I.H. v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 10533/83 • ECHR ID: 001-986
Document date: October 4, 1989
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Application No. 10533/83
by I.H.
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
4 October 1989, the following members being present:
MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President
J. A. FROWEIN
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
J. C. SOYER
H. G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
G. BATLINER
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
L. LOUCAIDES
Mr. H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 27 November 1978
by I.H. against Austria and registered on 22 August 1983
under file No. 10533/83;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to:
- the Commission's decision of 10 March 1988 to declare part
of the application inadmissible and to bring the remainder
of the application to the notice of the respondent Government
and invite them to submit written observations on its
admissibility and merits;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
29 July 1988 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 31 May 1989;
Having deliberated on 3 and 4 October 1989;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be
summarised as follows:
The applicant is a Hungarian refugee born in 1944 who came
to Austria in 1964. At the time of introducing the present
application he was detained in an institution for mentally deranged
offenders. He was released in November 1984 and now resides in
Vienna. The present application concerns the circumstances of the
applicant's above detention.
On 9 November 1972, the Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht
für Strafsachen) of Vienna convicted the applicant of several criminal
offences involving, inter alia, acts of physical aggression against his
wife and clients. It pronounced a prison sentence of two years. This
judgment was in substance confirmed by the Supreme Court (Oberster
Gerichtshof) on 28 June 1973. The applicant served his sentence until
13 May 1974. With regard to his conviction he filed an application
with the Commission (No. 6398/73) which was declared inadmissible on
12 December 1974.
On 2 February 1973, the Regional Criminal Court of Vienna
found the applicant guilty of a number of further offences (fraud,
extortion, resistance against officials, etc.). It imposed a prison
sentence of five and a half years which was subsequently reduced to
three years by a decision of the Supreme Court of 12 December 1973.
The applicant served this sentence immediately after the first one,
until 13 May 1977.
During his detention in various prisons the applicant was
found to be a difficult prisoner, mainly because he addressed numerous
petitions and complaints to various authorities concerning his
allegedly wrongful convictions and his treatment in prison. Because
of his querulous behaviour, civil proceedings were eventually taken
against him in 1975 by the prosecution authorities with a view to
establishing a partial lack of legal capacity to act (beschränkte
Entmündigung). After having heard psychiatric expert evidence, the
District Court of Vienna City (Bezirksgericht Wien - Innere Stadt) by
a decision of 23 December 1975 declared him to lack legal capacity,
and appointed a guardian (Beistand) for him. This decision became
final on 3 November 1977 when it was confirmed by the Vienna Regional
Court of Civil Affairs (Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen). The
applicant denies that there is a valid final decision in this respect.
In 1983 the guardian was replaced by another guardian who continues to
exercise his functions to the present day.
Having served the above two sentences on 13 May 1977, the
applicant was remanded in custody on suspicion of having committed
further criminal offences while in detention (assaults on prison
wardens and fellow prisoners, uttering dangerous threats in letters
addressed to the presiding judge of the first trial). The warrant of
arrest of 12 May 1977 was based on the grounds that the applicant
might abscond and carry out his threat to commit further offences
(Section 180 paras. 1(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Strafprozessordnung)).
On 9 January 1978 the President of the trial court in the new
case decided that the applicant should be provisionally detained
(vorläufige Unterbringung) in an institution for mentally deranged
offenders (Anstalt für geistig abnorme Rechtsbrecher) under Section
438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This decision was based on the
advice of several experts. It was confirmed by the Review Chamber
(Ratskammer) of the Regional Court of Vienna on 6 March 1978, and by
the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) on 19 April 1978.
On 4 April 1978 a trial took place which was interrupted due
to the behaviour of the applicant. The applicant was then examined by
a psychiatric expert who expressed the view that the applicant
suffered from paranoia querulans which could be considered as being
equivalent to a mental illness and that he was therefore irresponsible
for his acts. In view of this expert opinion, the prosecution
abandoned the original indictment seeking the applicant's conviction
and replaced it by a new one aiming at his detention in an institution
for mentally deranged offenders according to Section 21 para. 1 of the
Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch).
A new trial was held before the Vienna Regional Criminal
Court on 9 and 10 January 1979. The Court found the facts of three
of the charges established (threats against a prison director
and a judge, resistance against officials, and bodily injury of a
prison warden). It ordered the applicant's detention in an institution
for mentally deranged offenders under Section 21 para. 1 of the Penal
Code, on the ground that he was a dangerous person who was not
responsible for his acts under criminal law.
As regards the question of criminal responsibility, the Court
took into account the expert opinions of three psychiatrists who all
considered that, although there were no signs of a mental illness in
the strict sense, the applicant suffered from paranoia querulans with
strong tendencies to aggression. In this state of mind he had already
committed the earlier criminal offences which had led to his criminal
convictions in 1972 and 1973, but the symptoms had aggravated during
the period of his subsequent detention. At least since 1975, the
querulous behaviour had reached the level of a serious mental
instability equivalent to a mental illness, preventing the applicant
from realising the unlawfulness of his behaviour and from acting
lawfully. The Court found the applicant to be a dangerous person
ridden by the obsession that he must fight against his "persecutors"
not only by a flood of petitions and complaints but also by threats
and physical acts of aggression.
The applicant's plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde)
against this decision was in part successful. By a decision of
3 October 1979 the Supreme Court confirmed the findings concerning
the first charge (dangerous threats) but quashed those relating to the
second and third charges on the ground that the trial court had failed
to hear certain witnesses. The matter was referred back to the
Regional Court for a new trial.
This trial took place on 20 March and 9 April 1980. It
covered the two charges in relation to which the Supreme Court
had quashed the earlier judgment, and a new charge of dangerous
threats. The facts of all three offences were found to be
established. The Court again ordered the applicant's detention in an
institution for mentally deranged offenders under Section 21 para. 1
of the Penal Code, on the grounds stated in its earlier judgment of
10 January 1979. It also relied on new expert evidence showing that
the situation had not essentially changed despite some improvement
which had been brought about by the applicant's psychiatric treatment.
This judgment became final on 6 November 1980 as the applicant
withdrew his plea of nullity. The applicant contests that he validly
waived this remedy.
The applicant repeatedly challenged his continued
detention in the institution for mentally deranged offenders.
After the Supreme Court's judgment of 3 October 1979 had been
served on the applicant, he requested his release, but this request
was rejected by the Review Chamber on 28 January 1980.
The detention ordered by the Regional Court's judgment of
9 April 1980 was maintained by a decision of the same Court of
8 February 1982 on the ground that the applicant continued to be a
dangerous person as confirmed by a report of the psychiatric hospital.
In July, September and October 1983, the applicant again
requested his release, observing that no decision ordering his
continued detention had been taken within the statutory one year
time-limit (Section 25 para. 3 of the Penal Code), which had expired
on 8 February 1983. The Court of Appeal on 14 February 1984 referred
the matter to the Regional Court. Two days later, on 16 February 1984,
the Regional Court ordered the applicant's continued detention. It
found that, according to the report of the psychiatric hospital, the
applicant's state of mental health had not essentially changed. He
still continued to write vexatious complaints without the consent of
his guardian whose appointment he did not accept, and if released he
would presumably raise numerous claims. At the same time, it could
not be predicted whether he would carry out any of the threats
previously uttered in particular against the prison staff. His
paranoia querulans could not be stopped even with modern medical
treatment. The treatment which he actually received had a sedative
effect which might end with his release as he was opposed to this
treatment, considering himself to be sane. As after his release he
would certainly refuse to undergo any treatment which, however, was
absolutely necessary, the danger which was at the basis of his
detention continued to exist.
The applicant's appeal (Beschwerde) against this decision was
rejected by the Vienna Court of Appeal on 4 April 1984. It considered
that the Regional Court had arrived at the correct conclusions on the
basis of the very detailed expert opinion of the director of the
psychiatric hospital and a supplementary report by another
psychiatrist.
The applicant was eventually released by a decision of the
Regional Court of 14 November 1984. On the basis of an expert
opinion obtained on 14 September 1984 it noted that there had been
no essential improvement of the applicant's state of health. His
paranoia querulans continued to exist, it had even developed by
acquiring a political component after the applicant's treatment with
injections had been discontinued, and he had still recently uttered
serious threats. However, the querulous behaviour was primarily
concerned with the detention (Haftquerulanz) and the vexatious
litigation (Rechtsquerulanz) was only a secondary phenomenon. The
latter would probably continue to exist even after a release, but
vexatious complaints, petitions etc. did not constitute a danger
within the meaning of Section 21 of the Penal Code. The querulous
behaviour concerning the detention on the other hand would cease in
the case of a conditional release. A genuine aggressiveness had been
observed only on rare occasions since the commission of the offences
which had led to the applicant's detention. It was to be assumed that
the applicant would seek to redress the wrong allegedly or even in
reality done to him first of all by querulous complaints. While it
could not be excluded that he would become aggressive in the case of
frustration, there was from the psychiatric point of view no acute
danger that he would commit criminal offences with grave consequences
because of his abnormal personality. A conditional release was
therefore now possible. A further psychiatric treatment or treatment
by drugs was no longer considered necessary by the expert, although it
was recommended.
By the date of his release on 14 November 1984, the applicant
had been detained without interruption under various legal titles
since 15 May 1972, i.e. for 121/2 years, including 71/2 years after
completion of his two criminal sentences on 13 May 1977. After this
date he was detained
- until 27 November 1980 in the prison of the Regional
Criminal Court of Vienna (detention on remand, since
9 January 1978 carried out for some time as provisional
detention in an institution for mentally deranged
offenders (Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure)
and as from 5 September 1979 as provisional detention in
a psychiatric hospital (Section 429 para. 4 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure);
- until his release on 14 November 1984 in a closed
department of the psychiatric hospital of Vienna
attached to the special prison of Mittersteig.
Throughout his detention, the applicant was considered a
particularly difficult prisoner and was therefore subjected to very
close supervision. The measures applied may be summarised as follows:
Medical treatment
Already in November 1976 the applicant's guardian had
suggested that the applicant should be subjected to compulsory
psychiatric treatment in order to prevent vexatious complaints. After
a hunger-strike in December 1977 he was transferred for a week to the
psychiatric hospital of Vienna and subsequently complained that he had
been treated with sedatives against his will. In view of increased
aggressiveness the Vienna Regional Court on 20 June 1979 ordered four
weeks' detention in a security cot (Gitterbett) which was carried out
in the psychiatric hospital of Vienna from 18 June to 23 July 1979.
Upon his return to the Regional Court's prison, the applicant began
another hunger-strike to protest against his continued detention and
deprivation of his files. He had a complete breakdown on 28 August 1979.
On 29 August 1979 the Vienna Court of Appeal ordered the
Regional Court's Review Chamber to deal with a complaint of the
applicant against his detention in a security cot. On 5 September 1979
the Review Chamber decided to replace that measure by provisional
detention in the psychiatric hospital of Vienna (Section 429 para. 4
of the Code of Criminal Procedure) subject to intensive medical,
socio- and psychotherapeutical treatment. The Court of Appeal upheld
this decision on 12 October 1979 in view of psychiatric reports
confirming that the applicant presented an acute danger to the public
and to himself, justifying his compulsory psychiatric detention under
Section 50 of the Hospital Act (Krankenanstaltengesetz).
The applicant subsequently requested the institution of
criminal proceedings against doctors and nurses because of his
having been kept with fetters in the security cot and having been
compulsorily treated with sedatives ("Niederspritzen"), alleging that
these measures amounted to attempted murder. However, in view of
the guardian's consent to the compulsory treatment (14 December 1979)
no charges seem to have been laid by the prosecution.
After these events the applicant remained most of the time in
the psychiatric clinic of Vienna where he continued to be treated with
sedatives on a regular basis until August 1984 (injections every
28 days). It further appears that from 1979 until the summer of 1982
the applicant observed a hunger-strike, during which he was subject to
compulsory feeding. Thereafter he underwent a work-therapy which he
stopped in the summer of 1984 after his guardian had seized the
applicant's remuneration (AS 3900.-) for the purpose of covering his
fees.
Control of correspondence
Throughout his detention the applicant conducted
correspondence on an extremely large scale, including private and
business letters and first of all letters, petitions and complaints
addressed to various authorities in connection with the numerous
proceedings in which he was involved or which he wished to institute,
and also concerning his treatment in prison, including the handling of
his correspondence.
In their attempts to reduce the flood of correspondence the
authorities resorted to different measures, including temporary
restrictions on the use of writing material. Thus the applicant's
first letter to the Commission of 27 November 1978 was written on
brown paper bags and the applicant stated that he had been refused
other paper and had also complained of this to the Ministry. Most of
the applicant's subsequent letters to the Commission were according to
him smuggled out under circumvention of the prison rules because he
did not get sufficient writing material or permission to write.
As regards delivery of correspondence, the applicant also
encountered difficulties on numerous occasions, both concerning the
incoming and outgoing mail. The applicant was repeatedly advised
of the applicable provisions of the Criminal Law Enforcement Act
(Strafvollzugsgesetz), in particular that letters must be submitted in
unsealed envelopes, that they must be correctly addressed and that he
must pay the postage. He was also advised repeatedly that it was
inadmissible to request an authority other than the prison, e.g. the
Ministry of Justice, to forward letters to other addresses on his
behalf. Such letters were regularly returned to him.
The payment of postage developed into a special issue of
confrontation with the authorities. The applicant claimed that he was
unable to pay postage from the money available to him for this purpose
(Eigengeld), and that the postage must therefore be paid by the
State. However, the authorities did not accept this view and
frequently refused to forward letters without stamps. On 27 January 1977
the Ministry of Justice confirmed that the postage was, in principle,
to be paid by the applicant from his own money, and that letters
without postage should not be accepted for transmission. Only letters
addressed to authorities competent for criminal matters were to be
forwarded through the official channels.
It appears that in practice most letters addressed to
authorities and courts were in fact transmitted to them, despite the
applicant's failure to pay postage, while other letters without
postage were returned to the applicant. The applicant nevertheless
consistently maintained his practice of submitting letters without
postage. He continued to do so even after his release and he has also
posted letters to the Commission without stamps on numerous occasions.
Some were returned and when the applicant refused to pay additional
postage they were retained by the Post Office and not handed back to
him.
During his detention on remand after 13 May 1977, the
applicant's mail was in principle subject to control by the
investigating judge under the relevant provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. However, when the applicant was detained in
the psychiatric hospital of Vienna, special arrangements were made for
the control of his mail. The hospital concluded an agreement with the
applicant's guardian according to which the applicant's letters were
no longer directly transmitted to the addressees, but collected and
from time to time sent to the guardian, who then decided whether
they should be forwarded or not. Only letters addressed to the
guardianship court and concerning the guardian's person as well as
letters addressed to the applicant's defence counsel were excepted.
This practice was apparently maintained from February 1977 until the
applicant's release in November 1984.
Access to files
In connection with the numerous proceedings in which he was
involved or which he tried to start, the applicant kept voluminous
files in his cell, but he was repeatedly deprived of these files.
On 7 November 1977 his cell was controlled and thousands of
pages removed to the deposits. The prison administration subsequently
reported this measure to the Ministry and to the applicant's
guardian. On 9 December 1977 the Ministry instructed the prison to
grant the applicant access to the files at any time, although it did
not object to their removal from the cell.
In August 1979 the cell was searched and voluminous files
removed to the deposits. They were returned to the applicant in the
psychiatric hospital of Vienna on 25 September 1979, despite doubts
of the prison administration and the Ministry, because it was thought
that possession of the files could contribute to the success of the
psychiatric treatment. However, it appears that the files were
removed again and taken to the deposits after a short period.
At the trials in 1979 and 1980 the applicant complained that
the deprivation of his files had hindered the preparation of his
defence. His requests to adjourn the proceedings for this reason were
rejected.
It appears that after the applicant's committal for detention
as a mentally deranged offender his voluminous files were not
available to him in the psychiatric hospital of Vienna, but were kept
in a special room to which he was not granted access, not even for the
purpose of preparing his present application to the Commission.
According to the Government's submissions, the applicant could,
however, request the handing out of specific documents. He did not
make such requests but insisted on access to the whole of the files.
His attempts in 1982 to get permission for consultation of the file by
a (non-practising) lawyer with whom he was acquainted also failed.
Access to court
In particular during the first period of his detention the
applicant was involved in numerous court (divorce, incapacitation,
business-related civil and enforcement proceedings) and
administrative proceedings (residence status, taxation, unauthorised
use of title etc.). He was frequently brought to court hearings.
However, after the institution of incapacitation proceedings
in 1975, the applicant was no longer able to bring or conduct court
proceedings himself. Proceedings were adjourned by the Commercial
Court (Handelsgericht) of Vienna and the Administrative Court
(Verwaltungsgerichtshof) pending the conclusion of the incapacitation
proceedings. As regards the institution of criminal proceedings, the
Supreme Court ruled on 10 March 1977 that the consent of the guardian
was required according to the circumstances of each case. Numerous
criminal proceedings brought by the applicant were subsequently
discontinued failing the consent of his guardian.
After the adoption of the procedure whereby the applicant's
mail was channelled through his guardian on a systematic basis, the
applicant was in principle prevented from instituting complaints and
other proceedings. This procedure was apparently maintained from 1977
until the date of the applicant's release in November 1984.
COMPLAINTS
Under Article 5 of the Convention the applicant submits that
he was unlawfully deprived of his liberty, in particular, that his
detention after completion of his criminal sentences lacked any
justification. He was detained on remand from 13 May 1977 until
9 April 1980, but when this measure was ordered there was no reasonable
suspicion of his having committed any criminal offence nor any reason
to assume that he would abscond or commit further offences (Article 5
para. 1 (c)). He was not released or brought to trial within a
reasonable time (Article 5 para. 3). Because he was deprived of
writing material he was prevented from submitting written requests for
release and was compelled to make such requests orally to the visiting
judge. However, all these requests were either suppressed or
disregarded and no decision was taken on them (Article 5 para. 4).
The same applied to his requests for compensation (Article 5 para. 5).
Insofar as his detention in psychiatric hospitals is
concerned, the applicant contends that it was totally unjustified as
he was never a person of unsound mind. His allegedly vexatious
behaviour which was considered equivalent to a mental illness was,
in his opinion, no more than the legitimate exercise of his right of
defence against the various unlawful measures taken against him.
The applicant raises numerous complaints concerning the
conditions of his detention:
He complains under Article 2 of the Convention that, due to
acts of physical ill-treatment and lack of appropriate medical care,
his life was put in danger on frequent occasions.
He further complains under Article 3 of the Convention that he
was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or torture by the
conditions of his detention, i.e. physical and mental ill-treatment,
isolated detention under appalling conditions for lengthy periods,
being kept with fetters in a security cot for a considerable time,
lack of appropriate medical care, compulsory feeding during lengthy
periods of hunger-strike (altogether more than three years) and
compulsory treatment with neuroleptic drugs against his will during
most of the time of his detention in the psychiatric hospital of
Vienna.
The applicant considers that during his detention he was
without any rights and thus practically kept in slavery contrary to
Article 4 para. 1 of the Convention. Between October 1982 and
June 1984 he was subjected to a work therapy in the psychiatric
hospital and received a very low renumeration. He stopped working
when he learnt that his guardian had seized the money (AS 3900.-) in
order to cover his fees. In the applicant's view this situation
amounts to compulsory labour contrary to Article 4 para. 2 of the
Convention.
The interference with his private life and correspondence
amounted in his view to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention which
was not justified by paragraph 2 of this provision. He further
submits that the interference with his correspondence and the
withholding of his files also affected his rights under Article 6 of
the Convention. Insofar as the interference concerned communications
with the Commission he invokes Article 25 para. 1 of the Convention.
The applicant alleges that in prison he was not allowed to
participate in religious ceremonies and that therefore his right under
Article 9 was violated.
He sees further interferences with his rights under Article 9
(freedom of thought and conscience) and Article 10 of the Convention
(freedom of expression) in the fact that his attempts to criticise the
various measures taken against him led to serious sanctions. Article 10
(freedom of information) is also invoked insofar as he was kept for
lengthy periods in complete isolation, without radio, television,
books and journals. By the same measures he was allegedly deprived of
his right of education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention.
He submits he had no possibility to complain effectively of
the various measures taken against him and therefore alleges a breach
of Article 13 of the Convention.
The measures in question were allegedly taken against him
because of his race, national origin or language, and were thus
discriminatory contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. He further
claims that they were abuses of the Austrian State contrary to
Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention.
Finally, the applicant complains under Article 2 para. 2 of
Protocol No. 4 to the Convention that he was prevented from leaving
Austria. In 1979/1980 he tried to arrange his repatriation to
Hungary, but this was made impossible by the Austrian authorities
who insisted that in Hungary he should also be detained in a mental
hospital. The Hungarian authorities refused to take him back on this
condition.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The applicant's first letter concerning the present case dates
from 27 November 1978. That letter was written on brown paper bags.
The applicant complained, inter alia, that in the prison of the
Regional Criminal Court of Vienna where he was then detained he was
refused writing material also for letters to the Commission. He
referred to earlier letters written on wrapping paper and stated that
the prison authorities had probably failed to forward these letters to
the Commission as he had received no reply. The letter of 27 November
1978 concluded by a postscriptum according to which a prison warden
had refused to accept the letter for delivery in the morning of
28 November 1978.
This letter was received by the Commission on 31 January
1979. The Secretariat's reply of 9 February 1979 referred to the
obligation of the Contracting States under Article 25 para. 1 of the
Convention not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of
individual petition. With regard to his complaints under other
Articles of the Convention the applicant was invited to show that he
had exhausted domestic remedies.
The applicant wrote again to the Commission on 1 December 1979
and 24 April 1981, each time also complaining of interferences with
his correspondence and the withholding of his files. He was again
invited by the Secretariat to show that he had exhausted domestic
remedies.
On 2 June 1981 the applicant wrote that he was unable to
submit any decisions as his files were still withheld from him. The
Commission's Secretary replied on 25 June 1981 that under Rule 38 of
the Commission's Rules of Procedure it was the applicant's duty to
submit the relevant documents. If he could not comply, he should ask
his defence counsel or guardian. An application form was enclosed.
The applicant submitted the completed form on 2 July 1981.
However, the case was not immediately registered because he had used
abusive language. On 31 July 1981 he was warned that the Commission
might consider the application as abusive within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 of the Convention and a new application form was
sent to him in order to give him an opportunity to set out his
complaints in proper form.
On 3 February 1983 the applicant insisted on registration of
the case on the basis of the application form which he had already
submitted. On 22 February 1983 he was again invited to complete the
form in good order. On 2 March 1983 he complained of the continued
refusal to register his case stating that the second application form
had been taken away by the prison administration.
The matter was then submitted to the Commission's President
who, on 14 July 1983, ruled that the applicant should be provided
with a new application form which he should complete in good order
having regard, in particular, to any further developments in the case.
Reference was again made to the authorities' duty not to hinder the
effective exercise of the right of individual petition, also as
regards access to the necessary files.
The applicant submitted the application form on 31 July 1983,
stating that the documents were still being withheld from him. The
form reached the Commission on 22 August 1983 and the case was
registered on the same day under file No. 10533/83.
On 14 October 1983 a member of the Commission, acting as
Rapporteur, after carrying out a preliminary examination of the case,
decided to request information from the respondent Government in
accordance with Rule 40 para. 2 (a) of the Rules of Procedure. In
particular, the Government were asked whether and, if so, for what
reasons, the applicant had at any time been restricted or otherwise
hindered in his correspondence with the Austrian authorities and/or
the Commission. The Government were further requested to state
whether it was true that any documents which could be relevant to the
applicant's complaints before the Commission were not available to
him and, if so, on which legal basis they were being withheld. In
that case the Government were requested to submit the said documents
to the Commission.
The Government replied to the request for information on
13 December 1983, stating, inter alia, that during his detention in the
Regional Court's prison and in the special prison of Mittersteig the
applicant had not been hindered in exercising his right to file
applications by interfering with his correspondence or by retaining
relevant documents. The alleged restriction of his right to lodge
applications and the alleged interference with his correspondence
might perhaps be felt by the applicant to arise from the fact that his
correspondence must first be shown to his guardian in view of his
partial incapacitation. The applicant had repeatedly been reminded of
his duty under Section 92 para. 3 of the Criminal Law Enforcement
Act to pay the postal charges for his correspondence with the
Commission. As he had refused to bear these postal charges the
correspondence concerned could not be dispatched. The documents kept
by the applicant were extremely voluminous (11 cardboard boxes, each
weighing between 25 and 30 kilogrammes) and therefore could not be
stored in his cell. They were kept in a special locked store-room.
Specific documents could always be handed out to him at his request,
but he had insisted on having all 11 boxes.
In his comments of 31 December 1983, the applicant maintained
that, contrary to the Government's assertions, he was still being
hindered in the exercise of his right of correspondence, including
correspondence with the Commission. He further noted the Government's
admission that he had not been granted access to his documents.
In a letter of 21 April 1984, the applicant stated again that
the authorities continued to refuse him access to these documents.
On 21 May 1984 the Commission's Rapporteur, noting that it
seemed impossible to obtain the relevant documents through the
applicant, made a second request for information to the respondent
Government, asking them under Rule 40 para. 2 (a) of the Commission's
Rules of Procedure to submit a full documentation of the case.
The Government submitted this documentation which fills 13
Leitz files on 11 July 1984, and the applicant submitted certain
comments on 26 July and 25 October 1984.
Thereafter, the applicant continued to write very frequently
to the Commission, raising various additional complaints even after
his release from prison.
By a partial decision of 10 March 1988, the Commission
declared certain complaints inadmissible, in particular concerning
facts which had occurred before 27 May 1978, that is more than six
months before the introduction of the application. As regards facts
which occurred after this date, the Commission decided to give notice
of the application to the respondent Government and to invite them,
pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to submit,
before 3 June 1988, their observations in writing on the admissibility
and merits of the application. This time-limit was subsequently
extended until 1 August 1988.
The Government submitted their observations on 29 July 1988.
The applicant was invited to submit observations in reply before
20 September 1988. This time-limit was suspended on 29 September 1988
in view of his request for free legal aid.
This request had been made on 25 April 1988 and the necessary
forms were sent to the applicant on 4 May 1988. A reminder was sent on
22 July 1988. In his reply of 19 August 1988 the applicant claimed
that he had already submitted the legal aid forms on 23 May 1988. As
the forms had not been received by the Commission, the Secretary urged
the applicant on 13 and 27 September 1988 to submit copies of the
legal aid papers. They were received on 14 October and transmitted
to the Government for comments before 8 November 1988. At the
Government's request this time-limit was extended until 23 December 1988.
The comments were submitted on 15 December 1988.
On 9 January 1989, the Acting President of the Commission
granted free legal aid to the applicant whose lawyer was invited to
submit observations in reply before 6 March 1989. At the lawyer's
request, this time-limit was extended until 31 May 1989 on which date
he submitted his observations on behalf of the applicant.
THE LAW
a) Deprivation of liberty
1. Following its partial decision of 10 March 1988, the
Commission is called upon to examine the applicant's complaint
concerning his detention after 27 May 1978.
The applicant alleges that this detention was unlawful and
unjustified, in particular that there were no sufficent reasons to
order his detention on remand and/or his detention as a person of
unsound mind, that the length of his detention on remand was excessive
as he was not brought to trial within a reasonable time, that his
requests for release were disregarded during his detention on remand
and that the time-limits for the judicial review of his subsequent
detention in an institution for mentally deranged offenders were not
respected. He invokes Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, the
relevant parts of which read as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after
conviction by a competent court;
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing
after having done so;
...
(e) the lawful detention of ...
persons of unsound mind ...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1(c) (Art. 5-1-c) of this Article shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law
to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
..."
2. From 13 May 1977 until the Regional Court's judgment of
9 April 1980 the applicant was kept in detention on remand which was
partly carried out as provisional detention in a mental institution.
The applicant alleges a violation of Article 5 para. 1
(Art. 5-1) of the Convention in that there were neither sufficient
reasons for justifying his detention on remand under subparagraph (c)
(Art. 5-1-c), nor sufficient reasons justifying his detention as a
person of unsound mind under subparagraph (e) (Art. 5-1-e) of this
provision. He further alleges a violation of Article 5 para. 3
(Art. 5-3) in that he was not brought to trial within a reasonable time.
The Government claim that the applicant's detention was covered by
Article 5 para. 1 (c) and (e) (Art. 5-1-c, 5-1-e) and that the
"reasonable time" requirement in Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) was
respected.
The Commission considers that the applicant's above complaints
are closely interrelated and cannot be separated. In view of the
considerable length of the detention in question (almost two years and
eleven months between 13 May 1977 and 9 April 1980) the applicant's
above complaints cannot be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention. This part of the application must accordingly be
examined as to the merits, no other ground of inadmissibility having
been established.
3. From 9 April 1980 until his release on 14 November 1984 the
applicant was detained in a closed department of the psychiatric
hospital of Vienna attached to the special prison of Mittersteig.
Until 6 November 1980, the date when the applicant withdrew his plea
of nullity against the Regional Court's judgment of 9 April 1980, this
detention continued to be regarded as detention on remand under
Austrian law, but it was carried out as provisional detention in a
psychiatric hospital. After 6 November 1980 the detention in the same
hospital was based on the Regional Court's judgment of 9 April 1980,
which had established that the applicant's acts fulfilled the
objective conditions of criminal offences, but that he lacked criminal
responsibility. The expert evidence had revealed that the applicant's
state of mind, although not amounting to a mental illness in the
proper sense, was equivalent to such an illness and involved a
potential of aggressiveness. For this reason the Regional Court
ordered the applicant's committal to an institution for mentally
deranged offenders.
The applicant claims that he was never insane and that the aim
of preventing vexatious litigation cannot justify detention in a
mental institution. He submits that also during this period his
detention lacked justification and, in particular, that it was not
covered by Article 5 para. 1 (e) (Art. 5-1-e). The Government contend that,
following the Regional Court's judgment of 9 April 1980, the applicant
was detained "after conviction by a competent court", and that for
this reason the detention was covered by Article 5 para. 1 (a)
(Art. 5-1-a). In the Government's view it was further justified under
Article 5 para. 1 (e) (Art. 5-1-e) throughout the relevant period,
having regard in particular to the finding of a state of mind
equivalent to a mental illness and involving aggressive behaviour.
Having regard to the reasons of the psychiatric expert opinion
of 14 September 1984 which finally led to the applicant's release in
November 1984, the Commission cannot at this stage of the proceedings
exclude that, although initially the applicant's detention as a person
of unsound mind may have been justified under Article 5 para. 1 (e)
(Art. 5-1-e) of the Convention, it may have ceased to be justifed
under this provision at an earlier time than when he was actually
released. This part of the application is therefore not manifestly
ill-founded. It requires examination as to the merits, no other
ground of inadmissibility having been established.
4. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 5 para. 4
(Art. 5-4) of the Convention in that his requests for release were
disregarded and the legal time-limits for judicial review of the
detention were not respected.
The Commission considers that the applicant's allegations in
this respect have not been sufficiently substantiated as regards the
period prior to the Regional Court's judgment of 9 April 1980. In
this respect his complaint must therefore be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded.
As regards the subsequent period, the applicant submits that
the procedure followed was unlawful because the time-limit stipulated
in Section 25 para. 3 of the Penal Code was not observed. The
Government admit that during the first review period the time-limit
was exceeded. It had been set down on 1 October 1981 when the
Regional Court's decision became final on 6 November 1980, but the
review proceedings actually started on 11 December 1981. In the
Government's view this nevertheless did not affect the lawfulness of
the detention which was confirmed on 8 February 1982. In the second
review period the time-limit was observed according to the Government
as the proceedings started on 6 December 1982. They explain the delay
until the decision of 16 February 1984 by a necessity to obtain
comprehensive expert evidence.
The Commission finds that the parties' above arguments raise
complex issues of law and fact concerning the application of Article 5
para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention, in particular as regards the
reasonableness of the actual intervals of judicial review and the
question of whether there has been a speedy decision on the
applicant's requests for release. This part of the application
accordingly is not manifestly ill-founded. It requires examination as
to the merits, no other ground of inadmissibility having been
established.
b) Conditions of detention
5. As to the conditions of his detention, the applicant complains
that physical ill-treatment and lack of appropriate medical care put
his life in danger, contrary to Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention;
that he was subjected to slavery and forced labour, contrary to
Article 4 (Art. 4) of the Convention; that he was not allowed to
participate in religious ceremonies, contrary to Article 9 (Art. 9) of
the Convention; and that his right to education was interfered with
contrary to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention. The
Commission finds none of these complaints sufficently substantiated.
It accordingly rejects this part of the application as being
manifestly ill-founded.
6. The applicant also complains that the conditions of his
detention in the psychiatric hospital of Vienna violated Article 3
(Art. 3) of the Convention, which reads as follows:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."
In this context the applicant has referred in particular to
his isolation, compulsory feeding and compulsory treatment with
neuroleptic drugs during lengthy periods.
The Government have submitted a detailed report on the
applicant's situation, in particular his medical treatment, during the
period under consideration. From this it appears that the applicant
was kept in a private room according to his own wish, and that his
isolation was in no way total. As regards the applicant's compulsory
medical treatment and compulsory feeding, the Government submit that
these measures "undoubtedly represent(ed) an interference with the
applicant's right as a person". The applicant consented to a certain
degree to being fed through a tube during his long hungerstrike (which
the Government admit was an unusual measure from the medical point of
view) and to his treatment with sedatives. However, it was not always
possible to secure his consent, and in this respect his compulsory
feeding and treatment with neuroleptic drugs was justified for medical
reasons in order to prevent the applicant from doing harm to himself
and becoming aggressive against others. The consent of the
applicant's guardian was obtained on 14 December 1979 for all
necessary medical treatment. It appears that the decisions concerning
this treatment were taken by the medical staff of the hospital, and
that the legal basis for this is to be found in the Hospitals Act.
The applicant contends that the relevant provision in Section 8
para. 3 of the Hospitals Act did not cover his case and that the
compulsory medical treatment in question therefore also constituted an
unlawful interference with his right to respect for his private life
as guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. He contests that
he consented to any of the above measures or that his guardian's
consent was obtained. In any event he challenges the validity of the
guardian's appointment.
The Commission considers that, combined, the measures applied
to the applicant require further examination under Articles 3 and 8
(Art. 3, 8) of the Convention, having regard to the long period during
which they were upheld and the fact that the compulsory feeding
involved methods which, according to the Government, were unusual from
the medical point of view. The Commission also notes the dispute
between the parties as to the lawfulness of these measures and as
regards the consent by the applicant or his guardian. In the latter
respect the Commission finally notes the very general nature of the
guardian's declaration of December 1979 and the fact that it was
apparently not renewed by the new guardian appointed in 1983.
The Commission considers that in these circumstances the
applicant's above complaint cannot be rejected as being manifestly
ill-founded, but requires determination as to the merits, no other
ground of inadmissibility having been established.
c) Correspondence and receipt of information
7. The applicant complains of unjustified interferences with his
correspondence and his freedom of expression including the right to
receive information. He invokes Articles 8 and 10 (Art. 8, 10) of the
Convention which read as follows:
Article 8 (Art. 8):
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
Article 10 (Art. 10):
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."
In this context the applicant has also referred to Article 9
(Art. 9) of the Convention (freedom of thought and conscience), but the
Commission finds no issue under this provision.
The Commission notes that during the relevant period the whole
of the applicant's voluminous correspondence was subjected to
restrictions. Until 6 November 1980 the applicant was detained on
remand and therefore his correspondence was controlled by the
investigating judge pursuant to Sections 183 et seq. of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In addition, as the applicant was detained in a
mental hospital, his correspondence and his contacts with the outside
world in general were under the control of the director of the
hospital, pursuant to Section 51 of the Hospitals Act. It appears
that after 6 November 1980 the Hospitals Act was exclusively
applicable by virtue of Article III of the Execution of Criminal
Judgments Adaptation Act.
The actual measures applied involved, on the one hand, a
restriction of writing material imposed by the hospital, and, on the
other, an agreement between the hospital and the applicant's guardian
as to the manner in which the applicant's correspondence should be
controlled. Under this agreement the guardian was given wide powers
to withhold letters, except those addressed to the guardianship court
or concerning the guardian's person, and those addressed to the
applicant's defence counsel. The Government submit that under this
system all letters addressed to authorities which had any prospects
of success were in fact transmitted, and that for the rest the
restrictions were justified in the applicant's own interest, in
particular to protect him against adverse effects of querulous
petitions.
In this respect the Government invoke the necessity to protect
the applicant's health and the rights and reputation of others. They
thus admit an interference with the right to respect for correspondence
under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, but claim that this interference
was justified under paragraph 2 (Art. 8-2) of this Article.
As to the alleged interference with the applicant's freedom of
expression under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, the Commission
considers that the issue is absorbed by Article 8 (Art. 8) insofar as the
applicant wished to impart information and ideas to others through the
above-mentioned correspondence. The Commission notes, however, that
the applicant was also subjected to restrictions of his right to
receive information. As the Government admit, his access to books,
journals, radio and television was regulated and, at least
temporarily, restricted by the hospital under the same provision of
the Hospitals Act which was also applied regarding the control of his
correspondence. There has accordingly been an interference with the
applicant's rights under Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) to this extent.
As regards the justification of this interference, the Government rely
on the same reasons as under Article 8 (Art. 8).
The applicant, on the other hand, claims that the above
interferences with his rights under Articles 8 and 10 (Art. 8, 10)
were not justified and, in particular, that the Hospitals Act provided
no sufficient legal basis for these measures.
The Commission notes that under both Articles the questions
arise whether the measures in question were "in accordance with" or
"prescribed by" law and whether their scope was proportionate to a
legitimate aim recognised in these Articles and thus "necessary in a
democratic society". The applicant's complaints in this respect
require further examination and cannot be rejected as being manifestly
ill-founded. No other grounds of inadmissibility have been
established.
d) Access to court and effective remedies
8. The applicant complains of unjustified interferences with his
right to access to court as guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)
first sentence of the Convention, which reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law. ..."
The Commission notes that it was one of the main purposes
of the measures taken against the applicant, including his legal
incapacitation and the control of his correspondence, to prevent
vexatious litigation. This interference can only raise an issue under
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) insofar as his access to court was impeded with
regard to proceedings which determined his "civil rights and
obligations". However, most of the applicant's correspondence
addressed to the Austrian authorities and courts concerned matters
which did not relate to such rights. This is true in particular of
the many instances where he sought the institution of criminal
proceedings. It is constant case-law of the Convention organs that
there is no right under the Convention, and in particular under
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), to have criminal proceedings instituted
against third persons.
To some extent the above measures also applied to the conduct
of civil litigation. After the appointment of a guardian the
applicant was no longer able to conduct such proceedings himself
without the latter's consent. The Government submit that in some
cases civil litigation was conducted with the consent of the guardian.
The applicant has not referred to any concrete instances where the
guardian unjustifiedly refused his consent to such proceedings during
the period under consideration. In any event it is a normal practice
in many Convention States that a person of unsound mind may be found
lacking legal capacity to act in court, and that in such cases a
guardian may be appointed for him and required to give consent to any
legal action which this person may intend to take. In such cases it
may also be justified that access to the relevant files be restricted.
In the Commission's opinion this is compatible with the aim and
purpose of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). The Commission therefore finds no
indication of a violation of the Convention in this respect and
accordingly rejects this part of the application as being manifestly
ill-founded.
9. The Commission is of the opinion that the performance by the
guardian of his duties concerns the "civil rights" of the person
placed under guardianship and that a court procedure is therefore
necessary if a serious and genuine dispute arises between the person
concerned and the guardian. The applicant never accepted the
appointment of a guardian for him and disagreed with practically all
measures taken by the guardian. In its partial decision of 10 March
1988 the Commission declared inadmissible the applicant's complaints
concerning the procedure whereby the guardian was appointed (failure
to observe the six months' time-limit under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention). It is true that the applicant claims that proceedings
concerning the validity of the appointment are still pending.
However, they do not concern the period under consideration here which
ends on 14 November 1984, the date of the applicant's release. In the
present case the only issue which remains to be examined is whether,
during the period between 27 May 1978 and 14 November 1984, a genuine
and serious dispute arose between the applicant and his guardian as to
the performance of the latter's duties and, if so, whether this
dispute was determined by an independent and impartial tribunal in
conformity with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
The Commission notes that the guardian's activities were under
the constant supervision of the competent guardianship court, as
provided for by Austrian law. As the proceedings in question were
non-contentious proceedings, they were conducted in a rather informal
way. It appears that each time the guardianship court approved the
reports submitted by the guardian and there is nothing to suggest that
the procedure followed was not in conformity with Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1). The only issue which could arise concerns the fact that
the proceedings in question were not conducted in public, but this is
covered by the Austrian reservation concerning Article 6 (Art. 6).
The Commission further notes from the information provided by
the Government that on two occasions during the relevant period the
guardianship court appointed curators (Kollisionskuratoren) for the
applicant in view of the latter's complaints concerning the handling
of his correspondence. The proceedings in question did not lead to
concrete decisions as it turned out that essentially the applicant
complained only of the decision preventing him from handling his own
affairs and the fact that as a consequence a guardian was appointed to
manage those affairs. The Commission considers that this way of
proceeding did not infringe the applicant's right of access to court.
It follows that this part of the application is also
manifestly ill-founded.
10. The applicant also complains that regarding the conditions of
his detention, including his medical treatment, the censorship of his
correspondence and the refusal of access to information, he did not
have an effective remedy before a national authority as required by
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which reads as follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in this Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
The Commission finds Article 13 (Art. 13) applicable in
relation to the applicant's complaints under Articles 3, 8 and 10
(Art. 3, 8, 10) of the Convention, insofar as these complaints have
been found admissible. In this respect the applicant could arguably
claim a violation of these provisions, and therefore he was, in
principle, entitled to an effective domestic remedy for the purpose of
determining the well-foundedness of such a claim.
The Commission notes that the Hospitals Act, under which the
relevant measures were taken, does not provide for any specific
remedy. The Government submit that, while it is questionable whether
the applicant himself could have lodged a complaint against these
measures with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), he
could have tried to do so with the assistance of his guardian. The
applicant denies this, observing that the Constitutional Court has
never dealt with complaints of this sort and that legal doctrine in
Austria tends to the view that such complaints cannot be brought
before the Constitutional Court.
The Commission considers that in these circumstances an issue
arises under Article 13 (Art. 13) as to whether an effective remedy was
available to the applicant, even acting with the assistance of his
guardian, to challenge the justification of the above measures. This
part of the application therefore cannot be declared manifestly
ill-founded, but requires examination as to the merits, no other ground
of inadmissibility having been established.
e) Other complaints
11. The applicant complains that the Austrian authorities did not
allow his repatriation to Hungary, and that this amounted to an
interference with his right under Article 2 para. 2 of Protocol No. 4
(P4-2-2) to the Convention "to leave any country". However, the
Commission notes that the applicant's efforts to be repatriated were
unsuccessful because the Hungarian authorities did not allow his
return under the condition formulated by the Austrian authorities.
Insofar as Austria is responsible for making the repatriation
dependent on such a condition, the Commission considers that the
restriction of the applicant's right to leave that country was covered
by paragraph 3 of the above Article, being a measure necessary in a
democratic society for the protection of health.
12. The applicant also complains that because of his Hungarian
origin he was discriminated against contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of
the Convention. The Commission accepts that Article 14 (Art. 14) could be
applicable in the present case in combination with one or more of the
other provisions of the Convention which the applicant has invoked.
However, it finds no indication that any of the impugned measures was
taken against the applicant because of his national origin.
This complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded.
13. The applicant finally invokes Articles 17 and 18 (Art. 17, 18)
of the Convention, claiming that the Austrian authorities have abused
their powers for illegitimate purposes. The Commission finds no
indication that this was in fact the case and therefore rejects the
applicant's complaints in this respect as being manifestly
ill-founded.
f) Alleged interference with the applicant's right of petition
14. The applicant alleges that the Austrian authorities hindered
the effective exercise of his right to petition the Commission. He
invokes Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention which reads
as follows:
" The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe from any person,
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming
to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that
the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been
lodged has declared that it recognises the competence of the
Commission to receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting
Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in
any way the effective exercise of this right."
The applicant submits that the restriction of writing material
and the control of his correspondence was of general scope and also
affected his possibility of communicating freely with the Commission.
He further complains that he was not allowed access to his files and
thereby prevented from substantiating his complaints to the Commission.
The Government deny this, claiming that the applicant could write
freely to the Commission at all times. They do not contest, however,
that letters for which the applicant refused to pay postage may not
have been forwarded to the Commission. As regards access to files,
the Government admit restrictions, but claim that the applicant would
have been allowed to have any specific document which he intended to
use for the Convention proceedings.
In any event, despite certain difficulties the applicant has
been able to effectively put his case before the Commission, and
therefore the Commission finds no further action required.
For these reasons, the Commission
1. DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,
the applicant's complaints:
a) that the applicant's detention until 9 April 1980 was not
justified under Article 5 para. 1 (c) and (e) (Art. 5-1-c) of the
Convention and that, contrary to Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of
the Convention, he was not brought to trial within a
reasonable time;
b) that the applicant's detention as a person of unsound
mind after 9 April 1980 was not justified under Article 5
para. 1 (e) (Art. 5-1-e) of the Convention throughout the time
until his release on 14 November 1984;
c) that after 9 April 1980 the applicant was not able to obtain
judicial review of the continued lawfulness of this detention
in conformity with Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4);
d) that the conditions of his detention, including, in
particular, his medical treatment, amounted to inhuman or
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) or to an
unjustified interference with his right to respect for his
private life under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention;
e) that there have been unjustified interferences with his
right to respect for his correspondence (Article 8) and
his right to receive information (Article 10); and
f) that there was no effective remedy to challenge the measures
under d) and e) above (Article 13);
2. DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE;
3. DECIDES TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION IN RESPECT OF THE ALLEGED
INTERFERENCE WITH THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF
INDIVIDUAL PETITION.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
