Lexploria

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

18 July 1986, the following members being present:

MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President

C.A. NØRGAARD

F. ERMACORA

G. JÖRUNDSSON

G. TENEKIDES

S. TRECHSEL

B. KIERNAN

A. WEITZEL

J.C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

H. VANDENBERGHE

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Art. 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 3 May 1985 by

A.H. against the United Kingdom and registered on 10 May 1985

under file No. 11590/85;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British and Italian citizen born in 1920, and

resident in Manchester. She is represented by Messrs. Clifford Otten

& Co., solicitors.

The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.

The applicant's husband was employed as a part-time cleaner at

Manchester High School. After suffering chest pains, he took time off

work but returned on 17 March 1981 to collect his wages. At 16.10 hrs

he was discovered collapsed. Several people, including teachers with

some first aid training saw him and decided he was dead. The school

called the police who arrived on foot at 17.00 hrs. The police called

an ambulance at 17.25 hrs and it took the applicant's husband to the

hospital nearby where he was pronounced dead by doctors at 18.05 hrs.

A post mortem conducted revealed that her husband had died of a

coronary occlusion.

The applicant was appalled by the attitude of the school in failing to

summon medical help immediately on finding her husband's body. She

brought an action herself for negligence against the school and in an

order dated 3 December 1984, the County Court judge found in favour of

the defendants on the grounds that, even if the school had acted more

promptly, it would not have been possible to resuscitate the

applicant's husband. Medical evidence indicated that death was

inevitable within 4-5 minutes of the seizure and could have only been

delayed by immediate, skilled cardiac resuscitation. Therefore even

if the applicant's husband was not already dead when discovered it was

highly improbable that he could have been resuscitated by the staff

who were untrained in cardiac resuscitation. The judge also found

that even if an ambulance had been summoned immediately, it would have

been too late.

The applicant was unable to appeal to the Court of Appeal due to lack

of financial means. She had been refused legal aid.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains that not all the necessary measures which

might have saved or prolonged her husband's life were taken. She finds

it unacceptable that lay people could presume to pronounce a man dead

and fail to call an ambulance immediately. If medical help had been

rushed to her husband, the applicant feels there was a chance for him

to have been resuscitated, if only to allow him to die in dignity with

his family by his side, instead of left on the floor of the school for

almost two hours. She complains that British law appears to condone

such negligence by not imposing a specific obligation to take prompt

emergency steps in such circumstances and by not awarding compensation

to the victims or their families.

The applicant accordingly invokes Articles 2, 6 and 13 (Art. 2,

art. 6, art. 13) of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that her husband did not receive the

prompt medical attention which may have increased his chances of

resuscitation.

Article 2 (Art. 2) guarantees that everyone's right to life shall be

protected by law.

Insofar as the applicant complains of the conduct of the members of

staff of a private school, the Commission recalls that under

Article 25, para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention, the Commission may

only admit an application from a person, non-governmental organisation

or group of individuals, where the applicant alleges a violation by

one of the Contracting Parties of the rights and freedoms set out in

the Convention and where that Party has recognised this competence of

the Commission. The Commission may not, therefore, admit applications

directed against private individuals. In this respect the Commission

refers to its constant jurisprudence (see e.g. the decisions on the

admissibility of applications Nos. 172/56, Yearbook 1 pp. 211, 215,

and 3925/69, Collection of Decisions 32 pp. 56, 58).

It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione

personae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

However, the applicant also complains that English law fails to place

a general obligation on persons to take prompt medical action in

emergencies. The Commission recalls that the medical evidence

established that the death was inevitable as a result of the massive

coronary damage, that the staff of the school, who were unskilled in

cardiac resuscitation, would have been unable to resuscitate him even

if they had tried and that even if an ambulance had been summoned it

could not have arrived in time. In these tragic circumstances, the

existence of any express obligation to take prompt emergency action

would not have been of any avail to the applicant's husband.

Therefore, even assuming Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention can be

said to impose an obligation on States to protect individuals by such

legal measures, the Commission finds that an examination of this

complaint as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of

a violation of the above Article (Art. 2).

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. The applicant also complains that her claim for compensation

against the school authorities was unsuccessful and that she has no

remedy. She invokes Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, art. 13) of the

Convention.

However, the Commission recalls that the applicant was able to bring

her claim before a county court, which had the power to grant damages

if she could show that the school authorities' negligence had

contributed to her husband's death. The applicant therefore did have

access to court within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6). The

Commission also finds in light of the above previous reasoning that no

separate issue arises under Article 13 (Art. 13). Accordingly, an

examination of the facts as submitted by the applicant fails to

disclose the appearance of a violation of these Articles. It follows

that as regards Article 6 (Art. 6), this part of the application is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention and that as regards Article 13

(Art. 13), this part of the application is (Art. 27-2) incompatible

ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (J.A. FROWEIN)

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HUGHES v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

HUGHES v. THE UNITED KINGDOM