AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 12805/87

                      by Ewa and Katarzyna NOWACKA

                      against Sweden

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 13 March 1989, the following members being present:

              MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  F. ERMACORA

                  G. SPERDUTI

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J.-C. SOYER

                  H.G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  G. BATLINER

                  J. CAMPINOS

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  C.L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs.  J. LIDDY

             Mr.  L. LOUCAIDES

             Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 24 January 1987

by Ewa and Katarzyna Nowacka against Sweden and registered

on 19 March 1987 under file No. 12805/87;

        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

        The first applicant is a Polish citizen, born in 1954 and

resident at Alvesta, Sweden.  She is a factory worker by profession.

The second applicant is the first applicant's daughter, Katarzyna,

born on 28 August 1982.  She is also a Polish citizen.  Since 13 June

1986 she has been living with foster parents at Färgelanda, Sweden.

Before the Commission the applicants are represented by Mrs.  Siv

Westerberg, a laywer practising at Gothenburg.

        In May 1985 the applicants came to Sweden from Poland.

They settled down in Alvesta with the first applicant's fiancé,

Jan Kuczynski.

        On 16 August 1985 the Chairman of the Social Council

(socialnämnden) of Alvesta decided to take Katarzyna into public care

on a provisional basis under Section 6 of the 1980 Act with Special

Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen med särskilda

bestämmelser om vård av unga).  It was suspected that Katarzyna, who

had been taken to hospital by the first applicant and Jan Kuczynski on

14 August 1985 as she was feverish and sick, had been maltreated.  Dr.

U.L., who examined her at the hospital, observed several bruises on

her body and, as he suspected maltreatment, made a report to the

social authorities.

        The provisional care order was confirmed by the County

Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Kronoberg County on

27 August 1985.

        The Social Council applied to the County Administrative Court

for a decision that Katarzyna be taken into public care pursuant to

Section 1 second paragraph 1 of the 1980 Act.  After having held a

hearing in the case on 23 September 1985, the Court on 8 October 1985

removed the case from its list of cases, as the Social Council had

withdrawn its action before the Court due to an agreement with the

first applicant that the care be carried out on a voluntary basis.

The provisional care decision was thereby revoked.

        After further injuries had been discovered in a medical

examination of the girl the Chairman of the Social Council on 31

October 1985 again decided to take Katarzyna into care on a

provisional basis.  The same day Katarzyna was placed at the

Children's Medical Clinic at the hospital of Växjö.  On 13 November

1985 the County Administrative Court upheld the provisional care

order.

        On 25 November 1985 the Social Council decided to apply to the

County Administrative Court for a decision that Katarzyna be taken

into public care pursuant to Section 1 second paragraph 1 of the 1980

Act.  It also decided to place the girl at the Arabo Children's Home

awaiting a transfer to a suitable foster home.   It prohibited Jan

Kuczynski from meeting Katarzyna and restricted the first applicant's

right of access to her to a couple of hours two or three times a week

under the supervision of personnel from the Children's Home or the

social authority.  The latter decison was taken under Section 16 of

the 1980 Act.  The first applicant and Jan Kuczynski were present and

assisted by counsel at the meeting in the Social Council at which

these decisions were taken after a discussion of the issues.  The

second applicant was represented by counsel appointed ex officio.

        The County Administrative Court held a hearing during which

the Social Council pointed out, inter alia, that it appeared from its

investigation that Katarzyna during the period from August until

November 1985 had suffered a number of injuries, the gravity of which

varied.  The doctor who treated her considered one of the injuries to

be very grave.  In medical examinations on 14 August and 2 November

1985 many bruises were discovered on Katarzyna's body.  Psychiatric

and psychological assessments of the girl had confirmed that the

physical injuries she had suffered had affected her mental health.

The Council argued that Katarzyna had been injured while in the care

of her mother and Jan Kuczynski and that it was obvious that they did

not have the ability to provide the care she needed and secure living

conditions.  Her life, health and development were endangered.  The

first applicant and Jan Kuczynski, who were present at the hearing and

assisted by counsel, maintained that neither of them had in any way

harmed Katarzyna.  They maintained that she was a lively child who

bruised herself easily and that her injuries were normal for a child

of her age.  The first applicant was opposed to public care being

provided for Katarzyna and together with Jan Kuczynski she appealed

against the Social Council's decision on access.  Katarzyna was

represented by officially appointed counsel before the Court.  He

supported the request for public care.

        The Social Council submitted the following documents to the

Court:  a report of the Social Council, two medical certificates

signed by Dr.  U.L., Head of the Children's Medical Clinic at the Växjö

hospital and the doctor who reported to the Social Council that he

suspected that Katarzyna had been maltreated, and an opinion issued by

Chief Doctor T.G. and the psychologist B.S., both of the Children's

and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic of Växjö.

        The first applicant submitted a certificate issued by the

Deputy Chief Doctor P.G.N. and referred to statements made by the

psychologists G.L. and A. L-C.

        The County Administrative Court also considered an opinion

given by Dr.  G.S. of the Lund Institute of Forensic Medicine, a

medical opinion issued by Dr.  S.L. of the X-ray department of the Lund

hospital, a medical certificate issued by Dr.  E.B. of the department

for coagulation diseases at the Malmö hospital, medical case-books

concerning Katarzyna, photographs taken of her on 14 August and 2

November 1985 and minutes from interrogations.

        The County Administrative Court heard as witnesses Dr.  U.L.,

Chief Doctor T.G. and Mr.  J.M., a friend of the first applicant and

Jan Kuczynski.  The Court also heard the first applicant.

        On 17 December 1985 the County Administrative Court granted

the Social Council's application and revoked the Council's decision on

access insofar as it concerned the first applicant.  The Court did not

examine Jan Kuczynski's appeal against the decision to restrict his

access to Katarzyna, no legal provision giving the Court the

competence to do so, as Jan Kuczynski was not Katarzyna's parent or

her custodian.  The Court stated, inter alia, the following in its

reasons:

"During a period of three months Katarzyna has suffered a

number of injuries the gravity of which has varied and she has

received several bruises.  Since 14 October 1985 Katarzyna

has spent only 17 days at home.  During this period she has

suffered several injuries and bruises.  After she was

taken into care on 31 October 1985 she has not suffered any

injuries.  The bruises subsequently observed were on her arms

and legs.  The doctor of forensic medecine G.S. has stated

that certain specific circumstances strongly tell against

the theory that all the injuries were self-inflicted

(accidents).  The Head of Clinic, Dr.  U.L., has expressed

his strong suspicion that Katarzyna has been maltreated.

The same idea is expressed in the opinion given by the

Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic.  Ewa Nowacka

has maintained that Katarzyna bruises easily.  The analysis

of a blood sample shows that Katarzyna's blood coagulates

normally.  The defect caused by stretching must have occurred

before 31 October 1985.

Katarzyna has suffered these injuries and bruises in her

home environment.  The County Administrative Court finds

strong reasons to believe that she has been maltreated.  It

concludes that the conditions in the home entail a danger to

Katarzyna's health and development.  The necessary care

cannot be provided with Ewa Nowacka's consent.  The Social

Council's request is therefore granted.

As regards the right to access Dr.  U.L. and Dr.  T.G. have

underlined the importance of maintaining contact between Ewa

Nowacka and Katarzyna.  The same opinion has been expressed

in the psychological certificates referred to by Ewa

Nowacka.  Katarzyna is at present staying at Arabo and it is

not envisaged to place her somewhere else.  Considering

Katarzyna's age and the fact that she does not speak Swedish

it is important that Ewa Nowacka has an unrestricted right

of access.  The Social Council's decision to restrict her

access is therefore revoked."

        The first applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of

Appeal (kammarrätten) of Jönköping.  The Court held a hearing, at

which the first applicant was present and the applicants were

represented in the same way as in the County Administrative Court.  The

applicant stated she did not object to care being provided for

Katarzyna on a voluntary basis.  She could live together with

Katarzyna at the Arabo Children's Home.  She referred to a certificate

issued by the psychiatrist R.S. on 5 February 1986 concerning Jan

Kuczynski.  The Social Council and Katarzyna's official counsel

maintained the position they had adopted in the lower court.

        At the request of the first applicant seven witnesses were

heard by the Administrative Court of Appeal.  Among them were Mr.

A.K., her counsel in the County Administrative Court, Jan Kuczynski's

ex-wife, the first applicant's aunt, Mr.  J.M., who used to stay with

Jan Kuczynski, and J.B., a Polish doctor.  At the request of the Social

Council the social welfare officer A.S. was heard as a witness.

Dr.  U.L. and Dr.  T.G. were heard as expert witnesses by the Court.

        After the hearing the Administrative Court of Appeal decided

on 11 February 1986 to obtain the opinion of the Legal, Social and

Medical Council of the National Board of Health and Welfare

(Socialstyrelsens råd för vissa rättsliga, sociala och medicinska

frågor).  The Council's opinion, dated 30 April 1986, was drafted by

the Board's council on children's surgery, composed of an Associate

Judge of Appeal, O.S., an expert on forensic medicine, G.V., and Dr.

R.G. The first applicant, Katarzyna's officially appointed counsel and

the Social Council were invited to comment on the opinion.

        In a judgment of 19 June 1986 the Administrative Court of

Appeal confirmed the decision of the County Administrative Court.  It

stated as follows:

"Katarzyna, who is a girl of almost four years, has been ill

on several occasions during three months in the autumn of

1985, inter alia with attacks of vomiting and with a grave

inflammation of the pancreas, and has suffered various

injuries such as a fractured arm, bruises and other injuries

of the skin.  The vomiting cannot be considered to have been

connected with the subsequent inflammation of the pancreas,

but can have had several causes and have been of a kind that

any child could be affected of.  On the other hand it is

established that the inflammation of the pancreas had

traumatic causes.  It has not been established what kind of

violence injured the pancreas.  The explanation given by Ewa

Nowacka, i.e. that Katarzyna fell in the forest and hurt the

pancreas, is not very probable.

On the other hand it cannot be excluded, but must be

accepted, that the dislocation of the arm, which is

something that mainly affects children of Katarzyna's age

and cannot be considered to have been serious, occurred in

the way and in the circumstances Ewa Nowacka has stated.

During medical examinations in the period August-November 1985

Katarzyna had a large number of bruises on her body, arms,

legs and head.  Ewa Nowacka's explanation that Katarzyna

hurts herself easily - an explanation that is extremely

frequent in cases like the present one - has been refuted

by statements of experts based on chemical analyses.

Katarzyna must therefore be considered to bruise herself

like other children of her age.  Children of her age often

have bruises.  Bruises have been found on Katarzyna's body

also when she was staying at Arabo.  They were, however,

considerably less numerous and situated mainly on her legs.

The bruises that were found during the autumn of 1985 when

Katarzyna was in the care of Ewa Nowacka had a frequency and

were found in such places on Katarzyna's body that they

cannot have been inflicted while she was playing but must

mainly be considered not to have been self-inflicted.  The

fact that the bruises are to be found on "different levels"

supports this opinion.

        The wound on Katarzyna's foot, which has left a

scar, as far as the investigation shows, cannot have

been caused by clothes or shoes galling the skin, but is more

profound.  Even if inflicted in the way Ewa Nowacka contends,

its character can only be explained by insufficient care.

        It appears clearly from the investigation that

Katarzyna's right arm was dislocated before 31 October 1985.

It has never been alleged that the dislocation was caused by

maltreatment.  However, if the girl was insufficiently

looked after this could have contributed to causing the

injury and when the dislocation had occurred Ewa Nowacka did

not notice it.

        Katarzyna has consequently in a few months been

injured on several occasions.  There might be a plausible

explanation for each injury, but the large number of

injuries, some of them grave, that Katarzyna has suffered

during a relatively short period, have given the Social

Council a justified reason to investigate the conditions of

Katarzyna's home.

        The question in this case has mainly been whether or

not Katarzyna has been maltreated.  The parties differ on

this.  The expert witnesses of the Court are convinced that

she was maltreated, whereas a doctor called by Ewa Nowacka

to give evidence has maintained the opposite, as well as the

other witnesses heard at Ewa Nowacka's request.

        Clearly the assessment made when assault is to be

established is different from the assessment in a case under

the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young

Persons.  In the former case the question is whether it has

been proven that a certain person intentionally has caused

an injury to another person.  In a case under the 1980 Act,

which is an Act the purpose of which is to provide the

necessary protection for the child, another assessment must

be made.  It is of no importance to the child whether it can

be established that a certain person intentionally

maltreated it.  The danger to the child's health and

development is the same, if this had been the case, if a

stranger caused the injuries or if they occurred as a

consequence of the custodian not looking after the child

sufficiently.  It is therefore in the present case without

importance that the police investigation concerning

maltreatment of Katarzyna, as has been pointed out by Ewa

Nowacka, has been discontinued.

        The Administrative Court of Appeal finds that the

injuries suffered by Katarzyna occurred during a period when

she was in the care of Ewa Nowacka.  Ewa Nowacka has

accordingly cared insufficiently for Katarzyna and has, on

account of the nature and the extent of her injuries, caused

a danger to Katarzyna's health and development.  Katarzyna is

therefore in need of supervised care organised by the State.

Ewa Nowacka has previously interrupted care organised for

Katarzyna on a voluntary basis.  Since it cannot be assumed

that the necessary care can be provided for Katarzyna with

Ewa Nowacka's consent, care must be provided under the Act

with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons."

        The first applicant appealed against the judgment to the

Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten).  She requested that

the public care of Katarzyna be terminated, that the Court appoint Dr.

P.G.F-F. as an expert witness and that it hold an oral hearing in the

case.  She maintained that the expert witness of the Administrative

Court of Appeal, Dr.  U.L., was biased as he was the doctor who

reported to the Social Council that he suspected maltreatment.

        Katarzyna's officially appointed counsel requested that the

Court obtain a medical opinion from the Children's and Juveniles'

Psychiatric Clinic of Vänersborg.

        Before granting leave to appeal the Supreme Administrative

Court on 16 October 1986 decided to obtain an opinion from the

National Board of Health and Welfare.  The opinion was to be submitted

before 24 November 1986, a time-limit that subsequently, at the

request of the Board, was extended to 16 February 1987.

        The Supreme Administrative Court delivered its judgment on 22

December 1987.  It found that Dr.  U.L. could not be considered to be

biased and that his certificate and statements were valid evidence.

The Court furthermore found that the investigation was comprehensive

and sufficient for a decision.  It therefore rejected the parties'

requests for further investigation as well as the request for a

hearing.  One of the judges dissented and considered that the Court

should request an opinion from Dr.  U.L. on the character of

Katarzyna's bruises in order to establish if they could have been

caused by the inflammation of the pancreas.

        The Court unanimously rejected the appeal.  In its judgment it

dealt in detail with the injuries inflicted on Katarzyna and the

expert opinions given on them.  The Court referred to an opinion of 23

March 1987 given by Dr.  G.B., formerly the Head of the Children's

Medical Clinic of Paris (Clinique Médicale Infantile) and submitted by

the first applicant.  It furthermore considered American and

Australian investigations concerning complications that can appear

after an inflammation of the pancreas, such as changes of the skeleton

as well as changes of the dermis that look like bruises.  The first

applicant had quoted medical publications in which the results of

these investigations were published.

        The Supreme Administrative Court concluded in the reasons for

its judgment:

"It appears from the above that Katarzyna, during a

period in which she was in Ewa Nowacka's care, has suffered

various injuries.  She received the injuries partly during a

period of a few weeks prior to 14 August 1985, partly

during the leaves from hospital referred to above

and partly during a period of not quite three weeks

prior to 31 October 1985.  One of the injuries, the

inflammation of the pancreas, could have been fatal.  The

bruises were numerous and unusually located on her body,

namely on the trunk, the upper part of the thighs and on the

throat.  It is unlikely that the bruises were caused in the

way Ewa Nowacka has maintained.  Ewa Nowacka has explained

that she did not notice that Katarzyna in October 1985 broke

her right upper arm, in spite of the fact that the fracture

must have caused Katarzyna pains during several days.  After

public care had been provided for Katarzyna under the Act

with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons she has

only been bruised in the way children do when they play or fall

normally.  Dr.  U.L. is convinced that Katarzyna has been

maltreated.  Also the two psychiatrists that examined

Katarzyna consider that she has been maltrated.  Dr.  B.T. is

of the same opinion.

Making an overall assessment the Supreme Administrative

Court finds that Katarzyna, during the period she was in the

care of Ewa Nowacka, has been maltreated or otherwise

subjected to physical violence.  Only a few of Katarzyna's

injuries can be related to accidents or conditions which Ewa

Nowacka could not prevent.  This shows that Ewa Nowacka's

care for Katarzyna has been insufficient.  Also the fact

that Ewa Nowacka did not notice the fracture of the arm and

did not provide for any treatment shows a serious neglect.

The Court finds the established insufficiencies in the care

of Katarzyna so serious that they entail a danger to

Katarzyna's health and development.

It appears from the case-file that in the beginning of

October 1985 the Social Council started co-operating with

Ewa Nowacka in order to provide the necessary care for

Katarzyna on a voluntary basis.  However, Ewa Nowacka

discontinued the co-operation after a few days.

As a consequence of the subsequent events the Social Council

could not rely on Ewa Nowacka's consent to provide Katarzyna

with the care she needs.

On account of this the Supreme Administrative Court finds

that the prerequisites for providing care for Katarzyna,

under Section 1 first paragraph and second paragraph first

sentence of the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of

Young Persons, were fulfilled at the time of the judgments

of the lower courts.  Nothing has emerged in the case

which could make the Supreme Administrative Court assess

Katarzyna's need for care differently."

        Parallel to the proceedings concerning the public care of

Katarzyna there have been several court proceedings concerning the

first applicant's right of access to her daugther.  The first

applicant was represented by counsel throughout all these proceedings.

        Katarzyna was placed at the Arabo Children's Home on 12

November 1985, after having been taken into care, and stayed there

until 13 June 1986 when she was placed in a foster home.  The first

applicant stayed with Katarzyna at the Children's Home from

10 February to 15 May 1986.  Thereafter she was refused permission

to stay in the Home and to see Katarzyna.  On 11 June 1986 the Working

Committee of the Social Council, in connection with the transfer of

Katarzyna from the Children's Home to a foster home, prohibited the

first applicant from seeing her and decided to keep her place of

residence secret to the first applicant.  The decision was taken under

Section 16 of the 1980 Act and the Working Committee stated that it

intended to reconsider it approximately three months after Katarzyna

had been placed in the foster home.

        The first applicant appealed against the decision to the County

Administrative Court, which held a hearing and heard two witnesses and

an expert witness.  The first applicant was also heard.  The evidence

submitted to the Court consisted inter alia of opinions given by two

doctors and a psychologist, of Ewa Nowacka's diary and of notes made

by the personnel of the Children's Home.  According to the medical

opinions and the statement of the expert witness Katarzyna's mental

state was bad because of the maltreatment she had been subjected to.

One of the doctors and the psychologist considered that Katarzyna

should be allowed to meet her mother regularly but under supervision.

In its judgment of 1 July 1986 the Court revoked the decision of the

Social Council.  After the Social Council had appealed against the

judgment, the Administrative Court of Appeal, on 2 July 1986,

confirmed the County Administrative Court's decision that there was no

reason to keep Katarzyna's place of residence secret to the first

applicant and decided to restrict the first applicant's right of

access to her daughter to three hours once a week during a period of

three months, to be counted from mid-June until mid-September.  The

reason given for the restriction was Katarzyna's need for tranquillity

and security during the period in which she was to adapt to the foster

home.

        The first applicant appealed against this judgment to the

Supreme Administrative Court, which on 14 August 1986 refused

leave to appeal.

        On 20 August 1986 a social welfare officer M.E. decided to

prohibit the first applicant from seeing her daughter pending the

meeting of the Social Council of 17 September 1986.  The reason for

this was a bruise that the first applicant had allegedly inflicted on

her daughter during a visit to the foster home.  The decision was

revoked by the County Administrative Court by a provisional decision of

22 August 1986 on appeal from the first applicant.  The Court decided

that, awaiting a final decision, the judgment of the Administrative

Court of Appeal of 2 July 1986 should be followed.  The Court

subsequently held a hearing and in a judgment of 15 September 1986

revoked the decision of the Social Council.  The judgment states,

inter alia, as follows:

"In its judgment of 2 July the Administrative Court of

Appeal considered that Ewa Nowacka should have access to her

daughter.  What has occurred in the case shows that those

who decided on access did not have sufficient reasons to

restrict the right of access.  The Administrative Court of

Appeal restricted the access during a transitional period

until mid-September.  There are no sufficient reasons

to assume that the conditions on which the restriction was

based still exist.  The revocation of the Social Council's

decision shall therefore not be combined with any

restrictions on the right of access."

        Two days after the judgment of the County Administrative

Court, the Working Committee of the Social Council decided to restrict

the first applicant's right of access to her daughter to one day every

second month, in the foster home, in the presence of the foster

parents.  The decision was to be reconsidered on 31 October 1987.

        The first applicant appealed against the decision to the

County Administrative Court, which, after a hearing, revoked the

decision on 24 September 1986.  The reason was that no new

circumstances had been presented in the case since the Court's

previous judgment.  It was ordered that the judgment be immediately

enforceable.

        After the judgment had been delivered the first applicant made

a request to meet her daughter.  On 26 September 1986 she got a letter

from the social welfare officer in charge of her case stating as

follows:

"Interpretation of the judgment of the County Administrative

Court of 24 September 1986.

In consultation with the Chairman of the Social Council, I.A.,

the Deputy Chairman, B.O., the Head of the social authority,

H.G., the district superintendant and the undersigned it was

decided that you may visit Katarzyna once a week for

approximately three hours, on a day that you and the Stenbäck

family agree upon.  In addition you might (if it is accepted

by the Stenbäcks, if the interpreter can come, if there is a

suitable train and so on) be able to visit Katarzyna during a

weekend, either on a Saturday or on a Sunday, in October.

An interpreter will be present during your visits.

Yours faithfully,

M.E."

        The Social Council appealed against the County Administrative

Court's judgments of 15 and 24 September 1986 to the Administrative

Court of Appeal.  The Court held a hearing at which the first

applicant claimed her full right of access and argued, inter alia, that

the Social Council, by not letting a catholic priest visit the girl in

the foster home, obstructed her efforts to give her daughter a catholic

education.  She also pointed out that the social authorities, in

restricting her access, refused to comply with the judgment of the County

Administrative Court.  At the hearing the Court heard an expert

witness, a social welfare officer and the foster father.  They were

all of the opinion that the first applicant should have access to

Katarzyna, but that it should be restricted.  The foster father stated,

inter alia, that neither he nor his wife interfered with Katarzyna's

religious education and that they were not opposed to a catholic

priest visiting Katarzyna.

        The Administrative Court of Appeal, in a judgment of 28

November 1986, decided to allow the first applicant to see her

daughter in the foster home every third week, alternately during one

day from 10 a.m. until 6 p.m. and during two days, the first day from

10 a.m. until 8 p.m. and the second day from 9 a.m. until 4 p.m.  This

should apply until further notice, but no longer than till 1 June

1987.  In its reasons the Court stated, inter alia, that the first

applicant, during the longer meetings with Katarzyna, could assist her

at night when she went to bed and participate in her evening prayers.

The Court referred to the above interpretation by the Social Council

of the judgment of the County Administrative Court of 24 September

1986.  The reason the Court gave for the restriction of the right of

access was Katarzyna's need for tranquillity and security in the

foster home.  The Court also referred to the foster parents'

possibilities of providing successful care.

        The first applicant appealed against the judgment to the

Supreme Administrative Court, which on 29 January 1987 refused to

grant leave to appeal.

        The first applicant reported the social welfare officer, M.E.,

who had produced the "interpretation" of the County Administrative

Court's judgment of 24 September 1986, to the police.  The criminal

investigation led to an indictment by the Regional Prosecutor

(statsåklagaren) of Kalmar on a charge of misuse of office or,

alternatively, negligence in office.  The applicants joined in the

prosecutor's action and claimed damages.  The social welfare officer

was convicted for negligence in office on 22 December 1987 by the

District Court of Växjö (Växjö tingsrätt) and sentenced to a fine.  The

second applicant's action was dismissed, however, as the Court

considered that the social welfare officer had only caused her minor

inconvenience.  It was decided that the applicants' claim for damages

should be examined separately in accordance with the procedure provided

for civil cases.

        The social welfare officer appealed against the judgment

to the Göta Court of Appeal (Göta hovrätt) which on 26 October 1988

confirmed the judgment of the District Court.

        The first applicant brought a request to the Legal Aid Board

(rättshjälpsnämnden) of Malmö for legal aid for the purpose of

bringing the present application to the European Commission of Human

Rights.  The Board rejected the request on 15 January 1987.

        The first applicant appealed to the Legal Aid Appeals Board

(besvärsnämnden för rättshjälpen), which rejected the appeal on 13

April 1987.

COMPLAINTS

1.      The applicants allege a breach of Article 8 of the Convention

in that the decision taking the second applicant into public care was

based on an incorrect medical diagnosis and in that the care was not

immediately terminated after it had appeared that the diagnosis

was incorrect.  They also complain that the restriction of the first

applicant's access to the second applicant unjustifiedly interfered

with their family life.

2.      The applicants complain that a social welfare officer, by

interpreting a judgment of the County Administrative Court of 24

September 1986 providing that there be no restriction of the first

applicant's right of access to the second applicant, has unjustifiedly

restricted that right.  They further complain that they had no

effective remedy against the social welfare officer's decision and

invoke Article 13 of the Convention.

3.      The first applicant alleges a violation of her right to a fair

trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention as the expert witness

of the Courts, Dr.  U.L., whose statement was of great importance for

the outcome of the case, was biased, Dr.  U.L. being the doctor who

made the incorrect diagnosis that led to the taking into care of the

second applicant.

        The applicants further allege a breach of Article 6 of the

Convention in that their case was not determined by the Supreme

Administrative Court "within a reasonable time" and in that they were

not afforded a hearing before that court.

4.      The first applicant also complains that she has been denied

the right to ensure that the second applicant is given a catholic

education.  She contends that her daughter, who was placed in a

protestant foster home, has not been allowed to receive visits from a

catholic priest.  She invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the

Convention.

5.      Finally, the applicants complain that their right to petition

the Commission has been interfered with by the refusal of the Legal

Aid Appeals Board on 13 April 1987 to grant the first applicant legal

aid for this purpose.  They allege a breach of Article 25 of the

Convention.

THE LAW

1.      The applicants have complained that their right to respect for

their private and family life has been interfered with in a manner

unjustifiable under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.  In

particular they have pointed out that the second applicant was taken

into public care by a decision based on an incorrect medical diagnosis

and that the care was not immediately terminated after it had appeared

that the diagnosis was incorrect.  The applicants furthermore contend

that the restriction of the first applicant's right of access to the second

applicant interferes with their rights under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) .

        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads as follows:

        "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private

        and family life, his home and his correspondence.

        2.      There shall be no interference by a public authority

        with the exercise of this right except such as is in

        accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

        society in the interests of national security, public safety

        or the economic well-being of the country, for the

        prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

        health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

        freedoms of others."

        The Commission finds that the decision to take the second

applicant into care and to restrict the first applicant's right of

access to the second applicant interfered with the applicants' right

to respect for their family as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention.

        It must therefore be examined whether this interference was

justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).  In this respect the

Commission recalls that three conditions must be satisfied:  the

interference must be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one

or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and

it must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those

legitimate aims.

        As regards the first condition, the Commission recalls its

opinion in the case (Olsson v.  Sweden, Comm.  Rep. 2.12.86, para. 139)

where it found that the text of the relevant provisions in the Swedish

acts, although vague, could not be considered as not satisfying the

requirements as to the quality of the law.  This view was confirmed by

the European Court of Human Rights (Eur.  Court H.R., Olsson judgment

of 24 March 1988, Series A No. 130, paras. 60-63).

        Apart from the restrictions on access following the County

Administrative Court's judgment of 24 September 1986 (see below under

2), the Commission finds no indication that the decisions taken in the

present case were contrary to Swedish law.  The issue of taking the

second applicant into care was examined by the competent

administrative courts up to the Supreme Administrative Court and the

issue of restricting the first applicant's right of access by two

courts, the Supreme Administrative Court refusing to grant leave to

appeal.

        The Commission furthermore finds that the interference had a

legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) , namely the interests of the

child, which in this case falls under the expression "for the

protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights

and freedoms of others".

        The Commission concludes that the decision to take the first

applicant's child into care was taken "in accordance with the law"

within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention and that it

had a legitimate aim (cf. also above-mentioned Olsson judgment, paras.

64-65).  The Commission considers that this also applies to the

decisions to restrict the first applicant's access to her daughter.

As regards the decision of the social welfare officer to restrict the

first applicant's access, after the judgment of the County

Administrative Court of 24 September 1986, the Commission refers to

its examination under 2 below.

        It remains to be determined whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the child.

        According to the established case-law of the European Court of

Human Rights the notion of necessity implies that the interference

corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is

proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  In determining whether

an interference is "necessary in a democratic society" the Commission

furthermore has to take into account that a margin of appreciation is

left to the Contracting States (cf. above-mentioned Olsson judgment,

para. 67).

        However, the Convention organs' review is not limited to

ascertaining whether a respondent State has exercised its discretion

reasonably, carefully and in good faith, and they cannot confine

themselves to considering the relevant decisions in isolation but must

look at them in the light of the case as a whole.  They must determine

whether the reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are

"relevant and sufficient" (cf.  Olsson judgment, para. 68).

        The Commission recalls that in the present case the applicants

have alleged that the decision to take the second applicant into care

was based on an incorrect medical diagnosis and that the care should

have been terminated as soon as it had appeared that the diagnosis was

incorrect.

        Before considering the substance of this issue, the Commission

recalls first of all that, subsequent to the taking into care of the

first applicant's daughter on a provisional basis, the first applicant

attended a meeting with the Social Council on 25 November 1985 when

the question of maintaining the care order was discussed.  During that

meeting the first applicant was assisted by counsel and the second

applicant represented by officially appointed counsel.  Furthermore,

the Commission recalls that both the County Administrative Court and

the Administrative Court of Appeal held oral hearings.  The first

applicant was present at both hearings and assisted by a lawyer.  The

second applicant was represented by officially appointed counsel.  The

County Administrative Court heard as witnesses Dr.  U.L., the doctor

who reported to the Social Council that he suspected that Katarzyna

had been maltreated and whose diagnosis according to the applicants

was incorrect, Chief Doctor T.G. of the Children's and Juveniles'

Psychiatric Clinic of Växjö and Mr.  J.M., a friend of the first

applicant and Jan Kuczynski.  The Court also heard the first

applicant.  At the request of the first applicant seven witnesses were

heard by the Administrative Court of Appeal.  Among them were Mr.

A.K., the first applicant's counsel in the County Administrative

Court, Jan Kuczynski's ex-wife, the first applicant's aunt, a Polish

doctor and a man who used to stay with Jan Kuczynski.  The Supreme

Administrative Court did not hold a hearing in the case, but, as

appears from the judgment, carefully examined the first applicant's

written submissions and the statements made by her in the lower

courts, as well as the certificates and scientific material submitted

by her.  Moreover, the first applicant was assisted by counsel on

appeal.  Having regard to these facts, as well as to the reasons

stated below in relation to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the

Commission finds that insofar as certain procedural requirements are

implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8), these requirements were satisfied as regards

the care issue since the first applicant was involved in the

decision-making process to a degree sufficient to provide her with the

requisite protection of her interests.

        The Commission recalls that also in the proceedings relating

to the restriction of the first applicant's right of access the County

Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal held

hearings, during which the first applicant was present and assisted

by counsel, and at which witnesses were heard.  The Commission

considers that also in these proceedings the procedural requirements

of Article 8 (Art. 8) were satisfied.

        As regards the taking into care the Commission recalls that

all three courts that examined the case found that the injuries that

had been inflicted on the second applicant, during a relatively short

period in which she was in her mother's care, showed that the

conditions in the home were such as to endanger her health and

development.  This reason was clearly relevant to the decision to take

her into care.

        However, a decision to take a child into care must be supported

by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations since such a decision

is in any case a serious interference with the right protected under Article 8

para. 1 (Art. 8-1).  In order to determine whether in the present case the

reasons can be considered "sufficient" for the purposes of Article 8, the

Commission must further examine the evidence that was available to the courts.

        In this respect the Commission recalls that a large number of

medical certificates and opinions were available to the courts when

they considered the care issue.  Although these certificates and

opinions to some extent expressed different views on the question

whether the second applicant had been maltreated, it was clear from

them that the girl had suffered several injuries while in her mother's

care and that she had been neglected.  Furthermore, the Commission

recalls that the County Administrative Court and the Administrative

Court of Appeal heard several expert witnesses who supported the

findings of the written opinions submitted.  The judgments of these

courts accordingly were not founded only on the above documentation

but the courts, on the basis of the hearings held before them, had the

benefit of their own impressions of the persons involved.  The

Commission considers the fact that Dr.  U.L., who had reported

Katarzyna's situation to the social authorities, was heard as an

expert witness, and that his medical certificates were regarded as valid

evidence in the case, to be without relevance for the assessment of

whether there were sufficient reasons for the care decision,

in view of the comprehensive investigation undertaken in this case.

It has furthermore not been substantiated that Dr.  U.L. was partial.

        In these circumstances the Commission finds that the decision

to take the first applicant's child into care was supported by

sufficient reasons and that, having regard to their margin of

appreciation, the Swedish authorities were entitled to think that it

was necessary to take the child into care.  Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that this decision can be regarded as "necessary

in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of

the Convention in the interests of the child.

        Making the same considerations on the issue of the

restriction of the first applicant's right of access, the Commission

finds that, although the County Administrative Court persistently held

that the right of access should not be restricted, the reasons for the

restrictions given by the Administrative Court of Appeal were clearly

relevant.  In its first judgment on the issue the Court refers to the

second applicant's need for tranquillity and security during the

period in which she was to adapt to the foster home and, in the second

judgment, it again refers to her need for tranquillity and security

and also to the foster parents' possibilities of providing successful

care.

        The Commission considers that in view of the circumstances in

which these decisions were taken the foregoing reasons can be

considered sufficient for the purposes of Article 8 (Art. 8).  The Commission

recalls that the Administrative Court of Appeal, when giving its first

judgment, the day after the judgment of the County Administrative

Court, had access to the investigation presented before that Court,

consisting inter alia of opinions given by two doctors and a

psychologist, of Ewa Nowacka's diary, of notes made by the personnel

of the Children's Home and of the statements made by two witnesses and

an expert witness.  From the opinions and the statement made by the

expert witness it appears that Katarzyna's mental state was bad

because of the maltreatment she had been subjected to.  However, one

of the doctors and the psychologist considered that Katarzyna should

be allowed to meet her mother regularly but under supervision.  Before

giving its second judgment on the issue of the first applicant's

access to her daughter the Administrative Court of Appeal held a

hearing.  The Court heard an expert witness, the foster father and a

social welfare officer.  They were all of the opinion that the first

applicant should have access but that it should be restricted.

        Consequently, the Commission finds that also the decisions on

access can be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the

meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention in the interests of

the child.

        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.      The applicants also complain of a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention in that the first applicant's access to the second

applicant was restricted by a social welfare officer subsequent to the

County Administrative Court's judgment of 24 September 1986, although

that court had ordered that there be no such restriction.  The

applicants further complain that they had no effective remedy in this

regard and that accordingly there has been a breach of Article 13 (Art. 13) of

the Convention.

        The Commission notes that this restriction, in obvious

contradiction to the Court's judgment, of the first applicant's right

of access was valid for two months, after which the Administrative

Court of Appeal had issued a new order concerning access.  During this

period of two months the first applicant was allowed to visit her

daughter once a week for a few hours.  The Commission furthermore

notes that the social welfare officer responsible for the decision to

restrict the first applicant's right of access was convicted for

negligence in office and sentenced to a fine.  The judgment was, after

appeal, confirmed by the Göta Court of Appeal.  The applicants' claim

for damages was separated from the criminal proceedings to be examined

in accordance with the procedure provided for in civil cases.  This

civil case is still pending.

        In these special circumstances the Commission considers that

the applicants can no longer claim to be victims of a violation of

the Convention with regard to these restrictions on access.

        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.     The applicants have also invoked Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

The relevant part of the first paragraph of this provision reads:

        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

        or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is

        entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable

        time by an independent and impartial tribunal established

        by law."

        The first applicant alleges a violation of her right to a fair

trial in that an expert witness of the courts, Dr.  U.L., whose statement

was of great importance for the outcome of the care proceedings, was

biased.  The applicants also allege a breach of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention in that their case was not determined by the Supreme

Administrative Court "within a reasonable time" and in that they were

not afforded a hearing before that court.

        The Commission considers Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

to be applicable to the proceedings at issue.

        With regard to the first applicant's allegation that she was

not afforded a fair trial the Commission recalls that, in accordance

with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the

observance of the obligations undertaken by the parties in the

Convention.  It is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,

except where it considers that such errors might have involved a

possible violation of any of the rights or freedoms set out in the

Convention (see e.g.  No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222,

236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77,

Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).

        In this respect the Commission first notes that the

applicant's case was dealt with by three different courts, i.e. the

County Administrative Court, the Administrative Court of Appeal and

the Supreme Administrative Court.  The applicant has in no way

shown that these courts were biased.

        As regards the procedure before these courts, the Commission

notes that hearings were held before the County Administrative Court

and the Administrative Court of Appeal.  During these hearings the

applicant was assisted by counsel, and several witnesses were heard,

including experts who had issued medical certificates.  There is no

indication that the applicant was prevented from presenting her

arguments and views to these courts or to the Supreme Administrative

Court or that the procedure was in any other respect unfair.  The fact

taken alone that the doctor who had examined the second applicant when

she was brought to hospital and who had reported to the social

authorities what he suspected was maltreatment, was heard as an expert

witness, does not in the Commission's opinion render the proceedings

unfair.  This could have been so only if it was established - which is

not the case - that the applicant had been prevented from putting

questions to him or calling a counter-expert to rebut his testimony

(cf.  Olsson judgment, para. 89).

        As regards the applicants' allegation that their case was not

determined by the Supreme Administrative Court within a reasonable time,

the Commission recalls that the Administrative Court of Appeal and the

Supreme Administrative Court delivered their judgments on 19 June 1986

and 22 December 1987, respectively.

        The Commission notes that before the Supreme Administrative

Court examines the merits of a case there is a procedure whereby the

Court decides whether to grant leave to appeal.  In the present case

the Court decided on 16 October 1986, before granting leave to appeal,

to obtain an opinion from the National Board on Health and Welfare.

The opinion was to be submitted to the Court before 24 November 1986,

a time-limit that subsequently, at the request of the Board, was

extended to 16 February 1987.

        Considering the above, the extensive material before the

Supreme Administrative Court and the difficult and serious issue it

had to decide upon, the Commission finds that, although it is of great

importance that matters of this nature are dealt with swiftly, the

duration of the proceedings cannot be said to have exceeded a

"reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

        Finally, concerning the applicants' allegation that the

refusal of their request for a hearing in the Supreme Administrative Court

constituted a violation of their rights under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), the

Commission recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has considered an

oral hearing not to be necessary in a court of cassation whose task is limited

to an examination of whether the law has been correctly applied (Eur.  Court

H.R., Axen judgment of 8 December 1983, Series A no. 72, Sutter judgment of 22

February 1984, Series A no. 74).

        In the present case, the Commission notes that the Supreme

Administrative Court was the third degree of jurisdiction whose

examination followed upon the judgments given previously by the County

Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal.  The task

of the Supreme Administrative Court in the Swedish legal system is

essentially to develop the case-law in administrative matters under

its jurisdiction.  However, in the present case new evidence concerning

the merits was considered by the Court, namely, inter alia, the

above-mentioned opinion the Court obtained from the National Board of

Health and Welfare and an opinion of a doctor of the Children's

Medical Clinic of Paris.

        The Commission recalls its decision in the case of Hardtmann

against Sweden (No. 12670/87, Dec. 10.3.88, to be published in D.R.)

in which a complaint that no hearing was held in the Supreme

Administrative Court was declared inadmissible on grounds relating

inter alia to the Court's task to develop case-law.  The main question

for the Court to decide upon in that case was whether the applicant

had had a permanent place of business in Germany in the meaning of the

Swedish-German double taxation agreement, which essentially was a

question of legal qualification.  It was clear in that case that,

since only the applicant had appealed, there was no question of the

Supreme Administrative Court giving a judgment more unfavourable to

the applicant than that of the Administrative Court of Appeal.  Also

the fact that there had been a hearing before the County

Administrative Court was an important reason for declaring the case

inadmissible.

        In the present case the Supreme Administrative Court had to

decide whether the lower courts had correctly assessed the situation

when deciding that the second applicant be taken into public care and

whether, in the circumstances, the girl should remain in care.

        As mentioned above there were hearings in both the County

Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal.  The

Commission notes that the Supreme Administrative Court, like in the

Hardtmann case, could not give a judgment more unfavourable to the

applicants than that of the Administrative Court of Appeal.

        In these circumstances, and in view of the limited scope of

the new evidence submitted to the Supreme Administrative Court, the Commission

considers that the guarantees in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) did not require

an oral hearing to be held also in the Supreme Administrative Court.

        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.      The first applicant has also invoked Article 2 of Protocol No.

1 (P1-2) to the Convention which reads as follows:

"No person shall be denied the right to education.  In the

exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to

education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right

of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity

with their own religious and philosophical convictions."

        The first applicant contends that her efforts to give her

daughter a catholic education are being obstructed.

        However, there is no indication that the social authorities

are prohibiting Katarzyna from seeing a catholic priest.  The

authorities have stated that a priest may visit the girl after

agreement with the foster parents.  The foster father has stated

before the Administrative Court of Appeal that a priest is welcome to

visit the girl in the foster home.  The Commission further notes that

the Court of Appeal, when deciding on the first applicant's right of

access, specially considered her possibilities to pray together with

Katarzyna.  The Commission therefore finds that the first applicant's

allegation of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 P1-2) to the

Convention is unsubstantiated.

        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.      The applicants also complain that their right under Article 25 (Art.

25) of the Convention to petition the Commission has been interfered with by

the refusal of the Legal Aid Appeals Board to grant legal aid for the purpose

of bringing the application before the Commission.

        Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1), second sentence, provides that those of

the High Contracting Parties who have recognised the right of individual

petition undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this

right.  The Commission finds no indication that the applicants have been

hindered in the submission of their present application.  Moreover, the

Commission considers that Article 25 (Art. 25) does not oblige Contracting

States to grant legal aid for the purpose of bringing an application under this

Article (cf. No. 11373/85, Eriksson v. Sweden, Dec. 11.5.87, to be published

in D.R.).

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

       (H. C. KRÜGER)                     (C. A. NØRGAARD)