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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 27567/95

by Nicholas STAMOULAKATOS

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 9 April 1997, the following members being present:

Mrs. J. LIDDY, President

MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

E. BUSUTTIL

A. WEITZEL

C.L. ROZAKIS

L. LOUCAIDES

B. MARXER

B. CONFORTI

I. BÉKÉS

G. RESS

A. PERENIC

C. BÎRSAN

K. HERNDL

M. VILA AMIGÓ

Mrs. M. HION

Mr. R. NICOLINI

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 25 May 1995 by

Nicholas STAMOULAKATOS against the United Kingdom and registered on

12 June 1995 under file No. 27567/95;

Having regard to:

- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

the Commission;

- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

15 March 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the

applicant on 6 April 1996;

- the Commission's decision of 16 October 1996 to invite the

parties to submit further written observations on the

admissibility and merits of the complaint concerning the length

of the above proceedings;

- the further observations submitted by the applicant on

27 October 1996 and by the respondent Government on

22 November 1996;

- the further comments provided by the applicant on

29 December 1996 and 11 January and 8 February 1997;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Greek citizen and a journalist. He was born

in 1936 in Greece and is currently resident in London. This is his

seventeenth application before the Commission. He has since lodged

fourteen additional applications.

The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 31 December 1990 the applicant lodged an action against the

"International League for Human Rights of United Nations", the

"International Intelligence S.A.", Mrs. E.I and Mrs. H.J before the

High Court for the recovery of a debt.

On 2 July 1991 a Master in chambers gave directions in the

applicant's action.

By letter of 12 August 1991 the solicitors of Mrs. H.S, E.I's

sister, informed the applicant that E.I had died.

On 2 October 1991 a judge proposed that the action be transferred

to a County Court. On 14 October 1991 the High Court examined the

matter and decided not to make an order for the transfer of the action

to a County Court.

The applicant's action would have been called for trial on

11 December 1991. On that date the High Court heard the applicant and

Mrs. W.T as representative of the first two defendants. It decided,

however, to adjourn the trial to enable the applicant to take such

steps as he thought appropriate to amend the writ and subsequent

pleadings in relation to E.I. It also requested the Attorney General

to appoint an amicus curiae to make submissions on the following

issues: first, the capacity of the first and second defendants to be

sued before the High Court, secondly, whether the first two defendants

had been properly served and thirdly, whether Mrs. W.T was duly

authorised to represent them. Finally, the court ordered that an

affidavit be sworn on behalf of the first two defendants dealing with

their constitution, all matters relating to their capacity to be sued

before the High Court and Mrs. W.T's capacity to represent them.

On 30 March 1992 the Attorney General suggested that, as a number

of detailed inquiries needed to be carried out in order to assist the

court, assistance might be better provided by the Official Solicitor.

On 1 April 1992 the court agreed to this course of action.

In an undated report filed with the court the Official Solicitor

noted, inter alia, that it had not been possible to establish whether

either of the first or second defendants was a corporate body and in

the absence of evidence to the contrary it could be presumed that the

organisations were unincorporated associations which had no legal

existence, apart from the members of which they were composed. The

Official Solicitor also noted that a letter of inquiry addressed to the

first defendant received a reply signed by or on behalf of the

applicant himself.

In October 1992 the Central Office of the Royal Courts of Justice

wrote to the applicant asking about the progress of the proceedings.

On 1 November 1992 the applicant informed the court that there had been

no settlement and that he was taking the matter to the European Court.

The court wrote to the applicant in the same terms in October 1993. In

a letter of reply of 14 November 1993 the applicant asked for his

documents to be returned and for a new hearing date.

On 24 February 1994 the High Court heard the applicant and

Mrs H.S in her capacity as personal representative of E.I. The court

ordered the adjournment of the action to enable Mrs. H.S to make an

application for the striking out of the applicant's claim. The earlier

request for the assistance of an amicus curiae was assigned to the

Official Solicitor.

On 12 June 1994 the applicant lodged an application for leave to

appeal and an extension of time for appealing the order of

24 February 1994. On 24 June 1994 the Civil Appeals Office informed the

applicant that a fee of 50 pounds, an affidavit in support and a sealed

copy of the order of 24 February 1994 would be required. The applicant

did not lodge the required fee, order and affidavit until 3 May 1995.

In May 1995 there was further correspondence between the applicant and

the Civil Appeals Office concerning the cost of certain transcripts

which the applicant was required to produce in support of the appeal

he intended to lodge. Once the transcripts were obtained the file was

referred back to the Registrar of Civil Appeals for further directions

in October 1995.

The application for leave to appeal was refused by a single judge

of the Court of Appeal on 5 February 1997. According to the Government,

the application was not in a fit state to list because the bundles were

so muddled and it was exceedingly difficult to follow what the case was

about. It is claimed that, to assist the applicant, a leaflet

explaining in simple terms what was required was sent to him. However,

the applicant refused to comply with the instructions given.

The proceedings before the High Court are apparently still

pending.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention about

the length of the proceedings in the United Kingdom.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 25 May 1995 and registered on

12 June 1995.

On 29 November 1995 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to

communicate the applicant's complaint concerning the length of the

proceedings in the United Kingdom and to declare the remainder of the

application inadmissible.

The written observations of the respondent Government were

submitted on 15 March 1996, after an extension of the time-limit fixed

for that purpose. The applicant replied on 6 April 1996.

On 16 October 1996 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to

invite the parties to submit further written observations on the

admissibility and merits of the complaint regarding the length of the

above proceedings.

The applicant submitted such further observations on 27 October

1996. The observations of the respondent Government were submitted on

22 November 1996, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose.

On 29 December 1996, 11 January 1997 and 8 February 1997 the

applicant provided further comments.

On 13 February 1997 the respondent Government protested about the

language used by the applicant in his observations and comments.

The respondent Government's letter of 13 February 1997 was

transmitted to the applicant on 28 February 1997.

THE LAW

The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention about the length of the proceedings in the United Kingdom.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as

relevant, provides as follows:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,

everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time

..."

The respondent Government request the Commission to declare the

remainder of the application inadmissible under Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention as an abuse of the right of petition.

They submit in this connection that the applicant has had previous

unsuccessful proceedings under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention. These related to the fairness of ten separate sets of

criminal proceedings brought against the applicant in Greece which had

taken place in his absence. The present application concerns civil

proceedings initiated by the applicant in the United Kingdom in 1990

which have, as far as the Government can establish, no substance to

them. Two of the defendants, whom the applicant purports to sue for the

recovery of a debt, do not exist as legal entities and appear to have

been represented by an agent of the applicant. The third defendant in

the proceedings is now deceased. The fourth defendant, purportedly a

former president of one of the non-existent entities, is alleged to be

in collusion with the applicant in taking out nonsensical actions

against various non-existent companies and individuals.

The respondent Government further submit that, since his arrival

in that country, the applicant has initiated numerous proceedings. All

his other actions have been struck out and in one case one of the

defendants successfully counterclaimed against the applicant. As

regards the proceedings complained of in the present application the

Government was faced with two alternatives, allow them to have run the

length of time that they have or have them struck out as an abuse of

process, like the others. It follows that the applicant has not

suffered any actual prejudice because, if the proceedings had not been

allowed to continue, they would have been determined against him.

The respondent Government finally submit that the applicant's

response to the Government's observations on the admissibility of the

application contains provocative and insulting language concerning the

Government and its Agent which, in accordance with previous case-law

of the Commission, constitutes an abuse of the right of petition.

The applicant contests the submissions of the respondent

Government.

The Commission notes that in the observations filed by the

applicant in response to the Government's observations the applicant

has made a series of allegations of criminal and dishonest conduct in

language which is both insulting and abusive against the respondent

Government and, more particularly, the Government's Agent. There is no

evidence whatever to support the allegations made and nothing to

warrant the language used, which in the Commission's view is wholly

without justification. In this connection the Commission recalls that

the persistent use of insulting or provocative language by an applicant

may be considered an abuse of the right of petition (No. 2724/66,

Dec. 10.2.67, Collection 22, p. 89; No. 2625/65, Dec. 30.9.68,

Collection 28 p. 26).

The Commission considers that this is the case with the present

application. The application must be, therefore, rejected as an abuse

of the right of petition in accordance with Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY

Secretary President

to the First Chamber of the First Chamber

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STAMOULAKATOS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

STAMOULAKATOS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

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