AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 12839/87

                      by Thomas ECCLES and Others

                      against Ireland

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 9 December 1988, the following members being present:

              MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J.-C. SOYER

                  H.G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  J. CAMPINOS

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  C.L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs.  J. LIDDY

             Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 27 March 1986

by Thomas Eccles and Others against Ireland and registered

on 1 April 1987 under file No. 12839/87;

        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The first applicant, Mr.  Thomas Eccles, was born in 1959

and is a glazier by profession.  The second applicant, Mr.  Patrick

McPhillips, was born in 1955 and is a labourer by profession.  The

third applicant, Mr.  Brian McShane, was born in 1964 and is also

a labourer by profession.  All of the applicants are Irish citizens

and are at present detained in Portlaoise prison, Ireland.  The

applicants are represented before the Commission by Mr.  Desmond Lavery

of Lavery & McGahon, Solicitors, Dundalk, and Messrs.  R. Mackey S.C.,

P. McEntee S.C. and P. Gageby B.L., of counsel.

        The facts are not in dispute between the parties and may be

summarised as follows:

        In August 1984 the applicants were arrested and subsequently

charged before the Special Criminal Court in Ireland for the offence

of capital murder and robbery.  They were accused inter alia of

robbing a post office and killing a member of the police force.

        The applicants applied to the High Court on 22 February

1985 for an interim order prohibiting their trial before the Special

Criminal Court on the ground that it was not an independent court.

The application was refused by Mr.  Justice Barrington in the High Court

on 22 February 1985.  An appeal to the Supreme Court against this

decision was refused on 25 February 1985.

        The trial of the applicants commenced on 25 February 1985 and

concluded on 28 March 1985.  Each applicant was found guilty of

capital murder and robbery and sentenced to death on the first charge

and twelve years' imprisonment on the second charge.

        At the conclusion of the trial the applicants sought a

declaration before the High Court that Section 39 of the Offences

Against the State Act 1939 was unconstitutional insofar as it permitted

the trial of a criminal offence by a court which was not independent.

This application was rejected by Mr.  Justice Barrington on 12 July 1985.

An appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected on 1 November 1985.

        Relevant domestic law and practice concerning the Special

        Criminal Court

        The Special Criminal Court was established for the first time

in 1939 and remained in existence until 1962.  In 1972, due to the

troubles in Northern Ireland, the Government invoked its powers to

establish a Special Criminal Court under Part V of 1939 Act.  Part

V of 1939 Act does not come into force unless the Government is

satisfied "that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the

effective administration of justice and the preservation of public

peace and order and publishes a Proclamation to this effect".

        A panel of judges is appointed by the Government to the

Special Criminal Court.  The panel consisted of eleven members in 1977

and was reduced to nine members in 1984.

        Sub-sections 1-4 of Section 39 of 1939 Act provide as

follows:

    of this Act shall consist of such uneven number (not being

    less than three) of members as the Government shall from

    time to time determine, and different numbers of members

    may be so fixed in respect of different Special Criminal

    Courts.

2.  Each member of a Special Criminal Court shall be

    appointed, and be removed at will by the Government.

3.  No persons shall be appointed to be a member of a Special

    Criminal Court unless he is a Judge of the High Court or

    the Circuit Court or a Justice of the District Court or a

    Barrister of not less than 7 years standing or a Solicitor

    of not less than 7 years standing, or an officer of the

    Defence Forces not below the rank of Commandant.

4.  The Minister for Finance may pay to every member of a

    Special Criminal Court such (if any) remuneration and

    allowances as the said Minister may think proper and

    different rates of remuneration and allowances may

    be so paid to different members of any such Court, or

    to the members of different such Courts."

        Section 40 of 1939 Act provides that the determination of

the Special Criminal Court is to be according to the opinion of the

majority and the existence or content of individual opinions, whether

assenting or dissenting, is not to be disclosed.  Section 41 provides

that the Special Criminal Court shall have power to regulate its own

sittings and shall have control of its own procedure in all respects

and that it shall, with the concurrence of the Minister for Justice,

make rules for this purpose.  The Special Criminal Court Rules 1972

(Statutory Instrument No. 147 of 1972) were made in accordance with

this Section and came into operation on 12 June 1972.  They were

replaced by the Special Criminal Court Rules 1975 (Statutory

Instrument No. 234 of 1975).  Section 53 of 1939 Act provides for the

immunity from any action, prosecution or other proceedings, civil or

criminal, of members of the Special Criminal Court.

        Section 43 of 1939 Act gives the Special Criminal Court

jurisdiction to try and to convict or acquit any person lawfully

brought before the Court.  It also confers ancillary jurisdictions

such as the power to sentence convicted persons to suffer the punishment

provided by law in respect of the offence in question and the power

to admit to bail, and to administer oaths.

        Section 44 of 1939 Act provides that convictions or

sentences of a Special Criminal Court are subject to appeal to the

Court of Criminal Appeal in the same way as convictions or sentences

of the Central Criminal Court.  Furthermore, in the case of The

State (Coveney) v.  Members of the Special Criminal Court [1982]

ILRM 284, the Special Criminal Court was treated as an inferior court

for the purpose of the order of prohibition so as to be subject to the

supervisory control of the High Court in the exercise of its

jurisdiction, including the power of the High Court to prohibit it from

taking any action contrary to the law or inconsistent with its powers.

        The rules of evidence which apply in the ordinary courts also

apply in the Special Criminal Court, apart from the provisions of the

Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976, permitting the taking of

evidence on commission in Northern Ireland (cf.  Section 11 of 1976

Act).

        The provisions of 1939 Act dealing with the establishment

procedures and powers of the Special Criminal Court were enacted

pursuant to the provisions of Article 38.3 of the Constitution which

provides:

"1°.  Special courts may be established by law for the trial

of offences in cases where it may be determined in

accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are

inadequate to secure the effective administration of

justice, and the preservation of public peace and order.

2°.   The constitution, powers, jurisdiction and procedure

of such special courts shall be prescribed by law."

Section 6 of Article 38 of the Constitution provides that:

"The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 of this Constitution

shall not apply to any court or tribunal set up under

section 3 or section 4 of this Article."

        Article 35 contains constitutional guarantees of the

independence of the judiciary.  In particular sub-sections 2 and 5

provide:

"2°.   All judges shall be independent in the exercise

of their judicial functions and subject only to this

Constitution and the law.

5°.   The remuneration of a judge shall not be reduced

during his continuance in office."

        In its decision of 1 November 1985 (Eccles and Others v.

Ireland, the Attorney-General and Others [1986] ILRM 343), the Supreme

Court found that the above guarantees of judicial independence did not

apply to persons sitting as members of the Special Criminal Court but

that this did not resolve the issue as to whether that court lacked

judicial independence.  The Supreme Court referred to a previous

decision of the Court in which it had been held that the presumption

of constitutionality carried with it the presumption that

"proceedings, procedures, discretions and adjudications" provided for

in legislation are to be conducted in accordance with the principles

of constitutional justice.  Any departure from these principles would

be restrained and corrected by the courts.  Chief Justice Finlay

added:

"This principle applies to the powers granted to the

Government and to the Minister, respectively, by these

sub-sections.  If either of these authorities were to seek

to exercise its power in a manner capable of interfering

with the judicial independence of the Court, in the trial of

persons charged before it, it would be attempting to

frustrate the constitutional right of persons accused

before that Court to a trial in due course of law.  Any such

attempt would be prevented and corrected by the courts

established under the Constitution.  Whilst, therefore, the

Special Criminal Court does not attract the express

guarantees of judicial independence contained in Article 35

of the Constitution, it does have, derived from the

Constitution, a guarantee of independence in the carrying

out of its functions.

The Court is, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiffs have

not established that S. 39 of the Act of 1939 is invalid,

having regard to the provisions of the Constitution and this

appeal must, therefore, be dismissed."

        The applicants then appealed against their conviction and

sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeal which dismissed their appeal on

10 February 1986.  The Court of Criminal Appeal also refused on the

same date an application for a certificate under Section 29 of the Courts

of Justice Act 1924 enabling the applicants to appeal to the Supreme Court.

An application was subsequently made to the Attorney General for a

certificate of leave to appeal on a point of law of exceptional public

importance.  This was refused by letter of 19 August 1986.

        In the meantime, on 21 February 1986, the President of Ireland

remitted the death sentences imposed on each of the applicants and

substituted sentences of forty years' imprisonment.

        The court which tried the applicants was constituted by

Mr.  Justice Hamilton, President of the High Court of Ireland,

His Honour Judge Desmond, a judge of the Circuit Court of Ireland, and

Mr.  Cathal O'Flynn, a former President of the District Court.

Mr.  O'Flynn had retired as President of the District Court in 1979, a

post which he had held since 1961.  As a member of the Special

Criminal Court he continued to be paid the same salary as that which

he received as President of the District Court.

        COMPLAINTS

        The applicants point out that Section 39 of the Offences Against

the State Act 1939 provides that the judges of the Special Criminal Court

are removable at the will of the Government and that the amount of their

salaries is within the discretion of the Minister for Finance.

        The applicants complain they were tried by a court that was not

independent in fact or in law in breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention.  They point out that they were tried by a court composed of

judges who had no judicial tenure in the court.

        They base their case on sub-sections 2 and 4 of Section 39

contending that the separate or combined effect of these two

sub-sections was to deprive persons sitting as members of the Special

Criminal Court of judicial independence and that persons tried before

that court were deprived of the right to a trial in due course of law

guaranteed by Article 38.1 of the Constitution.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 27 March 1986 and registered

on 1 April 1987.   On 8 October 1987 the Commission decided that

notice should be given to the respondent Government of the application

and that the Government should be invited to submit written

observations on the admissibility and merits of the application in so

far as it raised issues under Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention.

These observations were submitted on 8 March 1988.  The applicants'

observations in reply were received on 3 June 1988.  The Government

submitted comments on these observations in reply on 11 July 1988.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

        The respondent Government

        The respondent Government note that the independence and

impartiality of the individual members of the Special Criminal Court

are not at issue in the present application and that there has been no

suggestion that the applicants did not receive a fair trial on account

of any absence of personal independence in any member of that court.

Furthermore, the Government submit that there is no question but that

the Special Criminal Court is wholly independent in fact and in law of

the Executive in its functioning and of the parties in matters

considered by it.

        Facts

        While the respondent Government recognise that the issue to

be determined relates primarily to Section 39 (2) and (4) of the

Offences against the State Act 1939, it nevertheless wishes to rebut

any assertion that might be made that Mr.  O'Flynn was retired at the

time of his appointment and that he was therefore not validly

appointed to the Special Criminal Court under Section 39 (3) of that

Act.  The Government point out that Mr.  O'Flynn was correctly and

validly appointed to the Court during his tenure in office as

President of the District Court, and that it is established that

Section 39 (3) of 1939 Act does not require that he should have

requalified for continuing membership upon his retirment from the

District Court (State (McGlinchey) v.  Governor of Portlaoise Prison,

unreported decision of the High Court, 14 December 1987).

        Furthermore, Mr.  O'Flynn did not receive any additional

remuneration as a member of the Special Criminal Court for as long as

he continued to hold the position of President of the District Court.

Upon his retirement from this latter position, he continued to be paid

the same salary at the then current rate as he had received before his

retirement as President of the District Court, until he ceased to be a

member of the Special Court on 4 September 1986 at the age of 77.

        Domestic law and practice

        The Government submit that it is clear from the relevant

provisions of the Constitution, from the text of Part V of the

Offences against the State Act 1939 and from the Supreme Court

decision in the applicants' case of 1 November 1985 (Eccles v.

Ireland [1986] ILRM 343), that the independence and impartiality of

the Special Criminal Court is wholly guaranteed under Irish law.

        In particular, the Court must exercise its functions with

constitutional propriety and with due regard to natural justice (Burke

v.  Minister for Labour [1979] IR 354).  Furthermore, Article 38.6 of

the Constitution does not take away the High Court's power to exercise

a "superintendence" of the Special Criminal Court in this respect

(State (Coveney) v.  Members of the Special Criminal Court [1982] ILRM

284, and Attorney General v.  Connolly [1947] IR 213).  Moreover,

the above-cited decision of the Supreme Court establishes that, if the

Government or the Minister for Finance were to seek to exercise their

powers under Section 39 (2) or (4) of 1939 Act in a manner capable of

interfering with the judicial independence of the Special Criminal

Court in the trial of persons charged before it, they would be

attempting to frustrate the constitutional rights of persons accused

before that Court to a trial in due course of law and any such attempt

would be restrained and corrected by the superior courts (cf.  East

Donegal Co-operative Livestock Marts Ltd. v.  Attorney General [1970]

IR341).

        The Government further point out that as the Special Criminal

Court iself has not been set up for any determined period and as it

may at any time be dissolved by a resolution of Dail Eireann under

Section 35 (5) of 1939 Act, the membership of the Special Criminal

Court is not and cannot be fixed with regard to security of tenure as

is the case with the ordinary courts.

        The Government submit further that, their actions in relation

to the Special Criminal Court are effectively confined to nominating

the panel of members.  Since 1972, this panel has been entirely

composed of serving or retired members of the judiciary and, since

Sepember 1986, wholly of serving members of the ordinary courts.

Beyond this, the Government submit that they have no control over how

the Court conducts its business.

        In this connection, the Government draw particular attention

to the following guarantees of the court's independence.  Section 40

of 1939 Act obliges the Court to deliver a single judgment, so

the Government are not privy to the individual opinions of members of

the court in particular cases.  Section 41 of that Act provides that

the Special Criminal Court shall have power to regulate its own

sittings and to have control of its own procedure in all respects.  The

Court has adopted its own rules of procedure for this purpose (S.I.

No. 234 of 1975).  Furthermore, appeals may be taken to the ordinary

courts of appeal against conviction and sentence in the same way as

appeals from ordinary courts (Section 44 of 1939 Act).  In addition,

with one minor exception, there are no rules of evidence which apply

to the Special Criminal Court which do not also apply to the ordinary

courts.  Finally, Section 53 of 1939 Act provides that members of the

Court are immune from civil proceedings and criminal prosecution in

respect of acts done by them as members.

        As regards the powers of the Minister for Finance under Section

39(4) of 1939 Act, the Government submit that there is a practice

of maintaining the previous salary at the then current rate of any

members of the Special Criminal Court who are retiring from another

judicial office.  The facts of the present application disclose that

this was the position for the only member of the Court as constituted in

the applicants' case who had so retired from other judical office i.e.

Mr.  O'Flynn, the former President of the District Court.  In the

Government's submission, the exercise of the Minister's powers under

Section 39(4), rather than cutting across the independence of the

Special Criminal Court, serves only to promote and to preserve its

independence in accordance with the principles inherent in Article

35.5 of the Irish Constitution.

        Article 26 of the Convention

        The Government submit that, as the personal independence of

the individual members of the Special Criminal Court was not

questioned in the course of the domestic proceedings in the Irish

courts, any allegations concerning their personal independence must be

rejected as inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies

under Article 26 of the Convention.

        Article 6(1) of the Convention

        The Government note that in their decision as to admissibility

in the case of X and Y v.  Ireland (No. 8299/78, Dec. 10.10.80, D.R. 22

p. 51, at para. 19), the Commission considered that the Special

Criminal Court sitting in the applicants' case was independent and

impartial within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

        The Government further observe that the term "independent" in

that Article has been interpreted by the Commission and by the Court

as comprising two elements, namely a court's independence from the

executive on the one hand and its independence from the parties on the

other (cf.  Eur.  Court H.R., Ringeisen judgment, 16 July 1971, Series A

No. 13, para. 95).  In the light of all the considerations of domestic

law and practice outlined above, the Special Criminal Court is clearly

independent of the executive in its functioning and of the parties in

matters considered by it.  In this connection, particular attention is

drawn to the established jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that

whilst the Special Criminal Court does not attract the express

guarantees of judicial independence contained in Article 35 of the

Irish Constitution, it does have, derived from the Constitution, a

guarantee of independence in the carrying out of its functions.  This

guarantee prevails over any inconsistent application of Section 39 (2)

or (4) of 1939 Act by the Government or by the Minister for

Finance respectively.  The Government also stress that as the Special

Criminal Court itself has not been set up for any determined period

and as it may at any time cease to exist by resolution of Dail Eireann

under Section 35 (5) of 1939 Act, the membership of the Special

Criminal Court is not and cannot be fixed with regard to security of

tenure as is the case with the ordinary courts.

        The Government further submit that in the case of Zand v.

Austria (Comm.  Rep. 12.10.78, D.R. 15 p. 70), the Commission

considered that even if the wide discretion given to the Minister could

facilitate the intrusion of extraneous considerations, the mere

possibility of that was not sufficient to warrant a finding that the

Austrian Labour Court's independence was generally affected.  It would

have to be shown by reference to particular cases that the practice of

the authorities is as a whole unsatisfactory, or that at least the

establishment of the particular court deciding the case was

influenced by improper motives.  In the Government's submission, no

such evidence of a particular nature has been adduced in the present

application.  Nor has reference been made to particular facts which

would lead to a conclusion that the functioning of the Special

Criminal Court was anything other than satisfactory.

        The Government conclude that the application should be

declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of the Convention.

        The applicants

        Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

        The applicants complain that the members of the Special

Criminal Court at the time of their trial were removable at the will of

the Government and that their salaries could be diminished at the will

of the Minister for Finance, contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention.

        The applicants indicate that no argument is made that the

members of the Special Criminal Court at the time of their trial were

not appointed or did not hold office otherwise than in accordance with

the domestic law.

        Nor is it alleged that any attempt was made either by the

Government or by the Minister for Finance to interfere with the

judicial independence of the Court in the trial of the applicants

before it.  Consequently, it is submitted that the reliance by the

Government on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case taken by

them does not address their complaint under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention, because the guarantees of judicial independence referred to

in that judgment are of no effect if in fact the judges are removable

and were so removed.

        In this connection, the applicants point out that on

4 September 1986, the five members of the Special Criminal Court who

were not then also judges of the ordinary courts, including one of the

members of the Court constituted in their case, were removed from the

Special Criminal Court by the Government.  The solicitors for the

applicants have subsequently requested information from the Ministers

for Justice and Finance as to the reasons for the termination of

these appointments.  By letter of 24 May 1988, the Department of

Justice gave the following reply:

        "The appointments were terminated by decision of the

        Government in accordance with Section 39 of the Offences

        against the State Act, 1939".

        The applicants submit that the refusal by the Government to

advance the reason for the removal of the judges places serious doubt

on the Government's reliance on the above judgment of the Supreme

Court.

THE LAW

        The applicants complain that they were not tried by an

independent court as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention. They complain, in particular, that the judges of the

Special Criminal Court were not independent since they could be

removed at will by the Government in accordance with Section 39 (2) of

the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and since their salaries could

be reduced by the Minister of Finance under Section 39 (4) of the same

Act.

        The relevant part of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention reads as follows:

        "In the determination of his civil rights and

        obligations or of any criminal charge against him,

        everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing

        within a reasonable time by an independent and

        impartial tribunal established by law. ..."

        The Commission's task is to consider the issues raised by the

concrete case before it.  It is not called upon, in the present case,

to examine the general compatibility of those provisions of the

Offences Against the State Act 1939 which establish the Special

Criminal Court with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Its function is limited to an examination of whether the applicants

were tried by an independent court within the meaning of this

provision (see, in this context, Eur.  Court H.R., Young, James and

Webster judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 22, para. 53).

        The Commission has previously found the Special Criminal Court

to be an independent and impartial tribunal although the applicants in

that case did not question the independence of the Court with

reference to the removability of the judges or to their remuneration

and the Commission did not examine these issues (see No. 8299/78, X

and Y v.  Ireland, Dec. 10.10.80, D.R. 22 pp. 551-75).

        In determining whether a court may be considered to be

"independent" both of the executive and of the parties to the case,

regard must be had to the manner of appointment of its members and the

duration of their term of office, to the existence of guarantees

against outside pressures and to whether the body presents an

appearance of independence (see Eur.  Court H.R., Campbell and Fell

judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80, pp. 39-40, para. 78).

        The applicants do not question, in any respect, the personal

independence of the members of the Special Criminal Court who tried

them.  They limit their complaint to the situation in law that the

members of the Court could be removed at will by the executive and,

therefore, do not enjoy judicial tenure and that their salaries could

be diminished by the executive.

        The Commission observes that members of the Special Criminal

Court are appointed by the Government under Section 39 (2) of 1939

Act.  Since the Court is not a permanent Court it follows that its

members cannot, as such, enjoy the same judicial tenure as judges of

the ordinary courts.

        Both the Commission and Court have stated that, in general,

the irremovability of judges by the executive during their term of

office must be considered as a corollary of their independence and

thus included in the guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention (see e.g.  Campbell and Fell judgment, loc. cit., para. 80,

and Zand v. Austria, Comm.  Report 12.10.78, D.R. 15 p. 82, para. 80).

However, in assessing this issue regard must be had not only to the

legal provisions concerning the composition of the court but also how

these provisions are interpreted and how they actually operate in

practice. In so doing the Commission must look at the realities of the

situation.

        In this connection the Commission notes the decision of

the Supreme Court in the applicants' case (Eccles & Others v.  Ireland,

The Attorney-General and Others [1986] ILRM 343) where the Court held

that, notwithstanding Section 39 (2) of 1939 Act, any attempted

interference with the judicial independence of the Special Criminal

Court would be prevented and corrected by the courts, such

interference being regarded as an attempt to "frustrate the

constitutional right of persons accused before that Court to a trial

in due course of law".  The Supreme Court added that in this way the

Special Criminal Court derived from the Constitution a guarantee of

independence in the carrying out of its functions.

        Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Special Criminal

Court is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court

which can review any action taken by the Court alleged to be illegal

or ultra vires (The State (Coveney) v.  Members of the Special Criminal

Court [1982] ILRM 284).

        The Commission also attaches significance to the fact that the

Special Criminal Court was composed of persons with a judicial

background, two of whom were serving members of the judiciary (the

President of the High Court and a Circuit Court judge) and the third a

former President of the District Court.  Moreover, the judgment of the

Court can be appealed to the ordinary courts of appeal in the same way

as appeals from the ordinary criminal courts (Section 44 (1) and (2)

of 1939 Act).  In addition, the Special Criminal Court regulates

its own procedure and generally applies the same rules of evidence as

the ordinary criminal courts (Section 41 of 1979 Act).

        Finally, the Commission finds that there is no evidence of

executive interference with the Court in the performance of its

functions.  Nor is such interference alleged by the applicants either

generally or on the facts of the present case.  It is true that in

September 1986 five members of the Court, one of whom was a judge in

the applicants' case (Mr.  O'Flynn), were replaced by decision of the

Government.  The Commission has no reason to suppose that this

decision was in any respect improper since it would appear from

the Government's submissions that the reason was to ensure that the

Court consisted entirely of judges who were also judges of the

ordinary courts (see above p. 7).  Furthermore Mr.  O'Flynn had reached

an age in excess of normal retiring age.

        The applicants also complain that the remuneration of members

of the Special Criminal Court is entirely at the discretion of the

executive.  However, there is no evidence of any attempt to undermine

the independence of the Court by an abusive exercise of the

power contained in Section 39 (4) of 1939 Act in a manner

calculated to influence the Court in the performance of its

functions.  Moreover, any attempted influence in a particular case, in

this way, would also be restrained by the courts as an

unconstitutional encroachment on judicial independence (Eccles &

Others v.  Ireland, the Attorney-General & Others, loc. cit.).

        Against the above legal and constitutional background, the

Commission concludes that the Special Criminal Court that tried and

convicted the applicants is an "independent" court within the meaning

of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

        It follows that the present application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

    (H. C. KRÜGER)                       (C. A. NØRGAARD)