Lexploria

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

13 October 1986, the following members being present:

MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

J. A. FROWEIN

F. ERMACORA

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

G. TENEKIDES

S. TRECHSEL

B. KIERNAN

A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

J. C. SOYER

H. G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

J. CAMPINOS

Mrs G. H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. F. MARTINEZ

Mr. H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 17 July 1985 by

W.K. against Sweden and registered on 24 September 1985 under file

No. 11762/85;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as they appear from the applicant's

submissions, may be summarised as follows:

The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1929 and resident at

Gunnebobruk. He is a consultant by profession.

Alleging that he was unemployed, the applicant asked for unemployment

benefits under the Act on Cash Labour Market Support (lagen om kontant

arbetsmarknadsstöd). His request was refused by the County Employment

Office (länsarbetsnämnden) of Kalmar on 26 November 1982.

The applicant appealed to the National Labour Market Board

(arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen) which in a decision of 23 March 1983

rejected the appeal with the following reasons:

"According to Section 4 of the Act on Cash Labour Market Support a

businessman is considered as unemployed if he no longer engages in any

activity in the business except such as is merely of an occasional

character. In the Governmental Bill 1973:56 concerning the Act on

Unemployment Insurance etc. the responsible Minister stated inter alia

that in companies where an employee or his family owns the major part

of the shares, such an employee is in practice to be regarded as a

private businessman (egen företagare).

Among the documents of the case it appears from the minutes of a board

meeting of 4 November 1982 that you have transferred your shares of

SKAFTET KRAFTVERK AB (a limited liability company) to your wife. It

has further appeared that you are still registered in the official

register of limited liability companies as competent to sign on behalf

of the company. For these reasons, the National Labour Market Board

finds that your personal activity in the company has not ceased and

that you are to be considered as a private businessman. According to

the Act you are not to be regarded as unemployed and consequently no

support can therefore be paid. The Board finds no reason to amend the

decision of the County Employment Office."

The applicant appealed to the Supreme Insurance Court

(försäkringsöverdomstolen). On 13 February 1985, the Court decided to

transmit the case-file to the National Labour Market Board for

supplementary investigation and for a possible opinion. The reply of

the Board was communicated to the applicant who submitted his final

statement by a letter of 4 April 1985.

In the meantime the applicant had made a new application for

unemployment benefits. This application was refused by the County

Employment Office on 10 December 1984. The applicant's appeal was

rejected by the National Labour Market Board on 3 March 1985.

The applicant submitted a further appeal to the Supreme Insurance

Court.

On 2 July 1985 the Supreme Insurance Court rejected the applicant's

two appeals.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains that contrary to Article 6 (art. 6) of

the Convention he has not had an impartial hearing before the Supreme

Insurance Court. He submits in particular that the Court was partial

since it requested his opponent, the National Labour Market Board, to

make an inquiry in the case.

2. The applicant also complains that he has had no effective

remedy as guaranteed by Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention since

he does not know what has happened before the Supreme Insurance Court,

which, in the applicant's opinion, has not examined the applicant's

submissions.

3. The applicant submits that the only reason for refusing him

unemployment benefits was that he was married to his wife. He alleges

that this is discrimination contrary to Article 14 (art. 14) of the

Convention as well as a breach of Article 12 (art. 12) of the

Convention.

4. Finally, the applicant complains that his personal identity

number was used as the case-file number. He submits that one of the

digits in this number indicates that he is of other than Swedish

origin. He submits that this practice is in violation of

Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that he was refused unemployment

benefits. He also complains about the procedure which was applied

when his applications for unemployment benefits were refused. The

applicant has invoked Articles 6, 12, 13 and 14

(art. 6, art. 12, art. 13, art. 14) of the Convention.

2. The Commission first observes that the Convention does not as

such guarantee any right to unemployment benefits, and there is no

provision in the Convention from which such a right could be derived.

Insofar as the application relates to the refusal to grant the

applicant unemployment benefits, it follows that the application falls

outside the scope of the Convention, and must therefore be rejected

under Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) as being incompatible ratione

materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

3. The applicant also complains that he did not receive an

impartial hearing before the Social Insurance Court and that

Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention has therefore been violated.

Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) first sentence reads:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any

criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public

hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial

tribunal established by law."

The Commission considers that it can leave open the question of the

applicability of Article 6 (art. 6), i.e. the question whether the

determination of the applicant's right to unemployment benefits

related to his "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6

(art. 6).

Even assuming that Article 6 (art. 6) was applicable to the

proceedings before the Supreme Insurance Court, the Commission finds

that the fact that the Court asked the National Labour Market Board to

make an inquiry in the case, and to state its views, does not raise an

issue under Article 6 (art. 6) in view of the fact that these views

were communicated to the applicant, who then submitted his final

statement. The practice that the appeal instance requests further

investigation or an opinion from the authority which has made the

decision appealed against, is not in itself an objectionable

procedure. This practice, as applied in the applicant's case, cannot

be considered to have made the Supreme Insurance Court lack

impartiality within the meaning of Article 6 (art. 6) or have resulted

in any lack of equality of arms, as guaranteed by Article 6 (art. 6).

It follows that in this respect the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of

the Convention.

4. Finally, as regards the applicant's complaints about the use

of personal identity numbers, the Commission observes that there is no

provision in the Convention which as such expressly or implicitly

prohibits the use of such numbers. The question which may arise is

whether the manner in which personal identity numbers are used

infringes any Articles of the Convention. The Commission has

previously held that data protection is an issue which falls within

the scope of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention and that it is

conceivable that the use of personal identity numbers as a way of

storing data in different registers and the matching of such registers

could raise an issue under Article 8 (art. 8) (see No. 10473/83,

Dec. 11.12.85, unpublished).

The Commission considers however that there is nothing in the

applicant's submissions which could raise an issue under

Articles 8 (art. 8) or 14 (art. 14) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H. C. KRÜGER) (C. A. NØRGAARD)

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K. v. SWEDEN

K. v. SWEDEN

LEXI