The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

7 July 1986, the following members being present:

                      MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

                          G. SPERDUTI

                          J. A. FROWEIN

                          G. JÖRUNDSSON

                          S. TRECHSEL

                          B. KIERNAN

                          A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                          A. WEITZEL

                          J. C. SOYER

                          H. G. SCHERMERS

                          H. DANELIUS

                          G. BATLINER

                          J. CAMPINOS

                      Mrs G. H. THUNE

                      Sir Basil HALL

                      Mr. H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Art. 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 23 March 1984 by

U.L. against Sweden and registered on 13 April 1984 under

file No. 10911/84;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows:

The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1933.  He is a farming

supervisor by profession and resides at Stehag, Sweden. Before the

Commission the applicant is represented by Mr. Peter Nobel, of the

law firm Chrysander hb, Uppsala, Sweden.

In 1943 through the parcelling out of land under the Manor of Noor

about seventy building sites were formed at Knivsta, a small rural

centre situated approximately 15 kilometres south of Uppsala.  The

forming of the original sites followed a subdivision plan drawn up in

1942 and confirmed by the competent authority on 8 July 1943.

On 4 December 1969 the applicant and his wife purchased three of the

still vacant sites identified in the official land register as Noor

53:1, 54:1 and 55:1.  Later Noor 53:1 was divided into two lots, Noor

53:1 and 53:2.

The entire area acquired by the applicant and his wife covered roughly

10,000 square metres.  They owned it jointly.  The purpose was to sell

out three of the lots and build a house for permanent dwelling on one

of them.  At this time no building was erected on any of these lots.

The applicant and his wife received the required building permit and

built a house on the property Noor 54:1, which is a piece of land of

approximately 3,000 square metres, and moved in there in 1970.  In the

years 1970 to 1972 Noor 53:1, 53:2 and 55:1 were sold to different

buyers who, after having been given due and proper building permits,

built a house on their respective lots and moved in.

Awaiting a more detailed planning of the area, a general building

prohibition was issued in 1972 according to Section 35 of the Building

Act of 1947.

Following a divorce  between the applicant and his wife, they agreed,

according to two contracts of 27 January and 10 September 1973 that

her half of the property should be transferred to him. Consequently

the applicant was registered on 20 February 1974 as the only owner of

Noor 54:1.

Thereafter, on 22 February 1974, the applicant signed two contracts.

Through the first contract (köpekontrakt) he sold the property to

Mr. E and his wife and with a stipulation among others that the buyers

should take the property into their possession on 1 May 1974.  On the

same day the applicant signed and entered into a leasing contract with

Mr. and Mrs. E, giving him a leaseholder's right to the western part

of Noor 54:1.  The applicant actually intended to remain the owner of

that piece of land, but as Noor 54:1 was not legally divided into two

independent real estate units of which each could be registered, the

applicant had to content himself with a provisional solution of

leasing the part.  According to the contract it was a lease for

dwelling purposes (bostadsarrende) and the size of the area was

approximately 1,500 square metres.  The duration of the lease was

50 years as from 1 May 1974 and thus expired on 1 May 2024. If no

notice to terminate the contract was given, the lease should be

prolonged by 50 years every time.  Furthermore the following passage

was found in the contract:

"At the same time as this lease contract the parties have agreed on a

contract of purchase of the leased area. When this purchase (köpet)

has been accomplished through the establishment of an independent real

estate unit registered for (genom fastighetsbildning och lagfart för

(the applicant), this lease contract will at the same moment expire."

The leasing contract also contained various guarantees from Mr. and

Mrs. E for the protection of the rights of the applicant. Inter alia

the last paragraph of the contract obliged Mr. and Mrs. E not to

transfer the ownership of Noor 54:1 to anyone who would not enter into

exactly the same obligations towards the applicant.

On 30 March 1979 Mr. and Mrs. E sold the entire property to Mr. G.

The acquisition was registered on 10 April 1979.  The applicant's

rights are fully preserved in relation to the present owner

of Noor 54:1.

As mentioned above a general building prohibition was issued in 1972

according to Section 35 of the Building Act of 1947.

Since, however, the authorities under the law could allow exceptions

from the general prohibition the applicant applied on 8 January 1974

for a building permit to build a house on the leased land.  This

application, however, was rejected by the Building Committee

(Byggnadsnämnden) on 13 June 1974 with reference to the general

building prohibition for the area.  The applicant appealed against

this decision to the County Administrative Board (Länsstyrelsen) which

upheld the decision on 14 May 1975.  It does not appear from the

documents submitted that the applicant appealed against this decision

to the Government.

The applicant submits that the general building prohibition expired in

1975.  It appears, however, that the County Administrative Board

issued a prohibition on 21 February 1977 against a dense building up

of the area in accordance with Section 168 of the Building Act.  The

applicant complained to the Government (Bostadsdepartementet) which,

on 5 February 1981 revoked the prohibition against densely building up

of the area, finding that such prohibition would cause too much of a

disadvantage to the landowners.

Thereafter, on 18 April 1981, the applicant asked the Building

Committee for a preliminary decision (förhandsbesked) as to whether he

could now get a building permit in order to build a house on the land

he had leased.  By letter of 9 June 1981 he asked the Building

Committee alternatively to acquire the piece of land at issue at a

price corresponding to the market value of land which could be used

for construction purposes and that he be offered a similar piece of

land where he could build a home in exchange for his leased lot.

On 2 July 1981, the Building Committee refused to make any preliminary

decision as requested by the applicant, pointing out that the

construction of a house on the piece of land in question would mean a

splitting up of Noor 54:1, which again was not in conformity with the

subdivision plan of the area.  Furthermore, the site was not found

suitable for construction, due to a great difference in the ground

levels of the site.

The applicant appealed against this decision to the County

Administrative Board which apparently adjourned the examination of the

case pending the outcome of the Government's decision regarding a new

general prohibition on the building of new houses in the area

introduced by the Board on 9 December 1981 and appealed against by the

applicant.  The Government decided on 22 December 1982 to uphold the

County Administrative Board's decision stating inter alia:

"The background for the building prohibition in question is that the

County fears an extensive building activity in the area on sites which

have not been exploited yet and after the parcelling out of the

relatively large sites.  (Another reason is that) the Health Care

Board has considered that further building up would cause sanitary

problems with the risk of polluting water sources and the Lake

Valloxen.

The Government decides as follows:

The size of the sites and the position of the area near the centre of

Knivsta speak in favour of the opinion of the County Authority that

further construction should be postponed.  For this reason, and since

a sewer system of such a standard that further construction in the

area could take place without the risk of sanitary problems is not

available, the Government finds that there is reason to introduce a

building prohibition in the area pending a necessary solution to the

sewer system problems, to be found either by the landowners or the

County Authority.  The appeal is therefore rejected."

Thereafter the County Administrative Board resumed the examination of

the applicant's case and decided on 7 February 1983 to uphold the

Building Committee's decision of 2 July 1981.  The applicant appealed

against the decision to the Government which, on 29 September 1983,

rejected it stating that they had found no reason to grant a

dispensation from the building prohibition imposed on

22 December 1982.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant recalls that he possesses since 1974 a leaseholder's

right for dwelling purposes (bostadsarrende).  He has the option to

buy the leased land if it could be registered as an independent real

estate unit (fastighetsbildning för lagfartsändamål).

The applicant complains that "the decisions of the Government and the

lower authorities constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention as (he) has been, for an intolerably

long period of time, prevented from the peaceful enjoyment of his

possession (or from disposing) of it."  The applicant has further

submitted that "since the (County Administrative Board) issued its

first prohibition for further building in 1972 (he) has in vain

struggled through all possible legal means (in order) to utilize what

was at that time his property ... and (which) is since then his

possession with a leaseholder's right and with a first option to

regain ownership."

THE LAW

The applicant has complained that the decision not to grant him

permission to build a house for dwelling purposes on the piece of land

he has leased, prevents him from peaceful enjoyment of his possessions

within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the

Convention which reads:

"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment

of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions

except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided

for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the

right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control

the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to

secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

Regarding the question whether the present case discloses an

interference with the applicant's right of property, the Commission

recalls that the applicant is a leaseholder and not the actual owner

of the piece of land in question.  The Commission does not, however,

find that this fact affects the outcome of this case, but accepts that

the land is the applicant's property within the meaning of Article 1

of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).  The Commission further finds that it can

be left open whether the prohibition on building a house on the land

interfered with the applicant's rights secured to him under Article 1

of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, because such an

interference is in any event justified for the following reasons.

In considering whether or not the interference violated Article 1

(P1-1), the Commission recalls that under Article 1 second paragraph

(P1-1-2) the contracting States have the right to enforce such laws as

are deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with

the general interest and the Commission finds that the present case

clearly falls within the ambit of this paragraph.  It is thus, the

Commission's task to ascertain whether the requirements set out in

Article 1 second paragraph (P1-1-2) are fulfilled, namely that the

interference is based on legal provisions, that it is in the general

interest and that the measure is proportionate to the legitimate aim

in question.

Regarding the first requirement, the Commission recalls that the

applicant does not allege that the building restriction or the refusal

to grant dispensation were unlawful.  Nor does the information

submitted by the applicant support such an allegation.  The decisions

taken were based on the relevant Swedish provisions of the Building

Act of 1947.  Whilst, consequently, it is beyond doubt that the

measure taken was lawful, the Commission has to consider next whether

the aim was legitimate as being in the general interest.

The Commission finds no difficulty in this respect.  In the

increasingly complex and ever-developing society of today, it is

indispensable that the use of land be regulated by detailed and

careful planning.  Therefore, there can be no doubt that the

development plans which have their legal basis in the Building Act are

adopted and implemented in the general interest.  From this it follows

that the contracting States must also have certain instruments at

their disposal, such as prohibitions on construction, in order to

secure the enforcement of such plans on the use of land.  The

Commission is thus satisfied that in the present case the prohibition

on construction was a lawful measure which pursued a legitimate aim.

According to what was indicated above, the Commission must finally

consider whether the restriction was proportionate to the legitimate

aim.  In this respect, the Commission recalls that the applicant has

referred to the "intolerable period of time" during which he has been

prevented from building a house on the land. Furthermore, the

Commission recalls the reasons given by the authorities for imposing

the restriction in question and the Commission will have to balance

the applicant's interest and that of the authorities.

The Commission recalls that a subdivision plan was drawn up concerning

the area in question in 1942 and this plan was confirmed by the

competent authorities in 1943.  The area was at that time divided into

a specific number of units.  There has not been any change since then

in this plan which still provides for a certain amount of units of

which the applicant purchased the one in question in this case in

1969.  He received a building permit, built a house on the property

and moved there in 1970.  The Commission also recalls that as far as

the applicant is concerned the initial division into a specific number

of units has subsequently been confirmed by the authorities in that

the applicant has been forced to become a leaseholder of his property

since the piece of land could not be legally divided into two

independent real estate units and by the fact that the authorities

initially refused to grant the applicant a building permit in 1981 on

the ground that a splitting up of the unit was not in conformity with

the subdivision plan and because the site would not be suitable for

construction due to a great difference in the ground levels of the

unit.

Furthermore the Commission recalls that a general building prohibition

was in force from 1972 to 1975.  Accordingly when the applicant first

bought the land he was fully aware of the subdivision plan and when he

later sold it and became a leaseholder he was also aware of the

building prohibition.  Therefore he could not have had any legitimate

expectations regarding a permission either to divide the unit into two

or to build one more house on the existing unit.

The Swedish authorities decided to introduce again in 1981 a general

building prohibition for the area and this prohibition was confirmed

by the authorities in 1982.  The Commission recalls that the reasons

for this were the risk of sanitary problems and pollution of the water

sources.  This prohibition will remain in force until a necessary

solution to the sewer system has been found either by the landowners

or by the County authority.  The Commission finds that these reasons

for the prohibition are free from any arbitrariness and its purpose is

consistent with what the Commission has found to be a legitimate aim

in the general interest.  Furthermore the Commission finds that no

right can be drawn from Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) obliging the

contracting States to provide the necessary facilities for urban

development.  It was therefore justified to issue a building

prohibition which would remain valid until the changes had been made,

if necessary by the landowners.

In these circumstances the present prohibition on construction cannot

be considered to be disproportionate to its legitimate purpose and it

follows that the interference with the applicant's right to peaceful

enjoyment of his possessions was justified under the second paragraph

of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) as being a lawful restriction

for the control of the use of property in accordance with the general

interest.

Accordingly the application must be rejected as being manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2)

of the Commission.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

    (H. C. KRÜGER)                       (C. A. NØRGAARD)