AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 12391/86

by John DI STEFANO

against the United Kingdom

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

13 April 1989, the following members being present:

                MM.  S. TRECHSEL, Acting President

                     F. ERMACORA

                     G. SPERDUTI

                     E. BUSUTTIL

                     G. JÖRUNDSSON

                     A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                     J.C. SOYER

                     H.G. SCHERMERS

                     H. DANELIUS

                     H. VANDENBERGHE

                Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

                Sir  Basil HALL

                MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                     C.L. ROZAKIS

                Mrs.  J. LIDDY

                Mr.  L. LOUCAIDES

                Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 14 October 1985

by John DI STEFANO against the United Kingdom and registered on

27 August 1986 under file No. 12391/86.

        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The applicant is an Italian citizen born in 1955 and resident

in Cambridge.  The applicant is represented by the Legal Department

of United Air Travel (Services) Ltd.  The facts as submitted by the

parties may be summarised as follows.

        On 19 June 1984, the applicant was arrested on a charge of

fraud.  He was released on bail.  On 21 August 1984, the applicant was

arrested again and charged with offences committed in July and August

1984.  His solicitor was informed of his arrest that day and was

present when the police searched the applicant's home and her own

office under warrant.  The applicant appeared before the Magistrates

Court the same day.  The police asked for conditions of bail to ensure

his future attendance since they feared he would abscond.  These

conditions included surrender of his passport, reporting to the police

station and £15,000 bail.  The applicant however could not fulfil

these conditions and remained in police custody.

        The applicant was brought before the Guildhall Justices on

23 August 1984.  The notes of the court clerk record that the charge

which the applicant faced was a holding charge.  The Detective

Inspector in court gave an assurance that a decision on the

substantive charges would be made next day and the applicant brought

to court again as soon as possible.  The Detective Inspector is also

recorded as explaining that the applicant had been arrested with

others in connection with a worldwide fraud and that he had refused

access to the applicant by his solicitor as that could prejudice his

enquiries.  The Court granted bail subject to conditions.  Since these

conditions were not fulfilled, the applicant was retained in custody

until 24 August 1984, when a full bail application was made on his

behalf by a legal representative.  The application was refused.

        In September 1984, a bail application before Mr.  Justice Otten

was adjourned and in November 1984, bail was subsequently refused when

the police informed the judge that the applicant was part of organised

crime with connections in the United States and that they feared that

he might abscond.

        In February 1985 the applicant was committed for trial without

another application for bail being heard.  In March 1985, a bail

application was heard in the Central Criminal Court but refused.

Following a complaint by the applicant that remand in custody for

such a long period was oppressive and illegal, it was ordered by

Mr.  Justice John Owen that his trial date be fixed for 23 September

1985.  The prosecution applied unsuccessfully to break the fixture in

May 1985.  In June 1985, a bail application failed following an

allegation by the prosecution that the applicant had written to

prosecution witnesses offering money to them in return for failing

to appear.  The letters however were not produced in Court.

        Further bail applications were refused by Mr.  Justice Tudor

Price on 2 August, 8 August and 28 August 1985 on the grounds that the

trial was fixed for September.  The prosecution did not inform the

Court that an application was to be made to the Court to postpone the

trial.  On 6 September 1985, the prosecution informed the Court that

they wished to join another defendant to the indictment and that this

person was awaiting "extradition" in Gibraltar.  The judge ordered the

trial to be postponed to the Spring.

        On 20 September 1985, the applicant applied for bail once

more.  The applicant alleges that, when the judge appeared willing

to grant bail, the prosecution stated that they preferred in such

circumstances to proceed without waiting for the "extradition" to be

completed.  The trial was subsequently fixed for November 1985.  The

trial began on 13 November 1985 and lasted until 19 March 1986, the

indictment against the applicant containing 11 counts of fraud.  The

trial involved over 100 witnesses and approximately 3,000 pages of

documents.

        The applicant was convicted on 19 March 1986 of three counts

and acquitted of the rest.  He was sentenced to a total of five years'

imprisonment: fraudulent trading (2 years imprisonment), conspiracy

to obtain property by deception (3 years) and obtaining £80,000 by

deception (18 months concurrent to the first two consecutive

sentences).  On 14 August 1986, he was granted leave to appeal against

conviction.  His appeal was heard on 27 January 1987 but was dismissed

by the Court of Appeal.

COMPLAINTS

        The applicant complains that, by the time his trial was

concluded, he had been in custody for almost 19 months.  The applicant

contends that this is an unreasonable time to be held in custody

awaiting trial and invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.  He

contends that the police allegations against him were false, and that

since his family were settled in England, there would have been no

risk that he would abscond.

        The applicant also complains that on his arrest he was refused

access to his lawyer or the Italian consulate.  He alleges that he was

not allowed to see a solicitor from 21 to 24 August 1984 and that he

did not in fact see a solicitor until after his bail application on

24 August had been refused and he had been remanded in custody.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 14 October 1985 and

registered on 27 August 1986.  On 13 July 1987, the Commission decided

to invite the respondent Government to provide information on the

application pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (a) of the Commission's Rules

of Procedure.  The Government submitted the information on 8 September

1987 and the applicant submitted his comments in reply on 11 October

1987.        The Commission considered the admissibility of the application

on 9 March 1988 and decided to invite the Government to submit

observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's

complaint of refusal of access to his solicitor.  The Government

submitted their observations on 13 May 1988 and the applicant

submitted his observations in reply on 20 July 1988 after a one month

extension of the time-limit.

        On 10 March 1989, the Commission again examined the

admissibility of the application and decided to adjourn its

examination.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

A.      The respondent Government

1.      The facts

        The applicant was the Director and Controller of a company

called Mastbid Limited.  Whilst the company was insolvent from May to

June 1984 the applicant purchased by deception video tapes valued in

excess of £500,000.  This was the offence of fraudulent trading for

which he was arrested on 19 June 1984 and later granted bail.  Between

July and August 1984 the applicant with others operated an

organisation which purported to be a bank and was also known as

Mastbid Limited.  The applicant and his associates circulated banking

documentation throughout Western Europe, the Far East and the United

States of America.  The face value of the documentation was in excess

of £25 million; and the eventual loss to customers was put at between

2 and 3 million US dollars.  The applicant was arrested in respect of

these offences in August 1984 and remained in custody until his

conviction.

        The applicant was arrested at 11.40 on 19 June 1984 and taken

to Wood Street police station in the City of London.  His custody

record shows that on that date he was permitted to telephone his

solicitor, Miss Robinson, at 22.50.  He received a visit from his

solicitor at 10.40 on 20 June and made a comprehensive statement to

the police in the presence of his solicitor between 10.50 and 14.50 on

that day.  The applicant was charged at 21.41 on 20 June and remained

in custody until his appearance before the Guildhall Justices at 9.00

on 21 June.

        It was necessary to delay giving permission for the applicant

to contact his solicitor on 19 June because, during that period, other

persons suspected of involvement in the crime were being arrested and

premises suspected of containing material evidence were being searched.

It was feared that knowledge of the applicant's arrest could have led

to suspects absconding and evidence being destroyed.

        On 21 August 1984 at 17.05 the applicant was arrested in

connection with offences of obtaining property by deception and

conspiracy.  His solicitor, Miss Robinson, was informed of his arrest

at 20.00 on that day.  She was present when, at 20.10 that evening,

the applicant's home was searched by police acting under a warrant.

Immediately following the search of the applicant's home, Miss

Robinson's office was also searched under a warrant and property

relating to the crimes was seized.

        The applicant was brought before the Guildhall Justices at

10.10 on 23 August 1984, when he was remanded back into police custody

until he could meet the conditions of his bail.  He was permitted

access to his solicitor while he was at the Guildhall court.  He

appeared before the justices again on 24 August, when he was further

remanded into prison custody until 30 August.

        Notwithstanding the note taken by the clerk of the court,

Detective Inspector's recollection remains that the applicant's

solicitor was not denied access to him between 20 and 23 August 1984.

There is no police record which supports the applicant's solicitor's

contention in this respect.  The applicant must have had legal advice

by 24 August because he was legally represented when an application

for bail was made on that day.

2.      Domestic law and practice

        The law governing the right of access to legal advice for

persons in custody is now contained in Section 58 of the Police and

Criminal Evidence Act 1984.  That Act came into force on 1 January

1986.  However, the events in issue in this application took place in

1984, and were accordingly not governed by the Police and Criminal

Evidence Act.

        At the relevant time a detained person's access to a solicitor

was covered by the Judges' Rules.  These Rules, which related to the

treatment of persons suspected of crime, were issued by the judges of

the Queen's Bench Division in 1964.

        The Rules are preceded by a number of principles, which are

statements of the common law, against which the Rules are to be read.

Paragraph (c) recalls:

        "That every person at any stage of an investigation

        should be able to communicate and to consult privately

        with a solicitor.  This is so even if he is in custody

        provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or

        hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation

        or the administration of justice by his doing so."

3.      Admissibility and merits

        The Government submit firstly that the fact that the applicant

did not have access to his solicitor in relation to his bail

application of 23 August 1984 could not in itself constitute a

violation of the Convention.  In the Neumeister judgment, Series A no.

8, paras. 22-24, the Court, in relation to the principle of equality

of arms inherent in Article 6 para. 1, did "not consider however that

this principle is applicable to the examination of requests for

provisional release".  (See also the Decision of the Commission on the

admissibility of Application No. 6541/74, X v.  FRG, D.R. 1, p. 82).

The Government accordingly submit that the provisions of Article 6

para. 3 (b) and (c), which are specific applications of the principle

set out in Article 6 para. 1, have no application to proceedings

relating to the examination of requests for provisional release, such

as bail applications.  In the circumstances, the fact that the

applicant was not legally represented in relation to his bail

application on 23 August 1984, and that such representation was not

available until his next application on the following day, did not

constitute a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (b) or (c) of the

Convention.

        Second, the Government submit that the reason recorded for the

denial of access was sufficient, and that this did not affect the

fairness of the applicant's trial, when the proceedings are taken as a

whole.  The Government also note that the applicant has not complained

that the trial which took place between November 1985 and March 1986

was itself unfair.  His complaint relates solely to the denial of

access to a solicitor for three days in August 1984; it does not

appear to be related to the fairness of the applicant's trial.

        The reason recorded for the denial of access, namely that

contact with his solicitor could be prejudicial to the police

inquiries, was sufficient to justify the measure taken.  It was known

that the applicant was involved with a number of others suspected of

involvement in crimes involving substantial amounts of money.  The

applicant's solicitor's office had been searched and property relating

to the applicant's offences was seized.  In the circumstances, it is

submitted that denial of access to a solicitor during the limited

period in question was not a disproportionate measure, having regard

to the aim pursued and having regard to the substantial amount of time

that the applicant had to prepare a defence to the charges on which he

was ultimately tried.

        As regards the position under Article 6 para. 3 (b), it

appears that when the applicant appeared in court on 23 August 1984 he

was only subject to a holding charge.  Other charges may have been

preferred on 24 August and possibly later.  Whenever the charges were

preferred, the applicant would not have been aware of the full extent

of the prosecution case against him until he was committed for trial

in February 1985.  Although a defendant is made aware of the nature of

the allegations against him when he is charged, it is only at the

committal proceedings that he receives copies of the statements of

witnesses who are to give evidence against him.  The greater part of

the preparation of the applicant's case would have taken place between

the committal in February 1985 and the start of the trial in November

1985.  Given that the applicant was, until 24 August 1984, detained

only on a holding charge and could not therefore have known the

greater part of the prosecution's case against him, it is difficult to

see how denial of access to a solicitor during the period in question

could have had any effect on the preparation of a defence to the

charges which were the subject of the trial.  The Government therefore

submit that denial of access to a solicitor between his arrest on 21

August and the second appearance in court on 24 August cannot have had

any effect on the applicant's ability to prepare his defence, nor to

defend himself at trial.

        As regards Article 6 para. 3 (c), it appears that the

applicant had access to legal assistance of his own choosing at least

from 24 August when he did have the services of a lawyer to make a

full bail application.  There is no suggestion that the applicant

experienced any difficulties in obtaining legal assistance of his own

choosing after the period 21 to 23 August 1984, or indeed at any other

time before his trial started in November 1985.  As explained above,

the greater part of the preparation of the applicant's case would have

taken place in the period from February to November 1985.  In the

circumstances, the Government submit that the applicant has failed to

show that, if he was denied access to his solicitor from 21-23 August,

this affected his ability to defend himself in person or through legal

assistance of his own choosing at his trial or at any stage of his

preparation for that trial.

B.      The applicant

1.      The facts

        While the applicant had access to a solicitor on 24 August

1984 when he was represented at a bail application, he was not

permitted to speak to his solicitor before or during the application.

He was only able to speak to the solicitor briefly after the

application.  In such circumstances the bail application was bound to

be jeopardised, the applicant not being in a position properly to

instruct his legal advisers.

2.      Domestic law and practice

i)      The Judges' Rules

        The main purpose of the Judges' Rules is to give guidelines as

to when evidence may be deemed inadmissible by reason of having been

obtained in potentially unproper circumstances.  Paragraph c of the

Rules sets out a fundamental principle unaffected by the Rules.

        The Judges' Rules were however established as guidelines

without the force of law.  They are prefixed by a letter to the police

force in general whereby the police officers are exhorted "to try to

be fair" and "scrupulously to avoid any method which could be regarded

as in any way unfair or oppressive".

ii)     Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

        The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 came into force on

3 January 1986.  Whilst it is conceded that at the time of the

applicant's detention by the police that Act was not in force, it is

submitted that its provisions are relevant in determining whether or

not in the circumstances of this matter the police were justified in

refusing access to lawyers for a period of some three days.  It is

submitted that the Act is a valuable source in this regard because it

codifies existing practice, and establishes the guidelines that the

British Parliament recognises as constituting proper procedure.  In

this respect it is based to some extent on the pre-existing Judges'

Rules, and is relevant in providing a benchmark of approved practice

against which the practice in the circumstances of this matter can be

considered.  The relevant provisions of the Police and Criminal

Evidence Act relied upon are set out below:

        "58 (1)  A person arrested and held in custody in a police

        station or other premises shall be entitled, if he so

        requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time.

        (4)  If a person makes such a request, he must be permitted

        to consult a solicitor as soon as is practicable except to

        the extent that delay is permitted by the Section.

        (5)  In any case he must be permitted to consult a solicitor

        within 36 hours from the relevant time, as defined in

        Section 41 (2) above.

        (6)  Delay in compliance with a request is only permitted:

             (a)  in the case of a person who is in police

             detention for a serious arrestable offence; and

             (b)  if an officer of at least the rank of

             superintendent authorises it."

        The applicant will submit that the enactment of the Police and

Criminal Evidence Act 1984 evidences an approved code of practice, and

that deviance from the code will constitute an unacceptable breach,

and potentially a violation of a human right.

iii)    Criminal Law Act 1977

        Section 62 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 provides:

        "Where any person has been arrested and is being held in

        custody in a police station or other premises, he shall

        be entitled to have intimation of his arrest and of the

        place where he is being held sent to one person reasonably

        named by him, without delay or, where some delay is

        necessary in the interest of the investigation or of

        prevention of crime or the apprehension of offenders,

        with no more delay than is so necessary."

3.      Admissibility and merits

        The Government contend that the entitlement under para. 3 (c)

of Article 6 to legal assistance is not an entitlement to such legal

assistance for the purposes of bail applications, but is simply an

entitlement to enable a proper defence to be prepared.  The applicant

denies that such a construction is to be placed on the provisions of

Article 6.  The decision in Neumeister simply concerns the proper

construction to be placed on "equality of arms".  The applicant knows

of no authority for the proposition that access to a lawyer may be

refused when a bail application is pending.  However, even if the

Government's interpretation of Article 6 is in this respect correct,

the applicant was denied access to a solicitor altogether, and not

merely for the purposes of the pending bail application.  The

applicant was unfamiliar with police procedure and the provisions of

the criminal law; his denial of access to a legal adviser coupled with

his first period of imprisonment in police custody, constituted a

severe violation of his rights, and jeopardised his ability adequately

to prepare his defence.

        The applicant denies that the reasons given for denial of

access to a lawyer were sufficient and submits that the fairness of

his trial was affected.  The reasons given for denial of access - that

access "may be prejudicial to enquiries" - were vague and ambiguous.

Reading between the lines of the Court record however, it is to be

inferred that the involvement of "others" and the "worldwide" nature

of the alleged offence may have been features thought by the police to

warrant a denial of access.  The Government have submitted no evidence

to substantiate their allegations that the applicant was involved with

a number of others suspected of involvement in crimes concerning large

amounts of money.  The applicant alone was charged and tried in

relation to this matter.  The only connection with "worldwide"

offences was the maintenance of accounts or connections with banking

corporations in London, whose head offices are located overseas.  In

the circumstances, it is almost impossible to meet the Government's

submission that denial was justified for the reasons recorded, as it

is far from clear what reason is relied upon.

        The applicant submits that the reasons given on later

occasions for the refusal of bail following an objection was by the

police to the granting of bail were erroneous, misconceived or plainly

wrong.

        It is also suggested that the fact that the applicant's

solicitor's office was searched in itself was reason to prevent the

applicant from having access to that solicitor.  The applicant would

not have insisted upon access to that particular solicitor, but simply

required access to competent legal advice which was denied him.

        The applicant submits that it is not for him to establish how

a solicitor, had he had access to such a solicitor at an early stage,

would have assisted him.  It is sufficient for him to establish that

he was denied access in circumstances which establish a violation of

his rights.  The applicant submits that a fair trial was thereby

precluded and that had he had earlier access the outcome would have

been very different.

        The applicant submits that the primary basis of his conviction

was the evidence of police officers Couling and Randall.  The police

officers referred to alleged conversations, unsigned statements and

alleged admissions made in the three day period of incommunicado.  The

police notes of these conversations were not produced at the trial,

and were alleged to have been lost.  The applicant submits that if he

had been granted proper legal representation for the duration of those

three days, evidence would have been available to the Court in a

proper form on the basis of a note of the question and answer

session.  Those notes would have shown that no admissions or other

concessions were given by the applicant.  The applicant's counsel

challenged the police evidence on the basis of breach of the Judges'

Rules but with no success.  Moreover, the applicant submits that

police officers seized a number of documents in the three day period

and did not provide a proper receipt for those documents, thereby

hindering the applicant's preparation of a defence.

        The Government maintain that from 24 August 1984 full and free

access was given to legal advice.  The applicant denies that full and

free access to legal advisers was made available to him thereafter; it

was only available to him on an intermittent basis.

        The applicant submits that by reason of the refusal of access

to a lawyer at an early and crucial stage in the proceedings, the

applicant's trial was thereby prejudiced.  The applicant contends that

the police conduct in maintaining him in communicado for a period of

more than three days constitutes a prima facie breach of the Judges'

Rules.  The Judges' Rules declare that everyone is entitled to

communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor.  This was not

permitted.  It is submitted by the applicant that "no unreasonable

delay or hindrance" would have been caused to the process of

investigation or the administration of justice by such access, and

that the police have failed to prove that there was even a reasonable

suggestion that such hindrance or delay would have thereby occurred.

The applicant also submits that no intimation of his whereabouts was

given to the solicitor of his choosing contrary to Section 62 of the

Criminal Law Act.  It is also clear that the proper procedure as

recognised in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was not

observed.

THE LAW

1.      The applicant complains that he was prevented from contacting

the Italian consulate and from seeing his solicitor during the first

four days of his arrest.

        The Commission has examined these complaints under Article 6

para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c) of the Convention which provides that:

        "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

        minimum rights:

        ...

        (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation

        of his defence;

        (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance

        of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to

        pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the

        interests of justice so require..."

        As regards his complaint concerning the Italian consulate, the

Commission notes that the applicant has lived in England for many

years and has apparently no difficulty with the English language.

There is no indication that the applicant was in any way prejudiced in

the criminal proceedings against him by the temporary refusal of

access to the consulate.

        As regards the applicant's complaint concerning access to his

solicitor, the Commission first observes that the Convention does not

expressly guarantee the right of an accused to communicate freely with

his defence counsel for the preparation of his defence, though the

fact that this right is not specifically mentioned does not mean that

it may not be implicitly inferred from its provisions, in particular those of

Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c).  The right for an accused to

communicate with his lawyer has been recognised by the Commission as a

fundamental part of the preparation of his defence.  However such a right to

have conversations with one's lawyer and exchange confidential instructions

cannot be said to be insusceptible of restriction (see e.g.  Can v.  Austria,

No. 9300/81, Comm.  Rep 12.7.84, Eur.  Court H.R., Series A no. 96, p. 17 and

Egue v.  France, No. 11256/85, Dec. 5.9.88, to be published in D.R.).

        As held by the Commission in the Can case (loc. cit.), the guarantees

enshrined in Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3) are not an aim in themselves but must

be interpreted in light of the general principle of fairness laid down in

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

        The Commission must therefore consider whether the restrictions imposed

on the applicant's access to his solicitor were in conformity with these

provisions of the Convention.

        It appears that the applicant was held in custody from 17.05 p.m. on 21

August until 24 August 1984 without seeing his solicitor. The Commission

recalls that the note of the court clerk records that the applicant had been

refused access to his solicitor as the police feared that it could prejudice

their enquiries.  The Commission notes in this regard that on 21 August 1984

the police had already searched the applicant's solicitors office under warrant

concerning the offences with which the applicant was charged.

        The period during which the applicant was denied access to his

solicitor was comparatively short, at most two and a half days. Thereafter, he

had the possibility for over one year prior to his trial to communicate with

his solicitor and to prepare his defence. The applicant has not contended that

he had insufficient contact with his solicitor to enable him to prepare his

defence.

        The applicant alleges, however, that during the short initial period in

which he was denied access to his solicitor the police took certain documents

and that at his trial, police officers referred to alleged admissions made by

him during this period, which he could have refuted if his solicitor had been

present to note his answers to police questioning.  The Commission finds

however that these allegations, the latter of which is somewhat hypothetical,

have not been substantiated.

        In light of the above circumstances, the Commission finds that, on the

facts of the case, the applicant has not established that the non-access to his

solicitor during the initial period of two and a half days of detention

prejudiced the preparation of his defence or the fairness of his trial.

        The possibility of communicating with a lawyer at the initial stage of

the proceedings may also be required by Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6 -3-c) of

the Convention in respect of the important function which defence

counsel may perform in challenging the lawfulness of any measures

taken in the course of the investigations, and in particular, the

legality of any detention.  The Commission notes in the present case

however that on 24 August 1984 a full bail application was made to the

Court on behalf of the applicant by his legal representative.

        The Commission consequently finds no appearance of a violation

of Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c)of the Convention.

        It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.      The applicant also complains of the length of his detention on

remand prior to his trial.  He invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.  The Commission has however examined this complaint under

Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

        Insofar as relevant, Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention

provides:

        "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the

        provisions of para. 1, sub-para. c of this (Art. 5-1-c) Article

        shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release

        pending trial.  Release may be conditioned by guarantees to

        appear for trial."

        The period, the reasonableness of which the Commission is

called upon to consider, starts on the 21 August 1984, when the

applicant was arrested.  The period ends on 18 March 1986, the date of

the applicant's conviction.  Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) does not apply to the

period subsequent to the conviction in first instance.  After the

conviction the applicant was detained in accordance with Article 5

para. 1 (a) (Art. 5-1-a) of the Convention, which provides for "the lawful

detention of a person after conviction by a competent court" (cf.  Eur.

Court H.R., Wemhoff judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7).  The

relevant period therefore lasted almost nineteen months.

        The applicant alleges that the length of his detention on

remand exceeded a "reasonable time" as guaranteed by Article 5 para. 3 (Art.

5-3).  Whether the length of detention pending trial is reasonable cannot be

determined in abstracto.  It is primarily on the basis of the reasons stated in

the decisions relating to applications for release and of the facts mentioned

by the applicant in his appeals that the question of violation must be

considered (Eur.  Court H.R., Neumeister judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no.

8, p. 37, para. 5).

        The applicant made numerous applications for release on bail during his

detention but these were consistently refused.  It appears that, in opposing

bail, the police relied on the gravity of the charges and also stated that the

applicant had links with organised crime in the United States.  The police

further relied on the risk that the applicant would abscond alleging that he

had no ties with the United Kingdom.  The Commission notes in this regard that,

while the applicant contends that he has strong ties with the United Kingdom

since he and his family have been settled there for 20 years, the applicant is

still an Italian citizen.  On another occasion, during the applicant's

detention, the police informed the Court that the applicant had been making

improper approaches to prosecution witnesses.

        The Commission also notes that in the present case the charges against

the applicant were of significant complexity.  The applicant was charged on 11

counts of fraud involving large sums of money.  The complexity of the matter is

also indicated by the length of the trial, which appears to have taken four

months, from 13 November 1985 to 19 March 1986, and involved 100 witnesses and

over 3,000 pages of documents.  As regards the handling of the case by the

authorities, the Commission notes that, although the police requested a

postponement of the trial to Spring 1986 in order to join another defendant to

the indictment, who was awaiting extradition from Gibraltar, the prosecution

nonetheless allowed the trial to begin in November 1986 when it became apparent

that on further delay the judge would grant the applicant bail.

        The Commission finds that the reasons given by the authorities for

refusing bail were relevant and sufficient to justify the applicant's continued

detention, and that, the length of time in detention prior to trial was not

unreasonable given the complex fraud charges in issue.  The Commission

therefore concludes that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 5

para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

        It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission         Acting President of the Commission

       (H.C. KRÜGER)                           (S. TRECHSEL)