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N. v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 11315/84 • ECHR ID: 001-560

Document date: March 3, 1986

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  • Cited paragraphs: 0
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N. v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 11315/84 • ECHR ID: 001-560

Document date: March 3, 1986

Cited paragraphs only



The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 3 March 1986, the following members being present:

              MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

                  J. A. FROWEIN

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  B. KIERNAN

                  A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J. C. SOYER

                  H. G. SCHERMERS

                  G. BATLINER

             Mrs.  G. H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

              Mr.  H. C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Art. 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Art. 25);

Having regard to the application introduced on 6 March 1984 by

B.N. against Sweden and registered on 27 December 1984

under file N° 11315/84;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows:

The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1960.  She is a student

and resides at Skottorp, Sweden.  Before the Commission she is

represented by her lawyer, Mr. Einar Höier Harksen, Göteborg, Sweden.

In the applicant's parents' bankruptcy proceedings, certain estate

inventory lists were submitted to the official receiver.  Due to

certain doubts as to the correctness of the inventory lists, he

requested the District Court judge dealing with the matter to hear the

applicant under oath according to Section 93, para. 2 of the

Bankruptcy Act of 1921 as to the inventory of the estate.

Section 93 para. 2 reads:

"Other persons than the debtor are obliged at the request of the

official receiver or a creditor to take an estate inventory oath or

under oath to confirm certain particulars in the estate inventory if

such statements may be presumed to be of importance for the

administration of the estate in bankruptcy."

The applicant, however, refused to submit any such statements under

oath, referring to the fact that she could not submit further

information of any relevance and secondly because of the family

relationship between the parties.  The question was thus brought

before the District Court of Varberg (Varbergs tingsrätt), which,

decided on 31 March 1983 that the applicant should submit a statement

under oath since it found that such a statement would appear to be of

importance for the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings.

The applicant appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal

for Western Sweden (Hovrätten för Västra Sverige) relying inter alia

on the argument that the request was merely based on a wish to harm

the family and not necessary for the bankruptcy proceedings.  On 25

May 1983 the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal without stating any

further reasons.  The applicant subsequently asked the Supreme Court

(Högsta Domstolen) for leave to appeal against this decision referring

to her submission before the lower instances and also pointing out

inter alia that her mother's health would be in jeopardy should she -

the applicant - be forced to submit the statement requested.  The

Supreme Court refused leave to appeal on 30 September 1983.

The case was thereafter resumed in the District Court and facing

possible fines or even detention in accordance with Section 94 para. 2

of the Bankruptcy Act, the applicant submitted on 21 December 1983,

under oath, the statement requested.  The applicant informed the Court

that she did not have any specific knowledge of the now bankrupt

estate, that she had had the possibility of examining the inventory

lists carefully and that, according to her knowledge, there were no

further liabilities or assets in the estate concerned. Finally, she

had no remarks or changes to add to the inventory lists.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant alleges that the Swedish courts have violated her right

to respect for private and family life by forcing her to submit a

statement under oath in relation to her parents' bankruptcy

proceedings.  She claims that she thereby has been forced to act

against her parents and their interests.  She invokes Art. 8 of the

Convention (Art. 8).

THE LAW

The applicant complains that the application of Section 93 para. 2 of

the Bankruptcy Act of 1921 in the present case violated her right to

respect for her private and family life secured to her under Art. 8,

para. 1 of the Convention (Art. 8-1) which reads as follows:

"1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family

life, his home and his correspondence."

The Commission recalls that regulations concerning the right to refuse

to testify in criminal cases against a close relative are common in

the legal systems of many Contracting States.  Regulations of this

kind are designed to avoid putting the witness in the dilemma of

making declarations damageable to a member of his family.  Such

regulations are inspired by the respect for family life which is

required by Art. 8 of the Convention (Art. 8) (cf. Unterpertinger

v. Austria, Comm. Report 11.10.84, para. 79).

In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant was

forced to make a statement under oath in proceedings in which her

parents had been declared bankrupt and concerning the estate inventory

now administered by an official receiver.  In the statement submitted

the applicant informed the Court that she did not have any specific

knowledge of the estate, that she had carefully examined the inventory

lists and that she had no further remarks as to their correctness. The

Commission finds that these circumstances do not reveal any

interference with the applicant's right to respect for her private and

family life as secured to her under Art. 8, para. 1 of the Convention

(Art. 8-1).

It follows, therefore, that the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Art. 27, para. 2 of the Convention (Art. 27-2).

For this reason, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission               President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER)                              (C.A. NØRGAARD)

© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu, 1998 - 2026

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