly served on the complainant and that, as long as this is not the case, the period may not commence (see decision of 23 October 2002 published in the Collection of Judgments and Decisions of the Constitutional Court under no. 163/2002 and also the admissibility decisions of 16 September and 15 October 2003 in unrelated cases nos. III. ÚS 201/03 and III. ÚS 229/03).

38 . In the context of complaints about judicial proceedings , the Constitutional Court has ‒ when determining compliance with the two ‑ month time-limit under section 53(3) of the Constitutional Court Act ‒ consistently considered irrelevant the dismissal of complainants ’ request s for an extraordinary appeal to be filed on their behalf. It has instead held the date of the final effect of the contested judicial decisions to be relevant in that context (see, for example, decision of 28 February 2006 in the case no. IV. ÚS 42/06, with further references). A similar approach is taken with respect to terminated proceedings in relation to which a request for reopening which has been dismissed (see decision of 21 February 2008 in the case no. II. ÚS 84/08).

COMPLAINTS

39. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the criminal charges against him ha d not been heard in his presence , that the proceedings leading to his conviction had been unfair and in breach of his rights of defence, and that it ha d been impossible for him to have the charges re ‑ examined in his presence .

40. Under the same provision, the applicant also complained that the length of the proceedings concerning his request for reopening of 19 June 2006 had been excessive.

41. Lastly, the applicant complain ed under Article 13 of the Convention that he ha d had no effective remedy at his disposal as regards the alleged violation of his right to have the criminal charges against him re-examined in his presence.

THE LAW

A. Determination of the criminal charges in absentia and the impossibility of obtaining fresh determination thereof

42. The applicant complained that the determination of the criminal charges against him in his absence had been contrary to the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention ‒ as was his inability to obtain its re ‑ examination in his presence ‒ and that he had had no effective remedy at his disposal in that respect, contrary to the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention.

43. The relevant part of Article 6 of the Convention reads:

“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...

...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

...

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;

... ”

44. Article 13 of the Convention provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

1. The parties ’ arguments

45. The Government objected that the applicant had failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention on two alternative grounds.

Firstly, they considered the present case to be similar to that of Šupák (cited above) and submitted that, just as in that case, the applicant should have challenged his conviction directly before the Constitutional Court. By not having done so, he had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies.

Alternatively, should the Court not share the above-mentioned view ‒ and admitting that at the time when the applicant had learned of his conviction he had had no other effective remedies at his disposal ‒ the Government contended that the application was out of time.

As to the substance, the Government considered the relevant part of the application manifestly ill-founded.

46 . The applicant replied by submitting that he had only learned of his conviction in 2005, when a copy of his first-instance judgment had been served on him. At that time he had had no access to or knowledge of the contents of the case file and he had been further hampered in asserting his rights by not having access to the Collection of Laws of Slovakia (see paragraph 15 above). He had appealed against the judgment at the earliest possible opportunity and yet the Supreme Court ’ s decision dismissing his appeal was not served on him until 2011 (see paragraph 18 above).

He emphasised that the judgment convicting him of the charges had become final and binding long before he had even been aware of it. It had thus been impossible for him to contest it before the Constitutional Court under Article 127 of the Constitution within the two-month time-limit under section 53(3) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above).

Before the Constitutional Court he had therefore contested only the outcome of the proceedings concerning his request for reopening, which was the only remedy that was available to him.

As a result, in the applicant ’ s own view he had satisfied the requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as regards both the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the applicable time-limit.

The applicant claimed that, in 2005 when he had learned of his in absentia conviction ‒ at which time the 1961 CCP had still been in force ‒ there had been no way for him to lodge a claim for re-examination of his case.

In addition, he submitted that he could not have claimed re ‑ examination under the 2005 CCP either, because the statutory provisions allowing such a claim had not entered into force until 1 January 2006 and could only be relied upon in respect of convictions of which the party concerned had learned no more than six months previously, while he himself had learned of his conviction more than six months before the entry into force of those provisions.

Nevertheless, he considered that trying him as a fugitive had been arbitrary because the courts had had no grounds for concluding that he had been avoiding justice. In that regard, the applicant submitted that he had nothing to do with the letter of 19 December 2000 (see paragraph 5 above) and that he had only learned of its existence later from his lawyer.

47. In a rejoinder, the Government submitted a document showing that the Supreme Court ’ s decision of 22 June 2005 had in fact been served on the applicant on 25 July 2005 (see paragraph 18 above).

2. The Court ’ s assessment

48. The Court reitera tes at the outset that although proceedings that take place in the accused ’ s absence are not in themselves incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention, a denial of justice nevertheless undoubtedly occurs where a person convicted in absentia is unable subsequently to obtain from the court which heard his case a fresh determination of the merits of the charge, in respect of both law and fact, where it has not been established that he has waived his right to appear and to defend himself, or that he intended to escape trial (see a summary of the relevant principles in Stoyanov-Kobuladze v. Bulgaria , no. 25714/05 , §§ 36 et seq ., 25 March 2014, with further references ).

49. As to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was tried and convicted in Slovakia in his absence and that his complaints concern that trial and his inability to have the charges re ‑ examined in his presence and in compliance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention.

50. As regards the trial itself, the Court observes that it took place and was completed within the procedural framework of the 1961 CCP, which contained no specific provisions for re-examining charges decided in absentia with final and binding effect. According to the statutory rules applicable at that time, the persons concerned had neither the right to have a copy of the judgment served on them and nor a right of appeal. It was precisely for these reasons that, in the case no. III. ÚS 133/02 , the Constitutional Court exercised its jurisdiction to review the in absentia trial and conviction by virtue of Article 127 of the Constitution. It found a violation of the complainant ’ s fundamental rights, quashed his conviction, remitted the case for re-examination, ordered the complainant ’ s release and awarded him compensation (see paragraphs 17 , 36 and 38 above).

51. The Court also observes that the applicant learned of his in absentia conviction at the latest on 24 May 2005 , when the first-instance judgment was served on him. It is further to be noted that, although the applicant was at that time not given any instructions regarding any remedies available to him, such instructions were provided at the latest in the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 22 June 2005. As regards the controversy as to when that judgment was served on the applicant, the Court considers that the postal delivery confirmation slip submitted by the Government leaves little room for doubt that it was on 25 July 2005 (see paragraphs 16 and 18 above).

52. The Court observes that all these events took place before the entry into force on 1 January 2006 of the 2005 CCP, which introduced a special procedure for re-examination of in absentia convictions. It concludes that, as in the case of Šupák (cited above), the remedy the applicant needed to exhaust for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in the circumstances of his particular case was a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution aimed directly at his in absentia conviction.

53. As to the applicant ’ s specific objection that such a constitutional complaint could only be filed within the statutory period of two months of the contested decision ’ s becoming final and binding, and that in his case this condition could not have been met because his conviction had become final and binding long before he had learned of it, the Court refers to the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law to the effect that the said time-limit would only commence once the contested judgment was served on him (see paragraph 37 above). The objection thus cannot be sustained.

54. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by the applicant ’ s claim that he could not adequately assert his rights for lack of access to the relevant laws. In particular, the Court observes that there is no indication that, on the relevant points, the applicant sought any legal assistance or that such assistance was unavailable to him.

55. The Court therefore concludes that, as regards the applicant ’ s Article 6 complaints, the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention .

56. As the applicant did have an effective remedy at his disposal, in particular the complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, his complaint under Article 13 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded.

57. The Court is of the view that the applicant ’ s attempts to challenge his conviction under the rules of the 2005 CCP change nothing with respect to the position presented above.

This is so because the possibility of having the case re-examined under Article 362 § 1 of that Code only became available with effect from 1 January 2006 and only with respect to convictions of which the party concerned had learned no more than six months before applying for the re ‑ examination. However, as the applicant himself admitted, he had learned about his conviction outside the aforementioned six-month time-frame (see paragraphs 32 , 34 and 46 above).

The same goes mutatis mutandis for his attempt to have an appeal on points of law lodged on his behalf (see paragraph 27 above).

Furthermore, regarding his request for leave to appeal out of time, even assuming this to be a remedy to be exhausted for Convention purposes, the applicant failed to challenge the Supreme Court ’ s decision concerning it by way of a complaint to the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 28 above).

58. In addition, as regards the applicant ’ s request for reopening of proceedings, the Court observes that it was subject to considerations that are different from those that are relevant for the analysis of the present complaints and it could not have had any impact on the statutory two-month time-limit for filing a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 35 and 37 above).

59. It follows that the relevant part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

B. Remaining complaint

60. The applicant also complained that the length of the proceedings concerning his request for reopening had been excessive.

61. The Government argued that the proceedings concerning that request had fallen outside the scope of Article 6 of the Convention and that, in any event, the applicant had failed to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies by raising that complaint before the Constitutional Court.

62. In reply, the applicant disagreed but submitted no arguments other than those already summarised above.

63. The Court considers that it is not called upon to rule separately on the question of applicability ratione materiae of the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention to the impugned proceedings because the remainder of the application is in any event inadmissible on account of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

64. In that regard, the Court observes that the contested proceedings were initiated by the applicant ’ s request of 1 9 June 2006 , that they ended with the S upreme Court ’ s decision of 1 February 2011 , and that the applicant ’ s subsequent constitutional complaint does not appear to have included any objection as regards their length.

65. In so far as this complaint has been substantiated, the Court has found no reasons for doubting that the applicant could have raised it and that, had he done so, he would have had the full array of remedies inherent in a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that ‒ as regards the complaints that the applicant did submit to the Constitutional Court ‒ his request for a legal-aid lawyer appears to have been dismissed.

66. It follows that th e remainder of the application must in any event be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Stephen Phillips Josep Casadevall Registrar President