FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF RAMDA v. FRANCE

( Application no. 78477/11 )

JUDGMENT

(Extracts)

STRASBOURG

19 December 2017

FIN AL

09/04/2018

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Ramda v. France ,

The European Court of Human Rights ( Fifth Section ), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Angelika Nußberger , President, Erik Møse , Nona Tsotsoria , André Potocki , Síofra O ’ Leary, Mārtiņš Mits , Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer , judges, and Milan Bla š ko , Deputy Section Registrar ,

Having deliberated in private on 28 November 2017 ,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1 . The case originated in an application (no. 78477/11) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Algerian national, Mr Rachid Ramda (“the applicant”), on 8 December 2011 .

2 . The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr E. Piwnica of the Conseil d ’ État and Court of Cassation Bar . The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr F. Alabrune , Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs .

3 . The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 .

4 . On 30 September 2014 the Government were given notice of the application .

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5 . The applicant was born in 1969 and is currently detained in Lannemezan Prison.

A. Background to the case

6 . The applicant was a member of the Islamic Salvation Front ( Front Islamique du Salut – “the FIS ” ) and left Algeria prior to the dissolution of that political group by a judgment of the Algiers Administrative Court dated 19 March 1992. After spending some time in Pakistan he entered the United Kingdom in January 1993 using the false name of Elias Serbis . On 26 February 1993 he applied for political asylum in that country, claiming to have been forced to leave Algeria because of his membership of the FIS. His application was refused on 10 August 1994.

7 . On 25 July, 17 and 26 August, 3, 4 and 7 September and 6 and 17 October 1995 eight terrorist attacks were carried out in France.

8 . Although no organisation explicitly claimed responsibility, certain factors, such as the existence of virulent press statements against France and the mode of operation of the attacks , pointed to the involvement of the Armed Islamic Group ( Groupement Islamique Armé – “the GIA ” ).

9 . In the course of the judicial investigation aimed at identifying the perpetrators, telephone tapping operations carried out on public payphones used by a certain B.B. led to a number of persons being arrested and to the search being focused on the United Kingdom and an individual named Elyes (also known as Elyesse or Eliass ). The sources of these names or pseudonyms were a telephone conversation of 1 November concerning Elyes and the Western Union bank, a search of B.B. ’ s home during which a document was found showing that a sum of money had been transferred to B.B. from that bank on 16 October 1995, and the decoding of a list of telephone numbers found on B.B. ’ s person and at his home and featuring three numbers in England preceded by the name “ Elyesse ” or “ Eliass ”. B.B., who was arrested on 1 November 1995, also directly implicated “ Ylies ” , claiming that he had funded the campaign of attacks from London and had been kept informed of their progress.

10 . On 3 November 1995 the French National Surveillance Directorate informed the investigators that the individual known as “ Elyes , Ilyes , Lyes , Iliesse , Eliass or Elyasse ”, whom B.B. had identified as having funded the attacks, might be the applicant. The latter, who was living in London, was suspected of being one of the leaders of the GIA in the United Kingdom, in particular because of his involvement with the publication Al Ansar (or Al Ansaar ) which the GIA used as a mouthpiece abroad.

11 . The investigations carried out in London established that the applicant had a home there and had a set of keys to a second London address, which served as the offices of the magazine Al Ansar and as a meeting place for all the persons involved in publishing and distributing it. On the premises the investigators found , among other items, the following: contracts for three mobile phones in the names of three of the applicants ’ acquaintances and corresponding to the numbers identified at the home of B.B., who had rung the numbers before and after each attack; a receipt for the rental of a post - office box in the name of Fares ELIASS with the applicant ’ s fingerprints on it; letters and statements from the FIS ; a statement saying that only the GIA was entitled to conduct the jihad ; a letter from the GIA to the French President calling on him to convert to Islam ; a letter commenting on the attacks carried out in France ; copies of press articles on anti-terrorism mentioning the names of judges and members of the intelligence service; a piece of paper on which “ Notre Dame 33 ‑ 1 ‑ 43 ‑ 54-46-12 ” was written, corresponding to the telephone number of the Western Union branch at 4 rue du Cloître Notre Dame in Paris ; and a receipt dated 21 July 1995 issued by a branch of Thomas Cook in London for a sum of 5,000 pounds sterling (GBP).

12 . The applicant was arrested and placed in police custody from 4 to 7 November 1995 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

13 . On 7 November 1995 the applicant was detained pending extradition under the terms of an international arrest warrant issued on the same day in connection with the investigation into the attack carried out on 6 October 1995 close to the Maison Blanche metro station.

14 . Three further international arrest warrants were issued concerning the applicant: on 24 November 1995 in relation to the attack of 17 October at the Gare d ’ Orsay station; on 29 January 1996 in the case concerning a conspiracy to prepare terrorist attacks; and on 16 January 2001 in relation to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995 at the Saint-Michel suburban rail station.

15 . The applicant lodged habeas corpus applications which were dismissed in June 1997 and in 2001. On 8 October 2001 the British Home Secretary ordered his removal to France, but that order was quashed by the High Court, Queen ’ s Bench Division, on 27 June 2002.

16 . On 6 April 2005 the Home Secretary signed a fresh order for the applicant ’ s extradition in the light of the assurances provided by the French authorities concerning the safeguards of a fair and impartial trial in France. On 14 October 2005 the High Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant.

17 . On 1 December 2005 the applicant was handed over to the French authorities and was remanded in custody the following day.

B. The proceedings before the criminal courts ( procédure correctionnelle )

18 . By an order of 5 February 1999 the applicant was committed for trial in the Paris Criminal Court for involvement – in France and in England, from an unspecified date until 4 November 1995 – in a n association or conspiracy formed with a view to the preparation, in the form of one or more material acts, of one of the terrorist acts in question . The investigating judge stated, in particular, as follows :

“ - [the applicant] was responsible for distributing the journal Al Ansar , a propaganda outlet of the Armed Islamic Group;

- ... was involved on this account in disseminating propaganda for that organisation, which is banned in France;

- ... was the main contact person in Europe for [D.Z.], alias Abou Abderhamane Amine, in organising and carrying out the GIA ’ s activities in Europe;

- ... was tasked with sending money to GIA members still in France to enable them to fund and carry out attacks;

- ... was in contact with numerous persons involved in and convicted of criminal conspiracy with a view to a terrorist enterprise .”

19 . In a judgment of 29 March 2006 accompanied by over thirty pages of reasoning, the Criminal Court first of all set out the facts with regard to the “political/religious background ”, the emergence of the FIS and then the GIA, the “background to the attacks” in 1995 – which it listed and described as attributable in all likelihood to the GIA – and the “context surrounding Rachid Ramda ”.

20 . Ruling on the criminal charges, the court began by examining the case against the applicant. It found that it could be established with certainty, on the basis of precise and concurring physical evidence, that the applicant had indeed used various false names and aliases which had come up in the course of the investigations, a fact the court described as “beyond doubt and indisputable”. With regard to the GIA ’ s funding the court, having noted the prosecution ’ s claims that the applicant had funded the GIA groups which carried out the attacks in France during the second half of 1995, examined the factual evidence in the case file at length and in detail . It observed in particular that, according to one witness who was a GIA member, the organisation ’ s groups had different specialisations depending on their location, with the London group being responsible for sending funds. The court further noted that the applicant had transferred GBP 5,000 on 16 October 1995, two days before the attack of 17 October 1995. This was established by the statements of the British police officers tasked with keeping the applicant under surveillance and of the staff of the Western Union branch where the transfer had been made, and also by the discovery of the applicant ’ s fingerprints on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union branch. The court also observed that one of the perpetrators of the attacks, B.B., had stated that the money used in preparing the various attacks had always been supplied by the applicant from Londo n. The court inferred that the facts as a whole “demonstrate[d] that Rachid Ramda was indeed responsible for funding terrorist groups on French soil”. Furthermore, in response to the public prosecutor ’ s submissions concerning the applicant ’ s role in disseminating GIA propaganda, the first-instance court also considered the various items of factual evidence before it, and in particular the wealth of correspondence and propaganda documents relating to the GIA ’ s views and actions that had been found during the searches of the various premises used by the applicant, as well as the statements by a GIA member confirming the applicant ’ s role as a member of the team publishing the magazine Al Ansar , which was the GIA outlet used in particular to claim responsibility for attacks. It also noted the presence at the applicant ’ s home of pamphlets promoting terrorism and killing with specific reference to France. The court concluded that the applicant had played a part in disseminating GIA propaganda and ideas.

21 . Turning next to the applicant ’ s involvement in a criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise , the court found this offence to have been made out, as the investigation had shown that several groups located in the Lyons area, in Paris and in Lille had been behind the 1995 attacks. All the members had either been directly involved or had played an indirect role by aiding and abetting and providing resources, and all of them were either known activists or claimed to be activists within the GIA. The court found that the applicant ’ s contacts with the various members of these networks, who had the shared goal of carrying out attacks, were sufficient to establish his conscious and deliberate participation in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts on French soil. In its judgment the court set out, among other findings, the facts showing the existence of links to eight members of three groups forming a support network for the GIA.

22 . Accordingly, the Criminal Court found the applicant guilty of criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise , on the basis of Articles 450-1 and 421-1 of the Criminal Code. It sentenced him to ten years ’ imprisonment and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. The court cited as reasons for imposing the prison sentence the fact that “by providing funding and issuing propaganda on behalf of the GIA, Rachid RAMDA not only enabled the attacks to be carried out but acted as a propagandist, potentially attracting new members to strengthen the networks spread over several European countries”. It further cited the fact that “his double talk reveal[ ed ] both his bad faith and his complete lack of regret or remorse”. The court awarded one euro (EUR) in damages to the association SOS Attentats , which had joined the proceedings as a civil party.

23 . In a final judgment of 18 December 2006 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. While referring expressly to the statement of facts as established in the judgment , it devoted some thirty pages to analysing the charges against the applicant, giving reasons. First of all, the Court of Appeal gave further details concerning the evolution and operation of the GIA. It also specified that the case before it concerned “the series of attacks carried out in France in the summer and autumn of 1995”, and that “the facts of the case at hand concern [ ed ] the preparation of the attacks and the actions enabling the attacks, which started in France in July 1995, to be carried out”. The Court of Appeal went on to list the eight attacks carried out between 25 July and 17 October 1995. With particular reference to the evidence of the existence of an information hub based in London which the applicant had allegedly managed, it found this to be established on the basis of the telephone calls made on the day after the killing of the imam S. in Paris; two days before the attack on the Saint-Michel suburban rail station; on the day of that attack and the day after the attempted attack on the Paris ‑ Lyon high-speed railway line at Cailloux-sur-Fontaines ; on 12 September 1995, a few days after the attack of 3 September on Boulevard Richard Lenoir in Paris, the attempted attack of 4 September o n Place Charles Vallin in Paris and the attack of 7 September in rue Jean-Claude Vivand in Villeurbanne; the day after the shooting at the Col de Maleval and the arrest of three people; five days before the attack of 6 October and two days after it; on 16 October 1995, in other words just before the attack of 17 October; and, finally, on 1 November 1995, immediately after a telephone conversation between B.B. and S.A.B. concerning preparations for an attack on the Wazemmes market in Lille , with B.B. stat ing that the purpose of the call was to report to the applicant on the “final preparations” for the Lille attack.

24 . The Court of Appeal also emphasised the existence of several items of factual evidence pointing to the applicant ’ s involvement as the supervisor of a structure set up to fund the GIA ’ s activities . These included the fact that the applicant had sent funds from England on 16 October 1995 under the false name of Philippe Hervier , which had been received by B.B. at the Rivoli branch of the Rivaud bank under the false name of A. Benabbas , and which matched an entry in A.T. ’ s accounts book marked “36,800 francs, Lyseo ” and B.B. ’ s statements ; the payment by the applicant of GBP 5,000 and 50,000 French francs (FRF) , as shown by an entry in A.T. ’ s accounts book which mentioned funds sent by “ Walid ”, a false name used by the applicant or the first name of one of his acquaintances who could be contacted in order to reach him ; statements from several individuals concerning services offered in return for payment, fundraising, the sending of substantial sums of money, a transfer of EUR 4,000 to M. and the existence of a receipt for GBP 100.

25 . Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted a series of facts demonstrating, firstly, that the applicant had been “the main contact person ... in organising and carrying out the GIA ’ s activities in Europe”, a s was clear in particular from a telephone conversation of 2 December 1995, from the statements of a witness who was a GIA member, and from the detailed content of several documents seized in London ( press statements, authorisations to conduct the jihad, documents on the management of funds, articles and handwritten notes on the activities of Islamist groups in Europe and anti-terrorist activities, notes on military weapons and the handling of explosives, and so on) ; secondly, that he had been “the GIA ’ s main propaganda agent outside Algeria”, with “his role on the magazine Al Ansaar ” (particularly in the light of documents seized at the applicant ’ s London address , namely a note on how to make the magazine more dynamic , a letter explaining the means of distributing it , a piece of computer equipment which the applicant would have been unable to afford, letters from readers and GIA sympathisers, a large number of magazines detailing the GIA ’ s ideas and violent actions , a substantial amount of correspondence relating to Algerian and Islamic issues, some testimonies , and a list of post - office boxes in numerous countries , used by the magazine ’ s subscribers); thirdly, that he had been at the centre of “the London cell which revolved around [him and which] also served as a rallying point for young recruits passing through”, as demonstrated by the personal histories of four of them; and fourthly, that he had been a leader with “a strategic role in the GIA ’ s external organisation”, as demonstrated by his links to members and correspondents of other Islamist terror ist groups worldwide.

26 . The Court of Appeal echoed the reasons given by the Criminal Court and added that there was sufficient evidence in the case to demonstrate that the applicant had been contacted regularly in order to be kept informed of events, that he had been responsible for funding GIA operations in Europe, that he had acted as a conduit for the GIA ’ s military command and as a propaganda agent for that organisation, especially through the magazine Al Ansar , that he had given shelter to fugitives passing through London and had sometimes been called up on to coordinate the GIA ’ s external activities. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded as follows:

“The Court of Appeal, like the first-instance court, therefore finds it established that the GIA created ‘ an external structure ’ in Europe designed to enable it to pursue its goal of overthrowing the Algerian regime, including by attacking institutions and people in countries that supported or were deemed to support that regime, by setting up networks in Belgium and France in particular which provided support to the Algerian guerrillas by supplying weapons, munitions and various items of equipment , supplying jihadists and providing saf e havens (accommodation and false identity papers) to fighters who were fleeing the maquis or had arrived to carry out attacks, organised and coordinated by a cell in London in charge of fundraising and using funds acquired lawfully or unlawfully.

... [ the applicant ] knowingly played a decisive role , by means of the material acts referred to by the Criminal Court and by this court above, in the achievement of the GIA ’ s goal, participating from London in the implementation of the group ’ s external structure, and played a vital role within the organisation whose aim was to prepare, assist in and carry out the attacks which took place.”

27 . In a judgment of 14 March 2007 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant.

C. The proceedings before the assize courts ( procédure criminelle )

28 . In a judgment of 13 February 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal indicted B.B., S.A.B. and the applicant for the attack of 17 October 1995 and committed them for trial before the Paris special Assize Court. The applicant was charged with aiding and abetting the crimes of attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing mut ilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection principally or incidentally with a terrorist enterprise , and with the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise .

29 . On 3 August and 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the orders issued by the Paris investigating judge on 27 April (concerning the attack of 25 July 1995) and 13 July 2001 (concerning the attack of 6 October 1995) for the indictment of the applicant and B.B. and their committal for trial before the special Assize Court. The applicant faced trial for aiding and abetting the crimes of murder, attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing death, mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection with a terrorist enterprise , and for the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise .

30 . The se three judgments of the Investigation Division specified that the applicant had aided and abetted by: transmitting instructions from the GIA ordering attacks with explosives and providing B.B. with instructions on manufacturing; relaying to the GIA leadership operational information provided by the perpetrators of the attacks; providing the perpetrators with the funds needed not just to manufacture the explosive devices but also to make all the logistical arrangements for preparing and carrying out the attacks. The judgments of 13 February and 3 August 2001 added the fact that the funds had also been intended, if necessary, to enable the perpetrators based in France to flee.

31 . In these judgments the judges noted in particular the following facts in relation to the applicant. The three mobile phones used by the applicant had received calls from B.B. on 16 and 22 October and 1 November 1995; a receipt for an exchange transaction performed on 16 October 1885 at 3.50 p.m. (Paris time) for an amount of FRF 36,800 had been discovered at B.B. ’ s home , together with a notice of transfer of FRF 38,000 from an English branch of Western Union , and t he checks carried out established that the applicant had gone into a Londis shop in Wembley containing a Western Union office at 2.34 p.m. on 16 O ctober 1995 and had re-emerged at 3.26 p.m. (London time); the applicant ’ s fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union office in the Londis shop; the words “LYESO – FF 36,600” had been found in the credit column of B.B. ’ s accounts and the words “West Union” and “West-Union Bank” had also been entered by B.B. in a document logging the details of the 17 October attack; the applicant had possessed the details of the Western Union branch in rue du Cloître in the Notre-Dame district of Paris; an exchange receipt dated 21 July 1995, for an amount of GBP 5,000 exchanged at a rate of 7.5%, had been found at the applicant ’ s home, with the number of a public payphone in Corbeil - Essonne s used by A.T. written on the back , and an entry had been made in the credit column of B.B. ’ s accounts for the sum of “5,000 pounds sterling from [W.], converted at a rate of 7.5% ” ; a sum of GBP 6,945 had been sent on 20 July 1995; between 20 and 25 July 1995 the sum of FRF 300 had been entered as expenditure for the purchase of a “GB ticket”, demonstrating that the funds, after being exchanged in England, had been transported to Paris in the days leading up to the attack at the Saint ‑ Michel suburban rail station; and a letter from British Telecom had been found, addressed to “ Walid ” at 122 Hamlet Gardens, the applicant ’ s address . The judges also noted, as evidence against the applicant, the content of a hard disk found in a London flat to which the applicant had keys, containing two financial reports , one relating to the activities of the GIA in Belgium and the other to a set of accounts for the period from September 1994 to 1 November 1995, the date of B.B. ’ s arrest.

32 . In its judgment of 13 February 2001 concerning the attack of 17 October 1995 the Investigation Division observed in particular that the applicant ’ s three telephone numbers had been called repeatedly from payphones used by B.B., around the time of the different attacks and in particular on the day before the attack of 17 October 1995. It compared these calls with the statements made by B.B. and a further accomplice , who had been planning an attack on Lille city market, according to which they had reported to the applicant on preparations for the operations, and in particular for the attack of 17 October 1995. The Investigation Division also noted that the applicant had made a transfer of FRF 36,800 from London the day before that attack – as shown by the fact that his fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip in the Western Union office in London – which had been received by B.B. in Paris on the same day. The link between that transfer and the attack of 17 October 1995 had also been established by B.B. ’ s statements and by a call made to the applicant ’ s mobile phone the same day, after the money had been received.

33 . In its judgment of 3 August 2001 relating m ore specifically to the attack of 2 5 July 1995, the Investigation Division stressed that the applicant ’ s English mobile phone had been called two days before that attack from a public payphone in Paris close to B.B. ’ s home from which other calls had been made, including a call to a mobile phone belonging to a member of the French GIA network , made one minute before the applicant was called. Furthermore, the day before the attack and then on the day itself, the applicant had received calls from France on his various numbers, including from a payphone close to the previous one, concerning his role as an intermediary between the perpetrators of the attacks and the person masterminding them in Algeria. Above all, the Investigation Division noted that the applicant had on 2 and 20 July 1995 sent sums of GBP 5,000 and GBP 6,945 respectively which were directly linked to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995.

34 . Lastly, in its judgment of 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division also noted that it was clear from these different elements that the applicant had sent funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, not just in relation to the campaign of attacks as a whole but also for use directly in carrying out the attack of 6 October 1995. With regard to the latter, it noted that the instructions issued by the GIA concerning the campaigns, which had been accompanied by advice on the manufacture of explosives, had been transmitted via the applicant, who had also funded all the operational arrangements put in place in France in order to ensure the success of the attacks, and that the recipients had been required to report to him on how the money had been used. A number of telephone calls had established that the applicant had been kept informed of the progress of the attacks, and in particular of the attack of 6 October 1995 , which had been followed by a telephone call on 8 October 1995 telling the applicant that everything had gone well on 6 October.

35 . On 26 October 2007 the Paris special Assize Court, composed of seven professional judges, found the applicant guilty as charged in connection with the three attacks. It sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years. The applicant appealed on 29 October 2007.

36 . The appeal proceedings before the Paris special Assize Court, this time composed of nine professional judges, too k place from 16 September to 13 October 2009. One hundred and ninety-six individuals joined the proceedings as civil parties, as did the RATP (the Paris public-transport operator), the SNCF (the French national rail company), the Guarantee Fund for victims of terrorist acts and other crimes, the Government Law Officer and the association SOS Attentats .

37 . At the hearing of 16 September 2009 counsel for the applicant made submissions requesting the termination of the proceedings and a finding that the prosecution was null and void , on the basis of the ne bis in idem principle. Citing Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 and the judgment in Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia , delivered by the Grand Chamber of the Court on 10 February 2009, the y argued that the material acts which the Assize Court was called on to examine were the same as those of which the applicant had previously been convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal in its final judgment of 18 December 2006. In counsel ’ s view, the material acts alleged in the Assize Court proceedings, namely the transfer of funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, the transmission of instructions to the same perpetrators, and the monitoring of the preparation and carry ing -out of the attacks, had also been alleged in the Criminal Court proceedings.

38 . In an interlocutory judgment of 17 September 2009 the special Assize Court dismissed the objection regarding a breach of the ne bis in idem principle, finding as follows:

“Although Rachid RAMDA ’ s defence counsel correctly points out that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second ‘ offence ’ in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same, the following factors need to be taken into consideration in the present case:

- The facts on which the criminal courts based their finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty , while they related to criminal acts dealt with in the current set of proceedings, were by no means confined to them. In finding the offence of criminal conspiracy to be made out – a separate offence that is provided for and punishable under Article 450-1 of the Criminal Code – the courts considered all the elements apt to substantiate the accused ’ s involvement in the conspiracy, which was aimed at organising, developing and ensuring the continuation of a movement that was bent on imposing its cause, in particular by using clandestine methods and material and intellectual resources (recruitment of and regular contact with activists, dissemination of information on the GIA ’ s activities and views, fundraising, seeking donations of weapons and various items of equipment, etc.), without necessarily pursuing the sole objective of carrying out the attacks that are the subject of the proceedings.

- The facts to be considered by this c ourt differ substantially from the earlier ones in that they relate to criminal conduct aimed at the achievement of one-off objectives which were determined with precision and were not inextricably linked , and which were driven by a specific motivation consisting in particular in providing others, in full knowledge of the situation, with the means of deliberately harming human life or individuals ’ physical or mental integrity by the use of explosives.

- In these circumstances the finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty and his conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal cannot lead the Assize Court to find that his prosecution has lapsed and to declare the criminal proceedings against him null and void.

- It is thus the task of the Assize Court, on conclusion of the proceedings and in the light thereof, to rule, by answering the questions raised before it, as to whether or not Rachid RAMDA is guilty of aiding and abetting as charged ... ”

39 . In an interlocutory judgment of 24 September 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal deferred its decision on a request for further information and eventually rejected the request in a further interlocutory judgment of 8 October 2009.

40 . Sixty-three questions concerning the applicant alone were put to the special Assize Court of Appeal. Twenty-six related to the circumstances surrounding the attack of 25 July 1995, eighteen to the events surrounding the attack of 6 October 1995 and nineteen to the attack of 17 October 1995. The questions gave precise details of the various alleged acts and where and when they had been committed , and listed the names of dozens of victims of killings and attempted killings, mutilation or permanent disability, injuries resulting in unfitness for work of up to eight days or more, and victims of damage to their property. The answer to sixty-one of the questions was “yes ” , by a majority (some questions, followed by a list of victims and requiring an individual reply in each case , were also found partly “devoid of purpose”), and two questions were found to be “ devoid of purpose ” . Besides details regarding the places and dates concerned in each instance, as well as the indication of the victims according to the damage suffered (death, mutilation or permanent disability, temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days and of a maximum of eight days, destruction of or damage to property), the questions related in particular to whether or not the applicant ’ s actions had been premeditated (questions nos. 2, 8, 28 and 46), and to incitement of others to commit certain acts (questions nos. 5 , 11, 20, 25, 31, 36, 43, 49, 57 and 62), the assistance lent by the applicant to the perpetrators of the attacks (questions nos. 10, 19, 24, 30, 35, 42, 48, 56 and 61) and whether the applicant had issued instructions to others to commit certain crimes (questions nos. 6, 12, 21, 26, 32, 37, 44, 50, 58 and 63). The parties did not comment on these questions.

41 . An affirmative answer was given to t he questions whether the applicant had knowingly assisted in the manufacture or possession of explosive devices and in issuing instructions to that effect , in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, and whether he had knowingly incited others to manufacture or possess such devices in the context of the a ttacks of 25 July and 17 October 1995.

42 . In a judgment of 13 October 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years, and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. It adjourned the civil hearing for a later date. The applicant appealed on points of law.

43 . On 15 June 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal on points of law. Regarding his ground of appeal to the effect that no reasons had been given for the finding of guilt, based in particular on Article 6 of the Convention, it found as follows:

“Firstly, the impugned questions, which were put in accordance with the law, established in all aspects the acts of aiding and abetting of which Mr Ramda was found guilty.

Secondly, the judgment convicting Mr Ramda included the answers which the judges comprising the special Assize Court of Appeal gave immediately after the oral proceedings, on the basis of their personal conviction and by a majority following a secret vote, to the questions concerning his guilt which were put to them in accordance with the operative provisions of the committal orders and were the subject of adversarial argument.

Accordingly, and given that steps were taken to ensure the prior investigation of the charges contained in the indictment, the free exercise of the rights of the defence , and the public and adversarial nature of the proceedings, the requirements laid down by the statutory and Convention provisions relied on were satisfied. ”

44 . As to the ground of appeal concerning a breach of the ne bis in idem principle on account of the applicant ’ s final conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006 on the basis of identical facts, the Court of Cassation held that criminal conspiracy was a separate offence from the crimes prepared or committed by its members and also from the offences characterised by certain material acts that embodied it.

...

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

49 . The applicant complained that no reasons had been given for the judgment delivered by the special Assize Court . He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

50. The Government contested that argument .

...

B. Merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

( a) The applicant

52 . The applicant stated at the outset that personal conviction, which was not the same as arbitrariness or intuition, must be based on a free assessment of the evidence. It found support in the free admissibility of evidence and not in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, if the defence adduced cogent evidence during the trial it had to be informed, if it was to understand and accept the verdict, of the main reasons why the Assize Court had found the accused to be guilty.

53 . Of the sixty-three questions read out at the hearing, twenty-eight had concerned the applicant personally . The applicant added that twelve questions had related to the attack of 25 July 1995, nine to the attack of 6 October 1995 and a further nine to the attack of 17 October 1995. The applicant submitted that the se twenty-eight questions had been drafted in the abstract by the president following the hearings and had not contained any factual reference or any reasoning regarding the charge of aiding and abetting. The manner in which they were drafted had left him unaware as to why the answer had been “yes” in each case despite the fact that he had denied any personal involvement in the three attacks.

54 . The applicant stated in particular that certain factual elements which he disputed prevented him from understanding the reasons for his conviction. In his submission, as it had become clear at the trial that there were shortcomings in the investigation as well as inaccuracies and uncertainty as to his personal involvement, he was unable to understand the reasons for his conviction on the basis of a combined reading of the indictments and the twenty-eight questions.

55 . He further submitted that the violation of Article 6 was even more evident since the verdict had not been given by a lay jury, but by a jury made up exclusively of professional judges, who were required to indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which their decisions were based. The professional judges making up an a ssize c ourt bench had to give reasons for their decision s, just as they did in cases before the ordinary criminal courts; that obligation was unquestionably one of the requirements of a fair trial in the modern age.

( b) The Government

56 . The Government referred first of all to the Court ’ s case-law concerning assize courts with a lay jury, while observing that the issue of the absence of reasons for a decision given in criminal proceedings in France by a jury of professional judges was being raised for the first time before the Court. T he Constitutional Council, in its ruling of 3 September 1986 on the special composition of the a ssize c ourt s in terrorism cases ( dec. no. 86-213), had found that the exception made in the formation of the a ssize c ourt was limited in nature, that the difference in treatment was designed to circumvent the risk of pressure or threats to which lay jurors might be subjected , and that an a ssize c ourt sitting in a special composition of professional judges satisfied the requirements of independence and impartiality. Furthermore, the accused benefited from the same information and the same safeguards as before the ordinary a ssize c ourts, including the possibility of appeal ing since the enactment of Law no. 2000-516 of 15 June 2000.

57 . The Government emphasised that Law no. 2011-939 of 10 August 2011, which had made it compulsory, as of 1 January 2012, for a ssize c ourt judgments to be accompanied by reasons, also applied to judgments of the special a ssize c ourts.

58 . The Government therefore submitted that the procedural safeguards had enabled the applicant to understand the decision in his case and that the proceedings had complied with the Convention requirements. They noted in particular that the applicant had been the only defendant in the appeal proceedings, and that the indictments had been read out in full, as had the questions put at first instance, the answers to those questions and the judgment convicting him. The oral proceedings had lasted from 16 September to 13 October 2009 and the charges had been the subject of adversarial argument ; the applicant had given evidence and had been able to defend his case by debating each item of evidence. The Government observed that no fewer than sixty-three questions had been put and that the affirmative answers had confirmed the three judgments committing the applicant for trial and the criminal conviction handed down at first instance. In particular, it had been open to the applicant to request that the questions be rephrased or that one or more additional questions be asked.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

59 . The Court reiterates that , while the Convention does not require jurors to give reasons for their decision and Article 6 does not preclude a defendant from being tried by a lay jury even where reasons are not given for the verdict ( see Taxquet v. Belgium [GC], no. 926/05, § 89, ECHR 2010 ; Agnelet v . France , no. 61198/08, § 56, 10 January 2013 ; and Lhermitte v. Belgium [GC], no. 34238/09, § 66, ECHR 2016), in proceedings conducted before professional judges, the accused ’ s understanding of his conviction stems primarily from the reasons given in judicial decisions. In such cases the national courts must indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they base their decisions (see Hadjianastassiou v. Greece , no. 12945/87, 16 December 1992, § 33, Series A no. 252, and Taxquet , cited above, § 91). Reasoned decisions also serve the purpose of demonstrating to the parties that they have been heard, thereby contributing to a more willing acceptance of the decision on their part. In addition, they oblige judges to base their reasoning on objective arguments, and also preserve the rights of the defence. However, even for professional judges the extent of the duty to give reasons varies according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case ( see Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 9 December 1994, § 29, Series A no. 303 ‑ A, and Taxquet , cited above, § 91). While courts are not obliged to give a detailed answer to every argument raised (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands , 19 April 1994, § 61, Series A no. 288), it must be clear from the decision that the essential issues of the case have been addressed ( see Boldea v. Romania , no. 19997/02, § 30, 15 February 2007 ).

60 . The Court also reiterates that, in any event, for the requirements of a fair trial to be satisfied, the accused, and indeed the public, must be able to understand the verdict that has been given; this is a vital safeguard against arbitrariness. As the Court has often noted, the rule of law and the avoidance of arbitrary power are principles underlying the Convention (see Taxquet , cited above, § 90, and Lhermitte , cited above, § 67). In the judicial sphere, those principles serve to foster public confidence in an objective and transparent justice system, one of the foundations of a democratic society ( see Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, § 37, 1 July 2003; Tatishvili v. Russia , no. 1509/02, § 58, ECHR 2007 ‑ I; and Taxquet , cited above).

61 . Seeing that compliance with the requirements of a fair trial must be assessed on the basis of the proceedings as a whole and in the specific context of the legal system concerned, the Court ’ s task in reviewing the absence of a reasoned verdict is to determine whether, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, the proceedings afforded sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness and made it possible for the accused to understand why he was found guilty ( see Taxquet , cited above , § 93). Such procedural safeguards may include, for example, directions or guidance provided by the presiding judge to the jurors on the legal issues arising or the evidence adduced, and precise, unequivocal questions put to the jury by the judge, forming a framework on which the verdict is based and sufficiently offsetting the fact that no reasons are given for the jury ’ s answers. Regard must also be had to any avenues of appeal open to the accused (see Papon v. France ( dec. ), no. 54210/00, ECHR 2001-XII; Taxquet , cited above , § 69; and Lhermitte , cited above, § 68). In this regard the Court must bear in mind that it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies ( see Taxquet , cited above , § 93 ; Lhermitte , cited above , § 69 ; and Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 21980/04, § 126, ECHR 2017).

62 . The Court notes that although the present case concerns an assize court it is distinguishable from comparable cases brought before it in the past in that the court in question did not sit with a lay jury, but in a special composition made up exclusively of professional judges. Accordingly, irrespective of the terminology used, the issue of the absence of reasons does not arise in the context of the involvement of a lay jury.

63 . The fact remains that no reasons were given for the Assize Court of Appeal judgment of 13 October 2009, just as was the case with judgments of the assize courts sitting with a lay jury prior to the enactment of Law no. 2011-939 of 10 August 2011 (see Agnelet , cited above; Oulahcene v. France , no. 44446/10 , 10 January 2013; Fraumens v. France , no. 30010/10 , 10 January 2013; Legillon v. France , no. 53406/10 , 10 January 2013; Voica v. France , no. 60995/09 , 10 January 2013; and Matis v . France ( d e c. ), no. 43699/13, 6 October 2015), which also applied to special assize courts.

64 . Consequently, while stressing that in proceedings before professional judges the domestic courts must indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they base their decisions, the Court reiterates that the extent of the duty to give reasons varies according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumsta nces of the case (see paragraph 59 above). It therefore considers it relevant, in view of the specific features of these proceedings – which are broadly similar to proceedings involving a lay jury – to examine the applicant ’ s complaint in the light of the principles established in its judgment in Taxquet (cited above; see also Agnelet , Oulahcene , Fraumens , Legillon and Voica , all cited above , and Lhermitte , cited above ).

65 . The Court observes at the outset that all defendants in French criminal proceedings, like the applicant, are provided with certain information and afforded certain safeguards: the indictment, or the judgment of the i nvestigation d ivision in the case of an appeal, is read out in full by the clerk at the trial in the a ssize c ourt; the charges are read out and are then the subject of adversarial argument, each item of evidence being examined and the accused being assisted by counsel; the judges and jury withdraw to deliberate immediately after the oral proceedings have ended and the questions have been read out, without having access to the case file; accordingly, their decision can only be based on the evidence examined by the parties during the trial. Furthermore, the decisions of the assize courts are subject to review by an enlarged assize court of appeal , made up of nine judges compared with seven at first instance in the case of a special assize court (see, in particular, Agnelet , cited above, § 63).

66 . With regard to the combined impact of the indictment and the questions to the Assize Court in the present case, the Court notes firstly that the applicant was not the only accused and that the case was a complex one.

67 . Furthermore, the three judgments committing the applicant for trial had a limited impact since they were delivered before the oral proceedings , which formed the crucial part of the trial . The Court nevertheless notes that each of these judgments concerned a different attack and that the reasoning was particularly thorough with regard to the charges, setting out the events in a very detailed manner. Moreover, the accused had already had an opportunity during the first-instance proceedings to assess the charges against him in depth and to put forward a defence. Besides the fact that the judgments committing the applicant for trial continued to form the basis for the charges against him in the Assize Court of Appeal proceedings, the oral proceedings at first instance had afforded him a more detailed insight into the charges against him and the grounds on which he was liable to be convicted on appeal.

68 . A total of sixty-three questions were asked concerning the applicant , of which twenty-six related to the events surrounding the attack of 25 July 1995, eighteen to the events surrounding the attack of 6 October 1995 and nineteen to the attack of 17 October 1995. The answer was “yes ” , by a majority , in the case of sixty-one of them ( some questions, followed by a list of victims and requiring an individual reply in each case, were also found partly “devoid of purpose”), and two questions were found to be “devoid of purpose” (see paragraph 40 above). The Court notes in particular that, besides details of the places and dates concerned in each instance and an indication of the victims according to the damage suffered (death, mutilation or permanent disability, temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days and of a maximum of eight days, destruction of or damage to property), the questions related in particular to whether or not the applicant ’ s actions had been premeditated (questions nos. 2, 8, 28 and 46), and to incitement of others to commit certain acts (questions nos. 5, 11, 20, 25, 31, 36, 43, 49, 57 and 62), the assistance lent by the applicant to the perpetrators of the attacks (questions nos. 10, 19, 24, 30, 35, 42, 48, 56 and 61) and whether the applicant had issued instructions to others to commit certain crimes (questions nos. 6, 12, 21, 26, 32, 37, 44, 50, 58 and 63). The Court considers tha t, owing to their number and precision, these questions formed a framework on which to base the verdict ( see , mutatis mutandis , Papon v . France (no. 2) ( d e c. ), no. 54210/00, ECHR 2001 ‑ XII). It further notes that, while the applicant objected to the manner in which they were drafted (see paragraph 53 above), he did not seek either to amend them or to ask other question s (see, mutatis mutandis , Lhermitte , cited above, § 79).

69 . Accordingly, in the light of the combined examination of the three judgments committing the applicant for trial , which were particularly thoroughly reasoned, the oral proceedings to which he had access both at first instance and on appeal, and the numerous and precise questions put to the Assize Court, the applicant could not claim to have been unaware of the reasons for his conviction.

70 . In sum, the Court considers that in the instant case the applicant was afforded sufficient safeguards enabling him to understand why he was found guilty (compare, mutatis mutandis , Legillon , cited above, § 67; Voica , cited above , § 53 ; and Bodein v. France , no. 40014/10 , § 42, 13 November 2014). The Court nevertheless welcomes the fact that the reforms introduced since the material time, with the enactment of Law no. 2011-939 of 10 August 2011 requiring a “statement of reasons form” to be drawn up (see Legillon , § 68; Voica , § 54; and Bodein , § 43, all cited above) , also applies to special assize courts (see paragraph 63 above).

71 . It follows that there has been no violation of A rticle 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL No. . 7

72 . The applicant contended that he had been prosecuted and convicted twice for identical facts, in view of his final conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006. He relied on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, which provides:

“1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.

2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case.

3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention.”

73 . The Government contested that argument .

...

B. Merits

1. The parties ’ submissions

( a) The applicant

75 . The applicant maintained that it was clear from the Court ’ s case-law that the facts to be assessed should be understood to refer to the behaviour or conduct of which he had been accused before the criminal courts and subsequently before the assize courts. In his view, the criminal acts referred to in the Investigation Division ’ s judgments were encompassed in the f acts on the basis of which he was finally convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006.

76 . In his application and his observations in reply to those of the Government, the applicant raised arguments regarding the funding operations and telephone calls. In particular, with regard first of all to the attack of 25 July 1995, he stressed that the transfer of a sum of GBP 5,000 referred to in the judgment of 3 August 2001 was also taken into consideration in the Paris Court of Appeal judgment of 18 December 2006. In the applicant ’ s view, the transfer of the sum of GBP 6,945 referred to in the Investigation Division ’ s judgment of 3 August 2001 should be regarded as being encompassed in the facts of the judgment of 18 December 2006, which had taken into account all the material acts committed by the applicant in connection with his role in funding the preparation s for the attacks.

77 . As to the telephone calls of 24 July 1995 referred to in the judgment of 3 August 2001 committing the applicant for trial, but not mentioned in the judgment of 18 December 2006, the applicant noted that in the latter judgment the Paris Court of Appeal had convicted him specifically on account of his role as coordinator of the GIA ’ s external activities, finding that the existence of an information hub in London which he had allegedly managed was demonstrated by the correlation between the telephone calls and the attacks. The calls of 24 July were thus inextricably linked to the calls made by the applicant in his role as coordinator of the various attacks.

78 . The same was true of the calls of 26 September and 22 October 1995 referred to by the Government. Although they were not mentioned in the judgment of 18 December 2006, the applicant maintained that they were inextricably linked to the other calls.

( b) The Government

79 . In the Government ’ s submission, the applicant had not been convicted on the basis of the same facts since he had been charged with separate offences, the elements of which were different . The facts in respect of which the applicant had been sentenced to ten years ’ imprisonment by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006 were not identical, or substantially the same, as those for which the special Assize Court of Appeal sentenced him to life imprisonment on 13 October 2009. In particular, the Paris Court of Appeal had examined the applicant ’ s involvement in the conspiracy, whereas the special Assize Court had tried him on charges of aid ing and abett ing the attacks of 25 July, 6 October and 17 October 1995. In the Government ’ s view, the facts were therefore different in the two sets of proceedings . In the criminal court proceedings , the applicant had been charged with membership of a terrorist group, whereas the special Assize Court had tried him for specific acts consisting of aiding and abetting the carrying-out of terrorist attacks. Moreover, each of the sentences passed was deemed to cover the concurrent offences, subject to the statutory limit applicable to each one.

80 . In the alternative, if the Court were to consider that the facts should be understood to mean the behaviour or conduct with which the applicant had been charged by the criminal courts and subsequently by the assize courts, the Government submitted that these were likewise not identical or substantially the same. For instance, the judgment of 18 December 2006 had not mention ed certain facts that were taken into consideration subsequently.

2. The Court ’ s assessment

( a) General principles

82 . The guarantee enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 becomes relevant on commencement of a new prosecution, where a prior acquittal or conviction has already acquired the force of res judicata . At this juncture the available material will necessarily comprise the decision by which the first “penal procedure” was concluded and the list of charges levelled against the applicant in the new proceedings. Normally, these documents would contain a statement of facts concerning both the offence for which the applicant has already been tried and the offence of which he or she stands accused. Such statements of fact are an appropriate starting-point for the Court ’ s determination of the issue whether the facts in both proceedings were identical or substantially the same. It is irrelevant which parts of the new charges are eventually upheld or dismissed in the subsequent proceedings, because Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 contains a safeguard against being tried or being liable to be tried again in new proceedings rather than a prohibition on a second conviction or acquittal (see Sergey Zolotukhin , cited above, § 83).

83 . The Court ’ s inquiry should therefore focus on the facts set out in these statements , which constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the same defendant and inextricably linked together in time and space, the existence of which must be demonstrated in order to secure a conviction or institute criminal proceedings (see Sergey Zolotukhin , cited above, § 84).

( b) Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case

85 . The Court notes at the outset that the judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal of 18 December 2006, convicting the applicant following criminal proceedings, became final on 14 March 2007 when his appeal on points of law was dismissed (see paragraph 27 above). From that point onwards, therefore, the applicant was to be considered as having already been finally convicted of an offence for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.

86 . The proceedings coming within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, which reflected the procedural choice made by the judicial authorities and gave rise to the judgments of February, August and November 2001 committing the applicant for trial , and which resulted in the applicant ’ s conviction by the special Assize Court on 26 October 2007 and on 13 October 2009, were not discontinued.

88 . As regards the proceedings in the criminal courts, the Court notes that the Criminal Court took care to present the facts in detail in its judgment of 29 March 2006. After setting the case in context and assessing the evidence against the applicant (see paragraphs 19-20 above), it found that his involvement in a criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise was established, as the judicial investigation had shown that several terrorist groups were based in the Lyons region, in Paris and in Lille and that the applicant ’ s contacts with the various members of these GIA support networks, who had the shared goal of carrying out attacks, were sufficient to establish his conscious and deliberate participation in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts on French soil. In its judgment the Criminal C ourt set out the facts demonstrating the applicant ’ s links to eight members of t hese groups and found that by providing funding and issuing propaganda on behalf of the GIA, the applicant had helped to strengthen the networks spread over several European countries (see paragraphs 21-22 above).

89 . The Court further notes that in its judgment of 18 December 2006 the Paris Court of Appeal gave reasons explaining its approach. It began by giving details of the telephone calls demonstrating the existence of an information hub in London which was allegedly managed by the applicant. Hence, it referred to the calls made the day after the killing of the imam S. in Paris; two days before the attack on the Saint-Michel suburban rail station; on the day of that attack and the day after the attempted attack on the Paris-Lyon high-speed railway line at Cailloux-sur-Fontaines ; on 12 September 1995, a few days after the attack of 3 September on Boulevard Richard Lenoir in Paris, the attempted attack of 4 September on Place Charles Vallin in Paris and the attack of 7 September in rue Jean ‑ Claude Vivand in Villeurbanne; the day after the shooting at the Col de Maleval and the arrest of three people; f ive days before the attack of 6 October and two days after it; on 16 October 1995, in other words just before the attack of 17 October; and, finally, on 1 November 1995, immediately after a telephone conversation between B.B. and S.A.B. concerning preparations for an attack on the Wazemmes market in Lille, with B.B. stating that the purpose of the call was to report to the applicant on the “final preparations” for the Lille attack ( see paragraph 23 above ). The Court notes that the Paris Court of Appeal went on to list the items of factual evidence pointing to the applicant ’ s involvement as the supervisor of a structure set up to fund the GIA ’ s activities in France . It referred to the funds sent by the applicant on 16 October 1995 under a false name and received by B.B.; the payment by the applicant of GBP 5,000 and FRF 50,000; and statements from several individuals concerning services offered in return for payment, fundraising and money transfer s (see paragraph 24 above). The Court of Appeal also referred to a series of facts demonstrating, firstly, that the applicant had been the main contact person in organising and carrying out the GIA ’ s activities in Europe, as was clear in particular from a telephone conversation of 2 December 1995, from the statements of a witness who was a GIA member, and from the detailed content of several documents seized in London (press statements, authorisations to conduct the jihad, documents on the management of funds, articles and handwritten notes on the activities of Islamist groups in Europe and anti-terrorist activities, notes on military weapons and the handling of explosives, and so on); secondly, that he had been the GIA ’ s main propaganda agent outside Algeria (in view of his role on the magazine Al Ansar as established by documents seized at the applicant ’ s London address, namely a note on how to make the magazine more dynamic , a letter explaining the means of distributing it, a piece of computer equipment which the applicant would have been unable to afford, letters from readers and GIA sympathisers, a large number of magazines detailing the GIA ’ s ideas and violent actions, a substantial amount of correspondence relating to Algerian and Islamic issues, some testimonies , and a list of post-office boxes in numerous countries, used by the magazine ’ s subscribers); thirdly, that he had been at the centre of the London cell which also served as a rallying point for young recruits passing through; and fourthly, that he had bee n a leader with a strategic role in the GIA ’ s external organisation, as demonstrated by his links to members and correspondents of other Islamist terrorist groups worldwide (see paragraph 25 above).

90 . Lastly, the Court notes that the Court of Appeal cited as reasons for its judgment the decisive role knowingly played by the applicant in the external structure set up in Europe by the GIA with the aim of overthrowing the Algerian regime. This involved creating networks in Belgium and France in particular in order to provide support to the Algerian guerrillas by supplying weapons, munitions and various items of equipment, supplying jihadists and providing safe havens to fighters who were fleeing the Algerian maquis or had arrived to c arry out attacks (see paragraph 26 above).

91 . As regards the assize court proceedings, the Court notes that the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal, in three judgments of 13 February, 3 August and 27 November 2001, committed the applicant for trial before the Paris Assize Court on charges of aiding and abetting the crimes committed during the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995 (see paragraphs 28-29 above). It observes that these judgments, which in this instance concerned specific criminal conduct aimed at the achievement of precise objectives represented by each of the attacks carried out in Paris on 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, set out the factual evidence forming the basis for the applicant ’ s prosecution and his committal for trial before the Assize Court. In particular, the applicant was charged, in relation to these three attacks, with transmitting instructions from the GIA ordering the attacks to be carried out with explosives and relaying to the GIA leadership operational information provided by the perpetrators of the attacks , and with issuing instructions for making the explosive device s to his accomplices in Paris, while procuring for them the funds needed to manufacture the explosive s and make all the logistical arrangements for preparing and carrying out these particular attacks (see paragraph 30 above).

92 . The Court observes that the Investigation Division ’ s judgments listed the following specific facts in particular . The three mobile phones used by the applicant had received calls from B.B., one of the main organisers in Paris and one of the perpetrators of the attacks, on 16 and 22 October and 1 November 1995; a receipt for an excha nge transaction performed on 16 October 1995 for an amount of FRF 36,800 had been discovered at B.B. ’ s home, together with a notice of transfer for FRF 38,000; the applicant ’ s fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union office in the Londis shop; the words “LYESO – FF 36,600” had been found in the credit column of B.B. ’ s accounts and the words “West Union” and “West-Union Bank” had also been entered by B.B. in a document logging the details of the 17 October attack; the applicant had possessed the details of the Western Union branch in rue du Cloître in the Notre-Dame district of Paris; an exchange receipt dated 21 July 1995, for an amount of GBP 5,000 exchanged in London at a rate of 7.5%, had been found at the applicant ’ s home, with the number of a public payphone in Corbeil-Essonnes used by one of the perpetrators of the attacks written on the back , and an entry had been made in the credit column of B.B. ’ s accounts; a sum of GBP 6,945 had been sent on 20 July 1995; and between 20 and 25 July 1995 the sum of FRF 300 had been entered as expenditure for the purchase of a “GB ticket”, demonstrating that the funds, after being exchanged in England, had been transported to Paris in the days leading up to the attack at the Saint-Michel suburban rail station. The judges also noted, as evidence against the applicant, the content of a hard disk found in a London flat to which the applicant had had keys, containing two financial reports , one relating to the activities of the GIA in Belgium and the other to a set of accounts for the period from September 1994 to 1 November 1995, the date of B.B. ’ s arrest (see paragraph 31 above).

93 . The Court also notes that the Investigation Division emphasised certain factual elements specific to the different attacks. For instance, in its judgment of 13 February 2001 concerning the attack of 17 October 1995 it stressed the fact that the applicant ’ s three telephone numbers had been called repeatedly from payphones used by B.B., around the time of the different attacks and in particular on the day before the attack of 17 October 1995, in order to report to the applicant on the preparations under way. The Investigation Division also highlighted the fact that the transfer of FRF 36,800 made from London the day before the attack of 17 October 1995 was directly linked to that attack (see paragraph 32 above). In its judgment of 3 August 2001 concerning the attack of 25 July 1995, the Investigation Division stressed that a call had been made to the applicant ’ s English mobile phone two days before the attack from a public payphone in Paris close to B.B. ’ s home which had also been used to contact another GIA member in France . T he day before the attack and then on the day itself, the applicant had received calls from France on his various numbers, including from a payphone close to the previous one, concerning his role as an intermediary between the perpetrators of the attacks and the person masterminding them in Algeria. Furthermore , the applicant had on 2 and 20 July 1995 sent sums of GBP 5,000 and GBP 6,945 respectively which were directly linked to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995 (see paragraph 33 above) . Finally, in its judgment of 27 November 2001 concerning the attack of 6 October 1995, the Investigation Division noted that the instructions issued by the GIA concerning the campaign of attacks , which had been accompanied by advice on the manufacture of explosives, had been transmitted via the applicant, who had been required to account for the use of the sums he had provided and had also been kept informed of the progress of the attacks, and in particular of the attack of 6 October 1995 by means of a telephone call of 8 October 1995 (see paragraph 34 above). The Assize Court went on to find that he had knowingly assisted in the manufacture or possession of explosive devices and issued instructions to that effect , in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, and had knowingly incited others to manufacture or possess such devices in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 17 October 1995 (see paragraph 41 above).

95 . The Court therefore concludes that the applicant was not prosecuted or convicted in the assize court proceedings on the basis of facts that were substantially the same as those that were the subject of his final conviction by the criminal courts.

96 . Lastly, the Court reiterates that it is legitimate for Contracting States to take a firm stand against those who contribute to terrorist acts, which it cannot condone in any circumstances (see, in particular, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 126, ECHR 2009; Ismoilov and Others v. Russia , no. 2947/06, § 126, 24 April 2008; and Daoudi v. France , no. 19576/08, § 65, 3 December 2009). Moreover, the applicant was convicted by the Assize Court not just on the basis of facts that differed from those for which he had been convicted in the first set of proceedings, but also for the crimes of aiding and abetting murder and attempted murder. The Court emphasises that these offences constitute serious violations of fundamental rights under Article 2 of the Convention, whose perpetrators States are required to prosecute and punish (see, mutatis mutandis , Marguš v. Croatia [GC] , no. 4455/10, §§ 127-28, ECHR 2014 (extracts) ) , provided that the procedural guarantees of the persons concerned are complied with (compare, in particular and mutatis mutandis , Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others , § 252, ECHR 2016), as they were in the applicant ’ s case.

97 . In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that there has been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT , UNANIMOUSLY,

...

2 . Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3 . Holds that there has been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 .

Done in French , and notified in writing on 19 December 2017 , pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Mi l an Bla š ko Angelika Nußberger Deputy Registrar President