SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no . 75468/10 Neslihan OLSOY against Turkey

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section ), sitting on 26 May 2015 as a Chamber composed of:

András Sajó , President, Işıl Karakaş , Helen Keller , Paul Lemmens , Egidijus Kūris , Robert Spano , Jon Fridrik Kjølbro , judges, and Stanley Naismith , Section Registrar ,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 15 November 2010 ,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Ms Neslihan Olsoy , is a Turkish national, who was born in 1952 and lives in Diyarbakır . She was represented before the Court by Ms Rehşan Bataray Saman and Mr Serdar Çelebi , lawyers practising in Diyarbakır .

2. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4. At the time of the events the applicant ’ s son , Fırat Olsoy , who was born in 1976, was serving a prison sentence in the Diyarbakır Prison.

5. On 24 January 2009 the applicant ’ s son asked to see the prison doctor. The doctor examined him, diagnosed him with myalgia (muscle pain) and anxiety and gave him medication to treat his problems.

6. At around 3 p.m. on 23 March 2009, suffering from severe chest pain and shortness of breath, the applicant ’ s son went to the prison infirmary. According to the applicant , the doctor was about to leave for the day and therefore hastily examined h er son and gave him painkillers and a sleeping pill before sending him back to his cell .

7 . At around 5 p.m. the same day the applicant ’ s son ’ s condition worsened and he had difficulty breathing. He told the other inmates in h is wing that he had severe pain in his chest. Some of the inmates carried him to the infirmary but it was closed. Subsequently, a prison warden arrived and called an ambulance. The applicant ’ s son died on the way to the hospital.

8. On the same day an autopsy was conducted by a forensic pathologist at the Diyarbakır State Hospital in the presence of the Diyarbakır p rosecutor. Since the cause of death could not be determined during that autopsy , blood samples and tissue samples taken from the heart, brain, lungs, liver, kidneys, spleen and the coronary arteries were sent for histopathological and toxicological examinations at the Forensic Medicine Institute ’ s headquarters in Istanbul.

9. The following day the prosecutor initiated an ex officio investigation into th e death of the applicant ’ s son. He asked the prison administration to forward him the applicant ’ s son ’ s medical file and the names of the prison personnel who were on duty at the time of the events, as well as the names of the inmates detained on the same wing as the applicant ’ s son. That information was provided to the prosecutor on 25 March 2009.

10. On 26 March 2009 the prosecutor took a statement from the prison doctor. The doctor told the prosecutor that at around 2.30 p.m. on 23 March 2009 he had examined the applicant ’ s son who had come to the prison ’ s infirmary with pain in his chest and shoulder and complained of difficulties in sleeping. The doctor told the prosecutor that he had prescribed four medicines to the applicant ’ s son, namely “Zedprex, Cdoral, Voltaren and Duzyl”, to relax his muscles, relieve his pain and calm him down. However , as he had examined a total of eighty-four prisoners that day, he did not have any further recollection of the applicant ’ s son or his problems.

11. The same day the prosecutor took a statement from the prison director who explained that , according to the closed circuit video recordings showing the inside of the prison , the applicant ’ s son had been brought to the infirmary at 5.1 9 p.m. by his fellow inmates. An ambulance had then been called and a prison guard had administered first aid. The ambulance had arrived at 5.45 p.m. and taken the applicant ’ s son to the hospital.

12. The prison guard who had administered first aid to the applicant ’ s son was also heard by the prosecutor on the same day and told the prosecutor that he had been asked to go to the prison ’ s infirmary some time between 5.25 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. When he had arrived the applicants ’ son was still alive but having difficulties in breathing. He had then called the ambulance again and urged them to come at once because the state of the applicant ’ s son ’ s health had become critical. The ambulance had arrived at 5.45 p.m. When put in the ambulance on a stretcher the applicant ’ s son had been alive but his condition had been critical. His body had started to take on a “purple colour”. The prison guard had also got in the ambulance and the doctor in the ambulance had carried out cardiac massage. However the applicant ’ s son had died on the way to hospital.

13. On 27 March 2009 the prosecutor took statements from nineteen inmates who had witnessed the incident on 23 March 2009. The inmates told the prosecutor that the y had been aware that the applicant ’ s son had been suffering from chest pains . They had also been aware that t he applicant ’ s son had gone to the infirmary earlier that day to see the prison doctor. One of the inmates stated that he had accompanied the applicant ’ s son to the infirmary at around 3 p.m. but that the prison doctor had been about to leave for the day and had hastily prescribed him painkillers without giving him a proper medical examination. The applicant ’ s son ’ s condition had deteriorated after his return from the infirmary and he had been unable to get out of his bed for the roll call which took place at 5 p.m. After the roll call the inmates had carried him to the infirmary because he had been unable to walk unaided.

14. Two of the inmates who had carried the applicant ’ s son out of his wing told the prosecutor that the infirmary had been closed at the time and that they had instead taken him to the dentist ’ s office where they had waited for 15-20 minutes for a prison warden to arrive. They also stated that the telephones in the infirmary had not been working. When the prison warden arrived he tried to put an oxygen mask on the applicant ’ s son but then quickly took it off when the applicant ’ s son felt worse with the mask. The inmates then “put pressure on the prison warden to call an ambulance” and they waited a further 15-20 minutes for the ambulance to arrive .

15. On 30 March 2009 the applicant ’ s other son, Mr Orhan Olsoy, filed a petition with the prosecutor ’ s office and informed the prosecutor that his brother had had no previous health problems and that during his frequent visits to the prison his brother had told him that he was well and would be released soon. Mr Olsoy asked the prosecutor to find out why his brother had lost his life and requested that an investigation be conducted to establish whether the death had been due to anyone ’ s negligence . He also asked the prosecuto r to determine whether there had been a ny delay s in calling the ambulance and requested the prosecutor to secure in evidence the recordings from the prison ’ s security cameras.

16. Between 22 and 28 April 2009 the prosecutor questioned the deputy director of the prison and four other prison guards. They explained to the prosecutor how they had been informed about the deterioration of the applicant ’ s son ’ s condition and how they had then called the ambulance and sent him to hospital.

17. At the request of the prosecutor, the footage recorded by the prison ’ s security cameras was examined by crime scene examination experts from the Diyarbakır police headquarters on 5 May 2009. According to the report prepared by these experts, two persons could be seen carrying another person in their arms at between 5.19 p.m. and 5.38 p.m. The person was put on a stretcher at 5.45 p.m. and put in an ambulance at 5.46 p.m.

18. The applicant and her husband were questioned by the prosecutor on 8 May 2009. They both told the prosecutor that they had not been aware that their son had had any health problems. The applicant added that on one occasion some ten days before her son was imprisoned he had told her that “he was not well”, but had not elaborated as to the nature of his problem.

19. On 9 June 2009 the prosecutor wrote to the Forensic Medicine Institute in Istanbul and urged it to carry out the necessary examinations of the blood and tissue samples taken from the body of the applicant ’ s son. The prosecutor sent another reminder to the Forensic Medicine Institute on 16 July 2009.

20. The doctor and the paramedic who had taken the applicant ’ s son to the hospital were questioned by the prosecutor on 29 June 2009. They told the prosecutor that they had been called to the prison at 5.31 p.m. and that they had arrived there at 5.39 p.m. When they had put the applicant ’ s son in the ambulance he had stopped breathing and his heart had stopped beating. They had tried to resuscitate him and had arrived at the hospital at 6.10 p.m. where they had handed the applicant ’ s son to the doctors waiting by the main entrance.

21. The doctor working at the accident and emergency department of the hospital made a statement on 13 July 2009 and told the prosecutor that the applicant ’ s son had already died on his arrival at the hospital. He and his colleagues had then unsuccessfully tried for approximately thirty minutes to resuscitate him.

22. The Forensic Medicine Institute in Istanbul prepared its report on 13 August 2009 and stated that according to the toxicological examinations there was no alcohol, drugs or other substances in the samples taken from the body. The Institute considered it necessary to seek the opinion of its specialist board on the cause of death.

23. On 25 November 2009 the Expertise Board of the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Institute , which consisted of eight medical experts, issued its report. It confirmed the findings of the toxicology report summarised in the preceding paragraph and added that during the autopsy no signs of trauma tic changes on the body had been observed . According to the report, the eight experts unanimously concluded that the exact cause of death could not be determined .

24. On 19 February 2010 the Diyarbakır p rosecutor delivered a decision of non-prosecution and concluded that there was no evidence to show that an offence had been committed. The prosecutor also added that the applicant ’ s son had died of natural causes and that there had been no fault or negligence attributable to another person in his death.

25. The applicant lodged an objection against the prosecutor ’ s decision and argued, inter alia , that the fact that there had been no signs of trauma on the body of her son and that the toxicology reports had not shown any harmful substances in his body did not exclude that someone ’ s negligence or fault had caused his death. She submitted that the prosecutor should have made attempts to establish whether or not the prison authorities had shown due care and attention and whether the prison doctor had examined him adequately. In this connection , she also argued that the role played in her son ’ s death of the infirmary being closed when his condition worsened and the appropriateness of the medicines prescribed by the prison doctor , should also have been examined by the prosecutor.

26. The applicant added in her objection petition that, according to the eyewitnesses, her son had been complaining about having breathing problems as well as pain in his chest, heart and muscles. However the doctor, instead of at least referring her son to a hospital for a detailed examination and further tests, had given him painkillers. The fact that her son ’ s condition had worsened after having taken the painkillers showed that the doctor had acted negligently. Finally, she alleged that the ambulance had not been called immediately.

27. On 14 May 2010 the Siverek Assize Court dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal. Th at decision was served on the applicant ’ s lawyer on 15 June 2010.

28. According to a report drawn up and signed by a doctor on 13 March 2013, at the time of his entry into the prison a medical examination had been carried out on the applicant ’ s son and no medical problems had been observed during that examination.

COMPLAINTS

29. The applicant alleged, in particular, that the domestic authorities had failed to protect the health and life of her son in prison, in breach of Article 2 of the Convention. She further complained under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention and alleged that the investigation conducted by the public prosecutor had been ineffective . In this connection, she maintained that despite her specific allegation s the prosecutor had not investigate d whether or not the prison medical service had displayed due diligence. In her view, the investigation had been limited to establishing whether or not her son had died as a result of a use of force.

30. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the emotional distress she had endured as a result of the death of her son.

31. The applicant further invoked Article 14 of the Convention and maintained that she had been subjected to discrimination on account of her Kurdish origin.

32. Finally, the applicant relied on Article 17 of the Convention and stated that the domestic authorities had abused her rights set forth in the Convention.

THE LAW

A. Complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention

1. The Government ’ s submissions

33. Referring to the judgments in the cases of Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy ( [GC], no. 32967/96, § § 48-51 , ECHR 2002 ‑ I ); and Vo v. France ( [GC], no. 53924/00, § 90 , ECHR 2004 ‑ VIII ) t he Government submitted that in cases of this kind in which the death was not caused intentionally, the positive obligation imposed by Article 2 of the Convention to set up an effective judicial system did not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case. In the sphere of medical negligence the obligation may for instance also be satisfied if the legal system afforded a victim a remedy in civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any liability of the doctors concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such as an order for damages and for the publication of the decision to be obtained. Disciplinary measures could also be envisaged.

34. The Government argued that, as the applicant had not initiated any action for compensation, the application should be rejected on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

35. The Government also maintained that the applicant ’ s son had been provided with the necessary treatment. In any event, even if the applicant ’ s son ’ s health problems had been diagnosed wrongly or not diagnosed at all, that would have been due to the doctor ’ s individual fault and would not, therefore, entail the responsibility of the State authorities. In this connection the Government referred to the conclusions reached by the Court in the cases of Powell v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 45305/99, 4 May 2000); and Sevim Güngör v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 75173/01, 14 April 2009) and argued that if a State Party to the Convention had legislated for provisions that are sufficient to provide high working standards to the medical personnel and to protect the lives of the patients, the faults of the medical personnel in treating a patient or negligent co-ordination between the medical personnel did not warrant the State being held responsible in respect of its obligation to protect life.

36. Finally, the Government submitted that an effective investigation had been conducted by their authorities in a timely manner and that all possible steps had been taken in the course of that investigation.

2. The applicant ’ s submissions

37. The applicant rejected the Government ’ s above-summarised submissions and maintained her complaints. She argued that her son had died as a result of the negligent and irresponsible behaviour of the prison authorities. Had the prison doctor done his job properly and examined her son properly, instead of prescribing him painkillers and sleeping pills, her son would not have died. Furthermore, as there was no doctor or any other medical personnel when her son ’ s condition deteriorated, her son ’ s fellow inmates had had to carry out the first aid procedures. The fact that the infirmary had been closed and that the telephones in the infirmary had not been working had delayed the arrival of appropriate medical assistance. As could be seen from the prison ’ s security camera footage, the ambulance had not been requested promptly despite the fact that in such cases prompt and adequate medical assistance is crucial.

3. The Court ’ s assessment

38. The Court does not deem it necessary to decide whether or not the applicant failed to comply with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies by not bringing a compensation claim, as it considers that her complaints are in any event manifestly ill-founded for the reasons set out below.

39. T he Court reiterates that the first sentence of Article 2 of the Convention, which ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention and also enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe, requires the State not only to refrain from the “intentional” taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. Those principles apply in the public-health sphere too. The positive obligations require States to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether private or public, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of patients ’ lives. They also require an effective independent judicial system to be set up so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible made accountable (see Vo , cited above, §§ 88-89 and the cases cited therein).

40. As pointed out by the Government, where a Contracting State has made adequate provision for securing high professional standards among health professionals and the protection of the lives of patients, the Court cannot accept that matters such as error of judgment on the part of a health professional or negligent co-ordination among health professionals in the treatment of a particular patient are sufficient by themselves to call a Contracting State to account from the standpoint of its positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention to protect life (see Byrzykowski v. Poland , no. 11562/05, § 104 , 27 June 2006 and the cases cited therein).

41. In cases concerning the health and well-being of persons deprived of their liberty , however, a heightened diligence will be expected from the national authorities and the applicable principles will be those regulating the obligation to protect the right to life by taking preemptive steps . This follows from the Court ’ s well-established case-law in which it was recognised that such persons are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 99 , ECHR 2000 ‑ VII ). Thus, the national authorities have an obligation to protect the health and well-being of persons who have been deprived of their liberty by provid ing them with the medical care necessary to safeguard their li ves (see Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia , no. 35254/07 , § 71 , 22 November 2011 ). In cases w here a detainee dies as a result of a health problem, in addition to satisfying their above-mentioned obligation to show that they had provide d the inmate with the medical care necessary prior to his or her death in order to safeguard his or her life , the State must also offer a reasonable explanation as to the cause of death ( Kats and Others v. Ukraine , no. 29971/04, § 104, 18 December 2008).

42. The Court will therefore examine whether the Government have satisfied these obligations. In doing so and in examining whether the Government have satisfactorily discharged their burden of providing a plausible explanation for the death of the applicant ’ s son, the Court will have particular regard to the investigation carried out at the domestic level in order to establish whether that investigation was effective, in the sense that it was capable of establishing the true facts surrounding the death (see Beker v. Turkey , no. 27866/03, § 44 , 24 March 2009 ; and Gülbahar Özer and Others v. Turkey , no. 44125/06 , § 59, 2 July 2013).

43. The Court notes at the outset that, according to the submissions made by the applicant and her other son Orhan Olsoy (see paragraphs 18 and 15 above), Fırat Olsoy had no known health problems prior to his death. This is further corroborated by the medical report of 13 March 2013 according to which the applicant ’ s son Fırat Olsoy had no medical problems at the time of his entry into the prison (see paragraph 28 above).

44. According to the information in the Court ’ s possession, during his detention in the prison Fırat Olsoy visited the prison doctor on two occasions. The first visit was on 24 January 2009 during which he was diagnosed with myalgia (muscle pain) and anxiety and was prescribed medication for those problems (see paragraph 5 above). The second and last time Fırat Olsoy saw the prison doctor was on 23 March 2009, a few hours before his death. According to the information provided by the doctor to the prosecutor, during that visit Fırat Olsoy complained of pain in his chest and shoulder and of sleeping difficulties. The doctor told the prosecutor that he had prescribed the applicant ’ s son with four different medicines to relax his muscles, relieve his pain and calm him down (see paragraph 10 above).

45 . A full autopsy was carried out on the body of Fırat Olsoy immediately after his death and blood and tissue samples taken from his body during that autopsy were subjected to further forensic examination. When the forensic pathologist who conducted the initial autopsy and subsequently the forensic pathologists at the Forensic Medicine Institute ’ s Istanbul branch were unable to establish the cause of death, the Expert Board of the Forensic Medicine Institute was called upon to scrutinise the initial autopsy report as well as the results of the toxicological and histopathological examinations (see paragraphs 8 and 22-23 above). At the end of all these forensic examinations the forensic authorities were still unable to establish the cause of death or determine any underlying health problems.

46. According to the Court ’ s case-law on the obligation to carry out effective investigations within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention, any deficiency in an investigation into a death which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling foul of that obligation (see AktaÅŸ v. Turkey , no. 24351/94, § 300, ECHR 2003 ‑ V (extracts) and the cases cited therein). However, a failure to establish the cause of death, as in the circumstances of the present case, cannot automatically amount to such a deficiency. Having regard to the documents in its possession, and having further regard to the lack of any challenge by the applicant to the conclusions reached at the end of the forensic examinations, the Court considers that no reproach can be made of the forensic authorities in failing to establish the cause of death.

47. It is also important to stress at this juncture that the obligation to investigate “is not an obligation of result, but of means”; as such, not every investigation should necessarily be successful or come to a conclusion which coincides with the claimant ’ s account of events. However, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those responsible (see Mikheyev v. Russia , no. 77617/01, § 107, 26 January 2006 and the cases cited therein; see also Calvelli and Ciglio , cited above, § 51 ). The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia , eyewitness testimony ( Aktaş , cited above, § 300 and the cases cited therein).

49 . Furthermore, the Court is not able to agree with the applicant that the prosecutor di d not investigate whether anyone ’ s negligence had contributed to her son ’ s death (see paragraph 29 above). Having regard to the steps taken by the prosecutor in the investigation and to their nature, the Court finds that the prosecutor took all reasonable steps in a timely, independent and impartial manner to establish the cause of death and to establish whether anyone had acted negligently in the sequence of events leading up to the death of the applicant ’ s son. Indeed, beyond arguing that the prosecutor ha d not taken any steps to examine whether her son had died due to someone ’ s negligence, the applicant has not sought to refer to any specific aspects of the investigation which she considered flawed and which would have led to a different outcome.

50 . Turning to the examination of the steps taken by the prosecutor, the Court notes that the above - mentioned forensic examinations were ordered during the course of the investigation started by the prosecutor of his own volition the day after the death of the applicant ’ s son. In the course of that investigation the prosecutor also obtained the applicant ’ s son ’ s medical file from the prison, summoned and questioned a large number of inmates who had witnessed the deterioration of the a pplicant ’ s son ’ s condition and assisted him, the prison authorities – including the prison doctor – who had come into contact with the applicant ’ s son in one way or other during his detention, and the ambulance and hospital personnel who had tried to save his life (see paragraphs 9-14, 16 and 20-21 above).

51 . The applicant and her family members were also given the opportunity to participate in the investigation during which they were able to give the prosecutor their own accounts of the events and voice their complaints (see paragraphs 15 and 18 above).

52. When, on one of those occasions, the applicant ’ s other son urged the prosecuto r to investigate whether there had been a ny delay s in calling the ambulance and to secure in evidence the footage recorded by the prison ’ s security cameras (see paragraph 15 above), the prosecutor instructed crime scene investigators to examine the footage. That examination revealed that two persons could be seen carrying the applicant ’ s son in their arms between 5.19 and 5.38 p.m. The applicant ’ s son was put on a stretcher at 5.45 p.m. and put in the ambulance at 5.46 p.m. (see paragraph 17 above).

53. It appears from this information, which is in turn corroborated by the statements made by the inmates, the prison guards and subsequently by the ambulance personnel, that Fırat Olsoy was carried out of his wing by his fellow inmates at 5.19 p.m. The ambulance personnel told the prosecutor that they had been called at 5.31 p.m. and that they had arrived at the prison at 5.39 p.m. (see paragraph 21 above).

54. It is thus clear that the ambulance was called within twelve minutes after Fırat Olsoy was taken out of his ward. Noting that during that time a prison warden had been found and that that warden tried to administer first aid (see paragraphs 7 and 14 above), the Court cannot agree with the applicant that the ambulance had not been called in a timely fashion (see paragraph 37 above).

55. As to whether the prison doctor ’ s alleged negligence in examining the applicant ’ s son “hastily” and not referring him to a hospital immediately contributed to his death, the Court considers it important to emphasise that the cause of death could not be established despite detailed forensic examinations. Having regard to that inability to establish the cause of death, and having further regard to the fact that the applicant ’ s son had no known previous medical problems, the Court does not find a causal link between the death and the alleged cursory nature of the examination carried out by the doctor. This lack of a causal link also prevents the Court from speculating whether the applicant ’ s son would have survived if the doctor had transferred him to the hospital immediately after he examined him. Thus, the present application can be contrasted with the comparable cases in which the Court examined whether the prison authorities had provided inmates with the necessary medical care for their existing and known problems (see, inter alia , Makharadze and Sikharulidze , cited above, § 90; Kats and Others , cited above, §§ 101 and 111; and Huylu v. Turkey , no. 52955/99, § § 57-69 , 16 November 2006 ).

56. As for the applicant ’ s submissions that the doctor prescribed her son with “only painkillers and sleeping medicines” and sent him back to his cell (see paragraphs 6, 26 and 37 above), the Court observes that the medicines prescribed to the applicant ’ s son are named in the prison doctor ’ s statement made before the prosecutor (see paragraph 10 above). The Court notes that those medicines, namely “Zedprex, Cdoral, Voltaren and Duzyl”, are used in the treatment of depression, anxiety, chest pain and inflammation which, it is to be observed, are compatible with the complaints the applicant ’ s son brought to the doctor (see paragraphs 6 and 10 above). The Court cannot accept, therefore, that the applicant ’ s son ’ s condition worsened after having taken the painkillers and that this showed that the doctor had acted negligently (see paragraph 26 above).

57. In these circumstances in which neither the authorities nor the applicant ’ s son were aware of any existing health problems, the respondent State cannot be said to have failed to provide any particular measures in order to prevent the fatal outcome. The Court also finds that, once the applicant ’ s son ’ s health problems manifested themselves, the reaction of the authorities was adequate and those authorities could not, therefore, be said to have failed to act appropriately.

58. The Court concludes, therefore, that the national authorities conducted an effective investigation into the allegations and that the fact that the investigation did not yield any results does not mean that the authorities can be reproached (see İlhan and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 23856/07, § 53, 27 August 2013). The Court finds that the investigation was effective, in the sense that it was capable of establishing the true facts surrounding the applicant ’ s son ’ s death and it thus enabled the Government to discharge their obligation to account for the death of the applicant ’ s son by showing that he had not died in circumstances in breach of Article 2 of the Convention. It also finds that the authorities of the respondent State did not fail to provide the requisite medical or other assistance to protect the right to life of the applicant ’ s son.

59. In light of the foregoing the Court finds that the applicant ’ s complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention are manifestly ill ‑ founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.

B. Complaints under Articles 3, 14 and 17 of the Convention

60 . Lastly, the applicant complained that her suffering stemming from the death of her son had been so severe as to be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Referring to Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention she added that she had been discriminated against on account of her Kurdish origin and that the domestic authorities had abused her rights set forth in the Convention.

61. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of any of the above Articles of the Convention. It follows that these complaints are also inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 18 June 2015 .

Stanley Naismith András Sajó Registrar President