THIRD SECTION

CASE OF YAROSLAV BELOUSOV v. RUSSIA

( Applications nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14 )

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

4 October 2016

FINAL

06/03/2017

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia ,

The European Court of Human Rights ( Third Section ), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Luis López Guerra, President, Helena Jäderblom, Helen Keller, Dmitry Dedov, Branko Lubarda, Georgios A. Serghides, Pere Pastor Vilanova, judges, and Stephen Phillips , Section Registrar ,

Having deliberated in private on 6 September 2016 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1 . The case originated in two applications (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14 ) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national , Mr Yaroslav Gennadiyevich Belousov (“ the applicant ”), on 20 December 2012 and 2 September 2014 respectively .

2 . The applicant w as represented by Mr D.V. Agranovskiy, a lawyer practising in Elektrostal. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights .

3 . The applicant complained about his prosecution and conviction for participation in mass disorder . He claimed that his pre-trial detention was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons and complained that various aspects of his detention had amounted to a degrading treatment. He also complained that he did not receive a fair hearing in the criminal proceedings and alleged a violation of his right to freedom of expression and his right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

4 . On 10 September 2013 and 13 October 2014 the applications were communicated to the Government. The applications were granted priority under R ule 41 of the Rules of Court .

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5 . The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Moscow .

6 . On 6 May 2012 the applicant was arrested during the dispersal of a political rally at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. He was found guilty of failure to obey lawful police orders, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and was subsequently charged with participation in mass disorder and with having committed violent acts against police officers, criminal offences provided for by Articles 21 2 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code. He was detained and tried on these charges and was convicted to a prison term of two years and three months.

A. The public assembly of 6 May 2012

8 . On 23 April 2012 five individuals (Mr I. Bakirov, Mr S. Davidis, Ms Y. Lukyanova, Ms N. Mityushkina and Mr S. Udaltsov) submitted notice of a public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow. The aim of the demonstration was “to protest against abuses and falsifications in the course of the elections to the State Duma and of the President of the Russian Federation, and to demand fair elections, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the international obligations of the Russian Federation”.

9 . On 3 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security approved the route from Kaluzhskaya Square, down Bolshaya Yakimanka Street and Bolshaya Polyanka Street, followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square , not ing that the organisers had provided a detailed plan of the proposed events. The march was to begin at 4 p.m., and the meeting had to finish by 7.30 p.m. The number of participants was indicated as 5,000.

10 . O n 4 May 2012 the First Deputy Head of the Moscow Department of Regional Security held a working meeting with the organisers of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, at which they discussed the security issues. T he organisers and the authorities agreed that the assembly layout and the security arrangements would be identical to the previous public event organised by the same group of opposition activists on 4 February 2012. On that occasion, the venue of the meeting had included the park at Bolotnaya Square and the Bolotnaya embankment.

11 . On 5 May 2012 the Tsentralnyy District Prosecutor ’ s Office of Moscow issued a warning to two of the organis ers, Mr Davidis and Mr Udaltsov, against exceeding the notified number of participants and against erecting camping tents at the meeting venue, an intention allegedly expressed by the organisers at the working meeting.

12 . On the same day the Moscow Department of the Interior published on its website the official information about the forthcoming demonstration on 6 May 2012, including a map. The map indicated the route of the march, the traffic restrictions and an access plan to Bolotnaya Square; it delineated the area allotted to the meeting, which included the park at Bolotnaya Square. Access to the meeting was marked through the park.

13 . On the same day the Police Chief of the Mo scow Department of the Interior adopted a plan for safeguarding public order in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (the “security plan”). In view of the forthcoming authorised demonstration at Bolotnaya Square and anticipated attempts by other opposition groups to hold unauthorised public gatherings, it provided for security measures in Moscow city centre and set up operational h eadquarters to implement them. The police units assigned to police the march and the meeting counted 2,400 riot police officers, of which 1,158 were on duty at Bolotnaya Square. They were instructed, in particular, to search the demonstrators to prevent them from taking tents to the site of the meeting and to obstruct access to Bolshoy Kamenyy bridge, diverting the marchers to Bolotnaya embankment, the place of the meeting. The adjacent park at Bolotnaya Square had to be cordoned off.

14 . At about 1.30 p.m. on 6 May 2012 the organisers were allowed access to the meeting venue to set up the ir stage and sound equipment. The police searched the vehicles delivering the equipment and seized three tents found amid the gear. They arrested several people for bringing the tents .

15 . At the beginning of the march, the organisers sign ed an undertaking to ensure public order during the demonstration and gave assurances to the police that the limits on the place and time allocated for the assembly would be respected and that no tents would be placed on Bolotnaya Square.

16 . The march began at 4.30 p.m. at Kaluzhskaya Square. It went down Yakimanka Street peacefully and without disruption. The turnout exceeded expectations, but there is no consensus as to the exact numbers. The official estimate was that there were 8,000 participants, whereas the organisers considered that there were about 25,000. The media reported different numbers, some significantly exceeding the above estimates.

17 . At about 5 p.m. the march approached Bolotnaya Square. The leaders found that the layout of the meeting and the placement of the police cordon did not correspond to what they had anticipated. Unlike on 4 February 2012, the park at Bolotnaya Square was excluded from the meeting venue, which was limited to Bolotnaya embankment.

18 . Faced with the police cordon and unable to access the park, the leaders of the march – Mr S. Udaltsov, Mr A. Navalnyy, Mr B. Nemtsov and Mr I. Yashin – stopped and demanded that the police open access to the park. T he cordon officers did not enter into any discussion with the protest leaders and no senior officer was delegated to negotiate. After about fifteen minutes of attempting to engage with the cordon officers, at 5.16 p.m. the four leaders announced that they were going on a “sit-down strike” and sat on the ground. The people behind them stopped, although some people continued to go past them towards the stage.

19 . Between 5.20 p.m. and 5.45 p.m. two State Duma deputies tried to negotiate the enlargement of the restricted area by moving the police cordon behind the park along the lines expected by the organisers. At the same time the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, at the request of police , attempted to persuade the leaders of the sit-in to resume the procession and to head towards the meeting venue at Bolotnaya embankment where the stage had been set up. During that time no senior police officer or municipal official came to the site of the sit-down protest, and there was no direct communication between the authorities and the leaders of the sit-in.

20 . At 5.50 p.m. the crowd around the sit-down protest built up, which caused some congestion, and the leaders abandoned the protest and headed towards the stage, followed by the crowd.

21 . At 5.55 p.m. the media reported that the police authorities were regarding the strike as a provocation of mass disorder and were considering prosecuting those responsible for it.

22 . At the same time a commotion near the police cordon occurred at the place vacated by the sit-down protest, and the police cordon was broken in several places. A crowd of about 100 people spilled over in to the empty space beyond the cordon. Within seconds the police restored the cordon, which was reinforced by an additional riot police force. Those who found themselves outside the cordon wandered around, uncertain what to do next. Several people were apprehended, others were pushed back inside the cordon, and some continued to loiter outside or walked towards the park. The police cordon began to push the crowd into the restricted area and advanced by several metres, pressing it inwards.

23 . At 6 p.m. Ms Mityushkina, on police instructions, announced from the stage that the meeting was now over , but apparently her message was not heard by most of the demonstrators or the media reporters broadcasting from the spot. The live television footage provided by the parties contained no mention of her announcement.

24 . At the same time a Molotov cocktail was launched from the crowd at the corner of Malyy Kamenny y bridge over the restored police cordon. It landed outside the cordon and a passer-by ’ s trousers caught fire. It was promptly extinguished by the police.

25 . At 6.15 p.m. at the same corner of Malyy Kamenny y bridge the riot police began breaking into the demonstration to split up the crowd. Running in tight formations, they pushed the crowd apart, arrested some people, confronted others , and formed new cordons to isolate sections of the crowd. Some protest e rs held up metal barriers and aligned them so as to resist the police, threw various objects at the police, shouted and chanted “Shame!” and other slogans, and whenever the police apprehended someone from among the protest e rs they attempted to pull them back. The police applied combat techniques and used truncheons.

26 . At 6.20 p.m. Mr Udaltsov climbed onto the stage at the opposite end of the square to address the meeting. At this point, he was arrested. Mr Navalnyy attempted to go up onto the stage, but he was also arrested , and so was Mr Nemtsov, five minutes later.

27 . Meanwhile, at the Malyy Kamenny y bridge the police continued dividing the crowd and began pushing some sections away from the venue. Through loudspeakers they asked the participants to leave for the metro station. The dispersal continued for at least another hour until the venue was fully cleared of all protest e rs.

28 . On the same day the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened a criminal investigation into the suspected mass disorder and violent acts against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code).

29 . On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day.

30 . On 24 May 2013 the first criminal case against twelve individuals suspected of participation in mass disorder , including the applicant, was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges (the first “Bolotnaya” case).

31 . On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow pronounced a judgment in the first Bolotnaya case. It found eight individuals , including the applicant, guilty of participation in mass disorder and of violent acts against police officers during the public assembly on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and four years; one of them was released on parole. The applicant was sentenced to two years and six months ’ imprisonment. Three co-defendants had previously been pardoned under the Amnesty Act and a fourth had his case disjoined from the main proceedings. This judgment was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 20 June 2014. It reduced the applicant ’ s prison sentence to two years and three months.

32 . On 24 July 2014 the Moscow City Court found Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev guilty of organisi ng mass disorder on 6 May 2012 and sentenced them to four and a half years ’ imprisonment. On 18 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Feder ation upheld the judgment of 24 July 2014, with amendments.

33 . On 18 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined another “Bolotnaya” case and found four persons guilty of participating in the mass disorder and of committing violent acts against police officers during the demonstration on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and three and a half years; one of them was released on parole. This judgment was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 November 2014.

B. The applicant ’ s arrest and pre-trial detention

34 . At the time of arrest the applicant was a student at the political science faculty of the Moscow State University and lived with his wife and their child born in 2011. On 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square to take part in the demonstration and, according to him, he did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police , although he was in the area where clashes occurred . At one point during the dispersal of the demonstration he picked up from the ground a small round yellow object and threw it over the heads of the protest e rs in the direction of the police. He was arrested shortly after that. There is no information as to whether he was detained on that day .

35 . On 17 May 2012 the applicant was charged with non-compliance with a lawful order by a police officer on 6 May 2012. He was found guilty of the offence provided by Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences and was sentenced to 24-hour s ’ detention.

36 . Until 9 June 2012 the applicant continued to study at the university while living with his family at his usual address. On the latter date he was detained on suspicion of having participated in mass disorders on 6 May 2012.

37 . On 11 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined and granted the request to detain the applicant pending criminal investigation. It reasoned as follows:

“In assessing the circumstance s under investigation, [the court takes account of] the submitted materials and the indicated information in their integrity, as well as the personality of [the applicant], who is suspected of having committed criminal offences one of which is characterised as grave and the other of medium gravity, punishable by up to two years of deprivation of liberty, and therefore giving sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant is likely to abscond, to continue hi s criminal activity, to destroy evidence, or to otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case.”

38 . The court dismissed the applicant ’ s request for an alternative preventive measure, including bail of 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB) , and personal guarantees of several state officials and found that his release was not required on health grounds. It ordered the applicant ’ s detention until 6 July 2012. On 2 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order.

39 . On 18 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Articles 212 § 2 (participation in mass disorder) and 318 § 1 (violence against a public official) of the Criminal Code. He was accused, in particular, of shout ing slogans and throw ing an unidentified small round yellow object that had hit the police officer ’ s shoulder.

40 . On 3 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined the investigator ’ s request to extend the term of the applicant ’ s detention by four months. The applicant asked for another preventive measure pending trial. He offered bail of RUB 500,000 or the personal guarantees of a State Duma deputy, two Moscow municipal deputies and one academic. His request for an alternative preventive measure was supported by petitions signed by six Moscow municipal deputies and three per sonal references from his place of residence and the university. The applicant also made a plea for release on health grounds, having provided medical certificates confirming that he was suffering from a high-degree myopia and asthma. On the same day the court found that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed and, referring to the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the investigation, extended the applicant ’ s detention until 6 November 2012. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 6 August 2012.

41 . On 29 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court granted another extension of the applicant ’ s detention, until 6 March 2013, essentially on the same grounds and not ing that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 26 November 2012.

42 . On 7 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were updated with a statement that the applicant ’ s and others ’ acts had cumulatively caused the police officer a h a ematoma on the head, leg and shoulder. The classification of the offences remained unchanged.

43 . On 1 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant ’ s detention, until 9 June 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before and not ing that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. On 10 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld this extension order.

44 . On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request for the extension of the applicant ’ s detention and granted it until 6 July 2013 . The decision read as follows :

“The materials presented [by the investigator] reveal that the grounds for choosing the preventive measure in respect of [the applicant] were not only the gravity of the charges but also the information about the personality of [the applicant] who could abscond from the investigation and trial, threaten witnesses , or otherwise obstruct the proceedings in the case, if released.

The aforementioned grounds ... have not changed, have not lost their relevance to date, and the circumstances of the case [and] the nature of the crime committed by [the applicant] lead the court to conclude that the need for the [pre-trial detention] has not, at this stage, ceased to exist ...

This term is reasonable, [it] is justified by the objective circumstances, it is not in conflict with the term of the pre-trial investigation, also extended on the same grounds ...

In accordance with the Constitutional Court ’ s [case-law], the proportionality of the preventive measure to the [gravity of the] charges imputed to [the applicant] show that in this case the public interests, in particular those related to the criminal investigation, override the importance of the principle of respect of individual liberty.”

45 . On 24 May 2013 the applicant ’ s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court for the determination of criminal charges.

46 . On 30 May 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 23 April 2013.

47 . On 6 June 2013 the latter court granted another extension of the applicant ’ s detention until 24 November 2013. This decision concerned eleven defendants and read , in so far as relevant , as follows:

“ ... the court concludes that the preventive measure in respect of [all defendants] ... is to remain unchanged because the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ...

... [the defendants] are accused of [grave crimes punishable by prison sentences] ...

Regard being had to all the available information about the personality of [the defendants] and the nature of the criminal offences imputed to each of them, the court still has sufficient grounds to believe that the said defendants, if at liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges.

... no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings ...

The court takes into account the arguments of Mr Akimenkov, Mr Belousov and Mr Barabanov and their counsel concerning the health problems which occurred in custody, but notes that no documentary evidence that these defendants have diseases threatening their life or health and incompatible with the detention in custody have been provided.”

48 . On 2 July 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 6 June 2013.

49 . On 6 August 2013, during the court hearing the applicant made an application for release which was dismissed by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court on the same day.

50 . On 11 September 2013 the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation applied to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court with a complaint about the extension of the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention , and requested an alternative preventive measure for him.

51 . On 22 October 2013 the applicant applied for release on the grounds of his child ’ s medical condition, as well as the deterioration of the applicant ’ s own health. This application was supported by several prominent public person age s, including university professors, the dean of the faculty of political science and a State Duma deputy, all of whom provided personal guarantees. On 2 October 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court rejected this application.

52 . On 1 November 2013 the Moscow City Court refused the Ombudsman ’ s request of 11 September 2013.

53 . On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges. It held, in particular, as follows:

“[The defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which belongs to the category of grave crimes punishable by a prison sentence of over three years. Furthermore, [some defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code, also punishable by a prison sentence of over three years.

Despite the defendants being registered as having permanent addresses in the Russian Federation, the analysis of the overall information about [the defendants ’ ] personalities, and the nature of the offences imputable to them, give the court sufficient grounds to consider that the defendants, if the preventive measure is changed to another one not involving deprivation of liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges ... the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ... ”

54 . On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 19 November 2013.

C. Conditions of detention and medical assistance

55 . The applicant has high-degree myopia. According to a 2009 medical certificate, his eyesight i n the right eye was minus 10 dioptres, and on the left eye minus 6 dioptres.

56 . From 19 June 2012 to 29 June 2013 the applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-77/5, and from 29 June 2013 he was held in IZ-77/2. Upon his arrival at the remand prisons the applicant was subjected to medical checks which did not reveal any health issues.

57 . The parties agree that on most days the number of inmates in the cell did not exceed the design capacity. They also agree that the size of the cells and the number of detainees allowed the applicant four square metres of personal space and that the applicant had an individual sleeping place in every cell.

58 . The parties provided the following accounts of the conditions in these cells. According to the applicant, the cells were inadequately lit and ventilated, excessively hot in summer and cold in winter, all with a lavatory pan separated from the living space by a chin-high plastic partition providing insufficient privacy. The applicant alleged that he had been constantly exposed to cigarette smoke, and although the window in the cell could be open ed it gave onto a courtyard used for incinerating rubbish, letting in fumes. Therefore the cell constantly lacked fresh air, and the forced ventilation could not compensate for it. O utdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day. The applicant also claimed that the window was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working with documents. Finally, he alleged that access to drinking water was conditional on the purchase of an electric kettle.

59 . According to the Government, the artificial light in the cells was maintained at 100 watt s round the clock exc ept at night, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., when it was 75 watt s ; they provided measurement tables for this detention centre created in August 2013 , which stated that the brightness in the cells was between 149 and 454 lux, the temperature in the cells between 26 o C and 29 o C, and the humidity between 36% and 45%. They indicated that in IZ ‑ 77/5 the detainees had access to a gym upon their written request.

60 . On 11 July 2012 the applicant applied in writing to the head of the facility for a medical examination. He alleged that he had been suffering from asthma and high-degree myopia. On 20 September 2012 he made a similar application to the investigator of the criminal case.

61 . On 3 October 2012 the investigator granted the applicant ’ s request for a medical examination. This decision read as follows:

“ ... the performance of a medical examination ... falls outside the competence of the investigating bodies ...

However, given that the state of health of the accused Mr Belousov is of importance to the present criminal case, the investigating bodies have sent the relevant request to the administration of [IZ-77/5] stating the need to carry out, in the shortest possible time, the medical examination of the accused Mr Belousov, the results of which are to be submitted to the investigating bodies for inclusion in the criminal case file.”

62 . It appears that the medical examination was not carried out.

63 . On 28 November 2012 and 11 January 2013 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and, according to the Government, the applicant made no complaints about the conditions of detention or the lack of medical assistance on either occasion.

64 . On 3 September 2013 the applicant had a hypertension crisis during a court hearing. An ambulance was called and provided him with the necessary assistance.

65 . Following his complaints of headaches, on 6 September 2013 the applicant was placed in the medical ward of IZ-77/2. Upon admission, the applicant was diagnosed with hypertension. He remained in the medical ward for a period of at least two months for his blood pressure to be monitored .

66 . The applicant alleged that the conditions in IZ-77/2 were poor, in particular on account of the lack of outdoor exercise and inadequate sanitary arrangements. He specified that the lavatory pan was separated from the living space by a chest -high partition providing insufficient privacy. According to the applicant ’ s letter of 30 July 2013, he had not been able to have a shower since his transfer to IZ-77/2.

67 . According to the Government, the conditions in the cells of IZ-77/2 were as follows: the toilet was separated by a solid partition from the rest of the cell and ensured the necessary privacy; the state of the sanitary facilities was satisfactory; the cells were treated for disinfection and pest-control once every three month s and whenever necessary; the applicant was entitled to one hour ’ s outdoor exercise per day; the cell was cleaned and the bedding changed once a week; the cells were equipped with forced ventilation and could be aired through a hinged window pane. A rtificial light was provided at 100 watt s by day and 75 watt s by night. The glazed windows let in sufficient daylight.

68 . Pursuant to the request of the applicant ’ s counsel filed on an unidentified date, on 31 January 2014 the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist and was diagnosed with high-degree myopia (minus 13 dioptres on both eyes).

D. Transfer between the detention centre and the court - house

69 . During the hearing of the applicants ’ criminal case, which began in July 2013, the applicant and his co-defendants were regularly transferred from the remand prisons to the court - house and back. All the defendants attended the hearings on three or four consecutive days every week. According to the Government, the applicant ’ s trial involved ninety-one court hearings, and it appears that the applicant was transferred to attend all of them. A t ypical schedule on a hearing day is represented by the following two-week extract submitted by the applicant:

02/07/2013

03/07/2013

04/07/2013

09/07/2013

10/07/2013

11/07/2013

Wake up

5 a.m.

6 a.m.

7 a.m.

6.20 a.m.

6.20 a.m.

6.20 a.m.

Assembly before transfer

6.10 a.m.

7.45 a.m.

8 a.m.

7.30 a.m.

7.40 a.m.

7.30 a.m.

Board the van

9.30 a.m.

9.30 a.m.

9.30 a.m.

9.30 a.m.

9.30 a.m.

9.30 a.m.

Arrival at the court - house

10 a.m.

10 a.m.

10 a.m.

10 a.m.

10 a.m.

10 a.m.

End of hearing

5 p.m.

adjourned

7 p.m.

5 p.m.

6 p.m.

3 p.m.

Board the van

8 p.m.

8 p.m.

8 p.m.

9 p.m.

8.30 p.m.

5 p.m.

Arrival at IZ-77/2

9 p.m.

9 p.m.

9 p.m.

10.30 p.m.

9.30 p.m.

7 p.m.

Brought to the cell

11.40 p.m.

10.30 p.m.

00.10 p.m.

11.10 p.m.

10.45 p.m.

7.40 p.m.

70 . According to the applicant, this schedule left him insufficient time for sleep between the court hearings, gave him no time to prepare for the next day ’ s hearing, and deprived him of hot meals.

71 . He further alleged that the conditions in the prison assembly rooms and in the transfer van ( «автозак» ) had been appalling, in particular owing to overcrowding. He claimed that he was cramped together with other detainees and their belongings in a small tin cabin without windows, ventilated only through a roof hatch. The benches were spaced at 30 cm, and the detainees had to get in and out by walking on others. Smoking was allowed, which caused further discomfort, especially to non-smokers. Occasionally, they were transferred in vans divided into tight individual metal cubicles. In both types of vans the cabin overheated in the summer and froze in cold weather. The transfer lasted for two to six hours depending on the number of pick-up points and traffic conditions. There was no opportunity to use a toilet during the transfer, even at other pick-up points where the van could wait for hours.

72 . At the Moscow City Court before and after the hearings the applicant and his co-defendants were held in convoy cells. According to the applicant, the se were poorly lit and often overcrowded, and access to a toilet was subject to the availability of a convoy officer. Some of the convoy cells on the ground floor of the court - house were as small as two square metres, and each could be shared by two detainees. The applicants ’ account was supported by witness statements submitted by his co-defendant Mr Kavkazskiy and those given by his three fellow inmates , unrelated to the present case; their detailed accounts of the prison transfers in the relevant period, as well as of the convoy cells at the Moscow City Court, were consistent with the applicant ’ s submissions.

73 . According to the Government, the morning transfer to the court ‑ house did not exceed 1.5 hours, and the transfer back lasted for up to three hours because of the evening traffic. Also, the applicant ’ s schedule allowed for eight hours of uninterrupted sleep. They indicated that the wake - up time at the detention centres was 6 a.m., the pickup would take place at 8 a.m., and the drop - off after the hearing at 9.30 p.m.; assembly before and after the transfer did not exceed 30 minutes. All the detainees were provided with packed meals for the whole day out at the court - house, and they were given hot water at lunchtime. They further indicated that the vans used for the transfer were 2009-2011 models of KAMAZ ‑ 4308 ‑ AZ, KAMAZ ‑ OTS ‑ 577489 ‑ AZ (both designed for 32 detainees), GAZ ‑ 326041 ‑ AZ (designed for seven detainees) , and GAZ ‑ 3309 ‑ AZ (designed for 19 detainees). As regards the convoy cells at the Moscow City Court, they submitted that the applicant and his co-defendants were detained in convoy area of the court - house , which included four cells measuring 12 square metres each and toilets, including a wheelchair-accessible one, which the detainees could use on demand, accompanied by the convoy. They submitted that the cells had adequate light and ventilation, and that they were furnished with tables and benches. During the intervals in the hearing the defendants could use an electric kettle to boil water.

E. Conditions in the courtroom

74 . On 6 June 2013 the court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 of the Moscow City Court. The latter court lent its premises to the Zamoskvoretsky District Court so as to accommodate all the participants in the proceedings, the public and the press. In that hearing room ten defendants were held in a glass cabin measuring 3.2 m x 1.7 m x 2.3 m (height). The Government submitted that the glass cabin was a permanent courtroom installation consisting of a steel frame and sheets of bulletproof glass, with a partition inside, a steel mesh ceiling and a secure door; the cabin was equipped with benches . The walls of the cabin had slots allowing documents to be passed between the defendants and the ir counsel; ventilation outlets were at floor level, and near the dock was an air conditioner. The cabin was equipped with microphones allowing for consultations with counsel and facilitating the defendants ’ participation in the proceedings. The Government specified that convoy officer guarded the cabin on both sides, supervised the defendants and intercepted any attempts of “contact with outsiders”, but the defendants could communicate with their counsel with the court ’ s permission.

75 . The applicant submitted that the glass cabin lacked space and ventilation and that it was virtually soundproof, hampering the defendants ’ participation in the proceedings and their communicati o n with counsel. The benches had no backrest s , and the lack of space made it impossible to have documents; it was impossible to consult counsel or the case file during the hearing. The applicant also submitted that the video evidence examined at the hearing could not be seen by him from the cabin because of the distance between the cabin and the screen and his poor eyesight.

76 . In August 2013 the proceedings moved to hearing room no. 635 of the Moscow City Court. This hearing room was equipped with two glass cabins similar to the one in hearing room no. 338, except that there were no slots in them. Each cabin measured 4 m x 1.2 m x 2.3 m (height). From 2 August 2013 one of the defendants was no longer placed in the glass cabin owing to a change in the measure of restraint for him . The n ine remaining defendants were divided between the two cabins.

77 . From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued on the premises of the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow (hearing room no. 303), and in January and February 2014 at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court (hearing room no. 410). These hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which the nine defendants (from 19 December 2013 eight), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. According to the photographs submitted by the applicants, the dimensions of the cages were similar to the glass cabins described above and, likewise, they were not equipped with any furniture other than benches.

F . The applicant ’ s trial

78 . On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing of the criminal case against ten participants in the public assembly at Bolotnaya Square charged with participation in mass disorders and violent acts against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the same court began the hearing on the merits.

79 . On 13 November 2013 police officer F., the victim of the applicant ’ s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that the applicant had thrown an unidentified yellow object which had hit him on the shoulder and caused him pain. The applicant asked for F. ’ s statements made during the investigation , which contained no mention of the yellow object or the applicant , to be read out in court . The applicant pointed out that no identification parade had been held during the investigation to enable F. to identif y the person who had assaulted him ; i nstead, the applicant and F. had been questioned in confrontation, whereby the applicant had been the only person introduced to F. as the likely perpetrator . The court refused the applicant ’ s request for F. ’ s statements to be read out .

80 . On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy Distri ct Court of Moscow pronounced judgment. It found, in particular, as follows:

“Between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ... , to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property.

On the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence ...

Thus, in furtherance of t his criminal intent, at an unidentified time and place Mr Belousov acquired an unidentified solid yellow round object with the intention of using it to caus e violence against officials ...

... together with other participants ... Mr B elousov repeatedly chanted anti ‑ government slogans.

Moreover ... the participants in the mass disorder threw chunks of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various body parts, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force not endangering life or health of those [officials] ...

Mr Belousov used violence not endangering the life or health of [Mr F.] ...

Between 5 p.m. and 8.10 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... unidentified participants in the mass disorder deliberately administered at least three blows and kicks to [F. ’ s] head, body and limbs, after which Mr Belousov ... deliberately targeting [F.], threw an unidentified solid yellow round object , which hit [F.] on the upper right side of the chest, causing him physical pain.

As a result of Mr Belousov and other unidentified persons ’ act ion s [F.] sustained physical pain and injuries in the form of bruis ing and abrasion of the soft tissues of the parietal region, bruis ing of the ... left forearm, abrasion on the ... right shin, [all of] which, assessed individually or cumulatively, constitute d injuries not endangering life or health, and not entailing short-term health impairment or minor durable professional incapacitation ...

Mr Belousov ... pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he wanted to see why the meeting was not starting [and] went to Malyy Kamennyy Bridge ... [he] saw the riot police cordon ... [and officers] arresting some [participants] ... [he] was looking to leave and went to the middle of Bolotnaya Square and saw a girl who tripped on something and nearly fell. Without looking at it closely he picked it up from the ground ; it felt soft and slimy ... and threw it away without aiming it at anyone ... he joined hands with other protest e rs chanting “One for all and all for one!”, “United, we are invincible!”. At this moment three police officers ran up to him, grabbed him and carried him to the police vehicle ...

Police officer [F.] testified that ... after the cordon was restored ... he was heading into the crowd to arrest offenders ... somebody hit him three times on the head ... then he felt a blow from a heavy object on his shoulder. From the corner of his eye he saw [Mr Belousov] take a swing and toss something ... like a billiard ball.

... Mr Belousov was filmed at the moment he threw a yellow object at the police ...

The [defendants ’ ] argument that no mass disorder took place is considered by the court unsubstantiated because ... as a result of the premeditated act ion s of a group of individuals who organised ... obstruction to the demonstrators ’ march on their way to the intended meeting venue where the s t age was, which caused discontent among the protest e rs towards ... the police ... those who were leading the march and who were able to make an unhindered approach to the meeting venue changed the ir tactics and called for ... a sit-in , hoping thus to secure a decision to change the placement of the cordon to their advantage and to extend the ir area beyond what had been agreed ... As a result ... the protest e rs forced their way through the police cordon ... public order was disrupted ... because of the larger crowd, uncontrollable and incited by organised groups ... conditioned the applicants ’ intent to participate in such actions, accompanied by chunks of tarmac and plastic bottles being thrown and violence towards the police otherwise being used . Conscious of their participation in spontaneously erupted disorder and wishing to take part in it , the defendants joined the mass movement ...

... the court takes into account the nature and the degree of [th e applicant ’ s] involvement in the mass disorder ... and considers it possible to give him a sentence below the minimum punishment provided for by Article 212 § 2. ”

81 . The applicant was sentenced to two years and six months ’ imprisonment , calculated on the basis of a two-year prison term under Article 212 of the Criminal Code partly concurrent with a one-year prison term under Article 318 of the Criminal Code . The applicant ’ s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence.

82 . The applicant appealed. He contested the first-instance court ’ s finding that mass disorder had taken place , and alleged that the re had only been isolated clashes between the protest e rs and the police , caused by the authorities ’ last-minute decision to alter the layout of the meeting venue and aggravated by their excessive crowd-control measures. He denied that the object he thr e w hit anybody; he alleged a breach of procedure for questioning in confrontation with the victim, police officer F., and complained that the court had refused to have the records of the latter ’ s interrogation conducted during the investigation read out . He also complained about the conditions in which he was escorted to the courtroom, the intensity of the hearing schedule , and that he had been placed in a g lass cabin during the trial, claiming that it hindered his communication with counsel.

83 . On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment, also reduc ing his prison sentence to two years and three months , comprising a one - year - and - nine - month term under Article 212 of the Criminal Code and a nine-month term under Article 318 of the Criminal Code, to run partly concurrent ly .

84 . On 8 September 2014 the applicant was released after serv ing his prison term.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

85 . The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides as follows:

Article 212 Mass disorder

“1. The organisation of mass disorder accompanied by violence, riots, arson, destruction of property, use of firearms, explosives and explosive devices, as well by armed resistance to a public official , shall be punishable by four to ten years ’ deprivation of liberty.

2. The participation in the types of mass disorder provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punishable by three to eight years ’ deprivation of liberty.

3. The instigation of mass disorder provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article, or the instigation of participation in it , or the instigation of violence against citizens , shall be punishable by restriction of liberty for up to two years, or community works for up to two years, or deprivation of liberty for the same term.”

Article 318 Use of violence against a public official

“1. The use of violence not endangering life or health, or the threat to use such violence against a public official or his relatives in connection with the performance of his or her duties shall be punishable by a fine of up to 200,000 roubles or an equivalent of the convicted person ’ s wages for 18 months, or community works for up to five years, or up to five years ’ deprivation of liberty ... ”

86 . For a summary of the relevant domestic law provisions governing the conditions and length of pre-trial detention, see the cases of Dolgova v. Russia (no. 11886/05, §§ 26-31, 2 March 2006) , and Lind v. Russia (no. 25664/05, §§ 47-52, 6 December 2007).

87 . For a summary of the applicable regulations and the European standards for prison conditions, see Ananyev and Others v. Russia (nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08 , §§ 55 et seq., 10 January 2012).

THE LAW

I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

88 . Given their common factual and legal background, the Court decides that the two applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

I I . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION DURING PRE-TRIAL DETENTION

89 . The applicant submitted a number of complaints under Article 3 of the Convention referring to various aspects of his pre-trial detention . In particular, he complained about the conditions of his detention in remand prisons. Next, he alleged that he had not received adequate medical assistance while in detention. Further, he complained about the conditions of his transfer to and from the court - house and the conditions of detention in the assembly section of the remand prisons and the convoy room of the Moscow City Court. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A. Admissibility

90 . The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Conditions of detention in the remand prisons

91 . The applicant alleged that the poor conditions of his detention were in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The parties ’ submissions as regards the material conditions of detention have been summarised in paragraphs 56 - 59 and 66 - 67 above. The main facts relevant to the assessment of the conditions of detention, in particular the size of the cells, the number of inmates detained there concurrently with the applicants, and the sanitary and hygiene arrangements were not in dispute between the parties. Nevertheless, they disagreed whether these conditions had amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 o f the Convention. The applicant maintained, in particular, that four square metres of personal space had been insufficient to avoid overcrowding, and that it was aggravated by other factors, such as inadequate ventilation and lighting, incomplete separation of the lavatory from the living space and the daily one-hour limit on outdoor exercise per day. The Government, on the contrary, contended that the applicant ’ s detention conditions had been in conformity with the standards applicable in respect of personal space, light, room temperature, sanitary facilities and hygiene arrangements.

92 . The Court has consistently stressed that to fall under Article 3 of the Convention the suffering and humiliation involved in the deprivation of liberty must go beyond that inevitable element of suffering and humiliation connected with detention. The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see KudÅ‚a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI, and Popov v. Russia , no. 26853/04, § 208, 13 July 2006).

93 . When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece , no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II, and Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826/03 , § 94, 22 May 2012 ). The length of time a person is detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v. Estonia , no. 64812/01, 8 November 2005 ).

94 . A serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were “degrading” from the point of view of Article 3 of the Convention (see Karalevičius v. Lithuania , no. 53254/99, § 36, 7 April 2005 , and Ananyev and Others , cited above ).

95 . In the present case, the Court observes that during the whole period of his detention the applicant w as held in cells that allowed him about four square metres of personal space. He was provided with an individual bed , and he never alleged that the arrangements of the cells, because of their fixtures such as tables, beds and toilets, impeded him from moving freely within the cell (compare Vladimir Belyayev v. Russia , no. 9967/06 , § 34 , 17 October 2013 ; and, by contrast, Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia , no. 41833/04 , § 87, 27 January 2011; and Manulin v. Russia , no. 26676/06 , § 46, 11 April 2013 ).

96 . Furthermore, the Court notes that lavatories in the cells were separated from the living space, al though the partition did not reach the ceiling. Also , in remand prisons IZ-77/5 and IZ-77/2 each cell where the applicant w as detained had unobstructed access to natural light. Windows were not fitted with metal shutters or other contraptions preventing natural light from penetrating into the cell. Where available, a small window pane could be opened for fresh air. Cells were additionally equipped with artificial lighting and ventilation.

97 . In the light of the parties ’ submissions the Court also considers it established that the applicant w as allowed a one-hour period of outdoor exercise daily. Cold running water was normally available in the cells and detainees had access to showers once every seven days. The Court has also taken note of the photographs showing the interior of the remand prisons in question, the recreation yard, the dormitory cells and their sanitary facilities, which do not appear to be in an especially bad state of repair or cleanliness.

99 . The Court therefore concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of detention in the remand prisons.

2. Alleged failure to provide adequate medical assistance

100 . The applicant alleged that the authorities had failed to provide him with medical assistance in relation to his health issues. He complained , in particular, that during his pre-trial detention he was not provided with necessary medical assistance in relation to his asthma, progressing myopia , and hypertension. He pointed out that no medical examination had been carried out in response to the investigator ’ s request of 3 October 2012 (see paragraph 61 above). The Government submitted that the applicant had been examined on admission to the remand prisons on 19 and 21 June 2012 and 29 June 2013, and that his condition had been found to be normal. They provided copies of his medical certificates concerning the prison admission health-checks of 19 and 21 June 2012 and the documents concerning his long-term supervision in the prison hospital which began on 9 September 2012.

101 . The Court notes that, according to the medical reports, the applicant had a high-degree myopia, which had indeed progressed between 2009 and 2014. However, the Court has insufficient proof that the deterioration had occurred, or was aggravated, during his detention in 2012-13, as the applicant alleged. It further notes that the applicant made no health complaints to the members of the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities who visited him on 28 November 2012 and 11 January 2013. Accordingly, as regards myopia and asthma, it finds no evidence to support the allegations that the gravity and urgency of these health issues had called for immediate measures. Therefore no conclusions may be drawn from the fact that the investigator ’ s request of 3 October 2012 was not followed up. When the applicant later required emergency help, he received it promptly . In particular, on 3 September 2013 an ambulance was called because the applicant had a hypertension crisis, and he was placed in the prison medical ward for long-term monitoring of this condition. Nothing in the case file suggests that th o se measures were insufficient in th at situation.

102 . It follows that the Russian authorities have complied with the ir positive obligations to provide the applicant with appropriate medical assistance, and accordingly there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.

3. Conditions of transfer to and from the court - house

103 . The applicant alleged that his transfer s from the remand prisons to the court - house and back had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. He complained about the frequency and the length of those transfers, of appalling conditions at the prison assembly sections and in the police vans , and about the intensity of the schedule , that did not leave him sufficient time for sleep. He claimed that the combination of the above factors led to physical exhaustion and emotional fatigue .

104 . The parties ’ submissions as regards the time and the frequency of the transfers and the conditions in the assembly sections, convoy cells and prison vans are summarised in paragraphs 69 - 73 above.

III . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONFINEMENT IN GLASS CABINS AND METAL CAGES DURING THE COURT HEARING

112 . The applicant complained that his confinement in glass cabins and metal cage s during the court hearing amounted to degrading treatment . H e relied on Article 3 of the Convention.

A. Admissibility

115 . The Court therefore considers that the applicant has missed the time-limit for lodging his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention about the placement in metal cages . It must be reje cted in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention (see Grishin v. Russia , no 30983/02 , § 83, 15 November 2007).

B. Merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

117 . The parties ’ descriptions of the conditions in the courtroom s are summarised in paragraphs 74 - 77 above.

118 . The applicant alleged that his confinement in glass cabins had amounted to degrading treatment. He complained, in particular, about the cramped conditions in the cabins in hearing rooms nos. 338 and 635 of the Moscow City Court and pointed out the difficulties these installations caused for his participation in the proceedings and communication with counsel. He alleged that on multiple occasions during the trial he complained to the court about the discomfort and the difficulties caused by his placement in these security installations.

119 . The Government considered that the security installations in question neither constituted degrading treatment nor caused significant discomfort . They submitted, in particular, that all detainees who were in pre-trial detention were routinely placed either in metal cages or in the glass cabins which were progressively replac ing the metal cages in courtrooms . They considered that, unlike the metal cages, the glass cabins did not have an appearance that could by itself raise issues under Article 3 of the Convention. They further submitted that after the initial complaints about the cramped conditions in hearing room no. 338, the trial was moved to hearing room no. 635 , where the defendants had more space because there were two cabins .

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) General principles

120 . As the Court has repeatedly stated, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim ’ s behaviour (see, among many other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95 , § 119, ECHR 2000-IV).

121 . Ill ‑ treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention . The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, for example, Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00 , § 67, ECHR 2006 ‑ IX). The public nature of the treatment may be a relevant or an aggravating factor in assessing whether it is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see, inter alia , Tyrer v. the United Kingdom , 25 April 1978, § 32, Series A no. 26; ErdoÄŸan Yağız v. Turkey , no. 27473/02 , § 37, 6 March 2007; and Kummer v. the Czech Republic , no. 32133/11 , § 64, 25 July 2013).

(b) Application of these principles in the present case

124 . The Court considers that glass cabins do not have the harsh appearance of metal cages, the very exposure in which to the public eye is capable of undermining the defendants ’ image and of arousing in them feelings of humiliation, helplessness, fear, anguish and inferiority. It also notes that glass installations are used in courtrooms in other m ember States (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev , cited above, § 76 ), although their design s vary from glass cubicles to glass partitions, and in the majority of the States their use is reserved for high-security hearings.

128 . Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of detention in hearing room no. 338 of the Moscow City Court , and no violation of Article 3 of the Convention as regards the conditions of detention in hearing room no. 635 of the same court .

IV . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION

129 . The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention was not based on a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that his pre-trial detention had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article 5 of the Convention , in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ...

...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ...

...

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

A. Admissibility

130 . As regards the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant ’ s detention, the Court notes that the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered his detention, which was subsequently extended on several occasions by the same court and, after the case had been submitted for trial , by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The domestic courts acted within their powers in making those decisions and there is nothing to suggest that they were invalid or unlawful under domestic law. Accordingly, the applicant ’ s detention was imposed and extended in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.

131 . As regards the allegation that the applicant ’ s detention was not based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed criminal offences, his complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention overlaps to a large extent with his complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the authorities ’ failure to adduce relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the extensions of his detention pending criminal proceedings. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention is mostly concerned with the existence of a lawful basis for detention within criminal proceedings, whereas Article 5 § 3 of the Convention deals with the possible justification for su ch detention. The Court deems it more appropriate to deal with this complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Khodorkovskiy v. Russia , no. 5829/04 , § 165 , 31 May 2011 ; Taranenko v. Russia , no. 19554/05 , § 46 , 15 May 2014 ; and Kovyazin and Others v. Russia , nos. 13008/13, 60882/12 and 53390/13 , § 71, 17 September 2015 ).

132 . As regards the applicant ’ s complaint of violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Conve ntion, the Court finds that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

133 . The parties made essentially the same submissions under Article 5 of the Convention as in Kovyazin and Others (cited above, §§ 73-74). The relevant general principles applicable in this case have been summarised by the Court in the same judgment (ibid., §§ 75-78 ) .

135 . It follows from the applicant ’ s detention orders and the Government ’ s observations that the primary reason for his detention was the gravity of the charges. Firstly, the domestic cour t considered that the applicant , faced with the risk of a prison term, was likely to abscond, tamper with the witnesses , or interfere with administration of justice. Secondly, they seemed to suggest that the very nature of the offences in question revealed certain dangerous features of the applicant ’ s personalit y , making him likely to reoffend and generally calling for caution.

136 . The Court has previously examined similar complaints lodged by the applicant ’ s co-defendants and found a violation of their rights set out in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Kovyazin and Others , cited above, §§ 82-94). T he Court noted, in particular, the domestic courts ’ reliance on the gravity of the charges as the main factor for the assessment of the applicant ’ s potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice, and their reluctance to devote proper attention to a discussion of each applicant ’ s personal situation or to have proper regard to the factors po inting in favour of his release. It also noted the use of collective detention orders without a case-by-case assessment of the grounds for detention in respect of each co-defendant and the failure to thoroughly examine the possibility of applying another, less rigid, measure of restraint, such as bail.

137 . Having regard to the material in its possession, the Court notes that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Indeed, the specifi c acts imputed to the applicant – shouting political slogans (classified as a grave offence) and throwing an unidentified yellow object which hit a police officer , causing no lasting harm (classified as a medium-gravity offence ) , were not of a gravity justify ing the pre-trial detention in itself, especially at the advanced stages of the proceedings (see Kovyazin and Others , cited above, § 84 , and the cases cited therein) . Moreover, the applicant ’ s detention was extended by the same collective orders as those of his co-defendants , without any individual assessment of his situation (ibid., §§ 92-93).

138 . There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

V . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

139 . The applicant submitted a number of complaints under Article 6 of the Convention referring to various aspects of his trial . He referred to his confinement in glass cabins during the court hearing and the intensive schedule of th ose hearings , and alleg ed that he did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and that he could not effectively defend himself in person or through legal assistance . He also claimed that his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him had been unduly restricted . The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant , reads as follows:

“1. In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights ...

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require ;

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ... ”

A. Admissibility

140 . The Government expressed doubt about the existence of effective remed ies a gainst the alleged violations, in particular about the capacity of the appeal court to provide relief in respect of the grievances about the placement in the glass cabin and the intensity of the court hearings . They suggested that the applicant might have missed the six-month time-limit if it is calculated from the date of the first-instance judgment. The applicant considered that he had complied with the six-month rule.

142 . The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

143 . The applicant alleged that the proceedings in his criminal case fell short of important guarantees of a fair hearing. He complained, in particular, that his confinement in glass cabins during the court hearing s hindered his participation in the trial , in particular because the glass partition reduced visibility and audibility and made confidential exchange s with legal counsel impossible ; the interior arrangement of the cabins also made it awkward to handle and read documents. The applicant further complained that the intensive schedule of the court hearings and late arrivals back at the detention facility did not leave him sufficient time to prepare for the next day ’ s hearings . T he lack of sleep compounded by lengthy transfers from the detention facility in difficult conditions le d to physical exhaust ion and diminished his ability to participate in the proceedings and to defend himself effectively . Finally, he complained that the court had not examined his objection to the admissibility and reliability of the witness testimon y of police officer F. , and did not allow that officer ’ s statement made during the investigation to be read out in court .

144 . The Government contested th ese a llegations . They contended that the applicant ’ s capacity to participate in the proceedings had not been affected by the glass cabin s because the latter were equipped with loudspeakers and microphones. They also did not consider the schedule of the court hearings excessively intensive , referring to the complexity of the case and the need to strike an appropriate balance between the need to expedite the proceedings and the interests of proper administration of justice. They pointed out that the applicant ’ s requests for intervals during the hearing to allow for preparations and consultations had usually been granted. They further contended that the applicant had been given ample opportunity to examine Mr F. after he had testified at the hearing. Moreover, his testimon y was corroborated by three other witnesses and the video recording. As for the alleged breach of criminal procedure during the investigation as concerned witness F. , the court did not refer to any investigative acts in its judgment but relied only on F. ’ s testimonies.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

146 . The applicant contended that the courtroom arrangement with glass cabins in which he sat throughout the trial not only constituted degrading treatment but also hindered his participation in the hearing and hampered contact with his legal counsel. The Court notes that in the present case the glass cabins were permanent courtroom installations, places designated for the accused in criminal proceedings. Apparently they were intended as an improvement on the metal cage arrangement otherwise used in the Russian courts as a matter of routine (see Khodorkovskiy , cited above , §§ 123 et seq. , and Svinarenko and Slyadnev , cited above, § 122). It appears from the Government ’ s submissions that all defendants are still systematically placed in a metal cage or a glass cabin as long as they are in custody.

148 . In hearing room no. 635 , however, the overcrowding problem was resolved, but the alleged impediments to the defendants ’ participation in the proceedings and to their legal assistance remained (see paragraphs 126- 28 above) . The Court will therefore examine whether the applicant ’ s being placed in the glass cabin during this period had been detrimental to the fairness of the hearing , despite its compliance with Article 3 of the Convention.

152 . The Court considers that it is incumbent on the domestic courts to choose the most appropriate security arrangement for a given case, taking into account the interests of administration of justice, the appearance of the proceedings as fair, and the presumption of innocence; they must at the same time secure the rights of the accused to participate effectively in the proceedings and to receive practical and effective legal assistance. In the present case, the use of the security installation was not warranted by any specific security risks or courtroom order issues but was a matter of routine. A s follows from the parties ’ submissions , the trial court had no discretion to order the defendants ’ placement outside the cabin, although it could change the courtroom for a nother one, with more cabins . The trial court did not seem to recognise the impact of these courtroom arrangements on the applicant ’ s defence rights , and did not take any measures to compensate for these limitations . Such circumstances prevailed for the whole duration of the first-instance hearing , which lasted for over eight months , including seven months in hearing room no. 635, and could not but adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.

153 . It follows that during the first-instance hearing the applicant ’ s rights to participate effectively in the proceedings and to receive practical and effective legal assistance had been restricted, and these restrictions had been neither necessary nor proportionate. The Court conclude s that the criminal proceedings against the applicant were conducted in violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention.

154 . In view of this finding, the Court does not consider it necessary to address the remainder of the applicants ’ complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (d) of the Convention.

V I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION

Article 10

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

Article 11

“ 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”

A. Admissibility

156 . In so far as the applicant complained about the general actions of the police taken to safeguard public order during the assembly, the Government alleged that the applicant had not brought these complaints before the domestic courts. They therefore asked the Court to declare this part of the application inadmissible on the grounds of the applicant ’ s failure to exhaust domestic remedies , or for failure to comply with the six-month time-limit.

157 . The applicant cont ended that the questions relating to the origin of mass disorders at the site of the rally had been repeatedly raised during the first-instance trial and in the points of appeal. The courts, however, avoided the examination of crucial issues , such as who had given the order to alter the agreed meeting layout and whether the ensuing standoff between the protest e rs and the police could have be en de - escalated by other means than termination and dispersal of the meeting . The applicant therefore considered that t his complaint had been made before, if not dealt with by , the domestic courts ; he considered that he had complied with the admissibility criteria in respect of this complaint .

158 . The Court o bserves that the applicant in the present case was convicted of having perpetrated mass disorder . This was the disorder which interrupted the assembly. Attribution of responsibility for the disorder was therefore a central question in the determination of the applicant ’ s criminal charges . In such circumstances, t he complaint about the authorities ’ role in the occurrence of the disorder is inseparable from the one concerning the lack of justification for the applicant ’ s criminal liability . For th is reason, the Court is not required in this case to assess the authorities ’ alleged failure to discharge their positive obligation in respect of the conduct of the assembly at Bolotnaya Square as a separate issue under Article 11 of the Convention . It will examine whether the measures taken against the applicant personally complied wit h Article 11 of the Convention in the light of all the materials submitted by the parties concerning the planning, conduct and dispersal of the assembly ( see Frumkin , cited above, §§ 100-01 and 134 , where a separate issue was distinguished in relation to a protest e r not accused of mass disorders ). There is therefore no need to examine whether the applicant has complied with the admissibility criteria as regards the complaint about the general actions of the police in relation to the assembly.

159 . The Court notes that the complaint about the applicant ’ s prosecution and criminal conviction, lodged under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention , is not manifestly ill ‑ founded wit hin the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

(a) The Government

160 . The Government contended that the disorder at Bolotnaya Square had occurred when some of the organisers and participants had refused to follow the agreed plan, disregarded the police instructions to proceed to the designate d venue at Bolotnaya embankment , and sat on the ground causing scuffles and disorder. The intervention of the police had been justified since the assembly had ceased to be “peaceful” within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention. In dispersing the protest e rs, the police had not resorted to excessive force: only police truncheons had been used; only the most aggressive perpetrators had been targeted; and no tear gas or smoke bombs had been deployed.

161 . The y considered that there had been no interference with the exercise of the applicant ’ s right to peaceful assembly , and argued that the criminal charges against him relate d to acts of violence unconnected with the exercise of freedom of expression or freedom of assembly. Moreover, the criminal proceedings against the applicant began only several weeks after the rally , and his prosecution could thus not retroactively interfere with his participation in the assembly.

162 . The y further submitted that both the authorities ’ handling of the assembly as a whole and the individual measures taken against the applicant personally had complied with domestic law, were necessary “for the prevention of disorder or crime” and “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” and remained strictly proportionate. They maintained that the applicant ’ s conviction had been justified in view of the serious threat of mass disorders , and that the sentence imposed on him had not been disproportionate to the risk he posed to the public order and well-being of the peaceful participants in the assembly .

163 . The Government concluded that in the particular circumstances of this case, regard being had to the context of mass disorders, the measures taken against the applicant had been justified under Article 11 § 2 of the Convention.

(b) The applicant

164 . The applicant submitted that on 6 May 2012 he came to take part in a peaceful meeting which had been authori s ed by the Moscow authorities. He pointed out that the officially published map of the assembly had indicated that the meeting venue would include the park of Bolotnaya Square, and that the authorities had not given notice to the participants of the change of the venue layout. T he unexpected placement of the police cordon near Malyy Kamennyy bridge had narrowed down the passage to the meeting venue, which had caused confusion and overcrowding in that area. During the criminal proceedings the applicant and his co-defendants asked the officials examined as witnesses to indicate by who m and for what reason an order had been given for the meeting layout to be changed , but no on e could answer th o se questions. The applicant denied that any mass disorders had taken place at Bolotnaya Square , or that the protest e rs had intended to break through the cordon. He alleged that the episodes of disorder ly behaviour and the clashes between the protest e rs and the police had been isolated incidents caused by the unannounced change of plan and aggravated b y the excessive use of force by the police .

165 . The applicant insisted that he was a peaceful law- abiding individual and his conduct during the assembly had remained non-violent , even though he had been in the area where scuffles and clashes had occurred . He admitted to having picked up a yellow object from the ground, which he described as “soft and slimy”, but only to throw it out of his way, not to aim it at anyone in particular. The applicant did not see where the object landed , and he was not convinced by the evidence presented at the trial that it had indeed hit the policeman ; the object itself had been neither found nor identified . He conside red that his prosecution, criminal conviction , and especially the lengthy prison sentence , had been unlawful and out of proportion , considering that the act s he had committed were benign . He explained the severity of his punishment by political reasons, suggesting that a widely reported criminal case would serve as a deterrent to others from taking part in public assemblies .

2. The Court ’ s assessment

(a) The scope of the applicant ’ s complaints

167 . On the other hand, notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 of the Convention must, in the present case, also be considered in the light of Article 10 of the Convention . The protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10 of the Convention , is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention (see Ezelin , cited above, § 37).

(b) Whether there has been an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly

170 . In the present case, the Government argued that the disruption of the previously peaceful assembly had been engineered by the organisers to stir up political unrest. They accused the assembly leaders of encourag ing the protest e rs to bring tents to set up an illegal campsite and of breaking through the police cordon with the intention of march ing outside the officially designated venue . Only the first of th ose two claim s is supported by evidence : the police had indeed intercepted several attempts to br ing tents to Bolotnaya Square . Also, Mr Udaltsov has called on the protest e rs to begin an “indefinite protest action” on the site of the cancelled meeting, although this could be a reaction to the developments on the spot . On any interpretation, the authorities ’ fear of an illegal long-term campsite being erected in the park of Bolotanaya Square had some foundation.

171 . As regards the breaking through the police cordon, nothing in the case file confirms that that was the organisers ’ desired outcome. On the contrary, the Court has previously found that the sit-in began because of the unexpected change of the venue layout, of which the police had not inform ed the organisers (see Frumkin , cited above, §§ 113-16 ). The march leaders spent about 45 minutes peacefully waiting for the confusion about the placement of the cordon to be resolved, to no avail. Above all, whatever the organisers ’ intentions were , they made no call for violence and s h owed no signs that they had been prepared for it. The security screening at the entrance s to the assembly venue, which was rather thorough, did not detect the presence of weapons or other objectionable equipment carried by the protest e rs, a part from a handful of tents, possibly prohibited but inherently harmless items . The round yellow object tossed by the applicant in the instant case remained unidentified but appeared, by all accounts, innocuous (compare with Primov and Others , cited above, §§ 158-59, where the protest e rs carried iron rods, wooden sticks, knives and firearms ). The fact that the applicant was chanting political slogans like “One for all and all for one!” or “United, we are invincible!” cannot be taken as evidence that he had violent intentions.

(c) Whether the interference was “prescribed by law” , pursued a legitimate aim and was “necessary in a democratic society”

174 . The court observes that Russian law does not contain a definition of “mass disorder”, and it accepts that this term might be imprecise, akin to “riot” or “breach of publ ic order”, which it has already examined in a similar context (see Kudrevičius and Others , cited above, §§ 113-14). Having noted that it would be unrealistic to require a legislator to formulate general rules without some degree of abstraction, the Court considered that the requirement of lawfulness would be satisfied i f the domestic courts ’ interpretation of these terms was neither arbitrary nor unpredictable, and if their use bore reasonable relation to the circumstances at hand .

175 . In the present case, the Court is sensitive to the applicant ’ s arguments that the incidents of disorderly behaviour and violence were localised and, moreover, that they were compounded by the authorities ’ own conduct. Even so, it was the scale rather than the nature of the events that might have placed them at the limit of Article 212 of the Criminal Code , but the applicability of this provision was not entirely inconceivable . Even if the Court were to disagree with the domestic court s ’ assessment of the situation, it considers that the y took their decision after a thorough assessment of all the relevant evidence and within the margin of their judicial discretion. As such, the applicant ’ s criminal conviction may not be considered “unlawful” on the grounds put forward by the applicant. The question whether it was justified to apply this provision to the applicant personally will be examined under the head of proportionality (see paragraph 177 et seq. below) .

176 . Turning to the existence of a legitimate aim, the Court accepts that the authorities pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

178 . T he main justification advanced by the Government for such a harsh sentence was the serious risk of potential civil unrest, in particular the threat to political stability and public order. The gravity of the punishment was thus attributable to the general context in which the applicant had assaulted the policeman , and not to the harm he had actually caused. In any event, the physical damage caused by the yellow object to officer F. was limited to short-term pain. Regard being had to other acts imputed to the applicant, it turns out that the applicant ’ s staying at the site of the rally and chanting anti-government slogans accou nted for a staggering one ‑ and ‑ a ‑ half-year addition to his prison term. These acts, unlike tossing the ye llow object, were peaceful and constituted protest, a form of expression protected by Article 10 of the Convention (see Taranenko , cited above, § 70 , and the cases cited therein ). If the domestic courts were to take into account that the applicant had committed those acts in connection with the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, they should have considered it a mitigating factor. Quite to the contrary, they penalised the applicant for the political message he intended to express by his presence at the venue and by chanting non-violent political slogans .

179 . The Court accepts that there may have been a number of individuals in the crowd who contributed to the onset of clashes between the protesters and the police. In the present case, the Court considers it crucial that the applicant was not found to be among those responsible for the initial acts of aggression ; he threw the yellow object at the height of the clashes, when the police were already arresting the protesters . The domestic courts also noted that the applicant ’ s participation in mass disorder had been insignificant and gave him on that basis a sente nce below the three-year statutory minimum , although still an extremely heavy one .

181 . It must be stressed, moreover, that the applicant ’ s criminal conviction , and especially the severity of his sentence, could not but have had the effect of discouraging him and other opposition supporters , as well as the public at large , from attending demonstrations and, more generally, from participating in open political debate. The chilling effect of his sanction was further amplified by the large- scale proceeding s i n this case which attracted widespread media coverage.

182 . The Court concludes that in view of the severity of the sanction imposed on the applicant his criminal conviction was a measure grossly disproportionate to the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others , and it was therefore not necessary in a democratic society.

183 . There has accordingly been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.

VII . ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE CONVENTION

184 . The applicant complained under Article 18 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had pursued the aim of undermining his right to freedom of assembly. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention. Article 18 of the Convention reads as follows:

“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”

185 . In their submissions under this head the parties reiterated their arguments as regards the alleged interference with t he right to freedom of assembly .

186 . The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the complaints examined above under Articles 11 of the Convention and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.

187 . It has found above that the applicant ’ s criminal conviction was not necessary in a democratic society and that this had had an effect of preventing or discouraging him and others from participating in protest rallies and engaging actively in opposition politics (see paragraphs 180 ‑ 81 above).

188 . Having regard to those findings, the Court considers that the complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention raises no separate issue and it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of that provision.

VIII . APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

189 . Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

190 . The applicant claimed 1,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage.

191 . The Government contested this claim as unreasonable and excessive.

192 . The Court observes that it has found a violation of Articles 3, 5, 6, and 11 of the Convention in respect of the applicant. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant ’ s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 12,500 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

194 . The applicant s did not submit any claims under this head . Accordingly, there is no call to award him any sum on that account.

C. Default interest

195 . The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT , UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;

2 . Declares the complaints raised under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the conditions of detention and transfer, the alleged failure to provide medical assistance and the placement in the glass cabins in courtrooms, and under Article s 5, 6, 10, 11 and 18 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible ;

3 . Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of detention in the remand prisons ;

4. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention as regards the alleged failure to provide the applicant with the adequate medical assistance;

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of transfer to and from the court - house ;

6. Holds unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of confinement in a glass cabin in hearing room no. 338 of the Moscow City Court;

7. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of confinement in a glass cabin in hearing room no. 635 of the Moscow City Court;

8. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;

9. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention ;

10. Holds that there is no need to examine the remaining complaints under Article 6 of the Convention;

11. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention;

12 . Holds that there is no need to exam ine the complaint under Article 18 of the Convention;

13 . Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 12,500 (twelve thousand five hundred euros) plus any tax that may b e chargeable, in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

14 . Dismisses the remainder of the applicant s ’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 October 2016 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

             Stephen Phillips Luis López Guerra Registrar President