COUNCIL OF CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS et al v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 11603/85 • ECHR ID: 001-389
Document date: January 20, 1987
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 11603/85
by the Council of Civil Service Unions,
Christopher BRAUNHOLTZ, Jack HART, Ann DOWNEY,
Jeremy WINDUST, Dennis MITCHELL and David McCAFFREY
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
20 January 1987, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
G. SPERDUTI
J.A. FROWEIN
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
G. TENEKIDES
B. KIERNAN
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
G. BATLINER
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs G.H. THUNE
Mr. F. MARTINEZ
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 9 May 1985 by
the Council of Civil Service Unions, Christopher BRAUNHOLTZ, Jack HART,
Ann DOWNEY, Jeremy WINDUST, Dennis MITCHELL and David McCAFFREY against
the United Kingdom and registered on 27 June 1985 under file No.
11603/85;
Having regard to:
- the first report of August 1985 provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
- the Commission's decision of 9 October 1985 to bring the
application to the notice of the respondent Government and
invite them to submit written observations on the admissibility
and merits of the application;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
22 January 1986 and the reply thereto submitted by the applicants
on 7 May 1986;
- the second report of June 1986 provided for by Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure;
- the Commission's decision of 17 July 1986 to invite the
parties to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the
application;
- the submissions of the parties at the hearing on
20 January 1987;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case as they have been submitted by the
parties may be summarised as follows.
The first applicant is a trade union registered in the United
Kingdom. The other applicants are all British citizens. The second
applicant, born in 1929, resides in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, and
the third applicant, born in 1926, resides in Taunton, Somerset. Both
are former civil servants. The fourth and fifth applicants, born in
1957 and 1952, respectively, reside in Cheltenham and are civil
servants employed at Government Communications Headquarters. The
sixth applicant, born in 1937 and resident in Cheltenham, is a former
civil servant. The seventh applicant, born in 1944, is a civil
servant resident in Gunnislake, Cornwall. Before the Commission all
applicants are represented by Messrs. Lawford and Co., solicitors
practising in London, who are instructing Messrs. A. Lester QC, R.
Drabble and D. Pannick.
I.
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is a civilian-
manned branch of Government established in its present form in 1947.
It has the function of ensuring the security of the United Kingdom's
military and official communications and to provide signals
intelligence for the Government. The main establishment is at
Cheltenham, where there are approximately 4,000 employees. Smaller
branches of the organisation exist in the United Kingdom and
elsewhere. The total number of employees who are all civil servants
is approximately 7,000. The fact that GCHQ was concerned with
national security was disclosed publicly in a newspaper article in
1978 and first acknowledged by the Government on 12 May 1983 in
connection with offences against the 1911 Official Secrets Act by a
person not relating to the present application.
From 1947 until 1984 staff at GCHQ were permitted to become
members of a trade union. On 31 December 1982, there were 4,454 paid
up trade union members at GCHQ.
The first applicant was formed as a trade union in May 1980.
It represented its members, inter alia, in pay negotiations and in
discussions over conditions of service. It is a coordinating body of
nine trade unions, six of which had members at GCHQ, and is the trade
union side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council, which is
responsible for determining the pay and conditions of service of all
non-industrial civil servants, including GCHQ employees.
II.
The terms and conditions upon which civil servants, in theory
members of the Sovereign's staff, are employed and continue in office
are governed by royal prerogative. Since 1963, by Order in Council,
these prerogative powers have been vested in the Minister for the
Civil Service. In this respect, Article 4 of the 1982 Civil Service
Order in Council states:
"a) The Minister for the Civil Service may from time to
time make regulations or give instructions ... ii) for
controlling the conduct of the Service and providing for the
classification of all persons employed therein and, so far as
they relate to matters other than remuneration, expenses and
allowances, the conditions of service of all such persons ... "
The exercise of this prerogative power is restricted in
particular by the Employment Protection Act 1975, insofar as it is
still in force, and the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act
1978. Section 138(1), (2) and (4) of the 1978 Act state:
"Application of Act to Crown employment:
138(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section,
Parts I (so far as it relates to itemised pay statement),
II, III (except Section 44), V, VIII and this Part and
Section 58 shall have effect in relation to Crown employment
and to persons in Crown employment as they have effect in
relation to other employment and to other employees.
(2) In this section, subject to sub-sections (3) to (5),
'Crown employment' means employment under or for the
purposes of a government department or any officer or body
exercising on behalf of the Crown functions conferred by any
enactment. ...
(4) For the purposes of this section, Crown employment does
not include any employment in respect of which there is in
force a certificate issued by or on behalf of a Minister of
the Crown certifying that employment of a description
specified in the certificate, or the employment of a particular
person so specified, is (or, at a time specified in the
certificate, was) required to be excepted from this section
for the purpose of safeguarding national security; and any
document purporting to be a certificate so issued shall be
received in evidence and shall, unless the contrary is
proved, be deemed to be such a certificate ... "
Section 121(4) of the 1975 Act states:
"For the purposes of this section, Crown employment does not
include any employment in respect of which there is in force
a certificate issued by or on behalf of a Minister of the
Crown certifying that employment of a description specified
in the certificate, or the employment of a particular person
so specified, is (or, at a time specified in the
certificate, was) required to be excepted from this section
for the purpose of safeguarding national security; and any
document purporting to be a certificate so issued shall be
received in evidence and shall, unless the contrary is
proved, be deemed to be such a certificate."
III.
On seven occasions between 13 February 1979 and 14 April 1981
various forms of industrial action were taken at GCHQ, such as one-
day strikes; work to rule; and overtime bans. This action generally
arose from disputes between the Government and national trade unions
over the pay and conditions of service applicable to civil servants.
Altogether over 10,000 working days were lost by virtue of this
action. At a one-day strike on 9 March 1981, 25% of the staff were
involved in such action.
On 22 December 1983 the Prime Minister as Minister for the
Civil Service directed orally, by virtue of the 1982 Civil Service
Order, that the Conditions of Service applicable to civil servants
serving GCHQ should be revised so as to exclude membership of any
trade union other than a Departmental Staff Association approved by
the director of GCHQ.
On 25 January 1984 the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs signed and issued two certificates under Section
138(4) of the 1978 Act and the corresponding Section 121(4) of the
1975 Act, in order to remove the rights granted by those Acts to all
GCHQ staff. In a ministerial statement in the House of Commons of the
same day he stated inter alia:
"The Government fully respects the right of civil servants
to be members of a trade union, and it is only the special
nature of the work of the GCHQ which has led us to take
these measures. I can assure the House therefore that it
is not our intention to introduce similar measures outside
the field of security and intelligence."
On 25 January 1984 GCHQ staff were informed by a General
Notice and an accompanying letter that, as a condition of service,
they were no longer permitted to be members of any existing trade
union other than a Departmental Staff Association. Disciplinary
action might be undertaken against anyone involved in industrial
action. Staff not wishing to remain at GCHQ were to be given the
opportunity to seek a transfer elsewhere in the civil service. If
such a transfer was not possible, the respective person would be
eligible for premature retirement on redundancy terms. Staff
remaining at GCHQ would receive an ex gratia payment of £1,000 in
recognition of the loss of rights previously enjoyed.
Subsequent representations by the first applicant to the
Government were without success.
On 14 February 1984, the all-Party House of Commons Employment
Committee unsuccessfully proposed in a report to the House of Commons
that the Government and the civil service unions hold discussions with
a view to an agreement which would preserve union membership for GCHQ
staff while meeting the Government's objectives.
At present, all staff at GCHQ have accepted the new conditions
of service, except 35 persons, including the fourth and fifth
applicants, who declined to express an option, and six persons who
opted to move but for whom a transfer has not yet been arranged. On
1 May 1985 a departmental staff association was formed at GCHQ by
members of staff under the name "Government Communications Staff
Federation" (GCSF). Its membership is over 49% of the GCHQ staff.
IV.
On 14 February 1984 the General Council of the Trades Union
Congress (TUC), through its General Secretary, acting on its own
behalf, complained to the Director General of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) that the United Kingdom Government was in breach of
Articles 2-5 and 11 of the 1948 ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of
Association. Article 2 states in particular:
"Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever,
shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the
rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations
of their own choosing without previous authorisation."
The Committee of Freedom of Association which was set up to
examine complaints from organisations of workers and employees
reported on 1 June 1984 that the action of the Government was not in
conformity with Convention No. 87. The Report was adopted by the
Governing Body of the ILO on 1 June 1984. The Committee again
considered the complaint of the TUC in February 1985, whereupon it
recommended that the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (the Experts) should examine the legal
arguments put forward. The Experts met in March 1985 and published a
Report of their proceedings which indicated that the Government's
reply did indeed raise complex legal questions on which the
International Court of Justice might more appropriately be requested
to provide an opinion. The Report of the Experts was considered by
the International Labour Conference Committee on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations, and the report of the Conference
Committee was put forward for adoption by the Plenary Session of
Conference, and concludes with the Conference Committee's hope that
"the Government would be able to find appropriate solutions to the
problems raised by the application of the Convention".
V.
In January 1984 all individual applicants were employed at
GCHQ. The third applicant was then Chairman of the Trade Union Side
of the Departmental Whitley Council at GCHQ.
Following the prohibition to join a trade union, the
individual applicants applied to the High Court for judicial review,
seeking declarations that the General Notice of 25 January 1984 and
the accompanying letter were ineffective to vary the conditions of
service, and that the two certificates of the same day were invalid.
This application was heard by a single judge of the Divisional
Court of the Queen's Bench Division. On 16 July 1984 the judge
declared invalid the instructions issued by the Minister for the Civil
Service on 22 December 1983.
In its reasoning the judge set out by assuming that the Court
had jurisdiction to control the exercise by the Minister for the Civil
Service of her power under Article 4 of the 1982 Civil Service Order.
The judge also found that the Crown was competent to dismiss a civil
servant at will, unless some statutory provision prevented this. It
was unnecessary in the present case to resort to ILO Convention No. 87
in view of the fact that there was no doubt about the relevant English
law. Moreover, the Prime Minister's instruction on 22 December 1983,
although of a general nature and given orally, was a proper
instruction under Article 4 of the 1982 Civil Service Order.
However, the judge accepted the applicants' submissions that
the Prime Minister's direction of 22 December 1983 and the statutory
certificates issued on 25 January 1984 were invalid, as there had been
no previous consultation by the Government of the trade unions. The
Government had, by means of various regulations, in effect promised to
consult about any changes in the conditions of service at GCHQ, and
the GCHQ staff had, therefore, a legitimate expectation in this
respect. When a decision by Ministers to withdraw the trade union
rights was in contemplation, fairness, i.e. natural justice, required
that the decision should not finally be made until the staff or their
representatives had been consulted.
On 6 August 1984 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the
Minister for the Civil Service and set aside the High Court's
declaration.
The Court of Appeal first examined its entitlement to
supervise the exercise of royal prerogative powers. In this respect
the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, found that the actions taken by the
Government with regard to trades union membership at GCHQ were actions
taken on the grounds of national security. The Ministers were the
sole judges of what the national security required and consequently
the instruction and certificates were not susceptible to judicial
review.
Lord Lane agreed with the previous court that on
22 December 1983 the Prime Minister had in fact been giving
instructions "for controlling the conduct of service" and for
"providing for ... the conditions of service" within the meaning of
Article 4 of the 1982 Civil Service Order, and that the Government's
actions had been in accordance with its international obligations
under the ILO Conventions. Insofar as the GCHQ staff had held
expectations as to prior consultation, there existed in the various
staff regulations restrictions on this requirement. He could
understand the Government's anxiety lest by premature disclosure of
their plans they might precipitate the very troubles which, by their
decision, they were seeking to avoid. Where there existed a conflict
between the interests of national security and the freedom of the
individual, the balance between the two was for the Home Secretary,
rather than for a court of law. On rare occasions, the rights of an
individual had to be subordinated to the protection of the realm.
The Court of Appeal then granted the applicants leave to
appeal to the House of Lords.
In its judgment of 22 November 1984 the House of Lords
unanimously dismissed the appeal.
The five Lords sitting concluded in their respective opinions
that the applicants had had a legitimate expectation that the Minister
would consult them before issuing the instructions of 22 December 1983.
However, the work at GCHQ was a matter of national security, and that
security would have been seriously compromised, had industrial action
taken place similar to that encountered between 1979 and 1981.
Consultation prior to the oral instructions of the Prime Minister
would have served further to reveal the vulnerability of GCHQ to such
action. For instance, a former director at GCHQ, when giving evidence on
8 February 1984 to the House of Commons Employment Committee, recalled
that one of his subordinates had sought to explain to the general
secretary of one of the trade unions the serious consequences of
industrial action. In reply he had been thanked for telling where the
Government could be hurt most. The Government had accordingly been
justified in the interests of national security in avoiding industrial
action and in issuing the instructions without prior consultation with
the applicants.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain under Article 11 of the Convention
that the United Kingdom Government have removed the right of
individual employees at GCHQ to belong to a trade union, and have
deprived these unions of any role in industrial relations at GCHQ.
The applicants submit that the Government's action was not
"prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 11 para. 2. While
the 1975 and 1978 Acts set out the circumstances in which the
respective certificates may be issued, the latter alone would still
have left the GCHQ employees with the contractual freedom to belong to
a trade union. It was for this reason that the conditions of service
had to be changed. Article 4 of the Civil Service Order does no more
than confer a discretion on the Minister with no guidelines as to how
this discretion should be exercised.
The Government's action was also not "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security" within the
meaning of Article 11 para. 2. No industrial action occurred between
1981 and 1984, and it is difficult to see a "pressing social need" for
the action. In any event, the blanket removal of all rights was
disproportionate to the end to be achieved. Thus, some of the other
45,000 civil servants are also in highly sensitive positions. Yet
only the GCHQ employees have been deprived of their trade union
rights.
The applicants submit that their application is not
substantially the same as that presented by the TUC to the ILO within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 1 (b) of the Convention.
2. The applicants complain under Article 13 of the Convention
that there was no effective remedy under domestic law for the alleged
breach of Article 11 para. 2, by which a municipal court can judge the
validity of a particular administrative action. No remedy was
available to them which was amenable, sufficient, and likely to be
effective, for instance in respect of their complaint concerning the
oral instruction of 22 December 1983, which changed their conditions
of service.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 9 May 1985 and registered on
27 June 1985.
On 9 October 1985 the Commission decided to bring the
application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite
them to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits
pursuant to Rule 42, para. 2, sub-para. b of the Rules of Procedure.
The Government's observations were submitted on
22 January 1986 and the applicants' reply thereto on 7 May 1986.
On 17 July 1986 the Commission decided to invite the parties
to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.
At the hearing which was held on 20 January 1987 the parties
were represented as follows:
For the respondent Government
Mr. M.C. Wood Agent, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
Mr. Robert Alexander QC Barrister, Counsel
Mr. Nicholas Bratza Barrister, Counsel
and four advisers
For the Applicants
Mr. Anthony Lester QC Barrister, Counsel
Mr. David Pannick Barrister, Counsel
Mr. B. Hooberman Solicitor, Lawford & Co.,
Adviser
The applicants Mrs. Downey and Messrs. Braunholtz, Hart,
Windust, Mitchell and McCaffrey were also present.
The applicant Council of Civil Service Unions were represented
as follows:
Mr. P. Jones Secretary
Mr. A. Christopher Chairman of the Major
Policy Committee
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
The parties have presented extensive written and oral
submissions which may be summarised as follows:
A. The respondent Government
I. The Facts (see THE FACTS above)
GCHQ is one of the security and intelligence agencies on which
the national security of the United Kingdom and to some degree of the
allies depends. The present case has direct effects on the national
security interests of the country.
Between February 1979 and April 1981 industrial action was
taken at GCHQ on the following seven occasions: first, a one-day
strike on 23 February 1979 followed by selective action continuing
until 2 April 1979; second, a one-day strike on 22 June 1979 followed
by selective action until 25 July; third, in September 1979, a work to
rule and overtime ban by industrial staff; fourth, between
20 December 1979 and 13 February 1980 industrial action in support of
a pay dispute by station radio officers; fifth, on 14 May 1980,
involvement by GCHQ staff in a TUC day of action; sixth, a protest
meeting on 27 November 1980 against the suspension of the existing pay
arrangements; and seventh, a one-day strike on 9 March 1981, which
resulted in the virtual closure of part of GCHQ, followed by various
forms of industrial action until 14 April 1981.
In the circumstances of the industrial disputes which took
place between 1979 and 1981 Ministers were satisfied that national
unions were pressing GCHQ staff to place their loyalty to their union
above their loyalty to the service to the detriment of national
security and that industrial disruption of the kind which took place
could do very real damage to national security.
As a result the Government considered in 1982 the measures
which could be taken to prevent such action recurring in the future.
Only in 1983, following the conviction of a former member of GCHQ of
offences under the 1911 Official Secrets Act, was the intelligence
role of GCHQ for the first time officially acknowledged. In December
1983, the Ministers concerned decided that the conditions of service
of GCHQ staff should be brought into line with the arrangements
prevailing in the other security and intelligence agencies, which had
not been available as a target for trade union disruption by ensuring
that national unions ceased to play any part in its affairs. It was
also decided for security reasons that GCHQ staff should cease to have
access to industrial tribunals under the 1978 Act.
The Ministers concerned did not consider that there was any
legal obligation on them to consult the national unions or the staff
involved before reaching the decision to take the steps mentioned
above. To have entered into such consultations would have served to
bring out the vulnerability of areas of operations to those who had
shown themselves ready to organise disruption, and consultation with
individual members of staff at GCHQ would have been impossible without
involving the national unions. Finally, the importance of the
decision was such as to warrant its first being announced in
Parliament.
During the subsequent meetings between the first applicant and
other unions with the Government, the unions accepted that the
certificates signed by the Secretary of State should stand but urged
that a no-disruption agreement would provide adequate safeguards. The
Ministers nevertheless rejected the proposals as not providing
sufficient guarantee that conflicting pressures would not produce
difficulties in the future. Support for this conclusion is taken from
the fact that the draft no-disruption agreement, which had been tabled
by the first applicant, was subsequently repudiated by two of the
national unions at their 1984 annual conferences.
II. Domestic Law and Practice (see THE FACTS above)
Civil servants are servants of the Crown. The civil service
is regulated primarily under the Royal Prerogative, subject, however,
to a number of qualifications. In 1920 the present pattern emerged
under which a central department, now in part the Minister for the
Civil Service, has been given power by the Sovereign through
successive Orders in Council to give instructions or make regulations
for providing for terms of conditions of service of the Home Civil
Service.
Pursuant to the powers conferred by Article 4 of the 1982
Civil Service Order in Council, regulations and instructions have been
made in relation to the Home Civil Service as a whole and are
consolidated in the Civil Service Pay and Conditions of Service Code
(the Code). The Code permits civil servants as a whole to belong to
a trade union or a staff association and applies to all Home Civil
Servants. Consistently with the Code and subject to particular
instructions under the Civil Service Order in Council, Government
Departments may make rules or give instructions for controlling the
conduct of their establishment and defining the condition of the
service of their staff. Departmental regulations or rules are
generally contained within a Department's own Handbook. The
conditions there set out may be supplemented from time to time by
General Notices. Pursuant to these provisions, Staff Regulations have
been in force at GCHQ. Under Section P provision was made for
membership of the appropriate staff association or trade union and for
consultation between management and staff in all matters of common
interest.
The generality of the powers contained in the Order in Council
is limited by the 1975 Employment Protection Act, insofar as it is
still in force, and the 1978 Employment Protection (Consolidation)
Act, which contain provisions relating to trade unions and membership
of trade unions.
III. As to the conditions of Article 27 para. 1 (b) of the Convention
The Government are content to leave the issue under Article 27
para. 1 (b) to the Commission in respect of the complaint under
Article 11 of the Convention and do not request it to reach any
particular conclusion thereon.
There is a clear similarity of scope and purpose between the
relevant provisions of the European Convention and the ILO Convention,
and the complaints made to the ILO and to the Commission arise out of
the same facts. Moreover, the substance of the complaint made under
the two Conventions is identical, namely that the Government have
removed the right of civil servants engaged at GCHQ to belong to a
trade union of their choice in contravention of the United Kingdom's
international obligations under each Convention. Finally, the
particular provisions of Article 11 para. 2 do not provide the
applicants with any new grounds for complaint before the Commission
which are not available to the applicants in the proceedings before
the ILO. There is no requirement in the provision that the particular
procedure involved should inevitably lead, or be pursued, to an
enforceable decision of a court.
The fact that the TUC application and the present application
are not identical is not a conclusive factor for the purposes of
Article 27 para. 1 (b). In the present case, not only is the first
applicant a member of the TUC, but it is plain on the face of the
TUC's application that it is made with the full concurrence of the
first applicant. There is nothing to have prevented the first
applicant, as "an industrial association of workers" within the terms
of Article 24 of the Constitution of the ILO, itself bringing a
complaint to the ILO. That the TUC instead lodged the complaint was no
doubt for the purpose of demonstrating that this was an issue of
national concern.
IV. As to Article 11 of the Convention
a. "Prescribed by law"
The Government refer to the Court's cases regarding the Sunday
Times (judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30), Silver and Others
(judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61) and Malone (judgment
of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, para. 66 et seq.). The requirement
"prescribed by law" in Article 11 para. 2 as explained by the Court
is amply satisfied in respect of the restrictions imposed on the
applicants' right to freedom of association.
It is clear that the giving of instructions by the Minister
for the Civil Service and the issue of certificates under the 1975 and
1978 Acts were both lawful and had a statutory legal basis in domestic
law. As to the former, Article 4 of the Civil Service Order in
Council 1982 expressly confers powers upon the Minister for the Civil
Service. The lawfulness of the exercise of the powers was upheld by
all the respective courts. As to the latter, the power of the
Secretary of State to issue certificates is expressly conferred by
Section 121(4) of the 1975 Act and Section 138(4) of the 1978 Act. The
present application contains no suggestion that the certificates had
no statutory legal basis or were other than lawfully and validly
issued.
The present case likewise satisfies the requirements of
foreseeability and accessibility. The 1982 Order in Council and the
1975 and 1978 Acts are unquestionably accessible, being contained in
published legislation. There is also no doubt that the relevant
provisions of the 1975 and 1978 Acts are sufficiently clear and
precise in their terms to give those affected an adequate indication
as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the
Secretary of State is empowered to issue certificates.
The Government accept that the 1982 Order in Council confers a
discretion on the Minister for the Civil Service. It is not, however,
accepted that in respect of conditions of service relating to union
membership that discretion is unfettered or that the scope of the
discretion or the manner of its exercise is so imprecisely defined
that those affected by its exercise are given inadequate protection
against arbitrary interference. The proceedings before the domestic
courts made clear not only that the exercise of the discretion under
Article 4 was subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts
but that the exercise of the prerogative power was now restricted by
statute in certain respects. In particular, by virtue of the
provisions of the 1975 and 1978 Act a civil servant is normally
entitled in law to be a member of a trade union, may not be legally
dismissed because of such membership, and is entitled to make a
complaint of unfair dismissal to an Industrial Tribunal if he is
dismissed for this reason. Accordingly, the power of the Minister in
the exercise of her discretion is specifically constrained by the
provisions of the 1975 and 1978 Acts except in the limited and
clearly defined circumstances in which a certificate may be issued
under the Acts, namely where the exception of the civil servant from
the protection of the Acts is required for the purpose of safeguarding
national security. Of course, GCHQ is a vital part of the security of
the United Kingdom.
The measures were not arbitrary, being based on considerations
of national security. In this connection, it is relevant to observe
that in the domestic proceedings the applicants did not allege that
the action of the Minister for the Civil Service or of the Secretary
of State was liable to judicial review on the grounds that it was
arbitrary or on grounds of "irrationality". Moreover, the measures
taken were both in line with the Convention as a whole and with one of
the particular purposes of restrictions on the right to freedom of
association permitted by para. 2 of Article 11 of the Convention.
Substantially the same considerations apply to the requirement
in the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2. For the reasons given
above the "restrictions" imposed were "lawful" in that there was a
statutory legal basis for the restrictions under domestic law and the
lawfulness of the restrictions was specifically upheld in the domestic
courts; the provisions under which the restrictions were imposed
satisfied the requirements of accessibility and foreseeability; the
restrictions, being founded on considerations of national security,
were not arbitrary and were consistent with the particular purpose of
the restrictions in Article 11 para. 2.
b. "Necessary in a democratic society"
The restrictions imposed on the applicants' rights were
justified under Article 11 para. 2 as being "necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security". The purpose of the
restrictions is consistent with the legitimate purpose set out in
para. 2 of protecting the interests of national security of which GCHQ
forms a vital part. The provisions of Sections 121(4) and 138(4) of
the 1975 and 1978 Acts reflected the acknowledged need for
particularly sensitive functions of Government to be protected so far
as possible from the risk of interference or disruption.
In making their assessment, the national authorities enjoy a
margin of appreciation as regards the nature and extent of the
restrictions required. The scope of the margin of appreciation varies
depending on the nature of the aim which is being pursued in
restricting an individual's rights under the Convention. In the field
of national security, the margin of appreciation afforded to the State
authorities is necessarily a wide one (see the cases of Klass and
Others, judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, para. 48 p.
23; Leander v. Sweden, Comm. Report 17.5.85, para. 68).
Although wide, the discretion afforded to the national
authorities is not unlimited and is subject to the supervision of the
Convention organs. The Commission's approach in Leander
(ibid. para. 69) is entirely consistent with that adopted by the
courts in the domestic proceedings. Members in the House of Lords made
clear that, although the precise requirements of national security
were matters on which the Government, rather than the courts, had
access to the information necessary to make a judgment, it was for the
Government to produce evidence that their decisions were based on
considerations of national security: a mere assertion that questions
of national security were involved would not be sufficient to exclude
review by the domestic courts.
In the present case, it is perfectly plain from the statements
of the unions that their industrial action was designed to disrupt
operations at GCHQ and hurt the Government. A moral pressure exists
for the trade union members to follow the call to strike, even if, as
in the present case, the strike did not concern GCHQ at all. There is
undisputed evidence that over 10,000 working days were lost at GCHQ as
a result of the industrial action and that, at its worst, on
9 March 1981, 25% of the staff at GCHQ were involved and parts of the
organisation were virtually shut down as a result. The Government
alone is in a position to appreciate the effects of the industrial
action.
Moreover, the lapse of time which occurred between the events
in question and the measures taken in January 1984 in no sense
suggests that the measures were other than a genuine response to a
pressing social need. Until the public acknowledgement of GCHQ's
functions in May 1983, the Government concluded that the disadvantages
associated with the public disclosure of GCHQ's role outweighed the
undoubted need to take measures to prevent a recurrence of the
disruption of GCHQ's operations by industrial action. When the role
of GCHQ was for the first time officially acknowledged, a full
reappraisal could be made of the measures required to prevent a
recurrence of the serious threat to national security proposed by any
disruption of the operations at GCHQ.
The measures taken were not disproportionate to the
legitimate aim sought to be achieved. The House of Lords found that
the Government had legitimately concluded that the interests of
national security demanded that no prior notice or consultation should
take place. In the domestic proceedings the applicants did not
contest that there was evidence on which a reasonable Minister might
have taken the view that advance consultation with the unions would
have involved the real risk of industrial disruption at GCHQ or,
indeed, that the respondent as a reasonable Minister might have taken
that view. For the reasons given in the House of Lords the interests
of national security justified not only the action taken by the
Government but the decision of the Government not to consult with the
unions prior to the introduction of the measures in question.
Before January 1984, there was no offer from the trade unions
for a no-strike. Thereafter, while giving careful consideration to
possible alternative courses of action, the Government concluded that
such an agreement would not provide an adequate guarantee that the
conflicting pressures on union members employed at GCHQ would not give
rise to serious difficulties in the future. This conclusion was
reinforced by the unsuccessful attempts in 1981 to persuade the
national unions not to involve key areas in their industrial action
and their response that they were glad to be told where they could
hurt the Government most. Subsequently, the principle of
no-disruption agreements was repudiated by two national unions at
their 1984 annual conference.
Still stronger objections applied to the suggested alternative
course of issuing ad hoc certificates under paragraph 2 of Schedule 9
to the 1978 Act. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 9 provides that, if, on a
complaint to an industrial tribunal under Section 24 or 67 of the Act,
it is shown that the action complained of was taken for the purpose of
national security, the industrial tribunal shall dismiss the
complaint. In the Government's view such ad hoc action would only
have operated after the event and would not have prevented the
interruption in the performance of GCHQ's functions as a result of
union-organised action.
It is not accepted that the Government's action was
disproportionate in that it placed civil servants at GCHQ in a unique
position in comparison with civil servants working in similar fields
elsewhere. On the contrary, the arrangements introduced at GCHQ were
those which had always existed in other agencies whose operations and
activities are primarily concerned with security and intelligence and
had the effect of bringing GCHQ into line with those other agencies as
regards membership of national trade unions. Indeed, national
security required that GCHQ be treated as a whole and industrial
action avoided throughout.
It can also not be said that only the work of a small part of
the GCHQ staff is essential to the continuous operation of GCHQ, since
the latter can only operate as an integral whole.
Steps were taken to secure, so far as possible, a fair balance
between the interests of national security and the individual rights
and freedoms guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention. Those
serving at GCHQ were given the choice between continuing to remain
there under the revised conditions (including receiving payment of
£1,000) and requesting a transfer to a similar alternative post
elsewhere in the Civil Service with a continuing right of membership
of a national trade union. A staff association - the GCSF - has now
been formed by members of the staff at GCHQ. It has been statutorily
listed as a trade union and has been granted recognition by GCHQ and
by the Treasury to represent the staff and negotiate on their behalf.
Moreover, many of the rights affected by the measures are paralleled
in the Code, the Staff Regulations in force at GCHQ and the Principal
Civil Service Pension Scheme.
Insofar as a very small number of staff have rejoined a
national trade union, they have been treated compassionately and have
not been dismissed, though they have been disciplined. They no longer
pose a threat to national security.
c. "Members ... of the administration of the State"
The second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 justifies the
imposition of restrictions on the freedoms enjoyed by persons in the
three specified categories which could not be justified under the
first sentence. The justification provided for in the second sentence
is entirely independent of that contained in the first sentence.
Otherwise, the provision would be superfluous. The sentence also does
more than just highlight the fact that persons in the three categories
have special duties and responsibilities which must be taken into
account under the first sentence. In a number of European countries
persons in the three categories are made subject to special
restrictions in relation to union membership and union activities.
Indeed, the word "restrictions" is sufficiently wide to introduce a
prohibition on membership of a trade union.
The words "members ... of the administration of the State" are
wide in scope. Although the phrase would appear to be limited to
civil servants employed in central government, it is not limited to
high-ranking civil servants such as the Cabinet Secretary and heads of
Government Departments. This would be inconsistent with the practice
in a number of States of imposing restrictions on persons in the
public service by reference not only to their level of responsibility
but also to the nature of the services they perform. The function of
GCHQ can be defeated just as effectively if the radio officer, or the
data processor, or those operating the teleprinters, are on strike.
The phrase thus covers also employees whose duties are of a
particularly confidential nature or who are in highly sensitive areas
of Government.
In the present case the restrictions imposed on the staff of
GCHQ were unquestionably lawful restrictions. They were imposed on
persons who were employed in central government in work of a highly
confidential nature. The second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 is
particularly apt to include civil servants at GCHQ, being directly
concerned as they are with the security of the State.
Of course, the second sentence does not exclude all
supervision by the Convention organs. In relation to the three
specified categories the State enjoys wider powers to impose
restrictions and the supervisory role of the Convention institutions
is correspondingly reduced. Moreover, the right to form or join
unions of one's choice is an important aspect of the rights guaranteed
by Article 11, but it is in no sense the only aspect of the Article.
The Article guarantees both the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and to freedom of association with others. Even the substance of the
right to join a trade union was not entirely destroyed. GCHQ staff
are free to join the departmental staff association, which serves to
protect the interests of all GCHQ.
Finally, the word "lawful" in the second sentence cannot be
interpreted in a more extensive manner than "prescribed by law" in the
first sentence as requiring that any restrictions should be both
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society.
V. As to Article 13 of the Convention
It is clear from the Court's case-law that Contracting States
are not obliged to ensure within their internal law the effective
implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention (see
Swedish Engine Drivers' Union judgment of 6 February 1976, Series
A no. 20 para. 50 p. 18; Silver and Others, ibid. para. 113 p. 42).
Article 13 does not require the incorporation of the Convention rights
into domestic law or that domestic courts apply the same standards or
criteria, or enjoy the same scope of examination, as provided for in
the Convention.
The rights of those in Crown employment to join a trade union
as guaranteed under Article 11 are as fully protected as the rights in
employment outside the Civil Service. The only power to restrict the
rights secured by the 1978 Act in relation to those in Crown
employment is the power conferred on the Secretary of State to issue
certificates under Section 121(4) of the 1975 Act and Section 138(4)
of the 1978 Act.
As is apparent from the domestic proceedings, both the issue
of the certificates and the giving of instructions under the Order in
Council are subject to judicial review by the English courts. The
decision of the House of Lords clearly demonstrates the effectiveness
of the remedy of judicial review, establishing as it does the
following propositions. First, the exercise of the power under the
1982 Order in Council is subject to judicial review and is to be
treated in identically the same way as the exercise of a statutory
power. Second, the exercise of the power may be challenged on any of
the usual grounds of judicial review, notwithstanding that the field
of law to which the decision relates is national security. Third,
although the Government is in a better position than the courts to
determine the requirements of national security, if a decision is
challenged by way of judicial review, it is for the Government to
adduce evidence to satisfy the court that the decision under challenge
was in fact properly founded on grounds of national security.
Thus the English courts were applying their minds to
substantially the same considerations as confront the Commission. The
material and evidence before the Commission are also identical to that
placed before the domestic courts, including the Report of the
Employment Committee on which the applicants heavily rely.
B. The Applicants
I. The facts (see THE FACTS above)
The applicants point out further detriments suffered by trade
union members employed within GCHQ. For instance, in April 1986 a
payment of £500 or 5% of an individual's salary was made to non trade
union staff at GCHQ on account of a proposed re-structuring of grades
within GCHQ. Moreover, GCHQ management have declared that trade
unionists will not be included in the new grading structure currently
being negotiated. This exclusion is expected to result in a financial
loss for union members.
General Notice GN100/84 provided that trade union members
within GCHQ "will not be promoted while (they) remain at
GCHQ". On at least two occasions members have been specifically
told that they were being refused promotion because of their union
membership. GCHQ trade unionists are also barred from training
courses which relate only to GCHQ work.
II. As to the conditions of Article 27 para. 1 (b) of the Convention
ILO Convention No. 87 contains no provisions comparable to
Article 11 para. 2. Therefore, the ILO has not already determined the
issues under Article 11. Nor would the Commission's consideration of
the present application give the appearance of an "appeal". One of
the central issues of the present application - whether the conditions
specified in Article 11 para. 2 are satisfied - does not arise under
the ILO Convention. It was because of the very narrow scope of the
issues under ILO Convention No. 87 that the Committee on Freedom of
Associatiion stated that the facts were not in dispute. Under Article
11, the facts - e.g., as to whether the decisions complained of were
necessary in a democratic society - are very much in dispute between
the parties.
The ILO does not provide "another procedure of international
investigation or settlement" within the terms of Article 27 para. 1
(b). The word "another" suggests that that provision is concerned
with a procedure similar to that provided by the Commission. There is
no investigation or settlement of the issues leading to a decision
binding on the State.
III. As to Article 11 para. 2 of the Convention
a. "Prescribed by law"
With reference to the Malone case (Eur. Court H.R.,
judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82 paras. 66-68), the
applicants submit that the powers conferred by Section 121(4) of the
1975 Act and Section 138(4) of the 1978 Act are not "prescribed by
law" in that they grant to the State discretionary powers without
providing any adequate indication as to the conditions on which such
powers relating to trade union rights should be exercised.
The Order in Council which was used to remove the right to
belong to a trade union, is part of the very broad and uncertain
prerogative powers of the Crown and contains no indication of the
purpose for which the powers are to be used. The powers conferred by
Article 4 of the Order in Council of 1982 are not "prescribed by law"
in that they are unjustifiably broad. They do not provide any
adequate indication as to the conditions on which such powers to
regulate contractual terms and conditions may be exercised. They
contain no provisions for judicial control of the State assertion that
national security is at stake. The exercise of such powers in
relation to GCHQ staff was also not reasonably foreseeable.
The powers referred to above were further not "prescribed by
law" in that they contravened the ILO Convention No. 87, i.e. an
international law obligation imposed on the State.
The Government refer to the fact that in the domestic courts
the applicants did not pursue an allegation that judicial review
should lie on the ground of "irrationality". The applicants emphasise
that the requirement that a law be adequately precise in order to
avoid arbitrary use, looks to the content of the law and its potential
for abuse. It does not primarily look to whether, in the instant
case, the law has been abused. In any event, judicial review for
"irrationality" is an extremely narrow remedy which does not provide
an effective means of ensuring that the power is "prescribed by law"
or that the power is exercised fairly or proportionately or for a
pressing social need. For that reason, in the domestic legal
proceedings such a claim was not pursued.
b. "Necessary in a democratic society"
The applicants first refer to the Court's case-law inter alia in
Handyside (judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24 paras. 48-50
p. 22 et seq.), Tyrer (judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26
para. 31 p. 15), Sunday Times (judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30
paras. 59 et seq., p. 35 et seq.; paras. 62 et seq., p. 38 et seq.),
Young, James and Webster (judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no.
44 paras. 63-65), Sporrong and Lönnroth (judgment of 23 September
1982, Series A no. 52 para. 69 p. 25 et seq.) as well as to the
Commission's Reports in de Becker v. Belgium (8.1.60, para. 263) and
Leander v. Sweden (17.5.85, para. 69).
The case is about a blanket ban on trade union membership and
not about industrial action. Conversely, assertions of national
security do not create a blanket exception to the Convention
guarantees. The Government's interpretation of Article 11 para. 2
would make the latter valueless as a protection of the rights of civil
servants throughout Europe. The exception clause in Article 11 para. 2
must be strictly interpreted and other international Human Rights
Conventions and the relevant ILO Conventions must thereby be
considered. Regard must also be had to the laws and practices of
other Convention States, the overwhelming number of which do not as a
general practice prevent or prohibit civil servants from belonging to
an independent trade union.
The House of Lords was applying a very much weaker test than
that of "necessary in a democratic society" which is not recognised in
English law. Therefore the conclusions reached in the English
domestic courts under domestic law do not provide any guidance on the
application of Article 11 para. 2 in this respect.
The traditional British approach has been to encourage trade
union membership since it promotes the settlement of industrial
disputes. Trade union rights at GCHQ have been encouraged by
successive Governments since the inception of GCHQ in 1947. This, and
the Government's conduct between the industrial action in 1981 and
January 1984 clearly demonstrate that there was no "pressing social
need" to deny trade union rights, and that the steps taken were, in
any event, not proportionate to any such need for the following
reasons.
Thus, the latest industrial action relied on by the Government
occurred on 14 April 1981. Yet the Government did not decide to
remove trade union rights at GCHQ until December 1983, over 2 1/2
years later. If the Government suggest that it was only in May 1983
that the intelligence role of GCHQ was for the first time officially
and explicitly acknowledged, the applicants point out that, as a
result of widespread publicity, members of the public well knew of the
functions of GCHQ by 1978. The Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs stated in an affidavit to the English courts that
"the activities at GCHQ were made known to the public as early as
1978...". Even after the official acknowledgement of GCHQ's function
in May 1983, the Government took no steps to ban trade union
membership until January 1984.
The true reason of the delay between April 1981 and January
1984 is that the industrial action now complained of by the Government
was not at the time perceived by the Government as constituting any
threat which justified the removal of trade union rights. Indeed, the
then Secretary of State for Defence stated in April 1981 in Parliament
that "up to now industrial actions have not in any way affected the
operational capability in any area". Only a small proportion of GCHQ
staff - probably less than one fifth - work in areas requiring
continuous operations. The examples of industrial action cited by the
Government could not affect the continuous nature of operations at
GCHQ. Thus:
- The one day strike on 23 February 1979 and the "selective
action" thereafter was a minor dispute involving junior grades.
- The one day strike on 22 June 1979 followed by some selective
action up to and including 25 July 1979 was part of a national
dispute. The participants were technicians involved in work on future
projects.
- The work to rule and overtime ban called by industrial staff
in September 1979 was called by the TGWU and AUEW, not the first
applicant. The participants were "non-craft" industrials (e.g.
cleaners).
- The TUC day of action of 14 May 1980 had no impact at all upon
the continuous nature of operations at GCHQ.
- The protest meeting on 27 November 1980 was a lunchtime
meeting with no conceivable impact on the day to day running of GCHQ.
- The two other incidents were the industrial action by station
radio officers between 20 December 1979 and 13 February 1980 and the
industrial action in March and April 1981. Advance warning was given
to the Government in order to enable alternative arrangements to
ensure the continuity of operations. The Government wrongly imply
that the industrial action had relevant adverse effects.
The Foreign Secretary himself said before the Parliamentary
Select Committee that he did not doubt the loyalty and professional
dedication of GCHQ staff. The loss of 10,000 working days is O.1% of
total working time over the relevant period. During the same period
(February 1979 - February 1984) sick leave accounted for the loss of
over 340 days work. No substantive approaches were ever made by
management to the trade unions involved stating that such action had
in any way threatened the operational efficiency of GCHQ.
The Government failed to consult the trade unions prior to the
removal of trade union rights and it failed to act on the February
1984 recommendations of the House of Commons Employment Committee. As
the Committee's Report of 14 February 1984 explains, it held an
inquiry into the Government's policy on trade union rights at GCHQ
immediately following the announcement on 25 January 1984 of the
removal of trade union rights. The Committee stated inter alia as
follows:
"15. One point which has concerned us is the timing of
the action ... We do not consider that the explanation given
by the Government justifies the delay ... Does this mean that
but for the exposure of a spy, which led to the avowal, the
Government would have continued indefinitely to be seriously
disturbed about possible threats to national security at
GCHQ, and yet be prepared to take no action? They could
surely have approached the unions to impress upon them the
seriousness of the position and to discuss other ways of
avoiding disruption ...
20. ... The Prime Minister stressed the need to treat
GCHQ like other security services. But there are important
differences. The staff of services like MI5 have never
enjoyed trade union rights, whereas GCHQ employees always
have. To remove those rights, which are also enjoyed by
many other civil servants in highly secret posts, from GCHQ
is a most serious step, which had provoked strong opposition
from the staff and the trade union movement, and caused
major political controversy. It is necessary to consider
whether the Government could achieve their objectives in
some other way."
The Committee noted, at paras. 21-24, the trade unions'
willingness to offer guarantees and a legally binding agreement to
meet the Government's objectives, including ensuring continuity of
operations at GCHQ, without denying trade union rights at GCHQ.
The Government had no pressing social need to remove trade
union rights without any consultation or negotiation. The
"unproductive informal discussions held earlier at GCHQ" were
insignificant. It is denied that any national union other than the
first applicant was approached or that the reaction of the first
applicant in 1981 justified the absence of negotiations or
consultation in 1984. No mention was made in 1981 of any specific
operation which should not be disrupted because of potential damage to
the effective operation of GCHQ. Had such mention been made, the
trade unions would immediately have stopped such action. There is
every reason to believe that the trade unions would have behaved in a
constructive manner, had such consultations taken place. In this
respect it is noted that the Employment Committee referred to above
rejected the Government's explanation for non-consultation. The ILO
Committee was especially critical of this aspect of the case.
No pressing social need existed in that the Government could
have accepted the recommendations of the Employment Committee in
relation to this matter and the trade unions' proposals. In the form
of an agreement these provisions would have become legally binding for
the trade unions. If the proposals did not meet the Government's
concerns, then it was for the Government to present further proposals,
short of a ban on trade union membership at GCHQ.
In fact the trade unions were willing to offer guarantees,
including a binding guarantee of continuity of operations at GCHQ. If
the national unions did indeed later vote against the trade union
proposals on account of the Government's own conduct, this in no way
justifies the Government's previous rejection of those proposals.
The measures were disproportionate to any danger to ban trade
union membership. Why prevent staff from exercising the right to
freedom of association when the alleged concern was not about trade
union membership but about trade union activities? As GCHQ employees
who are trade union members will continue to work at GCHQ, and as this
is now accepted by the Government, it is clear that there is no
pressing social need for the removal of trade union rights.
The creation of a staff association (which has not applied
for, and would not be granted, a certificate of independence by the
Certification Officer) is not relevant to the question of whether
there was a pressing social need or whether the Government acted
proportionately to any such need. Rather, Article 11 contains a right
to associate in a trade union of one's choice, particularly when the
trade unions chosen have been recognised by the employers for this
purpose since 1947.
c. "Members ... of the administration of the State"
The second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 should be narrowly
construed, providing as it does an exception clause to a basic right
under the Convention. It does not exclude persons from protection of
their basic rights under Article 11 para. 1 even when the conditions
specified in the first sentence of para. 2 are not satisfied. It
would be contrary to the objects and purposes of Article 11 to empower
States to exercise unlimited powers to regulate trade union rights
without supervision by the organs established under the Convention.
This would require the clearest language in the Convention.
"Lawful" in the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 means
more than merely authorised by domestic law. It means lawful under
the Convention, that is having regard to the aim and object of the
Convention to prevent fundamental rights being interfered with other
than by means which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a
democratic society (reference to Comm. Reports of 11.5.84 in G. v.
Federal Republic of Germany, paras. 94 et seq., and K. v.
Federal Republic of Germany, paras. 87 et seq.).
The second sentence ensures that the nature of the work done
by those employees may validly be considered in applying the first
sentence of Article 11 para. 2. Moreover, it authorises restrictions
on trade union activities, but not the denial or prohibition of trade
union membership. The second sentence refers to restrictions on the
exercise of the right, but not to its destruction. As an exception
clause, it should be narrowly construed, particularly as a broad
interpretation would remove hundreds of thousands of public sector
employees in the United Kingdom and millions throughout Europe from
the protection of Article 11 and would be entirely inconsistent with
the "fair balance" which is at the heart of the Convention as a whole.
If the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 does exclude
certain persons from the protection of Article 11 para. 1, it is
submitted that the present case does not concern "members ... of the
administration of the State". Article 11 para. 2 should be narrowly
interpreted only to cover persons expressly mentioned - that is police
and army personnel - and those who are included by necessary
implication from the overwhelming demands of the context. All GCHQ
employees are not so included. However, the trade union rights of all
GCHQ employees were removed. The applicants refer in this context to
Article 55 of the Treaty of Rome, Article 22 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 5 of the Social
Charter as well as to the Court's case-law in National Union of Belgian
Police (judgment of 27 October 1975, Series A no. 19 para. 38 p. 17
et seq.), Swedish Engine Drivers' Union (judgment of 6 February 1976,
Series A no. 20 para. 32 p. 14), and Schmidt and Dahlström
(judgment of 6 February 1976, Series A no. 21 para. 36 p. 16).
In this light, the phrase "members ... of the administration of
the State" should not be construed to cover all public employees or
all employees of central government. Nor can it be appropriate to
include within the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 all persons
working at GCHQ simply because their work is (directly or indirectly)
associated with national security. Indeed, if the second sentence
were to be so interpreted, there would be no need for the phrase "in
the interests of national security" in the first sentence of Article
11 para. 2. The phrase "members ... of the administration of the
State" means, in this context, persons who have a specific and direct
connection with the exercise of official authority or who administer
the basic functions of the State, that is high-ranking civil servants
such as the Cabinet Secretary and Heads of Government Departments. It
therefore does not cover all employees at GCHQ.
The second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 is not unique.
Thus, the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the
third sentence of Article 10 para. 1 are subject to the principle of
proportionality. The phrase "administration of the State" should
therefore be construed to apply only to those employees covered by the
overwhelming demands of the language and context.
The approach adopted by the Government in the present case
would conflict with the general practice throughout Contracting States
of allowing civil servants to join a trade union. The general
practice fully recognises the right to belong to a union as distinct
from the right to strike or to take other forms of industrial action
which are, of course, restricted and sometimes even forbidden for
certain sectors of the labour force in Convention States. Even in the
United Kingdom, armed forces may belong to a trade union, though they
may not be active in it.
The Government's approach also conflicts with the obligations
undertaken by the United Kingdom under international Human Rights
Covenants and Conventions. Article 11 para. 2 can only properly be
understood against the background of the ILO Conventions of 1948 and
1949, against which background the 1950 Convention was drafted.
In this respect the ILO carefully distinguished two distinct
rights. First, the ILO distinguished the right to belong to a trade
union. Under Convention No. 87 of 1948, this right to belong is
enjoyed by members of the administration of the State as well as by
other employees. Secondly, there is the right to collective
bargaining guaranteed by ILO Convention No. 98 of 1949. Public
servants engaged in the administration of the State are not covered by
Convention No. 98 dealing with collective bargaining though they are
covered by the right to belong to a trade union in Convention No. 87.
The consistent case-law of the ILO has always recognised this vital
distinction.
Article 5 of the European Social Charter, Article 22 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 8 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, by
all of which the United Kingdom is bound, also recognise the rights of
members of the administration of the State to belong to a trade union.
Those instruments expressly prevent measures which would derogate from
the ILO Conventions.
IV. As to Article 13 of the Convention
It is important to understand that the applicants complain of
the issue of certificates under Section 121(4) of the 1975 Employment
Protection Act and Section 138(4) of the 1978 Employment Protection
(Consolidation) Act removing trade union rights "for the purpose of
safeguarding national security". They also complain of the exercise
of powers under the 1982 Order in Council withdrawing the right to
trade union membership for the same purpose. The domestic remedy open
to the applicants, which they have exhausted, did not allow an
assessment of whether, in taking those steps, the Government acted in
response to a pressing social need or proportionately to any such
need, or whether the powers exercised were prescribed by law. For
that reason, the applicants did not argue before the domestic courts
that the Government's action was not required by a pressing social
need or that it was disproportionate to any such need or that it was
not prescribed by law.
The decision of the House of Lords in the present case
stated inter alia that judicial review does not exist to determine
whether the decision complained of "was proper or fair or justifiable
on its merits. These matters are not for the courts to determine"
(per Lord Fraser). The scope of judicial review can be conveniently
summarised under three main heads: illegality, irrationality and
procedural impropriety (per Lord Diplock).
By "illegality" is meant that the decision-maker must
understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power
and must give effect to it. The House of Lords were not concerned
with any such challenge in the present case.
By "irrationality" is meant, inter alia, that the
decision-maker must not have regard to irrelevances, or ignore
relevances, or act for an improper purpose. It was not suggested in
the present case that the House of Lords should conclude that the
decision complained of was irrational in that very narrow and extreme
sense.
By "procedural impropriety" is meant the failure to observe
the rules of natural justice or a failure to act with procedural
fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision.
That was the complaint raised in the House of Lords: namely, that the
complainants had a reasonable expectation of consultation prior to the
decision to remove trade union rights, but that no such consultation
had taken place.
In the present case, the House of Lords held that the
complainants did have a legitimate expectation of consultation.
However, in the present case "there was evidence upon which a
reasonable Minister might have taken (the) view" that the Government
"needed to act, to preserve national security" (per Lord Roskill).
Once such evidence was produced, the court would not assess its
weight, unless reliance on national security was irrational, which was
not here suggested. So national security excused what would otherwise
have been an unlawful procedural impropriety in failing to consult
prior to the decision of which complaint was made.
It can therefore be seen that it was not open to the
applicants to seek judicial review of the decisions complained of on
the grounds that the powers exercised were not prescribed by law or
the decisions made were not required by a pressing social need or were
disproportionate to any such need.
Neither judicial review nor any other domestic legal
procedure entitles the applicants to complain before a national
authority with the power to grant an effective remedy if their rights
guaranteed under Article 11, or the substance of those rights, have
been breached. It is well known that the Convention is not
incorporated into English law and that English courts have no power to
determine whether the Convention has been breached. Judicial review
applies criteria much less onerous for the State to satisfy (reference
to Weeks v. United Kingdom, Comm. Report 7.12.84, para. 100;
X v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 5 November 1981,
Series A no. 46 para. 56 et seq., p. 24 et seq.).
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention
that the respondent Government have removed the right of individual
employees at GCHQ to belong to a trade union.
a) In respect of the conditions set out in Article 27 para. 1 (b)
(Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention, the applicants submit that the
present application cannot be regarded as being substantially the same as that
presented by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) to the International Labour
Organisation (ILO). In particular, ILO Convention No. 87 contains no
provisions comparable to Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2). The issue whether the
conditions specified in Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) are satisfied does not
arise under the ILO Convention. Moreover, there was in the present case no
investigation or settlement of the issues leading to a decision binding on the
respondent Government.
The respondent Government do not request the Commission to
reach any particular conclusion on the issue under Article 27 para. 1 (b)
(Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention. Nevertheless, it is pointed out
that there is a clear similarity of scope and purpose between the relevant
provisions of the two Conventions, and the complaints arise out of the same
facts. The substance of the complaints is also identical. Moreover, the first
applicant is a member of the TUC, and the TUC's application was made with the
full concurrence of the first applicant.
The Commission has examined whether the present application is
substantially the same as the complaints raised before the ILO within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention which states:
"1. The Commission shall not deal with any petition
submitted under Article 25 (Art. 25 ) which ...
(b) is substantially the same as a matter which ...
has already been submitted to another procedure of
international investigation or settlement ... "
It is true that the rights mentioned in Article 2 of the ILO
Convention No. 87 of 1947 resemble to an extent the rights guaranteed
in Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1) of the Convention. However, the Commission
finds that the present applicants, namely the Council of Civil Service
Unions and six individual applicants, are not identical with the
complainant before the ILO organs concerned. Rather the complaints
before the ILO were brought by the Trades Union Congress, through its
General Secretary, on its own behalf. Indeed, the six individual
applicants before the Commission would not have been able to bring
such complaints since the Committee on Freedom of Association was set
up to examine complaints from organisations of workers and employees,
as opposed to individual complainants.
Accordingly, the present application cannot be regarded as
being substantially the same as the complaints brought before the ILO within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention. The
Commission is therefore called upon to deal with the complaints raised by the
applicants.
b) The applicants complain that individual employees at GCHQ no
longer have the right to belong to a trade union. They rely on
Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention which states:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly and to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of
these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of
the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of
the State."
The Commissions finds - in agreement with the parties - that
there has been an interference by a public authority with the exercise
of the applicants' right, under Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1), to
form and to join trade unions, namely in that on 25 January 1984, upon
instructions of the Prime Minister as Minister for the Civil Service,
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs issued two
certificates with the result that GCHQ staff were henceforth no longer
permitted to be members of any existing trade union.
The Commission's next task is to examine whether such
interference was justified under Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) of the
Convention. First it must consider whether the interference falls to
be considered under the first or the second sentence of Article 11
para. 2 (Art. 11-2).
The applicants have submitted that the restrictions at issue
were not justified either by the conditions stated in the first or in
the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2). They have
pointed out that the second sentence did not exclude persons from
protection of their basic rights under Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1)
even when the conditions specified in the first sentence of paragraph
2 (Art. 11-2) were not satisfied. In any event, they consider that
the present case does not concern "members ... of the administration
of the State", since this concept must be given a narrow
interpretation.
The Government have filed submissions justifying the
interference both under the first and the second sentence of Article
11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2). However, in the Government's submissions the
justification provided for in the second sentence is entirely
independent of that contained in the first sentence. Otherwise the
second sentence would be superfluous.
The Commission observes that the first sentence of Article 11
para. 2 (Art. 11-2) provides criteria for justifying an interference
with the rights under Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1). The second
sentence specifically envisages restrictions on the exercise of these
rights by various categories of persons employed by the State. The
Commission finds that the restrictions at issue fall to be examined
primarily under the second sentence, if the staff serving at GCHQ can
be considered as "members ... of the administration of the State".
The Commission must therefore turn its attention to the meaning and
scope of these terms.
In this respect, the Commission notes that the applicants have
placed much reliance on various other international instruments as a
background to their interpretation in particular in the second
sentence of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) of the terms "members ...
of the administration of the State".
It is true that the Commission has occasionally had recourse
to other international instruments under international law (see
Swedish Engine Drivers Union, Comm. Report 27.5.74, paras. 65 ff). In
the present case, it notes that for instance Article 22 para. 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 ensures
the right to form and join trade unions. The second sentence of
Article 22 para. 2 is similar to the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2
(Art. 11-2) of the Convention, while only mentioning "the armed forces and ...
the police" but not the administration of the State. Again, Article 8 para. 1
(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of
1966 also guarantees the right to form and join trade unions. Nevertheless,
Article 8 para. 2 which resembles the second sentence in Article 11 para. 2
(Art. 11-2) of the Convention now expressly includes the "members ... of the
administration of the State".
In the Commission's opinion these differences sufficiently
demonstrate that there can be no settled view under international law
as to the position of members of the "administration of the State" in
respect of trade union rights, and that these instruments cannot
therefore be of assistance to the Commission in the present case.
In interpreting the term "members ... of the administration of
the State" the applicants point out that the second sentence covers
police and army personnel and those who have a specific connection
with the exercise of official authority or who administer the basic
functions of the State, e.g. high-ranking civil servants. It should
not be construed to cover all persons working at GCHQ simply because
their work is directly or indirectly associated with national
security. Otherwise there would be no need for the phrase "in the
interests of national security" in the first sentence of Article 11
para. 2 (Art. 11-2).
In the Government's submissions, the words "members ... of the
administration of the State" are not limited to high-ranking civil
servants. This would be inconsistent with the practice in a number of
States of imposing restrictions on persons in the public service by
reference not only to their level of responsibility but also to the
nature of the services they perform. The function of GCHQ can be
defeated just as effectively by the radio officer or the teleprinter
operator. GCHQ can only operate as an integral whole. The phrase
thus also covers employees whose duties are necessary for the proper
performance of vital Government functions.
The Commission has examined whether the staff serving at GCHQ
fall under the terms "members ... of the administration of the State".
To a certain extent, the meaning and scope of these terms is uncertain
and the Commission will not attempt to define them in detail.
Nevertheless, the Commission notes that the terms are mentioned, in
the same sentence in Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2), together with
"members of the armed forces (and) of the police". In the present
case, the Commission is confronted with a special institution, namely
GCHQ, whose purpose resembles to a large extent that of the armed
forces and the police insofar as GCHQ staff directly or indirectly, by
ensuring the security of the respondent Government's military and
official communications, fulfil vital functions in protecting national
security.
The Commission is therefore satisfied that the staff serving
at GCHQ can be considered as "members ... of the administration of the
State" within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2
(Art. 11-2) of the Convention. It must therefore examine whether the
further conditions of the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2
(Art. 11-2) have been met, in particular whether the restrictions at
issue were "lawful" within the meaning of that provision.
The applicants have pointed out that this must mean lawful
under the Convention, having regard to the aim of the latter to
prevent the interference with fundamental rights other than by means
which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic
society. They submit that the term "prescribed by law" in the first
sentence of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) is not met in that Section
121(4) of the 1975 Act and Section 138(4) of the 1978 Act grant to the
State discretionary powers without any adequate indication how these
powers should be exercised. Moreover, the powers conferred by Article
4 of the Order in Council of 1982 do not adequately indicate the
conditions on which contractual terms and conditions may be regulated.
Further, no provisions are made for judicial control of the State
assertion that national security is at stake.
The Government submit that the measures imposed on GCHQ staff
were lawful restrictions within the meaning of the second sentence of
Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2). Under the first sentence of Article
11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) the Government contend that Article 4 of the
1982 Civil Service Order in Council expressly confers powers upon the
Minister for the Civil Service. The power of the Secretary of State
to issue certificates is expressly conferred by Section 121(4) of the
1975 Act and Section 138(4) of the 1978 Act. These provisions are all
sufficiently clear and precise in their terms to give those affected
an adequate indication as to the conditions in which certificates may
be issued, namely where the exception of civil servants from the
protection of the Acts is required for purposes of national security.
The Commission recalls that it has so far not expressed an
opinion in its case-law on the meaning of the term "lawful" in this
particular context. In the Commission's view, however, "lawful"
within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2
(Art. 11-2) means in the first place that the measures at issue must at
least have been in accordance with national law.
In the present case the Commission observes that, according to
Article 4 of the 1982 Civil Service Order in Council, the Minister for
the Civil Service may regulate the conditions of service of civil
servants. It is true that this order is rather broad in that it does
not specifically refer to the regulation of trade union membership.
However, these powers of the Minister must be seen in connection with
the two Employment Protection Acts of 1975 and 1978 which restrict the
exercise of the powers under the Civil Service Order in Council and on
the basis of which provisions the Foreign Secretary, on
25 February 1984, signed and issued certificates. In particular,
Section 138(4) of the 1978 Act and the corresponding Section 121(4) of
the 1975 Act expressly refer to the issuing of such certificates for
the purpose of safeguarding national security. The Commission finds
that the measures at issue met this condition in that the staff at
GCHQ were concerned with vital functions of national security.
Against this legislative background the Commission considers
that the relevant legal provisions provided an adequate and sufficient
indication to those employed at GCHQ as to the possibility of steps
being taken to regulate trade union membership. In this respect the
Commission notes, in addition, that the measures at issue were subject
to judicial control by the domestic courts. In the Commission's
opinion, the measures were, therefore, taken in accordance with
national law.
The applicants have also submitted that the "lawful
restrictions" of a right cannot imply its destruction. Furthermore,
the second sentence is also subject to the principle of
proportionality and, as an exception clause, should be narrowly
construed since a broad interpretation would remove millions of public
sector employees throughout Europe from the protection of Article 11
(Art. 11). In the context of the terms "necessary in a democratic
society" in the first sentence of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) , the
applicants contend that the measures were disproportionate in that
there was no "pressing social need" for the Government to deny trade
union rights after 37 years, and to deny them only 2 1/2 years after
the industrial action occurred. The Government failed to consult the
trade unions before issuing the certificates, and failed to act on the
recommendations of the House of Commons Employment Committee, even
though the trade unions were willing to offer guarantees.
The Government submit that the term "lawful" in the second
sentence of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) cannot be interpreted as
requiring that restrictions should also be "necessary in a democratic
society". In the context of the first sentence of Article 11 para. 2
(Art. 11-2) the Government submit that undoubtedly the industrial
action at GCHQ was intended to harm the Government who alone can
appreciate the effects of the action. The lapse of time until the
certificates were issued can be explained by the fact that the
Government undertook a full reappraisal of the measures required to
prevent a recurrence of the threat to national security. The
Government also found that the guarantees offered by the trade unions
were not adequate. A fair balance has now been secured between the
interests of national security and the rights under Article 11 (Art. 11)
by creating a departmental staff association at GCHQ.
The Commission has examined first the applicants' submission
that the term "restrictions" in the second sentence of Article 11
para. 2 (Art. 11-2) cannot imply complete suppression of the exercise
of the right in Article 11 (Art. 11). However, the Commission recalls
that the same term is also employed in the first sentence of Article
11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2). This provision has been interpreted by the
Commission as also covering a complete prohibition of the exercise of
the rights in Article 11 (Art. 11) (see e.g. Application No. 8191/78,
Rassemblement jurassien and Unité jurassienne v. Switzerland,
10.10.79, D.R. 17 p. 93). Accordingly, the term "restrictions" in the
second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) is sufficiently
broad also to cover the measures at issue.
Second, the Commission notes the applicants' submissions that
the term "lawful" in the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2
(Art. 11-2) includes the principle of proportionality. In this
respect, the Commission finds that, even if the term "lawful"
("légitime") should require something more than a basis in national
law, in particular a prohibition of arbitrariness, there can be no
doubt that this condition was in any event also observed in the
present case.
The Commission recalls its case-law according to which States
must be given a wide discretion when ensuring the protection of their
national security (see Leander v. Sweden, Comm. Report 17.5.1985,
para. 68).
In the present case, the Commission has considered the
Government's position when issuing the certificates. In particular,
the Government had to ensure that the functioning of GCHQ would no
longer be vulnerable to disruption by industrial action. After
industrial action had occurred in 1981 and once the Government had
acknowledged the functions of GCHQ in May 1983, the time and means
were lacking for the Government to conduct substantial negotiations
with the trade unions. The guarantees offered by the latter were in
the Government's assessment not adequate. The Government were aware
that trade union officials outside GCHQ could organise industrial
action within GCHQ in which GCHQ staff would participate as loyal
trade union members. Thus, it could not be excluded that industrial
action could again occur at GCHQ at any moment. In this respect the
Commission notes in particular that the House of Lords, in its
judgment of 2 November 1984, unanimously accepted that the basis of
the Government's actions related to the interests of national
security.
The Commission considers that in this light and against the
whole background of industrial action and the vital functions of GCHQ
the action taken, although drastic, was in no way arbitrary. The
measures would therefore also be "lawful" within a wider meaning of
that term in the second sentence of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2).
The Commission is thus satisfied that the measures at issue,
while interfering with the applicants' rights under Article 11 para. 1
(Art. 11-1), were justified under the second sentence of Article 11
para. 2 (Art. 11-2) as being "lawful restrictions (imposed) on the
exercise of these rights by members ... of the administration of the
State". Therefore, there is no further need to examine the measures
in relation to the conditions of the first sentence of Article 11
para. 2 (Art. 11-2). It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicants complain that there was no effective remedy
under domestic law for the alleged breach of Article 11 para. 2
(Art. 11-2), by which a municipal court can judge the validity of a
particular administrative action. No remedy was available to them
which was sufficient and effective. No remedy allowed an assessment
of whether the Government acted in response, or proportionately, to a
pressing social need, or whether the powers exercised were prescribed
by law. The Convention is not incorporated into English law and
English courts have no power to determine whether the Convention has
been breached. Judicial review applies criteria much less onerous for
the State to satisfy. The applicants rely on Article 13 (Art. 13) of
the Convention which states:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
The Government submit that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not
require the incorporation into domestic law or imply that domestic
courts enjoy the same scope of examination as provided for in the
Convention. Both the issue of the certificates and the giving of
instructions under the Order in Council are subject to judicial review
by the English courts. The decision of the House of Lords clearly
demonstrates the effectiveness of the remedy of judicial review. In
fact, in the present case, English courts had regard to substantially
the same considerations as confront the Commission. Moreover, the
material and evidence before the Commission are also identical to that
placed before the domestic courts.
The Commission recalls the case-law of the Convention organs
under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention according to which an
individual, who has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation
of the rights set forth in the Convention, should have a remedy before
a national authority in order both to have his claim decided and, if
appropriate, to obtain redress. However, neither Article 13 (Art. 13)
nor the Convention in general lays down for the Contracting States any
given manner for ensuring within their internal law the effective
implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention (see Eur.
Court H.R., judgment of Silver and others of 25 March 1983, Series A
no. 61, para. 113 p. 42).
In the present case the Commission, which considers that the
applicants had an arguable claim, observes that they were able to
bring the case before the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords. In dealing with the case, these courts examined
whether the measures at issue fell under the 1982 Civil Service Order
and the 1975 and 1978 Acts. The courts also examined the rights of
trade union members as well as the manner in which the measures were
taken, for instance, whether the Government should first have
consulted the trade unions. Moreover, the courts reviewed the
justification of the measures, in particular on grounds of national
security.
The Commission has also taken account of the fact that, since
the Convention is not part of the domestic law of the United Kingdom,
the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, as the
"national authorities" referred to in Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention,
did not decide upon arguments which were made with express reference
to the Convention. However, the Commission concludes that in the
present case the relevant rights were substantially relied upon by the
applicants in the domestic proceedings and that the national authorities
were capable of affording the complainants an "effective remedy" within the
meaning of Article 13 (Art. 13) (see No. 9261/81, Dec. 3.3.82, D.R. 28 p. 177).
In particular, the Commission considers that the Court of
Appeal and the House of Lords were able to consider the essence of the
applicants' present complaints under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention.
The courts would have been able to quash the action taken by the Prime Minister
under the 1982 Civil Service Order, had they found for the applicants in the
proceedings in question. In fact, this course was followed by the High Court
in its decision of 16 July 1984 which was subsequently set aside, on appeal, by
the Court of Appeal.
The Commission concludes that effective remedies were in fact
available to the applicants and that the proceedings concerned
satisfied the requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention. It
follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)