Lexploria

PARTIAL

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 14062/88

by D.

against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 5 March 1990, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

J.A. FROWEIN

S. TRECHSEL

F. ERMACORA

A. WEITZEL

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. F. MARTINEZ

Mrs. J. LIDDY

Mr. L. LOUCAIDES

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 18 February 1988

by D. against Sweden and registered on 26 July 1988 under file

No. 14062/88;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

The applicants are Swedish citizens, born in 1923 and 1918

respectively. They are married and reside at Saltsjöbaden, Sweden.

The present application concerns five different sets of civil

proceedings involving the applicants.

I

On 17 February 1983 the applicants instituted proceedings

against two of their former employees in order to obtain damages

allegedly incurred through the actions of the former employees.

On 15 December 1983 the District Court (tingsrätt) of Mora

pronounced judgment by default (tredskodom) as the applicants failed

to appear in court although they had been properly summoned. On

9 January 1984 the applicants then asked for the proceedings to be

resumed (ansökan om återvinning).

The case was accordingly examined again by the District Court

of Mora on 31 October 1986 where the applicants claimed damages

amounting to the symbolic sum of one Swedish crown. After having heard

the parties' arguments and after an evaluation of the information and

documents submitted the District Court rejected the applicants' claim

for damages and costs were awarded against them.

The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Svea Court

of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) where, they submit, the case is pending at

present (January 1990).

II

In 1980 the above-mentioned employees instituted proceedings

against the applicants claiming damages for unfair dismissal and on

18 May 1982 the District Court of Mora pronounced judgment against the

applicants and ordered them to pay damages to their former employees

totalling approximately 38,000 Swedish crowns plus interest.

The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Labour

Court (arbetsdomstolen) which upheld the judgment of the District

Court on 16 February 1983.

Subsequently the applicants lodged an extraordinary appeal

(besvär över domvilla) with the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen)

maintaining that errors had been committed in the judgments of the

District Court and the Labour Court. However, on 9 June 1983 the

Supreme Court rejected the applicants' appeal.

III

In 1983 a dispute arose between the applicants and certain

other former employees and it appears that proceedings commenced in

the District Court of Mora on 28 April 1983 where each party claimed

damages from the other owing to alleged irregularities in a labour

contract. On 15 December 1983 the District Court pronounced judgment

by default against the applicants as they failed to appear in court

when summoned to do so. On 26 December 1983 the applicants then

asked for the proceedings to be resumed.

The case was examined again by the District Court of Mora on

30 June 1987. After having heard the parties' arguments and after an

evaluation of the information and documents submitted the District

Court found against the applicants who were ordered to pay

approximately 30,000 Swedish crowns plus interest to the former

employees.

The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Labour

Court which upheld the judgment on 2 November 1988.

IV

In 1976 the first applicant instituted proceedings in the

District Court of Mora against her mother claiming approximately

272,000 Swedish crowns in damages as her mother allegedly had not

properly looked after the applicant's economic interests until she

came of age.

Judgment was pronounced by the District Court on 26 February 1981

and, on appeal, by the Svea Court of Appeal on 8 June 1982. By these

judgments some of the applicant's claims were accepted whereas others

were rejected. She subsequently asked for leave to appeal but this

was refused by the Supreme Court on 17 August 1983.

V

It appears that after the death of one of the first

applicant's relatives the District Court of Mora was in charge of the

estate of the deceased person. On 3 November 1986, the first

applicant complained to the Court that certain inventory lists

registered by the Court on 19 September 1986 were incorrect. However,

the District Court dismissed the complaint on 6 November 1986 as it

had been submitted out of time.

The applicant appealed against this decision to the Svea Court

of Appeal which upheld the decision to dismiss the complaint on

15 December 1986.

Leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1987.

COMPLAINTS

As regards part I the applicants complain that their civil

case has not been determined within a reasonable time, in particular

since it is still pending. They refer to Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention.

As regards part II the applicants complain of an incorrect

interpretation of Swedish law. They refer to Article 7 para. 1 of the

Convention.

As regards part III the applicants complain that their civil

case was not determined within a reasonable time. They refer to

Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

As regards part IV the first applicant complains of an

incorrect interpretation of Swedish law. She refers to Article 7

para. 1 of the Convention.

Finally as regards part V the first applicant complains of the

fact that her case was dismissed as being referred to the Court out of

time. She invokes in this respect Article 7 para. 1 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. As regards the facts of the application relating to part I the

applicants have complained that their civil case before the Swedish

courts has not been determined within a reasonable time. They refer

in this respect to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention

which secures to everyone in the determination of his civil rights and

obligations the right to a hearing within a reasonable time.

The Commission notes that the proceedings commenced on

17 February 1983 and that they are still pending. At present this is

a total of approximately seven years. The Commission considers that

it is not sufficiently informed to decide on this complaint and finds

it necessary to obtain from the parties observations on the

admissibility and merits in this respect.

2. As regards the facts of the application relating to part II

the applicants complain of an incorrect interpretation of Swedish law

in a civil case concerning unfair dismissal.

However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or

not the facts alleged by the applicants disclose any appearance of a

violation of the Convention, as Article 26 (Art. 26) provides that the

Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six

months from the date on which the final decision was taken".

In the present case the decision of the Labour Court, which

was the final decision regarding the subject of this particular

complaint, was given on 16 February 1983, whereas the application was

submitted to the Commission on 18 February 1988, that is, more than

six months after the date of this decision. Furthermore, an

examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special

circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of

that period.

It follows that this part of the application has been

introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

3. As regards the facts of the application relating to part III

the applicants have complained that their civil case before the

Swedish courts was not determined within a reasonable time. As above

under part I they refer to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

The Commission notes that the proceedings commenced on

28 April 1983 and ended with the judgment of the Labour Court of

2 November 1988. This is a total of approximately 51/2 years. As under

part I above the Commission considers that it is not sufficiently

informed to decide on this complaint and finds it necessary to obtain

from the parties observations on the admissibility and merits in this

respect.

4. As regards the facts of the application relating to part IV

the first applicant complains of an incorrect interpretation of

Swedish law in a civil case brought against her mother.

However, the Commission is again not required to decide

whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any

appearance of a violation of the Convention, as under Article 26

(Art. 26) it "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six

months from the date on which the final decision was taken".

In the present case the decision of the Supreme Court, which

was the final decision regarding the subject of this particular

complaint, was given on 17 August 1983, whereas the application was

submitted to the Commission on 18 February 1988, that is, more than

six months after the date of this decision. Furthermore, an

examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any

special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the

running of that period.

It follows that this part of the application has again been

introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

5. Finally, as regards the facts of the application relating to

part V the first applicant complains of the fact that her case was

dismissed as being referred to the District Court out of time.

The Commission has considered this aspect of the application

under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention insofar as this provision

guarantees to everyone a right of access to a court. This does not,

however, debar Contracting States from making regulations governing

the access provided that such regulations are for the good

administration of justice.

The Commission has examined the applicant's complaint in view

of the above and finds no appearance of a violation of the rights and

freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission:

1. ADJOURNS the examination of the application as far as

it concerns the length of the proceedings as set out in

parts I and III;

2. declares the remainder of the application (parts II, IV,

and V) INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

Menu

D. v. SWEDEN

D. v. SWEDEN

LEXI