The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 12 May

1986, the following members being present:

                   MM C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                      G. SPERDUTI

                      J.A. FROWEIN

                      F. ERMACORA

                      E. BUSUTTIL

                      G. JÖRUNDSSON

                      G. TENEKIDES

                      S. TRECHSEL

                      B. KIERNAN

                      A. WEITZEL

                      J.C. SOYER

                      H.G. SCHERMERS

                      H. DANELIUS

                      G. BATLINER

                  Mrs G.H. THUNE

                  Sir Basil HALL

Mr H.C. KRÃœGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 17 June 1980 by J.M.

against the Federal Republic of Germany and registered on 3 February

1982 under file No. 9701/82;

Having regard to:

- the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the

Commission;

- the decision of 14 May 1984 to communicate the application for

observations on its admissibility and merits;

- the respondent Government's observations of 30 October 1984 and the

applicant's replies of 5 and 20 May 1985;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, a lawyer working as a civil servant in a Federal

ministry, is a German citizen, born in 1935 and living in Bonn.

He complains of the length of proceedings in which the question had to

be determined whether he or his ex-wife should be granted the parental

right to care and custody over their two sons, who were born in 1968

and 1969 respectively.

The couple separated in 1971 when the mother, of Austrian nationality,

left the applicant and returned to her home country taking with her

the two children.

Divorce proceedings were instituted in the same year. Eventually the

divorce was pronounced by the Cologne Court of Appeal

(Oberlandesgericht) in second instance and the divorce judgment of 4

February 1974 became final on 3 May 1974.  According to the appellate

court's judgment both parties were guilty of the divorce but the

wife's guilt was predominant.

Parallel to the divorce proceedings the Guardianship Court

(Vormundschaftsgericht) at Bonn first had to regulate the applicant's

right of access (Umgangsrecht).  On 21 May 1971 the applicant also

requested that he be granted the right to determine where the children

should live (Aufenthaltsbestimmungsrecht).  On 28 May 1971 the

Guardianship Court heard the parents and their counsels on this

request.  The parties declared at the hearing that all problems would

first be discussed between their legal representatives and that the

guardianship proceedings should consequently be suspended.

Referring to his previous request of 21 May 1971, on 5 May 1972 the

applicant submitted a request asking the Guardianship Court to grant

him the provisional right to care and custody over both children

pending the divorce proceedings.

This request was based on Sections 1672 (1) and 1666 of the Civil Code

(BGB).  He alleged that the manner in which his wife treated the

children was a danger for their physical and mental well-being.  He

also complained that his wife had not respected orders he had obtained

previously concerning his right of access.

---------------

(1) This Section provides that in case of separation of parents the

court decides at the request of one of them on the provisional

attribution of the right to care and custody. This question is

determined according to what is in the best interest of the

child(ren).

---------------

On 14 July 1972 the Guardianship Court obtained a report of the Youth

Office (Jugendamt) Völkermarkt/Austria about the living conditions of

the children.  On 15 February 1973 the Guardianship Court obtained a

further report of the Bonn Youth Office.  On 4 April 1973 the

Guardianship Court granted the right of care and custody to the

mother.  The applicant appealed.  His appeal was rejected on 8 June

1973 by the Bonn Regional Court.  The applicant lodged a further

appeal.  On 9 November 1973 the Cologne Court of Appeal quashed the

Regional Court's decision of 8 June 1973 and sent the case back for

re-examination by the Regional Court.

According to the Court of Appeal the applicant had submitted evidence

tending to show that the Austrian Youth Office's Report was not based

on a thorough and personal investigation on the spot.  The appellate

court therefore considered it necessary that the Regional Court

investigate further and in more detail the children's living

conditions in Austria and the question of the mother's aptness to

bring up the children.

The proceedings under Section 1672 BGB were terminated without further

decision as on 3 May 1974 the divorce became final.

Subsequently the Guardianship Court had to decide under Section 1971

of the Civil Code (BGB) to whom of the divorced parents the parental

right to care and custody was to be awarded.  On 19 June 1974 the

court charged Dr. K to submit an expert opinion on the question

whether either of the parents had had a negative influence on the

development of the children.  In July 1974 the court received a report

from the Bonn Youth Office.  On 12 November 1974 Dr. K submitted an

expert opinion suggesting leaving the children in the care of the

mother.  The applicant criticised the expert opinion and requested the

court not to base its decision thereon.  He requested that a further

expert should be heard.  On 23 May 1975 Dr. V was charged by the

court to submit an expert opinion.  In September 1975 the court

received another report from the Bonn Youth Office.

In October 1975 Dr. V submitted his expert opinion.  He considered it

best for the children if the mother continued to take care of them.

In April 1976 the court requested the International Social Service to

obtain a report on the children's living conditions in Austria.  In

July 1976 the court received a report of the competent Austrian Youth

Office.  As the report was in favour of the mother it was objected to

by the applicant who requested that supplementary investigations be

carried out in Austria.  Furthermore the applicant requested another

expert opinion from a psychologist.  Supplementary information from

the Austrian Youth Office was obtained in October 1976.  On 29 October

1976 the court heard the parties, the experts Dr. V and Dr. K and a

representative of the Bonn Youth Office.  The applicant challenged the

expert Dr. K and again suggested obtaining the expert opinion of a

psychologist.  The motion of challenge was rejected.  Subsequently the

court tried to find another expert (psychologist) in agreement with

the parties, although Dr. V had declared at the oral hearing that no

relevant new results could be expected from a further expert opinion

and further examination would only affect the children.  Eventually an

expert, Dr. W, was found and instructed on 27 May 1977.

On 1 July 1977 the Bonn Family Court (Familiengericht) became

competent to deal with the case, due to a change of legislation.

In February 1978 the applicant suggested that Dr. W should prepare his

expert opinion in consultation with an expert on diabetes, as one of

his sons (Markus) is suffering from diabetes.

On 31 May 1978 the Family Court consequently appointed Dr. B to submit

a supplementary expert opinion.  He submitted an interim report on 28

June 1978.  On 27 June 1978 Dr. W submitted her expert opinion stating

there were no coercive reasons to commit the children either to their

father or to their mother.  On 7 August 1978 the court heard the

children, the parents and a representative of the Bonn Youth Office.

On 21 August 1978 the court heard counsels for the parents and the

expert Dr. W.  On 26 September 1978 the Family Court granted the

mother the right of care and custody.

The applicant lodged an appeal.  On 24 November 1978 the applicant,

who had already changed counsel several times, informed the court that

he chose another counsel.  Counsel requested to be given time to study

the voluminous files.  On 26 March 1979 the applicant's counsel,

having repeatedly obtained extensions of the time-limit, eventually

submitted further reasons for the appeal.  Observations by both

parties were exchanged throughout July to September 1979.  On 29

September 1979 the Court of Appeal decided to obtain further evidence.

In February 1980 the court received a further report of the Austrian

Youth Office.  On 27 May 1980 the appellate court heard the parties

and the children and the expert Dr. W.  Both children stated that they

liked living in Austria and wanted to stay there.  They also stated

that they wished the applicant's right of access regulated in a

generous manner.  On 24 June 1980 the applicant's appeal was dismissed

in so far as it concerned the right to care and custody.  The Court of

Appeal, however, amended the Family Court's decision in so far as it

concerned the applicant's right of access.

The principal events in the proceedings concerning the right to care

and custody are set out in the attached annex.

The applicant lodged two constitutional complaints.  The first

concerned decisions given by the Cologne Court of Appeal on 31 January

1975 confirming that the provisional regulation of 4 April 1973

transferring the right to care and custody to the mother remained

valid until a new order was given in this respect after the divorce.

This complaint was rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court

(Bundesverfassungsgericht) on 1 June 1976 as offering no prospects of

success.  The second complaint concerned the appellate court's

decision of 24 June 1980 and the length of the proceedings.  It was

dismissed on 23 July 1981 again as offering no prospects of success.

The court considered that the length of the proceedings was

sufficiently explained by the particular difficulties of the case

(.. weil der Fall besondere Schwierigkeiten bot, die sich zeitlich

auswirken mussten).

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains of the length of the proceedings concerning

the right to care and custody.

He invokes Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Referring to Article 8 para. 1 (art. 8-1) of the Convention, he also

complains that as a result of the duration of the proceedings up to 26

September 1978 he and his children had been deprived of the right to

respect for family life without there being a judicial decision or a

legal basis justifying this situation.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The applicant first wrote to the Commission's Secretariat on 17 June

1980 stating that he intended to complain about the length of

proceedings concerning the right to parental care and custody.  In

reply he was sent an application form on 15 July 1980 and requested to

submit copies of the decisions given in the proceedings concerned.  He

did not reply to this letter until 20 January 1982 when he returned

the application form.

On 14 May 1984 the Commission decided to communicate the application

for observations on its admissibility and merits.  The respondent

Government's observations dated 30 October 1984 were received on 9

November 1984.  The applicant submitted replies on 5 May 1985 and 20

May 1985.  He stated in his letter of 20 May 1985 that he would submit

further observations.  However, no such further observations were

received.

SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' OBSERVATIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND MERITS

The respondent Government

The respondent Government have submitted a detailed history of the

proceedings in question which is reflected in the summary of the

principal events attached to this decision.

1.      The respondent Government argue that the proceedings

concerning the provisional attribution under Section 1672 of the Civil

Code (BGB) of the right to care and custody pending the divorce are

distinct from the subsequent proceedings after the divorce.  The

proceedings concerning Section 1672 BGB were started by the

applicant's request of 5 May 1972 and terminated when the divorce

became final, i.e. on 3 May 1974, or, at the latest, on 31 January

1975, when the Cologne Court of Appeal confirmed that the Guardianship

Court's order of 4 April 1973 provisionally attributing the right to

care and custody to the mother continued to be valid until a new

decision on the attribution of this right after the divorce was taken.

Consequently the application was, with regard to these proceedings,

lodged out of time.  In any event, the courts dealt with the various

motions and appeals lodged by the applicant and/or his ex-wife

respectively in an expeditious manner.

2.      As regards the proceedings concerning the attribution of the

right to care and custody after the divorce became final the

respondent Government point out that both the applicant and his

ex-wife lodged numerous requests concerning the right of access on the

one hand and the right of care and custody on the other hand.  The

proceedings concerning these different requests should not be

considered as an integrated whole.  The reasonableness of the length

of the proceedings in question therefore had to be judged in a more

differentiated manner than other court proceedings because the courts

were under the obligation at any time to review ex officio or at the

request of a parent whether a change of the factual situation

necessitated a change of the existing regulation concerning the

exercise of the right to care and custody.  In fact the applicant

repeatedly requested that he be granted the right to care and custody

by way of injunction.

The respondent Government argue that the length of the proceedings was

primarily caused by the parties, i.e. the applicant and his ex-wife.

In this connection it is pointed out

- that the applicant changed counsel eight times and that the new

counsels often requested extension of time-limits to submit

observations;

- that the parents disputed each other's right of access and right to

care and custody in an embittered manner and quarelled about every

detail concerning the right of access. Most of the time two instances

had to deal with these matters;

- that the files often had to be submitted to higher courts for

decision on the numerous appeals lodged in connection with the

disputes on the right of access;

- that the applicant repeatedly submitted private expert opinions or

criticised the official expert opinions if they did not confirm his

affirmation that he was best suited to raise the children;

- that the manner in which the experts should proceed was often in

dispute between the parents.  Therefore each of them repeatedly tried

to have the regulations concerning the right of access changed

believing thereby to create more favourable conditions in view of the

preparation of the expert opinion.

As regards the handling of the case by the courts the respondent

Government consider that the history of the proceedings prove that at

no stage was the matter dealt with in an inappropriate or dilatory

manner.  The proceedings were rendered difficult by the extremely

controversial attitude of the parties.  As Youth Offices and experts

considered both of the parents apt to educate the children it was

absolutely necessary for the competent court to obtain thorough and

complete knowledge of all circumstances in order to decide what was

best for the well-being of the children.

Finally the respondent Government submit that by complaining of the

length of the proceedings the applicant in reality tried once more to

question the decision attributing to his wife the right to care and

custody.  There was, however, nothing to show that this decision was

arbitrary and was not primarily motivated by the necessity to assure

the children's well-being.

The applicant

The applicant argues that the proceedings concerning the request under

Section 1671 of the Civil Code (BGB) subsequent to the divorce were a

continuation of the proceedings concerning the request under Section

1672 BGB pending the divorce proceedings.  Therefore these two

proceedings should be considered as a whole having lasted from 5 May

1972 until 24 June 1980.  These long proceedings were a torture for

both children and parents.

The length of the proceedings could not be explained by the fact that

the right of access was likewise and repeatedly in dispute as these

disputes should have been settled in separate proceedings.  The

timetable of the proceedings showed that there were several periods of

inactivity of the court.  Between May 1972 and May 1974 the

Guardianship Court did not carry out all the investigations necessary

to decide on the attribution of the right to care and custody.  The

time from May 1974 to May 1977 was wasted for irrelevant

investigations.  As early as 1973 or 1974 the court should have

ordered that an expert opinion be submitted.  The court was not

responsible for the long-lasting preparation from May 1977 to June

1978 of the expert opinion, but the period from 8 November 1978 to 28

September 1979 was again marked by inactivity.  The appellate court

should and could have started investigations before the parties had

submitted their observations concerning the appeal.

As regards the alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the

Convention the applicant submits that from 4 April 1973 to 26

September 1978 he was unlawfully excluded from the exercise of the

right to care and custody.  He argues that the decision given by the

Cologne Court of Appeal on 9 November 1973 deprived the Guardianship

Court's order of 4 April 1973 of its legal basis.

THE LAW

The applicant complains of the length of the proceedings concerning

the decision on the attribution of the right to care and custody.

The proceedings in question were divided into two phases.  The first

phase concerned the period of the parents' separation pending the

divorce action necessitating a provisional regulation of the right to

care and custody.  The second phase concerned the period after the

divorce became final necessitating a new and distinct decision on the

attribution of the right to care and custody.

The applicant argues that both phases should be considered to form a

whole as both concerned the right to care and custody.  The Government

argue that the proceedings concerning the provisional attribution of

the right to care and custody pending the divorce action have to be

distinguished from the proceedings subsequent to the divorce.  The

Commission does not consider it necessary to decide this issue as in

any event it considers the applicant's complaint on the length of both

proceedings taken as a whole to be, for the following reasons,

manifestly ill-founded.

The period to be taken into consideration runs from 5 May 1972, when

the applicant submitted his request to be granted the right to care

and custody pending the divorce action, until 24 June 1980, when the

Cologne Court of Appeal confirmed the Bonn Family Court's decision of

26 September 1978 attributing to the mother the right to care and

custody over the applicant's two sons after the parents' divorce.  The

subsequent proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court no

longer concerned the determination of a "civil right" (cf. Eur. Court

H.R., Buchholz case, judgment of 6.5.81, Series A, Vol. 42, para. 48).

The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must be assessed

in each instance according to the particular circumstances, taking

specifically into account the complexity of the case, the conduct of

the applicant and the conduct of the judicial authorities (Eur. Court

H.R., Guincho case, judgment of 10.7.84, Series A, Vol. 81, paras. 31

et seq.).

It has already been established in the Court's jurisprudence that in

civil proceedings it is for the parties to take all appropriate steps

to further the expeditious conduct of the litigation (Guincho

judgment, loc. cit., para. 32).  Although the civil proceedings here

in question were not mainly in the hands of the parties, as the

Guardianship or Family Courts also had an obligation to investigate ex

officio in order to find out which solution was in the best interest

of the children, the Commission nevertheless considers that here too

particular attention and weight has to be attributed to the parties'

conduct.  In effect it is primarily the responsibility of the parents

to find themselves an agreement on the exercise of the parental right

of care and custody in case of a separation or divorce (see Section

1671 (3) of the Civil Code).  If a court has to be seized by one of

the parents to help solve this problem its primary task is of a

mediatory character.  If the question remains controversial between

the parents, the court has to investigate the matter thoroughly and to

take its decision.  Such decision is not taken on the basis of

predetermined, clear-cut conditions set up by the law but on the basis

of the court's discretionary appreciation of what is in the best

interest for the children concerned.

As regards complexity the Commission considers that the proceedings in

question were complicated in view of the fact that in addition to the

controversial issue relating to the parental right of care and custody

the judicial authorities constantly had to deal with the likewise

highly controversial issue relating to the right of access claimed by

the applicant.  Both issues necessitated that the German judicial

authorities repeatedly had to assess the given situation and find

interim solutions.  In addition the necessary investigations were

rendered difficult by the fact that the children were living with

their mother in Austria and reports had to be obtained via the

official channels, from the local Austrian Youth Office.  These

reports repeatedly had to be supplemented, following the applicant's

requests.  Furthermore the proceedings were rendered complicated by

the numerous appeals lodged by the parties and in particular the

applicant.

The applicant has, by his own conduct, not only rendered the

proceedings difficult, but his conduct was, in the Commission's

opinion, to a large extent the main cause for the length of the

proceedings. It follows from the attached survey of the main events of

the proceedings that the applicant, by appealing against practically

all decisions given in favour of his ex-wife, by complaining or

criticising all expert opinions and Youth Office's reports in so far

as they were in favour of attributing to or leaving to his ex-wife the

right to care and custody, prevented that a final decision could be

given in this respect before 24 June 1980.  It has also to be noted in

this context that the applicant changed counsel several times.

Although some of them continued the case immediately it is evident

that changes of counsel of such unusual frequency negatively affected

the course of proceedings and caused delays.  For example, the

applicant's counsel informed the Court of Appeal on 13 November 1978

that he intended to submit further observations.  Eventually these

observations were submitted, after repeated extensions of the time

limit, by another counsel on 26 March 1979.

It also has to be noted that the other party to the proceedings,

namely the applicant's ex-wife, like the applicant himself submitted

numerous requests, motions and appeals.  Both parties have thus by

their inflexible attitude multiplied the issues which had to be

determined.

As regards the conduct of the proceedings by the judicial authorities

it has first to be noted that in addition to the dispute on the right

to care and custody the courts repeatedly had to deal with disputes on

the right of access.  Both issues were by nature closely linked and it

was therefore appropriate to deal with them in the same proceedings.

Taking into account the difficulties which arose from the constant

disputes over the right of access, it cannot be found that there were

important periods of inactivity on the part of the judicial

authorities or that the matter was dealt with in an inappropriate,

dilatory manner.

After the applicant lodged his request of 5 May 1972 to be granted the

right to care and custody pending the divorce action, the Guardianship

Court first obtained a report of the Youth Office in

Völkermarkt/Austria on 14 July 1972.  From 13 July 1972 until 22

September 1972 the files were with the Regional Court.  In November

the Guardianship Court had to deal with a request concerning the right

of access.  Its order relating to this request was appealed against

and both the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal had to deal with

the matter.  After the return of the files from the Court of Appeal

the Guardianship Court sent the files to the Bonn Youth Office for a

report.  This report was received on 15 February 1973 and after an

exchange of written observations the applicant and his ex-wife were

heard by the court on 29 March 1973.  Subsequently the applicant asked

for another opportunity to submit written observations and on 4 April

1973 the Guardianship Court decided to attribute the right to care and

custody to the mother.

The applicant's appeal was rejected by the Regional Court on 8 June

1973.  This decision was then quashed by the Court of Appeal on 9

November 1973.

Neither the proceedings before the Guardianship Court, which decided

on the applicant's request of 5 May 1972 on 4 April 1973, i.e. within

eleven months, nor the appeal proceedings reveal in these

circumstances any undue delay for which the judicial authorities would

have to be held responsible.  The Commission notes in this context,

that while the Court of Appeal considered, particularly in the light

of the applicant's allegations, that further investigations were

necessary, mainly about the children's living conditions in Austria,

the reports obtained subsequently did not reveal anything justifying

the withdrawal of the right to care and custody from the mother.

As the applicant later, in the proceedings subsequent to the divorce,

which became final on 3 May 1974, considered that the Youth Offices'

reports obtained so far were insufficient and as the Guardianship

Court then had to take a fresh decision on the right to care and

custody in the light of the actual situation, the result of the prior

investigations which led to the Guardianship Court's order of 4 April

1973 could not serve as a basis for this new decision.

As soon as the Guardianship Court was informed that the divorce had

become final it chose, in agreement with the parties, an expert, Dr.

K, who was instructed in the same month, i.e. July 1974. This expert

submitted an expert opinion on 12 November 1974. Meanwhile, a report

of the Bonn Youth Office had been obtained.  As the applicant

criticised Dr. K's expert opinion and did not accept it as a basis for

the decision on the right to care and custody a new expert, Dr. V, was

instructed on 23 May 1975.  In the meantime the files had to be

submitted to the Court of Appeal and to the District Court of

Berlin-Schöneberg.  Furthermore disputes on the right of access had to

be settled.  Dr. V submitted his expert opinion in October 1975.

Although the expert considered both parents apt to raise the children

he recommended leaving them with the mother. Subsequently further

observations were submitted by the parties and further disputes on the

right of access had to be settled by the Guardianship Court.  As the

applicant also criticised Dr. V's expert opinion the court ordered in

April 1976 that a report of the competent Austrian Youth Office should

be obtained.  This report was sent back in October 1976 as the

applicant requested supplementary information.  At a hearing of 29

October 1976 the applicant requested that a further expert opinion be

obtained from a psychologist.  The expert Dr. V, who also attended the

hearing declared that no relevant new information could be expected

from  a further expert opinion while further examination would affect

the children.  The applicant then challenged the expert Dr. K.  This

motion was rejected in November 1976.  An appeal was to no avail.  At

the end of 1976 no disputes arose as regards the right of access.  As

the applicant insisted the Guardianship Court had to find another

expert.  An expert, who was accepted by both parties, was not found

until May 1977.  This expert, Dr. W, was also requested, in August

1977, to state an opinion with regard to the regulation of the right

of access and submitted her expert opinion on 27 June 1978.  Meanwhile

the expert had, following the applicant's suggestion, been requested

to contact a specialist for diabetes in view of the fact that the son

Markus suffered from diabetes, and needed special treatment.  The

preparation of the expert opinion also seems to have been delayed by

an illness of the expert and by the fact that the files were not

always available to the expert but had to be submitted to the Court of

Appeal.  In any event the applicant has not himself alleged that the

judicial authorities can be held responsible for the length of time it

took to prepare the expert opinion.

The parties were then heard on 21 August 1978, subsequently submitted

written observations and on 26 September 1978 the Family Court which

had been competent to deal with the case since 1 July 1977, decided to

grant the right to care and custody to the mother.

The Commission finds that the history of the proceedings before the

Guardianship Court and the Family Court subsequent to the divorce

likewise does not disclose any undue delays.  They are marked by the

courts' efforts to take account of the applicant's objections to the

evidence obtained in the course of the proceedings and of his requests

to investigate the matter further.  Had the courts disregarded the

applicant's cricitism and requests for obtaining further evidence a

decision could have been taken already at the end of 1974 after the

first expert, Dr. K, submitted a report on 12 November 1974 proposing

leaving the children with the mother.  Again, a decision could have

been taken after the Austrian Youth Office's report was received on 22

July 1976 suggesting leaving the children with the mother.

Nevertheless the competent court continued to investigate the matter

further at the applicant's request, which was maintained although the

second expert, Dr. V, even warned that no relevant new information

would be obtained but only damage be done to the children.

Finally the appeal proceedings which lasted from 29 September 1978,

when the applicant lodged his appeal, until 24 June 1980 can in no way

be considered to be unreasonably long taking into account that the

applicant's new counsel did not submit his conclusions before 26 March

1979, that the parties subsequently exchanged observations until

September 1979, that on 28 September 1979 the Court of Appeal decided

to take further evidence, that this evidence, namely a further report

of the competent Austrian Youth Office, was obtained on 20 February

1980, that subsequently the parties were given time to comment on this

report and were eventually heard, as well as the children, and the

expert Dr. W.

Having examined the complexity of the proceedings in question, their

conduct by the applicant and the judicial authorities and having

regard to the attached table of the main events, the Commission agrees

with the Federal Constitutional Court that the length of the

proceedings is explained by the particular difficulties of the case

and considers that both parents, but in particular the applicant, are

to a large extent responsible for the difficulties encountered by the

judicial authorities.  An examination of the complaint as it has been

submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the

rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and in particular in

Articles 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) and 8 para. 1 (art. 8-1).

It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of the Convention;

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission           President of the Commission

      (H.C. KRÜGER)                            (C.A. NØRGAARD)