SECOND SECTION

CASE OF HABRAN AND DALEM v. BELGIUM

( Applications nos. 43000/11 and 49380/11 )

JUDGMENT

(extracts)

STRASBOURG

17 January 2017

FINAL

29/05/2017

This judgment became final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Habran and Dalem v. Belgium ,

The European Court of Human Rights ( Second Section ), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Işıl Karakaş, President, Julia Laffranque, Paul Lemmens, Valeriu Griţco, Ksenija Turković, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, Georges Ravarani, judges, and Stanley Naismith , Section Registrar ,

Having deliberated in private on 13 December 2016 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1 . The case originated in an application (no. 43000/11) against the Kingdom of Belgium lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Belgian national s , Mr Marcel Habran (“the first applicant”) , and Mr Thierry Dalem (“the second applicant ” ) on 4 July 2011 and 27 July 2011 .

2 . The first applicant was represented by Mr M. Uyttendaele and Mr L. Kennes, lawyers practising in Brussels, as well as by Mr G. Thuan dit Dieudonné, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The second applicant was represented by Mr S. Mary and M s Bosmans, lawyers practising in Brussels . The Belgian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr M. Tysebaert , General Adviser, Federal Department of Justice .

3 . The applicant s alleged that their conviction on the basis of witness statements from “criminals turned inform ers” had rendered the proceedings unfair and that the length of proceedings had been excessive (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention) .

4 . On 8 April 2014 the application was communicated to the Government .

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5 . The first applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Brussels. The second applicant was born in 1958 and is detained in Verviers Prison.

A. Investigation conducted before the applicants ’ arrest

6 . On 12 January 1998 an attempted robbery was carried out on an armoured van owned by the B.Z. company on the motorway adjacent to the municipality of Waremme in Belgium . Two of the three occupants of the van were killed . Two vehicles abandoned by the perpetrators were found on the scene, and a Kalashnikov, two Fal-type magazines and ammunition were discovered inside the latter .

7 . A ballistic expert assessment carried out on 14 February 1998 revealed that the Fal -type weapon had been u sed in an attack on a mail van in Dison in 1996.

8 . The surviving occupant of the armoured van recounted the attack , pointing out that it had been carried out by five masked men wearing gloves .

9 . The Liège public prosecutor s ubmitted those facts to an investigating judge , classifying them as assault and robbery accompanied by murder .

10 . An anonymous witness stated that the possible offender s included one L.C., who had been con victed of offences linked to organised crime and had been acting as an inform er , a s well as L.M., who subsequently became a co- defendant ( see paragraph 13 below ). On 30 March 1998 L.C. stated that he had been invited by the second applic ant and C.K., who was also a co- defendant , to reconnoitre the area prior to the attack on the B.Z. armoured van. L.C. ’ s partner , E.E., subsequently confirmed that witness statement . The anonymous witness was murdered on 4 October 1999.

11 . According to a document prepared by the Liège Federal Police on 19 June 2002, a n individual who had been detained at the time , R.C., had voiced a wish to “ co operate with the judicial authorities in exchange for certain advantages ” . On 11 March 2002 R.C., who was known to the police in connection with numerous robbery offences, had been charged with complicity in armed robbery in a different bandit ry case , the “ B. case ” . On 20 June 2002, R.C. was questioned by the police concerning the attack on the B.Z. van and the Dison mail van .

12 . On 24 June 2002 the arrest warrant issued against R.C. in the B. case was quashed on the grounds of insufficient evidence, but he remained in detention to serve the remainder of a two-and-a-half year sentence .

13 . According to the aforement ion ed document ( see paragraph 11 above ), when R.C. had again been questioned by the police on 25 June 2002, he had mentioned , in connection with the attack on the B.Z. van , the names of the applic ants a nd of L.M. and J.S. , who subsequently became co- defendants .

14 . On 30 September 2002 a warrant was issued for the purposes of a police hearing of R.C. , following which he was first questioned officially on 2 October 2002. On that occasion he confirmed his wish to make disclosures on high-profile individuals in the organised crime circles, including the applic ants, and, in particular, on the attack on the armoured van in Waremme.

15 . On 25 October 2002, a ccording to the aforementioned document prepared by the Liège Federal Police, the Witness Protection Board order ed provisional emergency protection measures in respect of R.C.

16 . On 28 October 2002 R.C. was hear d by the investigating judge as a witness under oath . R.C. ’ s statements were reproduced in the indictments subsequently drawn up by the Federal Prosecutor . He admitted his involvement in preparing the attack on the van at the beginning of 1994 , stating that the second applic ant h a d been one of the instigators . He explained that in 1997 he had left the group of instigators foll owing his con vic tion for other offences. Subsequently, while in prison in 2000, he had approached M.A., a member of the aforementioned group, which had in the end refrained from taking part in the attack on the van. M.A. had recounted the course of events and discussed the first applic ant ’ s involvement in the attack on the van.

17 . On 5 November 2002 R.C. was released on licence .

B. First arrest of the applic ants

18 . On 31 October 2002 the first applic ant had a face-to-face meeting with R.C. and a warrant was issued for his arrest . The second applic ant was arrested on 4 November 2002.

19 . Appearing before the investigating judge , the applic ants denied any involvement in the attack on the van in Waremme , claim ing that L.C. and R.C., who were themselves involved in organised crime, had provided false information . The first applic ant also described, as an alibi, exactly what he had been doing and when on the day of the attack on the van .

20 . The applic ants were released on licence in the absence of sufficient evidence to prolong their pre-trial detention , under decisions taken by the Indictments Division of the Liège Court of A ppe a l, on 30 October 2003 in respect of the first applic ant and on 27 November 2003 in respect of the second applic ant.

C. The continued investigation

21 . On 15 September 2004 L.M., one of the co- defendants, was murdered.

22 . On 15 November 2004 D.S. inform ed the Liège Federal P olice Department t hat he fear ed for his life and that he was prepared to submit to questioning on L.M. ’ s murder in exchange for police protection . The police question ed him on 2 December 2004 . On 6 December 2004 he officially informed the authorities of his intention to cooperate with the authorities and to give statements on the Waremme attack .

23 . According to the indictment subsequently drawn up by the Federal Prosecutor ( see paragraph 34 below ), R.C. and D.S. hardly knew each other even though they both belonged to the world of organised crime .

24 . On 9, 10 and 16 December 2004 D.S. officially gave evidence as a witness, and his statements were reproduced in the indictment. He provided the investigators with information which he had obtained from L.M., in particular stating the names of those involved in the attack , including the applic ants, and mentioning that the attack had been prepared a long time in advance by a different team and that one of the weapons discovered in one of the vehicles abandon ed at the scene of the crime had been purchased by L.M. from the first applic ant and used in an attack on a van in 1996.

25 . On 20 December 2004 D.S. was granted provisional emergency protection. In a statement of 28 October 2005 he mentioned the assistance which he had received by way of protection measures . The special protection was lifted on 22 December 2005.

26 . After D.S. ’ s initial statements , the investigators travelled to France following an international letter of request in order to present M.A. with the statements made by D.S. M.A admitted that he had met the latter and that they had discuss ed the informat ion which he had given R.C. in confidence ( see paragraph 16 above ) , and also that he had reconnoitred with R.C. prior to the van attack .

27 . On 8 March 2005 H.P., the wife of the late L.M. , was also questioned, in the framework of police protection measures , in particular concerning the B.Z. van attack . She cited the name of the second applic ant but said that she did not know whether the first applic ant had taken part in the van attack .

28 . In 2006 the applic ants had several face-to-face meetings with the witnesses D.S. and H.P. , who maintained their statements .

D. Second arrest of the applic ants and committal for trial before the Assize Court

29 . In the meantime, on the basis of the statements by D.S. and H.P., the applic ants were arrested once again , on 18 May and 8 June 2005 respectively . Appearing before the investigating judge , they contested the new evidence against them, arguing that D.S. was an untrustworthy character who had negotiated his witness statement in order to secure criminal impunity . The second applic ant also contested H.P. ’ s statements. Subsequently, the first applic ant admit ted that the alibi which he had put forward after his first arrest ( see paragraph 19 above ) had been “ made up ” .

30 . On 28 September 2006 the Indictments Division of the Liège Court of A ppe a l ord ered the first applic ant ’ s release .

31 . On 19 December 2006 the investigation was closed by the investigating judge . On 6 March 2007 the Federal Prosecutor applied for twelve persons, including the applic ants, to be committed for trial . On 26 June 2007 the Liège Court of First Instance, sitting in private, committed those twelve defendants for trial before the Indictments Division of the Liège Court of A ppe a l in order to decide on possible committal for trial before the Assize Court . On 3 December 2007 the Indictments Division committed the twelve defendants for trial before the Liège Assize Court .

32 . Four persons , including the first applic ant, lodged appeals on points of law against the judgment of the Indictments Division. Those appeals on points of law were dismissed by the Court of C assation by judgment of 19 March 2008.

33 . In February 2008 D.S. d ied of natural causes .

E. Trial before the Liège Assize Court

34 . On 2 July 2008 the Federal Prosecutor deposited the 13 0 - page indictment .

35 . On 3 September 2008 the Liège Assize Court commenced proceedings against eleven of the defendants, including the applic ants, for offences connect ed with the attack on the B.Z. van, as well as other offences linked to organised crime.

36 . During a hearing before the Assize Court , V., a prosecution witness, stated that R.C. had been awarded a bounty. Th e President of the Assize Court invited R.C. to explain himself . The latter state d , with his face in plain view , that he had been paid 50, 000 euros (EUR). He explained that he had received half of that sum in 2006 and the other half just before his appearance before the Assize Court in 2008.

37 . On 3 March 2009 the Liège Assize Court acquitted two of the defendants and convicted the other nine, including the applic ants. The first applic ant was con victed of offences linked to the attack on the van , in his capacity as leader of a criminal organisation . The aggravating circumstances of murder and of bearing or using a firearm were not made out against him . He was sentenced to fifteen years ’ imprisonment and twenty years ’ placement at the Government ’ s disposal. The second applic ant was con victed of offences of robbery committed in Luxembourg and of the offences committed in Waremme and Dison . The aggravating circumstance of murder was made out against him in the attempted robbery in Waremme. He was sentenced to thirty years ’ imprisonment . The applicants ’ conviction was also based on the charges of possession of firearms and leadership of a criminal conspiracy and a criminal organisation.

38 . On 30 September 2009, since the Liège Assize Court had given no reasons for its sentences, and with reference to the Chamber ’ s judgment in the case of Taxquet v . Belgium (n o. 926/05, 13 January 2009) , the Court of C assation quashed the judgment in a s much as it adjudicated on the proceedings brought against four appellants, including the applicants, and referred the case to the Brussels-Capital Assize Court .

F. Trial before the Brussels -Capital Assize Court

39 . On 1 February 2010 the Federal Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment. That bill set out R.C. ’ s and D.S. ’ s witness statements verbatim (see paragraphs 16, 22 and 24 above).

40 . On 2 April 2010 the retrial commenced before the Brussels -Capital Assize Court .

41 . During the proceedings the applic ants filed conclusions contest ing , pursuant to A rticle 6 § 1 of the Convention, the lawfulness of the prosecution inasmuch as it had been based on the statements of R.C. and D.S., the latter having since died.

...

44 . By interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2010, the Assize Court declared ill- founded the applicants ’ request that their prosecution be declared i nadmissible, and ordered the immediate continuation of proceedings ....

49 . On 28 September 2010 the jury found the applic ants guilty , in particular , of the attack on the B.Z. van in their capacity as leaders of a criminal organisation . The main reasons for the jury ’ s decision were subsequently sum marised as follows in a statement of reasons issued by the Assize Court that same day :

“ The [ first applic ant ’ s guilt ] regarding his involvement in the attempted robbery in Waremme on 12 January 1998 transpires from the concurring statements of [R.C. and D.S.] , which come from different sources . Those indirect testimonie s are corrobor ated by the objective fact that a Kalashnikov was found in the Chrysler vehicle on the scene of the crime . When an ‘ appeal for witnesses ’ programme was broadcast , [D.S.] recognised that weapon as one of those belonging to [L.M.], who had purchased it from [ the applic ant].

...

Among the sources of R.C. ’ s information to the effect that [ the applic ant] had taken part in the Waremme attack were [ the second applic ant and J.S.] , both of whom admitted that they had had talks with [R.C.] , although they disputed the content of those talks .

...

The [ second applic ant ’ s guilt ] regarding his involvement in the attempted robbery in Waremme on 12 January 1998 transpires from the concurring statements of [R.C., D.S. and H.P.], and from the information provided by C.S. as confirmed by witness E.E. Those statements and information are confirmed by objective facts ... (ballistic links relating to the use of the same Fal firearm and ammunition found in a bag handed over to J.P.M. by [the second applicant]).”

50 . By judgment of 30 September 2010 the Assize Court determined the sentence . ... The court sentenced the first applic ant to fifteen years ’ imprisonment and the second to twenty-five years ’ imprisonment .

51 . Relying on a series of violations of A rticle 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applic ants lodged an appeal on points of law against the aforementioned three judgments of the Brussels Assize Court . The Court of C assation dismissed that appeal on points of law by judgment of 30 March 2011.

52 . In contesting the interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2010 , the applicants argued that R.C. ’ s witness statement could only be taken into consideration if it came from a citizen desirous of promoting justice, but not from a person who was testifying for reasons of personal interest . The Court of Cassation dismissed that plea on the following grounds:

“ ... it falls to the trial court to gauge the impact on the evidential value of a witness statement of its purported venal motivation. ... The reasons impelling a witness to testify may give rise to dou b t s concerning his or her credibility, but that is not necessarily inconsistent with the holding of a fair trial .

Article 6 , cited above, does not prohibit ... the judge from using in evidence a statement by a witness under police protection pursuant to A rticles 102 to 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , even where such witness is an informer who has decided , a fter having provided information under informer status, to testify officially in court . ”

53 . The applic ants submitted that R.C. ’ s use of the status of informer and then that of witness, given that confidentiality had been observed in respect of his contacts as informer with the police, had amounted to a violation of the principle of adversarial proceedings, because his statement had been used in evidence against them, especially since that witness had received a bounty in the context of his informer status . The Court of C assation dismissed those arguments as follows :

“ An official statement by a person having previously provided information under informer status does not infringe the general principle of law relating to compliance with the rights of the defence , given that it has the effect of making the witness statements subject to inter partes debate and that the confidentiality require ment set out in A rticle 47 decies , § 6 of the C ode of Criminal Procedure does not co ver evidence referred to the trial court.

...

Th e right to a fair trial requires the communication neither of information supplied by an informer nor of data on the contacts which that informer has had with the police.

The subsequent questioning of such in former as a witness has the effect of making his statements subject to inter part es debate . The judgment notes that, according to the police offic ers having received the statements contained in the case-file, the latter do not diverge from the information previously supplied confidentially .

The appellant ’ s submission to the effect that the confidentiality of the informer ’ s involvement has the effect of removing the evidence which the latter provided against him from the inter partes debate is therefore unjustified . ”

54 . The Court of Cassation gave the following reply to the applicants ’ criti cism of the fact that the procedure for granting a threatened witness assistance and protection is not subject to court supervision and, owing to its confidentiality , prevents the defendant from establishing that the financi al assistance provided is tantamount to the covert purchase of witness statements :

“ A rticle 6 of the Convention requires the prosecuting authorities to communicate to the defence all the relevant evidence in their possession for or against the defendant .

The right to di sclosure concerns neither the measures taken in order to protect witness e s at risk of reprisals , on pain of expos ing the latter to the danger which those measures are supposed to prevent , nor the management of a police officer ’ s contacts with an informer , on pain of jeopardising the implementation of that specific investigative method .

The limits o n the di sclosure of those confidential data are adequately offset by the oral adversarial proceedings conducted before the jury, since the case-file presented to the latter compr ises no elements other than those communicated to the defence and the latter has had an opportunity before the trial court to criti cise the statements received against the defendant, as regards both their content and their origin .

The judgment lawfully decides that the lack of supervision by an independent and impartial court of the procedure for granting protection to threatened witnesses has no impact on the fairness of the proceedings. ”

55 . The first applic ant complained that the statement of reasoning of 28 September 2010 had been based on two indirect witness statement s whose authors had been paid to testify against the applicants . The Court of C assation declared that plea i nadmissi ble as being based on a factual premise . For the remainder it considered that A rticle 6 § 1 of the Convention did not relate to a jury ’ s assessment of the evidential value of the evidence presented to it . The court also dismissed the second applic ant ’ s argument concerning the insufficiency and irrelevance of the evidence used by the jur y to corrobor ate the statements given by the protected witnesses .

56 . Finally, th e first applic ant complained that the judgment of 30 September 2010 determining the sentence had not taken account of the abnormal length of the proceedings against the applic ants when the sentence was passed. The Court of C assation had dismissed the argument on the grounds that the Assize Court , on the basis of the specific circumstances of the case, had legitimately ruled that the proceedings had not been excessively lengthy .

...

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS FAIRNESS OF PROCEEDINGS

81 . The applicants complained that their conviction on the basis of witness statements by “ criminals turned informers ” had infringed the fairness of the proceedings in breach of A rticle 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:

“ In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing . .. by a ... tribunal . ”

...

B. Merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

a) The applic ants

87 . The applic ants submitted that they had been con victed on the basis of statements given by R.C. and D.S. , who had not been “ordinary” witnesses but “criminals turned informers” in that they had been involved in organised crime and had testified for reasons of personal interest, in return for certain advantages . The manner in which the statements had been gather ed had therefore raised specific questions concerning the fairness of the proceedings , and the authorities ought to have provided special procedural safeguards .

88 . As regards R.C., i t transpires from the timescale of events that in addition to receiving a bounty, he had benefited from advantages in terms of the criminal proceedings against him : he had not been prosecuted for taking part in the offences which he had denounced , his arrest warrant had been annulled and he had obtained early release in ret u rn for his collaboration with the authorities . Regardless of the nature of the collaboration ( confidential and then official ), the accusations had been levelled by a person who had re ceived advantages in return for co-operating with the courts in the same set of proceedings relating to the same facts . I t had been disproportion ate to conceal the precise conduct and content of the negotiations leading up to the provision of such a witness statement. Given that R.C. had become a witness even before he had received any kind of bounty , there had been no justification for concealing that information , which was in the prosecution ’ s possession , from the defence and the jury , unless the intention had been to prevent a challenge to the lawfulness of the proceedings and the evidential value of the witness statement.

89 . The applicants alleged that their conviction had been based exclusively on the witness statements given by R.C. and D.S. In fact, given the circumstances under which those statements had been given, they ought to have been corroborated by objective evidence of the applicants ’ guilt. As regards the first applic ant, the fact, taken into account by the Brussels Assize Court , that a weapon had been discovered in the vehicle abandoned on the crime scene could not be used as evidence of guilt because the contradiction in D.S. ’ s statements on the origin of the weapon had been ignored . By the same token , to affirm , as the Assize Court had done, that the second applic ant ’ s guilt had been demonstrated by the concurring statements of R.C. and D.S. , without noting their contradictions as highlighted by that applicant , amounted to a gratuitous assertion which did not constitute pr oof of guilt .

90 . The applic ants complained that they had not benefited from sufficient procedural safeguards to offset the use of the said witness statements by the Assize Court . Unlike in the case of Cornelis v . the Netherlands ((d e c.), n o. 994/03, 25 May 2004), the agreements concluded between the police authorities and the witnesses before they had made their formal deposition had been subject neither to court scrutiny no r to adversarial proceedings in the presence of the applic ants. In the absence of such safeguard s , which would have allowed the applicants to assess the credibility and reliability of the statements, R.C. ’ s questioning had been superficial and the jury had not been in possession of the requisite facts to assess the risks which those statements had posed to the fairness of proceedings .

b) The Government

91 . The Government contested the applicants ’ argument that the witnesses R.C. and D.S. had benefited from unlawful advantages negotiated with the Belgian authorities. They added that technically , although both witnesses had indeed benefited from police protection, only R.C. had held informer status , and that for a very short period of time . At any event, the lawful provision of expenses for an informer could not in itself constitute an infringement of a fair trial where the information received had no evidential value and had not been included in the case-file to be used in evidence against the defendant . Moreover , even though one of the witness statements had been given by R.C., a person who had previously been questioned confidentially as an official in former, that statement had been an “ ordinary ” testimony whose content had remained unchanged throughout the proceedings . R.C. had been questioned officially and with his face in plain view during the proceedings before the Brussels-Capital Assize Court concerning all the facts of the case and of his statement, including the defrayal of expenses . Therefore, the statements given by R.C. and D.S. and u sed by the Assize Court to con vict the applic ants had pos ed no particular threat s to the fairness of the proceedings .

92 . Contradicting the applic ants ’ interpretation , the Government submitted that the Assize Court ’ s judgment clearly showed that, as in the aforementioned Cornelis case , the jury had not had exclusive or decisive regard to those witness statements in reaching their verdict. Although the defence had not had access to the confidential “informer” file , it had had cognisance of the whole procedural file and had been able, during the adversarial proceedings, to raise objections and put forward arguments concerning the special status of witnesses R.C. and D.S.

93 . The fa ct that the statements made by those two witnesses and the data on the procedure for granting protected witness status had not been disclosed before they made their formal deposition had not particular ly jeopardised the fairness of proceedings , since those statements had been confidential , and in any case they had not been used in evidence against the applic ants. The defence had been presented with the witnesses ’ statements and been able to discuss them on an inter partes basis . Moreover , i t transpired from the submissions of the competent department s that the information provided by R.C. and D.S. before they made their formal deposition had not differed from that which they had given as protected witnesses .

2. The Court ’ s assessment

95 . Furthermore , its task under Article 19 is to ensure the observance of the obligation s undertaken by the States Parties to the Convention ( see paragraph 84 above ). I t is therefore not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence accepted by the domestic courts in order to establish the applicants ’ guilt, may be admissible ( see , mutatis mutandis and among other aut ho r iti es, Allan v . the Uni ted Kingdom , n o. 48539/99, § 42, E CH R 2002 ‑ IX ; Jalloh v . Germany [GC], n o. 54810/00, § 95, E CH R 2006 ‑ IX ; Bykov v . Russia [GC], n o. 4378/02, § 89, 10 March 2009 ; and Ibrahim and Others , cited above , § 254 ). While Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is primarily a matter for regulation under national law ( see Gäfgen v . Germany [GC], n o. 22978/05, §§ 162 and 175, EC H R 2010, and Al ‑ Khawaja and Tahery , cited above , § 118).

96 . The Court, i n making i t s assessment , will look at the proceedings as a whole , having regard to the rights of the defence but also to the interests of the public and the victims that crime is properly prosecuted and, where necessary, to the rights of witnesses ( see Al ‑ Khawaja and Tahery , cited above , § 118, and Schatschaschwili , cited above , § 101).

97 . The applic ants submitted that the impugned witness statements had been obtained , in the absence of any legal framework, from “ criminals turned informers ” whose coope ration with the judicial authorities had been negotiated , confidentially and in return for certain advantages , by the prosecuting authorities , and that they therefore had had no evidential value . They complained that the failure to disclose the exchanges between the prosecuting and investigating authorities and the witnesses in question before they made their formal deposition had, in fact, prevented the Assize Court from verifying the credibility and reliability of the evidence against them and noting that that evidence had been negotiated by those authorities in return for certain advantages in the criminal proceedings .

98 . By interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2010 the Brussels -Capital Assize Court analysed in detail all the pleas entered by the applic ants and , considering that the witness statements complained of by the applic ants could be used in evidence, dismissed their request to dismiss those statements ... . The Assize Court ruled that the applic ants ’ allegations that the two witnesses were “ criminals turned informers ” and had benefited from advantages in the proceedings against them were unfounded . It emphasised that no provision of Belgian law prevented anyone from being successive ly an informer and a witness in the same case or from receiving financi al assistance in those respects . Under that hypothesis , only statements given as witnesses were admitted as evidence . The Assize Court pointed out that neither the informers ’ statements included in the confidential file created by the P ublic Prosecutor ’ s Office n o r those appearing in the file set up by the Witness P rotection Board contained , or could contain, evidence for use in a subsequent set of proceedings . That being the case, the Assize Court ruled that the failure to communicate evidence contained in the said files to the defence and the absence of court supervision of the procedure for granting police protection had not influence d the adversarial nature of the proceedings, the rights o f the defence or the fairness of the trial .

99 . The Court observe s, at the outset, that despite the lack of an y official “ criminal turned informer ” status in Belgian law , it is quite legitimate to consid er that in the present case the witnesses in question were indeed “ criminals turned informers ” . I t was suffi cien t to note that both those witnesses had been involved in criminal circles and had benefited from certain financi al advantages . The Court also considers that in the light of the timescale of events ( see paragraphs 11 - 17 above ) , the applic ants were justified in suspecting that R.C. had been granted certain advantages in return for his statements.

101 . As regards the particular circumstance , as accepted by the Brussels -Capital Assize Court , that one of the witnesses, R.C., had been an informer, the Court r eiterates that the Convention does not preclude reliance, at the preliminary investigation stage and where the nature of the offence may warrant it, on sources such as anonymous informants . However, the subsequent use of such sources by the trial court to found a conviction is a different matter and is acceptable only if adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse are in place, in particular a clear and foreseeable procedure for authorising, implementing and supervising the investigative measures in question ( see Doorson v . the Netherlands , 26 March 1996, § 69, Re ports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ II, and Ramanauskas v . Lithuania [GC], n o. 74420/01 , § 53, E CH R 2008).

102 . Nonetheless , the Court also r eiterates, as emphasised by the Court of C assation ( see paragraphs 52 - 55 above ) , and contrary to the applic ants ’ submissions , that the use of statements of dubious origin does not rend er the holding of a fair trial impossible ( see , i n particular , the Cornelis , Vladislav Atanasov , and Shiman decisions cited above ).

103 . In the instant case , the Court takes the view, in the light of the timescale of events and in view of the combined informer and witness statuses, as well as the profiles of the two contested witnesses, that the boundary between what is and what is not valid evidence is not as impermeable as the Assize Court claimed, and that the applicants might legitimately have wondered whether their indictment and conviction had been based on allegations that had not been fully verified, put forward by persons who were not necessarily disinterested.

104 . That being the case, the Court notes that although the witnesses in question , R.C. and D.S., benefited from police protection, they had not been granted anonymity and their identities were known to the applic ants. Furthermore, the Court agrees with the domestic courts that it was important that the police officers who gathered the information from R.C. and D.S. declared on oath that that initial information had not been different in substance from the formal deposition subsequently made by those persons as included in the criminal file, which was accessible to the defence ....

105 . As regards the question whether, as the applic ants complained , the statements by the witnesses R.C. and D.S. formed the decisive basis for the applic ants ’ conviction , the Court note s that other factors such as ballistics and other “ non-suspect ” witness statements conc urring with those of the witnesses in question were taken into consideration ( see paragraph 49 above ) , although, as the applic ants pointed out ( see paragraph 89 above ), the solidity of those factors taken in isol ation was somewhat dubious .

106 . However that may be , i t is clear that definite importance was attached to the witness statements in question . Given the particular circumstances surrounding the giving of those statements and the difficulties which their admission necessarily caused the defence (see paragraphs 97-104 above), the Court holds that it must consider whether those difficulties were duly taken into account such as to ensure that the proceedings as a whole could be deemed fair.

107 . The Court notes that one of the witnesses, R.C., was present during the proceedings before the Brussels-Capital Assize Court , which adjudicated on the applic ants ’ guilt . R.C. w a s questioned and also cross-questioned by the defence pursuant to the rules governing the conduct of assize trial s under Belgian law ....

108 . On the other hand, the other witness , D.S., was not questioned during the proceedings before the Assize Court because he had died before the commencement of the first set of proceedings . Even though the applicants ’ observations did not concern that aspect taken on its own, the Court notes that D.S. ’ s witness statements were read out to the jury by the President of the c ourt ....

109 . The Court r eiterates that in the case of Al-Khawaja and Tahery , cited above , the crucial witness in the proceedings against Al-Khawaja, whose statements had been taken by the police and read out to the jur y , had been absent because he had died before the commencement of proceedings . The Court examined whether there had been sufficient compensatory factors counterbalancing the difficulties caused to the defence to be able to consider the proceedings fair ( see Al-Khawaja and Tahery , cited above , §§ 153-158).

110 . In the present case , a s the Court has already noted, it transpires from the indictment that the two witnesses R.C. and D.S. hardly knew each other ( see paragraph 23 above ). In its reasons for finding the applic ants guilty, the Assize Court emphasised that the statements given by the two witnesses had concurred , even though their sources were different ( see paragraph 49 above ). The Court considers that the concurring statements by R.C. and D.S., originating from different sources and given at different times, constituted a “whole” which convinced the jury beyond any reasonable doubt.

111 . The circumstance mentioned by the applic ants that the statements had been given by persons from a crimi nal background who might have been indirect ly involved in the offences of which the applic ants were con victed ( see paragraphs 15 and 24 above ) does not alter that fact ( see , mutatis mutandis , Jerino v . Italy (d e c.), n o. 27549/02, 7 June 2005).

112 . The Court further note s that although the applic ants did no t have access to the confidential “ in formers ’ ” file or the files held by the Witness P rotection Board , they di d have cognisance of the whole criminal file. Moreover, in general terms , they did not allege that the preparation of their defence before the Assize Court had been hampered as such .

113 . Furthermore , and this is very important, at no stage in the proceedings were the applic ants prevented from disputing the reliability of the witnesses or the content and credibility of their statements . A fter the face-to-face meeting with the witnesses during the investigation, adversarial proceedings were conducted before the Assize Court on the basis , in particular, of D.S. ’ s written statements and R.C. ’ s formal deposition at a public hearing , with his face in plain view and available for questioning by the applic ants. All the pleas put forward by the applic ants were accepted and carefully scrutinised by the Assize Court and then by the Court of C assation.

114 . Moreover, the Court assumes, in the absence of any allegations to the contrary from the applic ants, that at no stage in the proceedings did the prosecution rely on non-disclosed facts, and that such facts were never brought to the attention of the jury.

115 . The Court observes that the fact that the witness statements were given by persons with a criminal background who might have been indirect ly involved in the offences of which the applic ants were con victed was known to the Assize Court . The Court also considers that this is also an important datum which suggests , contrary to the applic ants ’ submissions , that the jur or s were in a position to assess the threat s posed by their testimony to the fairness of the trial .

116 . Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that the Court of C assation was right to hold, in its judgment of 30 March 2011, that the restrictions on the disclosure of specific items of evidence on file had, in the instant case, been sufficiently compensated by the oral adversarial proceedings conducted before the trial court .

117 . The Court concludes that the proceedings as a whole were surrounded by sufficiently solid guarantees and were not unfair vis-à-vis either of the applic ants.

118 . Accordingly, insofar as the application concerns the fairness of proceedings , there was no violation of A rticle 6 § 1 of the Convention.

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B. The merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

121 . The applicants complained that the excessive length of the proceedings, from 2002 to 2011, had not been taken into account by the Brussels -Capital Assize Court in sentencing them.

122 . Th e Government explained that the case had been very unusual and exceptionally complex : initially involving eighteen cases, which were join ed in 2007, twelve murders, twenty-seven large-scale criminal offences , 143 boxes in the case-file for the proceedings and twenty-three applications to join proceedings as civil parties . Regard must also be had to the applic ants ’ conduct and to the fact that owing to the “law of silence” which is observed in such criminal circles , i t was very difficult indeed to make swift headway at the preliminary and judicial investigation stages . It was not until R.C. and D.S. gave their statements that further evidence against the applicants was discovered and the investigation, which had come to a standstill, began to progress again. The delay thus cause d lasted an estimated three years . Once the investigators had obtained cogent new evidence , they completed the investigation within a year and a half . Moreover, the applic ants availed themselves of all the remedies at their dispos al and had recourse to the option of requesting additional investigative measures, which necessarily extended the overall length of the proceedings . The outcome was an exception al set of proceedings which had encountered such unusual circumstances as the quashing of the judgment of the Liège Assize Court, which had been delivered barely a month and a half after the judgment of a Chamber of the Court in the case of Taxquet v . Belgium (n o. 926/05, 13 January 2009). Apart from those circumstances, the various stages of the proceedings were conducted within very reasonable time-frame s , and, in any event, the authorities cannot be accused of inertia at any stage.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

123 . The Court r eiterates its case-law to the effect that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, in particular the complexity of the case, the applicant ’ s conduct and the conduct of the competent authorities. In addition, only delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of a failure to comply with the “reasonable time” requirement ( see Pélissier and Sassi v . France [GC], n o. 25444/94, § 67, E CH R 1999 ‑ II, and Idalov v . Russia [GC], n o. 5826/03, § 186, 22 May 2012).

124 . The Court observe s that the applic ants were arrested for the first time on 31 October 2002 , in the case of the first applic ant , and on 4 November 2002 , in the case of the second applicant. The Court takes those two dates as the starting point for the impugned criminal proceedings ( see Neumeister v . Austria , 27 June 1968, § 18, Series A n o. 8). The final judgment was delivered on 30 March 2011 by the Court of C assation , which dismissed the applic ants ’ appeal on points of law against the applicants ’ con vic tion by the Brussels -Capital Assize Court on 28 September 2010. Consequently , the proceedings lasted eight years and five months, including the investigation and the examination of the case at two levels of jurisdiction .

125 . The Court notes the extreme complexity of the case, given, as emphasised by the domestic courts ( see paragraphs 50 and 56 above ), the multiplicity of facts to be considered, the organised nature of the crime of which those facts formed part , the number of persons i nvolved, the difficult y of the investigation and the mass of information to be processed during both the preparatory investigation and the judicial proceedings .

126 . The Court further note s that the applic ants used various remedies and submitted a large number of requests . It reiterates, in that connection, that applic ants cannot be blamed for making use of the remedies available to them under domestic law ( see McFarlane v . Ireland [GC], n o. 31333/06, § 148, 10 September 2010).

127 . As regards the conduct of the authorities , the Court observe s that the proceedings as a whole were conducted with sufficient diligence ( see , f or a similar assessment in a “ case ... of extraordinary complexity” , Neumeister , cited above , § 21). The only extension of the length of proceedings which might be attributed to the authorities stemmed from the fact that in order to take account of the aforementioned Taxquet case- law , the first assize decision was set aside and the whole proceedings had to start again from the beginning ( see paragraph 38 above ).

128 . Making an overall assessment of the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and the total length of the proceedings, the Court considers that the latter did not go beyond what may be considered reasonable in this particular case .

129 . There was therefore no violation of A rticle 6 § 1 of the Convention.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT , UNANIMOUSLY,

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2 . Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the fairness of the proceedings ;

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Done in French , and notified in writing on 17 January 2017 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

             Stanley Naismith Işıl KarakaÅŸ Registrar President