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OLSSON v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 13441/87 • ECHR ID: 001-665

Document date: May 7, 1990

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 0

OLSSON v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 13441/87 • ECHR ID: 001-665

Document date: May 7, 1990

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 13441/87

                      by Stig and Gun OLSSON

                      against Sweden

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

7 May 1990, the following members being present:

              MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  F. ERMACORA

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J.-C. SOYER

                  H. DANELIUS

                  G. BATLINER

                  J. CAMPINOS

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  C.L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs.  J. LIDDY

             Mr.  L. LOUCAIDES

             Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 23 October 1987

by Stig and Gun OLSSON against Sweden and registered on 3 December 1987

under file No. 13441/87;

        Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

        Having regard to the Government's written observations of 27 April

and 14 September 1989 and the applicants' written observations of 13 June,

27 September, 6 and 13 October, 6, 16, 17 and 28 November, 6, 20 and

21 December 1989, as well as their letters of 25 and 31 January and 13,

21, 23 and 28 February, 29 March and 9 April 1990.

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

        The applicants are a married couple, the husband born in 1941

and the wife in 1944.  They are Swedish citizens and reside at Angered.

Before the Commission they are represented by Mrs.  Siv Westerberg, a

lawyer practising in Gothenburg.

        The applicants have three children: Stefan, born in June 1971,

Helena, born in December 1976, and Thomas, born in January 1979.

        The applicants' three children were taken into public care,

pursuant to Sections 25 (a) and 29 of the 1960 Act on Child Welfare

(barnavårdslagen), by a decision of the Social District Council No. 6

(sociala distriktsnämnden 6) of Gothenburg of 16 September 1980.  Since

the applicants did not consent to the Council's decision, the matter was

submitted to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County

of Gothenburg and Bohus, which by a judgment of 30 December 1980

confirmed the Council's decision.  The basis for the care decision was

that the health and development of the children were jeopardised as a

result of the parents' inability to give them satisfactory care and

education.  The Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of

Gothenburg, on 8 July 1981, confirmed the judgment of the County

Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court (regerings-

rätten) refused leave to appeal on 27 August 1981.

        After having been taken into care the applicants' children were

placed in a children's home in Gothenburg.  From 28 February 1981 Stefan

was placed in a foster home at Tibro, approximately 100 kilometres from

the applicants' home, and from 28 June 1983 in a children's home at

Vänersborg, approximately 80 kilometres north of Gothenburg.  Helena

and Thomas were placed in separate foster homes - Helena at Näsåker on

21 October 1980 and Thomas at Maråker on 10 November 1980.  The foster

homes are situated about 100 kilometres from each other and the

distances between the foster homes and Gothenburg are about 630 and

590 kilometres, respectively.

        The applicants' right of access to their children was

restricted during the periods in which the children were in public

care.  Stefan spent three or four weeks with his parents in the summer

of 1982.  On 10 August 1982 the Social Council decided, pursuant to

Section 16 (1) of the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of

Young Persons (lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga,

hereinafter referred to as "the 1980 Act"), to limit their access to

him to one visit every six weeks.  After 22 April 1984 the applicants

were allowed to see Stefan every week, mostly at their home.

        On 21 October 1980 the Social Council decided to prohibit access

to Helena and Thomas at their foster homes, in accordance with Section 41

of the 1960 Act, and to prohibit disclosure of their whereabouts.  The

applicants were allowed to meet the children elsewhere every second month.

The restriction was lifted in September 1981, but in February 1983 the

Social Council decided to restrict the applicants' right of access to

Helena and Thomas to one visit every third month in the foster homes.  This

restriction continued in force for the remainder of the period during which

Helena and Thomas were in public care.

        The applicants made a request for termination of the care of their

children in 1982, which was rejected by the Social Council.  The rejection

was confirmed by the County Administrative Court on 17 November 1982

and by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 20 December 1982.  The Supreme

Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.

        Another request by the applicants to the Social Council for

termination of the care of the children was refused on 6 December 1983.

        On 30 October 1984 and 17 September 1985, the Social Council

rejected further requests by the applicants for termination of the care

of Helena and Thomas and of Stefan, respectively.  Appeals by the

applicants against these decisions were rejected by the County

Administrative Court on 3 October 1985 and 3 February 1986, respectively.

        The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal,

which joined the two cases.  After holding a hearing at which the

applicants were present and gave evidence, the Administrative Court of

Appeal, by judgment of 16 February 1987, decided that the public care

of Stefan be terminated.  Stefan was subsequently reunited with his

parents.  However, the appeal concerning Helena and Thomas was

dismissed.  The Administrative Court of Appeal's opinion that the

public care of these two children should continue was based primarily

on the finding that the applicants were unable to understand and

satisfy the special needs arising in connection with the reunification

of parents and children after so long a period of separation.

        Following an appeal by the applicants, the Supreme Administrative

Court, by judgment of 18 June 1987, ordered that the public care of

Helena and Thomas should terminate there being no sufficiently serious

circumstances to justify its continuation.  The Supreme Administrative

Court pointed out that the question to be determined in deciding

whether care should be discontinued pursuant to Section 5 of the 1980

Act was whether there was still a need for care.  The problems

associated with the removal of a child from a foster home and its

possible detrimental effects on him and with his reunification with his

natural parents - on which the Administrative Court of Appeal had

relied - were matters to be considered not under Section 5 but in

separate proceedings, namely an investigation under Section 28 of the

1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen).  The latter Section

empowers a Social Council to prohibit, for a certain period of time or

until further notice, the removal from a foster home of a minor who is

not or is no longer in public care, if there is thereby a risk, which

is not of a minor nature, of harming his physical or mental health.

        The applicants have previously submitted an application

(No. 10465/83) concerning the public care of their children.  The

applicants mainly complained about the taking into care of their

children, about the refusal to terminate the care and about the

implementation of the care decision.  The Commission found that the

care decisions concerning the applicants' children in combination with

the placement of the children in separate foster homes far from each

other and far away from the applicants constituted a violation of

Article 8 of the Convention (Olsson v.  Sweden, Comm.  Report 2.12.86,

para. 179, Eur.  Court H.R., Series B No. 130).  The Court found that

the implementation of the care decision, but not the decision itself or

its maintenance in force, gave rise to a breach of Article 8 of the

Convention (cf.  Eur.  Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988,

Series A No. 130-A).

        On 23 June 1987 the Social Council, pursuant to Section 28 of

the Social Services Act, prohibited the applicants until further notice

from removing Helena and Thomas from their respective foster homes.

The Council considered that there was a risk, which was not of a minor

nature, of harming Helena's and Thomas' physical and mental health by

separating them from the foster homes.  The reasons given for this were

inter alia that a long time had passed since their parents last took

care of them, that they only had little contact with their parents

during the public care, that they had emotional ties with their foster

homes and that Helena had expressed a wish not to leave the foster home.

        On 25 June 1987 the applicants' application for a suspension

(inhibition) of this prohibition was refused by the County Administrative

Court.  This decision was confirmed by the Administrative Court of

Appeal on 2 July 1987 and, on 17 August 1987, the Supreme Administrative

Court refused leave to appeal.

        On 4 August 1987 the applicants' representative, Mrs.  Westerberg,

received some documents in the case, relating to the prohibition on

removal, from the County Administrative Court.  Among these was a

decision of 17 July 1987, whereby the District Court (tingsrätten) of

Gothenburg, upon a request made by the Social Council on 1 July 1987,

had appointed CÃ… guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas according to

Chapter 18 Section 2 of the Parental Code (föräldrabalken).  The Social

Council had requested that the matter be decided urgently, for which

reason the applicants were not heard.  The applicants had not been

informed of the decision by the District Court and the time limit for

an appeal had expired.

        On 5 August 1987 the applicants requested that the guardian ad

litem be dismissed.  Their request was granted by the District Court on

26 October 1987.  In its decision the Court stated that CÅ had been

appointed guardian ad litem for the purpose of applying for legal aid

for Thomas and Helena and for the appointment of an official counsel

for them.  CÅ was appointed their official counsel by the County

Administrative Court on 31 July 1987 and on the same day they were

granted legal aid.  The Court dismissed CÅ as guardian ad litem as he

had completed his mission.

        On 27 October 1987 the Social District Council again requested

that CÅ be appointed guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas.  This

time the District Court invited the applicants to state their opinion

before the decision was taken.  On 12 February 1988 the Court granted

the request finding that the children's interests might be opposed to

those of their parents in the proceedings concerning the prohibition on

removal and also in proceedings concerning the applicants' request that

the children be returned to them in accordance with the rules laid down

in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code.  The Court considered CÅ suitable

as guardian ad litem as he was well acquainted with the matter.  It

found that the objections made by the spouses Olsson as regards CÃ…'s

suitability were due to the fact that he had taken a position opposite

to theirs.

        The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Western

Sweden (hovrätten för Västra Sverige), which on 23 August 1988 rejected

their appeal.  On 8 November 1988 the Supreme Court (högsta domstolen)

refused the applicants leave to appeal.

        In the meantime, the applicants appealed to the County

Administrative Court against the decision to prohibit them from moving

Helena and Thomas.  They requested that the Court appoint

Dr.  Fedor-Freybergh to give an expert opinion.  On 3 July 1987 the

Court decided to ask Chief Doctor Per Jonsson and Chief Doctor George

Finney to give an opinion not later than 6 August 1987 as to whether

there would be any risk of harm to Helena and Thomas if they were to

be moved from their foster homes.  These doctors had previously given

expert opinions in the proceedings concerning the termination of the

care order.

        Chief Doctor Per Jonsson in an opinion of 14 July 1987

concluded that "moving Helena against her will would entail a

considerable risk to her mental well-being and also a great risk to

her physical health if, in desperation, she were to implement her

plans of running away".  In an opinion of 3 September 1987 Chief

Doctor George Finney stated inter alia that "moving Thomas now would

be disastrous to his mental development both emotionally and

intellectually".  In an opinion of the same date the certified

psychologist Göran Löthman stated that moving Thomas would not be in

his best interests.

        The Social Council and CÅ recommended that the appeal be

rejected.  The applicants did not request a hearing and no hearing was

held before the County Administrative Court.  In its judgment of

3 November 1987 the Court stated the following:

        "According to Section 28 of the Social Services Act, the

        Social Council may, for a certain period of time or until

        further notice, prohibit the guardian of a minor from taking

        the minor from a foster home, if there is a risk, which is

        not of a minor nature, of harming the child's physical or

        mental health by separating it from the foster home.

        As a background to how Section 28 of the Social Services

        Act should be interpreted the County Administrative Court

        quotes the Minister in the Government Bill proposing the

        Social Services Act and the Standing Social Committee of

        the Parliament (riksdagens socialutskott).

        The Minister: 'The aim of the provision is to safeguard the

        best interests of the children.  Basically it is the

        guardian's right to determine the domicile of the child.

        This right can in certain circumstances be in conflict with

        the child's best interests.  The provision provides a

        possibility to suspend the guardian's right to decide over

        the child.

        The condition for this is that there is a risk which is not

        of a minor nature that the child's physical or mental health

        would be harmed, if it was forced to move from the home where

        it is staying.  Only a passing disturbance or other occasional

        disadvantage is not a sufficient ground for issuing a

        prohibition on removal.  Among the factors to be considered

        are the age of the child, the degree of development, character

        and emotional ties.  Furthermore, the time the child has been

        cared for away from the parents, the living conditions it has

        and those it would come to, must be considered.  The parents'

        contacts with the child during the period they have been

        separated must also be taken into account.  An important

        element in the assessment whether there is a need to issue a

        prohibition on removal is the child's own preference.  If the

        child has reached the age of 15 years, its preference must not

        be opposed without good reasons.  Even the preferences of

        younger children must be considered.  The child's preferences

        can be of importance in considering the risk of damage to the

        child as a result of a removal.  In this connection it should

        be noted that a prohibition on removal according to the new

        provisions can be issued until the child is 18 years old.'

        The Standing Social Committee of the Parliament: 'The fact

        that the Section follows the pattern of a previous provision

        regulating the same matter, does not imply that the intention

        is to codify earlier practice characterised by the views of the

        past on children's rights and needs.  The Committee therefore,

        in connection with the statements on the issue in the

        Government Bill (Volume A p. 541), stresses that the provision

        is aimed at safeguarding the best interests of the child.  The

        guardian's interest in determining the domicile of the child

        must give way when it conflicts with what is in the best

        interests of the child.  In addition to what has been stated

        in the Government Bill the Committee wants to point out that

        a separation generally involves a risk of damage to the

        child.  Repeated transfers and transfers which take place

        after a long time when the child has managed to develop strong

        links with the home where it lives should thus not be accepted

        without good reasons.  Children's needs for secure relations

        and living conditions must to as large an extent as possible be

        decisive in any decision on these questions.'

        From the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of

        18 June 1987 it appears that Helena and Thomas were taken into

        public care in September 1980 by the Social District Council

        No. 6 of Gothenburg.  The Council's decision was confirmed by

        the County Administrative Court.  The Administrative Court of

        Appeal of Gothenburg confirmed the County Administrative

        Court's judgment and the Supreme Administrative Court did not

        grant leave to appeal.  The children were placed in separate

        foster homes, Helena at Näsviken and Thomas at Ljusne, both

        homes approximately a thousand kilometres from the home of

        their parents.  The addresses of the foster homes were not

        given to the spouses Olsson during the period October 1980 to

        September 1981.  From then and during most of the stay in the

        foster homes the spouses Olsson's right of access to the

        children has been restricted to one visit every three months.

        According to the information submitted by the children's

        guardian ad litem, Gun Olsson has not met Helena and Thomas

        since the summer of 1984.  Stig Olsson has, together with

        Stefan, visited Helena and Thomas in the spring of 1987

        and on a few occasions during the last years he has contacted

        the foster homes by telephone.

        The contacts between the parental home and the children,

        according to the information given, have been very limited.

        This might be due both to the Social District Council and the

        spouses Olsson and the limited contacts between parents and

        children also make a reunification appear complicated.  Firstly,

        to assess the children's own preferences, it appears natural to

        the County Administrative Court that the children are opposed

        to moving, be it only for the reason that they, like most human

        beings, try to avoid changes and prefer to stay in the

        environment they are used to.  Whether the children's

        preferences shall be considered must be decided on the basis

        of the children's capacity to take a stand on that issue.

        A comparison must be made in this connection with the provision

        in Chapter 21 Section 5 of the Parental Code, which states that

        enforcement according to the Parental Code must not take place

        contrary to the wishes of the child, if the child is twelve

        years old or, if the child is not yet twelve years old but

        mature enough to have its preference considered.  Helena will

        soon be eleven years old and Thomas nine years old.  Thomas

        is in this respect obviously too young to have his preference

        considered.  Helena is approaching the age at which there is

        a better possibility to consider her preference, but the

        County Administrative Court does not find it likely that she,

        not yet twelve years old, is mature enough to be compared with

        a twelve-year-old child.  The County Administrative Court

        therefore finds no basis for taking the children's own

        preferences into account.

        If the children are assessed individually Thomas' mental

        health does not seem to be so strong but he seems to have

        improved continuously.  The County Administrative Court

        finds it likely that without preparatory contacts between

        Thomas and the natural parents, Thomas' mental health will

        be seriously endangered if he, without sufficient preparatory

        measures, is moved to his parents' home.  A prohibition on

        removal is therefore justified for his part.

        Helena seems stronger than her brother, but even for her part

        the idea must be that the child's interest must be considered

        to be more important than the parents' rights.  For her part

        it also appears, considering the sporadic contacts she has

        had with her parental home, that an immediate removal and

        separation from the foster home, without preparatory

        measures, would bring about a risk, which is not of a minor

        nature, of harm to her mental health.  Also for Helena

        it appears therefore for the time being that a prohibition on

        removal is well-founded.

        A prohibition on removal should not, according to the opinion

        of the County Administrative Court, be valid for too long a

        time.  A condition for the prohibition on removal to be revoked

        is therefore that the spouses Olsson as well as the Social

        District Council engage actively in improving the contacts

        between parents and children.  It is difficult for the County

        Administrative Court, which cannot directly participate in the

        work and follow the development, to decide on a time limit for

        an endeavour of this kind.  The prohibition on removal issued

        by the Social District Council shall therefore be valid until

        further notice."

        The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal.

In the first place, they requested that the prohibition on removal be

revoked and, in the second place, that it be limited in time, at the

utmost until 6 January 1988.  They requested that Dr.  Fedor-Freybergh

be appointed an expert.  The Social District Council and the children's

guardian ad litem recommended that the appeal be rejected.  The

applicants did not request a hearing and no hearing was held before

the Court.  The Court gave judgment on 30 December 1987.  It refused

the applicants' request that Dr.  Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an expert

and rejected the appeal, giving, inter alia, the following reasons:

        "As has been accounted for in detail by the County

        Administrative Court in the judgment that has been appealed

        against, the contact between the spouses Olsson and their

        children Helena and Thomas have for a long time been very

        limited.  A reunification between them is therefore complicated

        and requires relatively extensive preparations.  There is

        nothing in the investigation to show that there have been any

        appropriate preparations for a reunification.  The prohibition

        on removal should therefore continue and according to the

        Administrative Court of Appeal there is not now any basis for

        deciding when the removal can be brought about without a risk

        of harm to the children's mental health.  Against the

        background of the conflicts that characterise the contacts

        between the children's foster homes and the Social Council, on

        the one hand, and the spouses Olsson and their counsel, on the

        other hand, there is no reason in this case to set a time limit

        for the prohibition on removal.  The Administrative Court of

        Appeal therefore agrees with the County Administrative Court's

        assessment that the prohibition shall be valid until further

        notice."

        The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Supreme

Administrative Court requesting, firstly, that the prohibition on

removal be revoked, and secondly, that it be limited in time until

15 March 1988.  They requested that Dr.  Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an

expert by the Court.  They alleged inter alia that, as the European

Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 24 March 1988 had found that

Sweden had violated the Convention by keeping Helena and Thomas in

foster homes far from them and from each other and with a very

restricted access to the children for the applicants, a continued

prohibition on removal would mean that Sweden continues to violate

their human rights and that Sweden refuses to abide by the judgment of

the Court.  The applicants requested a hearing before the Supreme

Administrative Court.

        On 4 February 1988 the Supreme Administrative Court granted the

applicants leave to appeal and decided to hear the National Board of

Health and Welfare (socialstyrelsen) and the Social District Council.

        In their opinion of 22 March 1988 the Social District Council

stated inter alia that it appeared from the written evidence of the

case that there was a risk which was not of a minor nature of harming

Helena's and Thomas' physical and mental health if they were to be

separated from their foster homes.  This risk could not be eliminated

by a prohibition on removal limited in time.  The Council further

stated that it intended to make a request to the District Court that

the custody of the children be transferred to the foster parents if the

Supreme Court rejected the applicants' appeal.

        The National Board of Health and Welfare, in their opinion

dated 23 March 1988, stated that the child psychiatric investigation

which had been carried out was sufficient.  It stressed that the

decisive factor as regards the transfer of children, having lived in a

foster home as long as in the present case, must be the relationship

between the children and their parents.  In order to create good contact,

and eventually a reunification, co-operation between the social welfare

officers and the foster home on the one hand and the parents on the

other hand is necessary.  The Board considered that it appeared from

the case-file that the applicants' counsel had not tried to co-operate

and that this had been unfortunate for the children.  It had had the

consequence that no such relation had been established between the

children and their parents as would make it possible for the children

to move to their parents without there being a serious risk of harm to

the children.  The Board recommended the Social District Council to

examine the possibility of having the custody of the children

transferred to the foster parents and advised against granting the

applicants' appeal.

        The Supreme Administrative Court, in its judgment of 30 May 1988,

rejected the appeal, the request to appoint Dr.  Fedor-Freybergh as an

expert and the request for a hearing, but amended the judgment of the

Administrative Court of Appeal to the effect that the prohibition on

removal was limited in time until 30 June 1989.  However, one of the

four judges gave a dissenting opinion wishing to confirm the judgments

of the lower courts.  The Court's reasons read inter alia as follows:

        "Section 28 of the Social Services Act provides that the

        Social Council, for a certain time or until further notice,

        may prohibit the guardian of a minor from taking the minor

        from a home of the kind mentioned in Section 25 (i.e. a foster

        home), if there is a risk, which is not of a minor nature, of

        harming the child's physical or mental health by separating it

        from the foster home.  The aim of this provision has been

        accounted for in the statements made by the responsible Minister

        and by the Standing Social Committee of the Parliament, as

        quoted by the County Administrative Court of Gothenburg in

        its judgment of 3 November 1987.

        When Section 28 of the Act is applied in this case a balance

        must be struck between, on the one hand, respect for the spouses

        Olsson's and their children's private and family life,

        including the spouses Olsson's rights as guardians according

        to the Parental Code and, on the other hand, the need to

        safeguard the children's health (cf.  Chapter 1 Section 2

        third paragraph of the Instrument of Government [regeringsformen]

        and Sections 1 and 12 of the Social Services Act; through these

        provisions the protection for private and family life referred

        to in Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human

        Rights and Fundamental Freedoms can be ensured).  In this

        assessment it must be considered that Section 28 of the Social

        Services Act as well as other provisions specifying the

        conditions for coercive measures must be interpreted so that

        such measures may be used only when the conditions specified in

        the text of the statutes are really satisfied.  There are

        special reasons to underline this as certain statements of the

        Standing Social Committee could be interpreted as if a more

        extensive right to take coercive measures exists than is

        allowed under the texts of the statutes.

        As appears from what has been stated above the children were

        placed in the two foster homes because they had been taken

        into public care; by virtue of the new Act the care has been

        transformed into care according to Section 1 paragraph 2 of

        the 1980 Act.  The care was caused by the lack of care for

        the children or other conditions in the home which entailed a

        danger to their health and development.  The aim when such a

        decision is taken, and when the children subsequently stay in

        a foster home, should normally be the reunification of the

        children with their parents as soon as circumstances allow.

        When the care is terminated according to Section 5 of the 1980

        Act the reunification should normally take place as soon as

        possible.  A reunification needs to be prepared actively and

        with understanding.  The appropriate preparations should be

        made immediately after the care has been terminated.  This

        should apply even if a prohibition under Section 28 of the

        Social Services Act has been issued or is being examined by a

        higher instance.  The character and the extent of the

        preparations, as well as the time required for them, depend on

        the circumstances in each case; one or more suitably arranged

        and successful visits by the children to their parents' home

        must always be required.  The need for a more definite

        prohibition on removal can normally only be assessed after the

        appropriate preparations have been carried out.  It is the

        Social Council's responsibility to arrange the appropriate

        preparations for reuniting parents and children after the care

        has been terminated according to Section 5 of the 1980 Act.

        The Social Council's responsibility includes an obligation to

        be persistent in trying to make the parents and their counsel

        actively take part in the preparations in the interests of the

        children.  The Social Council is not discharged of its

        responsibility only because the parents and their counsel, by

        appealing against the Council's decisions or in other ways,

        show that they dislike the measures taken by the Council or

        its personnel.  According to Section 68 of the Social Services

        Act the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) should

        assist the Council with advice and ensure that the Council

        performs its duties in an appropriate way.

        Pending the beginning and completion of the appropriate

        preparations for the reunification of parents and children the

        question of a more temporary prohibition on removal under

        Section 28 of the Social Services Act can also arise.  Such a

        prohibition should be seen as a temporary measure awaiting

        that the child can be separated from the foster home without

        any risk of harm as mentioned in the section.

        The elements that should be considered when a decision on

        prohibition of removal is taken are - according to the quoted

        preparatory works - the age of the child, the degree of

        development, character and emotional ties, the time the child

        has been cared for away from the parents, the living conditions

        it has and those it would come to and the parents' contacts with

        the child during the period they have been separated.

        From the investigation in the present case it appears that no

        appropriate preparations have been made to reunite parents and

        children.  The time after the Supreme Administrative Court's

        decision to terminate the care seems to have been spent

        litigating instead.

        The issue whether a prohibition on removal under Section 28 of

        the Social Services Act is needed in this case, must therefore

        be examined without considering the effect of preparations

        that have already been carried out.  The Supreme Administrative

        Court's decision must therefore concern the kind of temporary

        prohibition on removal that, according to what has been

        stated above, can be issued awaiting that more appropriate

        preparations are carried out.

        From the investigation - above all the opinion given by the

        National Board of Health and Welfare and the medical

        certificates quoted in it - it clearly appears that for the

        time being, before any preparations have been made, there is a

        risk which is not of a minor nature of harming Helena's and

        Thomas' physical and mental health by separating them from

        their foster homes.  Accordingly, there are sufficient reasons

        for a prohibition on removal under Section 28 of the Social

        Services Act.

        As concerns the length of a prohibition on removal the Supreme

        Administrative Court, in a previous decision (cf.  RÅ 1984

        2:78), has stated inter alia the following:  If, when the

        prohibition is issued, it is already possible to assess with

        sufficient certainty that there will be no such risk after a

        specific time - at which some measures will have been taken or

        the effect of them will have had time to occur - the

        prohibition must be valid only until that time.  If, on the

        other hand, it is uncertain when the child, without a risk

        which is not of a minor nature, can be moved to its parents,

        the prohibition should be valid until further notice and the

        question of a removal be raised again at a later stage, when

        it is easier to assess the risk of harming the child's health.

        An application of this rule would in the present case lead to

        a prohibition on removal valid until further notice.  However,

        the circumstances of this case are different from those of the

        previous case, as no appropriate preparations to reunite

        parents and children have been made because of the conflict

        between the Social District Council, on the one hand, and the

        parents and their counsel, on the other hand.  Furthermore, it

        must be presumed in this case that only by fixing a time limit

        can the parties - without any further litigation - be made to

        co-operate in making appropriate preparations in the interest

        of the children.  If within a certain time limit there are no

        such preparations, or if their result is not acceptable, the

        Social Council may take up the question of a prolonged

        prohibition based on the then existing circumstances.

        Against this background the Supreme Administrative Court finds

        that the prohibition on removal should be valid until 30 June 1988.

        The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment of

        24 March 1988, has found that Sweden in one respect has

        violated Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of

        Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  This violation

        concerned the implementation of the care decision and inter

        alia the fact that the children were placed in foster homes so

        far from their parents.  The issue in this case is another,

        namely when and on what conditions the children can be

        reunited with their parents in view of the fact that the

        Supreme Administrative Court on 18 June 1987 decided that the

        care be terminated.  A prohibition on removal as mentioned

        above is therefore not in conflict with the judgment of

        24 March 1988."

        In the meantime, on 8 December 1987, the applicants requested

that their children be allowed to visit them without the foster

parents being present.  The Chairman of the Social District Council on

18 December 1987 rejected the request.  On 21 December 1987 the Social

Council was informed about the decision in respect of which it did not

take any specific measures.  The applicants appealed against the

decision to the County Administrative Court.  On 8 March 1988 the Court

decided not to examine the appeal.  The Court considered that, as

Section 28 of the Social Services Act does not regulate parents' right

to access during the time a prohibition on removal is in force, other

provisions in the Act must be applied.  The Court referred to Section 22

third paragraph of the Act which provides that the Social Council shall

encourage an individual's contact with his relatives and home

environment.  As decisions taken according to that section are not

among those enumerated in Section 73 of the Act, which can be appealed

against, the Court concluded that no appeal lies against a decision on

access while a prohibition on removal is in force.

        The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal

which, by a decision of 29 April 1988, confirmed the decision of the

County Administrative Court.  The Court stated that the Chairman's

decision was not a decision under Section 28 of the Social Services

Act and that it did not belong to any of the other categories of

decisions against which an appeal lies and which are enumerated in

Section 73 of the Act.

        The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court

alleging inter alia that the Chairman's decision of 18 December 1987

was unlawful and that it was in violation of Article 13 of the

Convention, as they had no right to appeal against it.  The Court

granted leave to appeal and on 18 July 1988 rejected the appeal.  Like

the lower courts it found that the decision of the Chairman of the

District Council was not a decision under Section 28 of the Social

Services Act and that it could not be appealed against according to

Section 73 of the Act.  The Court noted that there are no special

provisions regulating the possibilities to appeal against arrangements

made in a foster home when a prohibition on removal is in force.  The

Court recalled that the parents had other remedies than administrative

appeals at their disposal in these situations.  They could request

that the children be returned to them in accordance with the rules

laid down in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code and they could also under

certain conditions lodge a municipal appeal.  The Court considered

that the decision of the Chairman of the Social Council of 18 December

1987 was null and void, there being no legal provision authorising the

Social Council to restrict access while a prohibition on removal is in

force.  The Court furthermore found that no appeal based on general

principles of administrative law lies against the decision and that

the European Convention on Human Rights does not give the applicants a

right to appeal.

        On 15 August 1988 the applicants lodged a municipal appeal with

the Administrative Court of Appeal against the Chairman's decision of

18 December 1987.  In a decision of 10 October 1988 the Court stated

that such an appeal could not be made against that decision.  The

Court found that the appeal must also be considered to be directed

against the fact that the Social Council did not take any specific

measure when informed about the Chairman's decision.  In this respect

the appeal was not lodged within the stipulated time limit and was

consequently rejected.

        A request made by the applicants on 10 August 1987 that Helena

and Thomas be returned to them in accordance with the rules laid down

in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code was rejected by the County

Administrative Court of the County of Gävleborg, after a hearing on

1 March 1988, by two separate judgments of 15 March 1988.  The Court

found that there was a risk, which was not of a minor nature, of

harming the children's mental health by separating them from the

foster homes.

        The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal

of Sundsvall which in a judgment of 11 July 1988 rejected the appeal.

The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court which on

23 September 1988 refused leave to appeal.

        On 17 March 1988 the applicants requested that Helena and

Thomas be allowed to attend their grandmother's funeral on 25 March 1988.

The Chairman of the Social Council rejected the request on 21 March 1988.

The reason given was that the grandmother had been a rather unknown

person to the children.

        On 5 April 1988 the Social District Council decided that the

judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 24 March 1988 did

not oblige the Council to amend its previous decisions in the case.

        On 7 April 1988 the applicants made a request that the

children be allowed to attend a special ceremony on 12 April 1988 at

which the grandmother was buried.  The Head of the social authority in

Gothenburg decided on 11 April 1988 to reject the request as being

incompatible with the children's best interest.

        On 2 August 1988 the applicants made a request to the Social

Council that Helena and Thomas be allowed to come to Gothenburg on

5 August 1988, or at the latest on 8 August 1988, to spend the remainder

of the summer holidays with their parents.  From the letter to the

Council it appears that the children had already visited their parents

in Gothenburg once during the summer holidays.  They were accompanied

by the foster mothers and met their parents for a few hours in a park

on 22 July 1988.  The applicants' request was rejected by the Head of

the social authority on 8 August 1988.

        On 28 September 1988 the applicants requested the Social

District Council of Gunnared to revoke the prohibition on removal.

They invoked the Commission's Report of 14 July 1988 in the Eriksson

case.  The Social Council rejected their request on 18 October 1988.

The applicants appealed to the County Administrative Court, which on

12 December 1988 rejected the appeal.  The Court referred to the

Supreme Administrative Court's judgment of 30 May 1988 and stated that

no such appropriate preparations to reunite the applicants with Helena

and Thomas, as mentioned in that judgment, had been made.  The Court

found that there was still a risk of harm to the children if the

prohibition on removal was to be revoked.

        The applicants made a further appeal to the Administrative Court

of Appeal, which on 22 December 1988 rejected the appeal.  The Court

noted that Stig Olsson had met the children on 11 and 12 October 1988

in their foster homes and in their schools and that the children had

visited the applicants' home together with their foster mothers on

16-17 December 1988.  The Court nevertheless considered, for the same

reasons as the County Administrative Court, that the prohibition on

removal should not be revoked.

        The applicants were refused leave to appeal by the Supreme

Administrative Court on 14 February 1989.

        On 28 September 1988 the applicants also requested access to

Helena and Thomas for a medical examination.  The purpose of the

examination was to obtain a medical certificate to be used in the

proceedings before the Commission.  On 18 October 1988 the Social

District Council decided to ask for an opinion from the National Board

of Health and Welfare as to whether the request should be granted.  In

an opinion dated 27 February 1989 the Board advised against granting

the request.  The Board considered that a further examination of the

children might be harmful and that it would not be helpful in the

proceedings.  The Social District Council decided on 21 March 1989 to

reject the applicants' request.

        On 20 December 1988 the Social District Council adopted a plan

for the applicants' meetings with their children in December 1988 and

February, April and June 1989.  The applicants were opposed to this

plan.

        On 27 June 1989 the Social District Council decided to issue a

new prohibition on removal concerning Helena and Thomas, valid until

further notice.  The Council also rejected a request that the children

spend their summer holidays with their parents in Alingsås and that

they visit their parents every weekend unaccompanied by their foster

parents.

        The applicants appealed to the County Administrative Court,

which in a judgment of 4 September 1989 confirmed the prohibition on

removal but limited it in time until 31 March 1990.  The Court

stressed the responsibility of the Social Council to implement the

courts' judgments but concluded that the investigation showed that

there was still a risk of harm to the children if they were to move

from the foster homes.  Referring to the decision of the Supreme

Administrative Court of 18 July 1988 the County Administrative Court

rejected the appeal insofar as it concerned the applicants' access to

their children.

        The applicants made a further appeal to the Administrative

Court of Appeal.  The Social District Council also appealed requesting

that the prohibition on removal be valid until further notice.  By a

judgment of 23 January 1990 the Administrative Court of Appeal confirmed

the judgment by the County Administrative Court but extended the time

limit for the prohibition on removal until 1 August 1990.  The

applicants lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court

which refused leave to appeal on 8 March 1990.

        On 28 July 1989 the applicants requested the Parliamentary

Ombudsman (justitieombudsmannen) to examine the Social District

Council's handling of their request for access to Helena and Thomas in

their home in Alingsås.

        The applicants' counsel, in her capacity as a member of the

Municipality of Gothenburg, filed a municipal appeal against the Social

District Council's decision of 27 June 1989 insofar as it concerned

the applicants' access to Helena and Thomas.  The applicants could not

make such an appeal themselves as they are no longer domiciled in the

municipality in which the decision was taken.  The applicants' counsel

also filed a municipal appeal against the Social District Council's

decision of 20 December 1988 to adopt a plan for the applicants'

meetings with their children.

        In a judgment of 8 January 1990 the Administrative Court of

Appeal found that the Social District Council's decision to restrict

the applicants' access to their children was unlawful.  The Court

revoked the decision in that part.  In a separate judgment of the same

date the Court found that the adoption of a plan for the applicants'

access to their children formed part of the measures the Social

Council considered to be necessary in order to arrange a removal of

the children from their foster homes to the applicants without any

risk of harm to them.  The plan was not a formal decision as regards

the applicants' right of access, especially since it stated that the

applicants could visit their children according to their own wishes.  On

8 March 1990 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicants'

counsel leave to appeal against the latter judgment.  The Social Council

appealed against this first judgment to the Supreme Administrative

Court (proceedings still pending).

        The Social District Council decided on 31 October 1989 to

institute proceedings before the District Court of Alingsås for a

transfer of the custody of Helena and Thomas to their respective foster

parents.  The reason for the decision was the considerable time the

children had spent in their foster homes, their strong relations with

their foster parents, Helena's unwillingness to move to her parents,

Thomas' special need of stability and the fact that a reunification of

the applicants and their children had not been possible in spite of the

considerable efforts made by the social authority.  A preliminary

hearing before the District Court was held on 27 February 1990.

        The following appears from the case file as concerns the

applicants' access to their children in 1989:

-       a request of 23 March 1989 that the applicants visit their

children on 1-2 April 1989 was rejected by the social authority for

lack of time to organise the visit;

-       a request was made that a visit by the parents be organised on

8-9 April 1989 or 15-16 April 1989;

-       a request of 16 April 1989 that the children be allowed to

participate in the celebration of their grandfather's birthday on

22 April 1989 was rejected on 21 April 1989;

-       a request of 10 May 1989 that the children be allowed to

participate in the celebration of their brother Stefan's eighteenth

birthday on 10 June 1989 was rejected on 31 May 1989;

-       a request of 19 July 1989 that the children visit their

parents on 28 July-1 August 1989 was rejected on 21 July 1989;

-       a request of 8 September 1989 that the children visit their

parents on 15-17 Septpember and 29 September-1 October 1989 was

rejected, as regards the first visit, because of lack of time to

organise it, and as regards the second visit, on the ground that the

children did not wish to visit their parents;

-       a request of 6 October 1989 that the children visit their

parents during the weekend of 13-15 October 1989 and every following

weekend was rejected on 11 October 1989.

        On 16 November 1989 the applicants requested, firstly, that

the children visit them every weekend, starting with the weekend of 24-

26 November 1989.  Secondly, they requested that the applicants and

their son Stefan visit the children on 25-26 November 1989 in one of

the foster homes without the foster parents being present.  Thirdly,

the applicants requested that their counsel be allowed to meet the

children for a day or a half-day to give them information about their

parents and their brother and to explain to them why they were taken

into care and why their parents do not wish to visit them in their

foster homes in the presence of the foster parents.  The Head of the

social authority acknowledged receipt of the applicants' letter on

20 November 1989 and informed them that the social welfare officer in

charge of their case would contact them as soon as possible with a view

to planning a suitable arrangement for their next meeting with their

children.

        On 21 December 1989 the applicants reported the officer in

charge of their case to the Public Prosecution Authority (Ã¥klagarmyn-

digheten) of Gothenburg for misuse of power and asked for her

immediate arrest.  The reason for this action was her failure to

comply with their request of 16 November 1989.  The applicants made a

similar request on 21 December 1989.  On 30 January 1990, the

Prosecution Authority discontinued the criminal investigation finding

no indication that any criminal offences had been committed.

COMPLAINTS

1.      The applicants complain that they have been the victims of a

breach of Article 8 of the Convention as a result of the prohibition

on removal that was issued by the Social Council, despite the fact

that the public care of their children had terminated.  They allege

that, instead of preparing Helena and Thomas for their return to the

applicants, the social authorities use the prohibition on removal to

tie the children closer to the foster homes and to obstruct their

return to the applicants.

        The applicants also maintain that the judgment of the Supreme

Administrative Court of 30 May 1988 violated their rights under

Article 8 of the Convention, as the time limit for the prohibition on

removal was 30 June 1989, at which time Helena would be twelve years

old and could no longer be moved from her foster home against her own

will.

2.      The applicants also complain about the decisions of the

Chairman of the Social Council not to let their children visit them in

their home in private and not to let their children attend their

grandmother's funeral.  They allege that the decisions are unlawful

and they do not have any effective remedy against them.  They invoke

Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention.

        The applicants also complain that the refusal of their

request that the children be returned to them according to Chapter 21

Section 7 of the Parental Code amounts to a violation of Article 8 of

the Convention.

3.      The applicants further complain about the decision of the

District Court to appoint a guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas

without hearing the applicants and without informing them of the

decision so that they could appeal against it.  They maintain that when

the guardian ad litem was dismissed he had already acted to the

applicants' detriment by applying for legal aid for the children and

for an official counsel to be appointed for them.

        The applicants allege that this constitutes a violation of

Article 6 of the Convention as they had no possibility to have the

original appointment of CÃ… as guardian ad litem examined by an

impartial tribunal and as the request to have CÃ… dismissed was not

examined by the Court of Appeal within a reasonable time.  The

applicants further allege that Swedish law, which does not require the

Court to inform the parents of proceedings to appoint a guardian ad

litem, as well as its application in the present case, violates

Article 8 of the Convention.  The applicants also allege a violation of

Article 13 of the Convention.

4.      The applicants also complain that the length of the proceedings

concerning the termination of the public care and the proceedings

concerning their request that the children be returned to them

according to Chapter 21 Section 7 of the Parental Code exceeded a

reasonable time.  The first-mentioned proceedings commenced in 1983,

when the applicants made a request that the care be terminated, and

were closed on 18 June 1987, when the judgment of the Supreme

Administrative Court was given.  The last-mentioned proceedings

commenced in 1987, when the applicants requested that the children be

returned, and on 23 September 1988 the applicants' request for leave to

appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court.  The applicants

invoke Article 6 of the Convention.

5.      The applicants allege that the refusal of the Supreme

Administrative Court to grant their request for a hearing in the

proceedings concerning the prohibition on removal constitutes a

violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

6.      The applicants finally allege that Sweden violates Article 53

of the Convention by not abiding by the judgment of 24 March 1988 of

the European Court of Human Rights.  Helena and Thomas are still in the

foster homes.  The applicants maintain that the Swedish authorities

obstruct the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in every

possible way and that they never intended to let Helena and Thomas

return to the applicants.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 23 October 1987 and

registered on 3 December 1987.

        On 14 December 1988 the Commission decided to invite the

Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and

merits of the application.

        The Government's observations, after an extension of the time

limit to 28 April 1989, were received by letter dated 27 April 1989

and the applicants' observations in reply were dated 13 June 1989.

        The Government submitted further observations on 14 September 1989

and the applicants on 27 September 1989.

        The applicants submitted further observations by letters dated

6 and 13 October 1989, 6, 16, 17 and 22 November 1989, 6, 20 and

21 December 1989, 25 and 31 January 1990 and 13, 21, 23, 28 February 1990,

29 March 1990 and 9 April 1990.

        On 16 February 1990 the Commission granted legal aid to the

applicants.

THE LAW

        The applicants allege that the authorities, through various

actions and proceedings, obstruct the return of their children from the

foster homes and prevent the applicants' access to their children.  The

applicants allege violations of a number of rights guaranteed to them by

Articles 8 (Art. 8) and 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.  They also allege

violations of Articles 13 (Art. 13) and 53 (Art. 53) of the Convention.

        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads:

"1.      Everyone has the right to respect for his private

and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2.      There shall be no interference by a public authority

with the exercise of this right except such as is in

accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

society in the interests of national security, public safety

or the economic well-being of the country, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others."

        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) first sentence of the Convention reads:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

reasonable time before an independent and impartial tribunal ..."

        The Government admit a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention in that the restrictions of the applicants' access to their

children after the care order was lifted were not "in accordance with

the law" as required by Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention.  The Government further admit a violation of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention on the ground that the applicants

had no access to court for determining the question of access to their

children.  In all other respects, the Government submit that the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

        The Commission considers that the facts of the case raise a

number of issues in particular under Articles 8 (Art. 8) and 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention. After an examination of the application in the light

of the parties' submissions, the Commission considers that the

application raises questions of fact and law which are of such a

complex nature that their determination requires an examination on the

merits.

        The application cannot therefore be considered manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of

the Convention. As no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has

been established, the application must be declared admissible.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE

        without prejudging the merits of the case.

Secretary to the Commission               President of the Commission

      (H.C. KRÜGER)                             (C.A. NØRGAARD)

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