OLSSON v. SWEDEN
Doc ref: 13441/87 • ECHR ID: 001-665
Document date: May 7, 1990
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 13441/87
by Stig and Gun OLSSON
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
7 May 1990, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
G. BATLINER
J. CAMPINOS
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. L. LOUCAIDES
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 23 October 1987
by Stig and Gun OLSSON against Sweden and registered on 3 December 1987
under file No. 13441/87;
Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the Government's written observations of 27 April
and 14 September 1989 and the applicants' written observations of 13 June,
27 September, 6 and 13 October, 6, 16, 17 and 28 November, 6, 20 and
21 December 1989, as well as their letters of 25 and 31 January and 13,
21, 23 and 28 February, 29 March and 9 April 1990.
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicants are a married couple, the husband born in 1941
and the wife in 1944. They are Swedish citizens and reside at Angered.
Before the Commission they are represented by Mrs. Siv Westerberg, a
lawyer practising in Gothenburg.
The applicants have three children: Stefan, born in June 1971,
Helena, born in December 1976, and Thomas, born in January 1979.
The applicants' three children were taken into public care,
pursuant to Sections 25 (a) and 29 of the 1960 Act on Child Welfare
(barnavårdslagen), by a decision of the Social District Council No. 6
(sociala distriktsnämnden 6) of Gothenburg of 16 September 1980. Since
the applicants did not consent to the Council's decision, the matter was
submitted to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County
of Gothenburg and Bohus, which by a judgment of 30 December 1980
confirmed the Council's decision. The basis for the care decision was
that the health and development of the children were jeopardised as a
result of the parents' inability to give them satisfactory care and
education. The Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of
Gothenburg, on 8 July 1981, confirmed the judgment of the County
Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court (regerings-
rätten) refused leave to appeal on 27 August 1981.
After having been taken into care the applicants' children were
placed in a children's home in Gothenburg. From 28 February 1981 Stefan
was placed in a foster home at Tibro, approximately 100 kilometres from
the applicants' home, and from 28 June 1983 in a children's home at
Vänersborg, approximately 80 kilometres north of Gothenburg. Helena
and Thomas were placed in separate foster homes - Helena at Näsåker on
21 October 1980 and Thomas at Maråker on 10 November 1980. The foster
homes are situated about 100 kilometres from each other and the
distances between the foster homes and Gothenburg are about 630 and
590 kilometres, respectively.
The applicants' right of access to their children was
restricted during the periods in which the children were in public
care. Stefan spent three or four weeks with his parents in the summer
of 1982. On 10 August 1982 the Social Council decided, pursuant to
Section 16 (1) of the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of
Young Persons (lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga,
hereinafter referred to as "the 1980 Act"), to limit their access to
him to one visit every six weeks. After 22 April 1984 the applicants
were allowed to see Stefan every week, mostly at their home.
On 21 October 1980 the Social Council decided to prohibit access
to Helena and Thomas at their foster homes, in accordance with Section 41
of the 1960 Act, and to prohibit disclosure of their whereabouts. The
applicants were allowed to meet the children elsewhere every second month.
The restriction was lifted in September 1981, but in February 1983 the
Social Council decided to restrict the applicants' right of access to
Helena and Thomas to one visit every third month in the foster homes. This
restriction continued in force for the remainder of the period during which
Helena and Thomas were in public care.
The applicants made a request for termination of the care of their
children in 1982, which was rejected by the Social Council. The rejection
was confirmed by the County Administrative Court on 17 November 1982
and by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 20 December 1982. The Supreme
Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.
Another request by the applicants to the Social Council for
termination of the care of the children was refused on 6 December 1983.
On 30 October 1984 and 17 September 1985, the Social Council
rejected further requests by the applicants for termination of the care
of Helena and Thomas and of Stefan, respectively. Appeals by the
applicants against these decisions were rejected by the County
Administrative Court on 3 October 1985 and 3 February 1986, respectively.
The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal,
which joined the two cases. After holding a hearing at which the
applicants were present and gave evidence, the Administrative Court of
Appeal, by judgment of 16 February 1987, decided that the public care
of Stefan be terminated. Stefan was subsequently reunited with his
parents. However, the appeal concerning Helena and Thomas was
dismissed. The Administrative Court of Appeal's opinion that the
public care of these two children should continue was based primarily
on the finding that the applicants were unable to understand and
satisfy the special needs arising in connection with the reunification
of parents and children after so long a period of separation.
Following an appeal by the applicants, the Supreme Administrative
Court, by judgment of 18 June 1987, ordered that the public care of
Helena and Thomas should terminate there being no sufficiently serious
circumstances to justify its continuation. The Supreme Administrative
Court pointed out that the question to be determined in deciding
whether care should be discontinued pursuant to Section 5 of the 1980
Act was whether there was still a need for care. The problems
associated with the removal of a child from a foster home and its
possible detrimental effects on him and with his reunification with his
natural parents - on which the Administrative Court of Appeal had
relied - were matters to be considered not under Section 5 but in
separate proceedings, namely an investigation under Section 28 of the
1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen). The latter Section
empowers a Social Council to prohibit, for a certain period of time or
until further notice, the removal from a foster home of a minor who is
not or is no longer in public care, if there is thereby a risk, which
is not of a minor nature, of harming his physical or mental health.
The applicants have previously submitted an application
(No. 10465/83) concerning the public care of their children. The
applicants mainly complained about the taking into care of their
children, about the refusal to terminate the care and about the
implementation of the care decision. The Commission found that the
care decisions concerning the applicants' children in combination with
the placement of the children in separate foster homes far from each
other and far away from the applicants constituted a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention (Olsson v. Sweden, Comm. Report 2.12.86,
para. 179, Eur. Court H.R., Series B No. 130). The Court found that
the implementation of the care decision, but not the decision itself or
its maintenance in force, gave rise to a breach of Article 8 of the
Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988,
Series A No. 130-A).
On 23 June 1987 the Social Council, pursuant to Section 28 of
the Social Services Act, prohibited the applicants until further notice
from removing Helena and Thomas from their respective foster homes.
The Council considered that there was a risk, which was not of a minor
nature, of harming Helena's and Thomas' physical and mental health by
separating them from the foster homes. The reasons given for this were
inter alia that a long time had passed since their parents last took
care of them, that they only had little contact with their parents
during the public care, that they had emotional ties with their foster
homes and that Helena had expressed a wish not to leave the foster home.
On 25 June 1987 the applicants' application for a suspension
(inhibition) of this prohibition was refused by the County Administrative
Court. This decision was confirmed by the Administrative Court of
Appeal on 2 July 1987 and, on 17 August 1987, the Supreme Administrative
Court refused leave to appeal.
On 4 August 1987 the applicants' representative, Mrs. Westerberg,
received some documents in the case, relating to the prohibition on
removal, from the County Administrative Court. Among these was a
decision of 17 July 1987, whereby the District Court (tingsrätten) of
Gothenburg, upon a request made by the Social Council on 1 July 1987,
had appointed CÃ… guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas according to
Chapter 18 Section 2 of the Parental Code (föräldrabalken). The Social
Council had requested that the matter be decided urgently, for which
reason the applicants were not heard. The applicants had not been
informed of the decision by the District Court and the time limit for
an appeal had expired.
On 5 August 1987 the applicants requested that the guardian ad
litem be dismissed. Their request was granted by the District Court on
26 October 1987. In its decision the Court stated that CÅ had been
appointed guardian ad litem for the purpose of applying for legal aid
for Thomas and Helena and for the appointment of an official counsel
for them. CÅ was appointed their official counsel by the County
Administrative Court on 31 July 1987 and on the same day they were
granted legal aid. The Court dismissed CÅ as guardian ad litem as he
had completed his mission.
On 27 October 1987 the Social District Council again requested
that CÅ be appointed guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas. This
time the District Court invited the applicants to state their opinion
before the decision was taken. On 12 February 1988 the Court granted
the request finding that the children's interests might be opposed to
those of their parents in the proceedings concerning the prohibition on
removal and also in proceedings concerning the applicants' request that
the children be returned to them in accordance with the rules laid down
in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code. The Court considered CÅ suitable
as guardian ad litem as he was well acquainted with the matter. It
found that the objections made by the spouses Olsson as regards CÃ…'s
suitability were due to the fact that he had taken a position opposite
to theirs.
The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Western
Sweden (hovrätten för Västra Sverige), which on 23 August 1988 rejected
their appeal. On 8 November 1988 the Supreme Court (högsta domstolen)
refused the applicants leave to appeal.
In the meantime, the applicants appealed to the County
Administrative Court against the decision to prohibit them from moving
Helena and Thomas. They requested that the Court appoint
Dr. Fedor-Freybergh to give an expert opinion. On 3 July 1987 the
Court decided to ask Chief Doctor Per Jonsson and Chief Doctor George
Finney to give an opinion not later than 6 August 1987 as to whether
there would be any risk of harm to Helena and Thomas if they were to
be moved from their foster homes. These doctors had previously given
expert opinions in the proceedings concerning the termination of the
care order.
Chief Doctor Per Jonsson in an opinion of 14 July 1987
concluded that "moving Helena against her will would entail a
considerable risk to her mental well-being and also a great risk to
her physical health if, in desperation, she were to implement her
plans of running away". In an opinion of 3 September 1987 Chief
Doctor George Finney stated inter alia that "moving Thomas now would
be disastrous to his mental development both emotionally and
intellectually". In an opinion of the same date the certified
psychologist Göran Löthman stated that moving Thomas would not be in
his best interests.
The Social Council and CÅ recommended that the appeal be
rejected. The applicants did not request a hearing and no hearing was
held before the County Administrative Court. In its judgment of
3 November 1987 the Court stated the following:
"According to Section 28 of the Social Services Act, the
Social Council may, for a certain period of time or until
further notice, prohibit the guardian of a minor from taking
the minor from a foster home, if there is a risk, which is
not of a minor nature, of harming the child's physical or
mental health by separating it from the foster home.
As a background to how Section 28 of the Social Services
Act should be interpreted the County Administrative Court
quotes the Minister in the Government Bill proposing the
Social Services Act and the Standing Social Committee of
the Parliament (riksdagens socialutskott).
The Minister: 'The aim of the provision is to safeguard the
best interests of the children. Basically it is the
guardian's right to determine the domicile of the child.
This right can in certain circumstances be in conflict with
the child's best interests. The provision provides a
possibility to suspend the guardian's right to decide over
the child.
The condition for this is that there is a risk which is not
of a minor nature that the child's physical or mental health
would be harmed, if it was forced to move from the home where
it is staying. Only a passing disturbance or other occasional
disadvantage is not a sufficient ground for issuing a
prohibition on removal. Among the factors to be considered
are the age of the child, the degree of development, character
and emotional ties. Furthermore, the time the child has been
cared for away from the parents, the living conditions it has
and those it would come to, must be considered. The parents'
contacts with the child during the period they have been
separated must also be taken into account. An important
element in the assessment whether there is a need to issue a
prohibition on removal is the child's own preference. If the
child has reached the age of 15 years, its preference must not
be opposed without good reasons. Even the preferences of
younger children must be considered. The child's preferences
can be of importance in considering the risk of damage to the
child as a result of a removal. In this connection it should
be noted that a prohibition on removal according to the new
provisions can be issued until the child is 18 years old.'
The Standing Social Committee of the Parliament: 'The fact
that the Section follows the pattern of a previous provision
regulating the same matter, does not imply that the intention
is to codify earlier practice characterised by the views of the
past on children's rights and needs. The Committee therefore,
in connection with the statements on the issue in the
Government Bill (Volume A p. 541), stresses that the provision
is aimed at safeguarding the best interests of the child. The
guardian's interest in determining the domicile of the child
must give way when it conflicts with what is in the best
interests of the child. In addition to what has been stated
in the Government Bill the Committee wants to point out that
a separation generally involves a risk of damage to the
child. Repeated transfers and transfers which take place
after a long time when the child has managed to develop strong
links with the home where it lives should thus not be accepted
without good reasons. Children's needs for secure relations
and living conditions must to as large an extent as possible be
decisive in any decision on these questions.'
From the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of
18 June 1987 it appears that Helena and Thomas were taken into
public care in September 1980 by the Social District Council
No. 6 of Gothenburg. The Council's decision was confirmed by
the County Administrative Court. The Administrative Court of
Appeal of Gothenburg confirmed the County Administrative
Court's judgment and the Supreme Administrative Court did not
grant leave to appeal. The children were placed in separate
foster homes, Helena at Näsviken and Thomas at Ljusne, both
homes approximately a thousand kilometres from the home of
their parents. The addresses of the foster homes were not
given to the spouses Olsson during the period October 1980 to
September 1981. From then and during most of the stay in the
foster homes the spouses Olsson's right of access to the
children has been restricted to one visit every three months.
According to the information submitted by the children's
guardian ad litem, Gun Olsson has not met Helena and Thomas
since the summer of 1984. Stig Olsson has, together with
Stefan, visited Helena and Thomas in the spring of 1987
and on a few occasions during the last years he has contacted
the foster homes by telephone.
The contacts between the parental home and the children,
according to the information given, have been very limited.
This might be due both to the Social District Council and the
spouses Olsson and the limited contacts between parents and
children also make a reunification appear complicated. Firstly,
to assess the children's own preferences, it appears natural to
the County Administrative Court that the children are opposed
to moving, be it only for the reason that they, like most human
beings, try to avoid changes and prefer to stay in the
environment they are used to. Whether the children's
preferences shall be considered must be decided on the basis
of the children's capacity to take a stand on that issue.
A comparison must be made in this connection with the provision
in Chapter 21 Section 5 of the Parental Code, which states that
enforcement according to the Parental Code must not take place
contrary to the wishes of the child, if the child is twelve
years old or, if the child is not yet twelve years old but
mature enough to have its preference considered. Helena will
soon be eleven years old and Thomas nine years old. Thomas
is in this respect obviously too young to have his preference
considered. Helena is approaching the age at which there is
a better possibility to consider her preference, but the
County Administrative Court does not find it likely that she,
not yet twelve years old, is mature enough to be compared with
a twelve-year-old child. The County Administrative Court
therefore finds no basis for taking the children's own
preferences into account.
If the children are assessed individually Thomas' mental
health does not seem to be so strong but he seems to have
improved continuously. The County Administrative Court
finds it likely that without preparatory contacts between
Thomas and the natural parents, Thomas' mental health will
be seriously endangered if he, without sufficient preparatory
measures, is moved to his parents' home. A prohibition on
removal is therefore justified for his part.
Helena seems stronger than her brother, but even for her part
the idea must be that the child's interest must be considered
to be more important than the parents' rights. For her part
it also appears, considering the sporadic contacts she has
had with her parental home, that an immediate removal and
separation from the foster home, without preparatory
measures, would bring about a risk, which is not of a minor
nature, of harm to her mental health. Also for Helena
it appears therefore for the time being that a prohibition on
removal is well-founded.
A prohibition on removal should not, according to the opinion
of the County Administrative Court, be valid for too long a
time. A condition for the prohibition on removal to be revoked
is therefore that the spouses Olsson as well as the Social
District Council engage actively in improving the contacts
between parents and children. It is difficult for the County
Administrative Court, which cannot directly participate in the
work and follow the development, to decide on a time limit for
an endeavour of this kind. The prohibition on removal issued
by the Social District Council shall therefore be valid until
further notice."
The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal.
In the first place, they requested that the prohibition on removal be
revoked and, in the second place, that it be limited in time, at the
utmost until 6 January 1988. They requested that Dr. Fedor-Freybergh
be appointed an expert. The Social District Council and the children's
guardian ad litem recommended that the appeal be rejected. The
applicants did not request a hearing and no hearing was held before
the Court. The Court gave judgment on 30 December 1987. It refused
the applicants' request that Dr. Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an expert
and rejected the appeal, giving, inter alia, the following reasons:
"As has been accounted for in detail by the County
Administrative Court in the judgment that has been appealed
against, the contact between the spouses Olsson and their
children Helena and Thomas have for a long time been very
limited. A reunification between them is therefore complicated
and requires relatively extensive preparations. There is
nothing in the investigation to show that there have been any
appropriate preparations for a reunification. The prohibition
on removal should therefore continue and according to the
Administrative Court of Appeal there is not now any basis for
deciding when the removal can be brought about without a risk
of harm to the children's mental health. Against the
background of the conflicts that characterise the contacts
between the children's foster homes and the Social Council, on
the one hand, and the spouses Olsson and their counsel, on the
other hand, there is no reason in this case to set a time limit
for the prohibition on removal. The Administrative Court of
Appeal therefore agrees with the County Administrative Court's
assessment that the prohibition shall be valid until further
notice."
The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Supreme
Administrative Court requesting, firstly, that the prohibition on
removal be revoked, and secondly, that it be limited in time until
15 March 1988. They requested that Dr. Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an
expert by the Court. They alleged inter alia that, as the European
Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 24 March 1988 had found that
Sweden had violated the Convention by keeping Helena and Thomas in
foster homes far from them and from each other and with a very
restricted access to the children for the applicants, a continued
prohibition on removal would mean that Sweden continues to violate
their human rights and that Sweden refuses to abide by the judgment of
the Court. The applicants requested a hearing before the Supreme
Administrative Court.
On 4 February 1988 the Supreme Administrative Court granted the
applicants leave to appeal and decided to hear the National Board of
Health and Welfare (socialstyrelsen) and the Social District Council.
In their opinion of 22 March 1988 the Social District Council
stated inter alia that it appeared from the written evidence of the
case that there was a risk which was not of a minor nature of harming
Helena's and Thomas' physical and mental health if they were to be
separated from their foster homes. This risk could not be eliminated
by a prohibition on removal limited in time. The Council further
stated that it intended to make a request to the District Court that
the custody of the children be transferred to the foster parents if the
Supreme Court rejected the applicants' appeal.
The National Board of Health and Welfare, in their opinion
dated 23 March 1988, stated that the child psychiatric investigation
which had been carried out was sufficient. It stressed that the
decisive factor as regards the transfer of children, having lived in a
foster home as long as in the present case, must be the relationship
between the children and their parents. In order to create good contact,
and eventually a reunification, co-operation between the social welfare
officers and the foster home on the one hand and the parents on the
other hand is necessary. The Board considered that it appeared from
the case-file that the applicants' counsel had not tried to co-operate
and that this had been unfortunate for the children. It had had the
consequence that no such relation had been established between the
children and their parents as would make it possible for the children
to move to their parents without there being a serious risk of harm to
the children. The Board recommended the Social District Council to
examine the possibility of having the custody of the children
transferred to the foster parents and advised against granting the
applicants' appeal.
The Supreme Administrative Court, in its judgment of 30 May 1988,
rejected the appeal, the request to appoint Dr. Fedor-Freybergh as an
expert and the request for a hearing, but amended the judgment of the
Administrative Court of Appeal to the effect that the prohibition on
removal was limited in time until 30 June 1989. However, one of the
four judges gave a dissenting opinion wishing to confirm the judgments
of the lower courts. The Court's reasons read inter alia as follows:
"Section 28 of the Social Services Act provides that the
Social Council, for a certain time or until further notice,
may prohibit the guardian of a minor from taking the minor
from a home of the kind mentioned in Section 25 (i.e. a foster
home), if there is a risk, which is not of a minor nature, of
harming the child's physical or mental health by separating it
from the foster home. The aim of this provision has been
accounted for in the statements made by the responsible Minister
and by the Standing Social Committee of the Parliament, as
quoted by the County Administrative Court of Gothenburg in
its judgment of 3 November 1987.
When Section 28 of the Act is applied in this case a balance
must be struck between, on the one hand, respect for the spouses
Olsson's and their children's private and family life,
including the spouses Olsson's rights as guardians according
to the Parental Code and, on the other hand, the need to
safeguard the children's health (cf. Chapter 1 Section 2
third paragraph of the Instrument of Government [regeringsformen]
and Sections 1 and 12 of the Social Services Act; through these
provisions the protection for private and family life referred
to in Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms can be ensured). In this
assessment it must be considered that Section 28 of the Social
Services Act as well as other provisions specifying the
conditions for coercive measures must be interpreted so that
such measures may be used only when the conditions specified in
the text of the statutes are really satisfied. There are
special reasons to underline this as certain statements of the
Standing Social Committee could be interpreted as if a more
extensive right to take coercive measures exists than is
allowed under the texts of the statutes.
As appears from what has been stated above the children were
placed in the two foster homes because they had been taken
into public care; by virtue of the new Act the care has been
transformed into care according to Section 1 paragraph 2 of
the 1980 Act. The care was caused by the lack of care for
the children or other conditions in the home which entailed a
danger to their health and development. The aim when such a
decision is taken, and when the children subsequently stay in
a foster home, should normally be the reunification of the
children with their parents as soon as circumstances allow.
When the care is terminated according to Section 5 of the 1980
Act the reunification should normally take place as soon as
possible. A reunification needs to be prepared actively and
with understanding. The appropriate preparations should be
made immediately after the care has been terminated. This
should apply even if a prohibition under Section 28 of the
Social Services Act has been issued or is being examined by a
higher instance. The character and the extent of the
preparations, as well as the time required for them, depend on
the circumstances in each case; one or more suitably arranged
and successful visits by the children to their parents' home
must always be required. The need for a more definite
prohibition on removal can normally only be assessed after the
appropriate preparations have been carried out. It is the
Social Council's responsibility to arrange the appropriate
preparations for reuniting parents and children after the care
has been terminated according to Section 5 of the 1980 Act.
The Social Council's responsibility includes an obligation to
be persistent in trying to make the parents and their counsel
actively take part in the preparations in the interests of the
children. The Social Council is not discharged of its
responsibility only because the parents and their counsel, by
appealing against the Council's decisions or in other ways,
show that they dislike the measures taken by the Council or
its personnel. According to Section 68 of the Social Services
Act the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) should
assist the Council with advice and ensure that the Council
performs its duties in an appropriate way.
Pending the beginning and completion of the appropriate
preparations for the reunification of parents and children the
question of a more temporary prohibition on removal under
Section 28 of the Social Services Act can also arise. Such a
prohibition should be seen as a temporary measure awaiting
that the child can be separated from the foster home without
any risk of harm as mentioned in the section.
The elements that should be considered when a decision on
prohibition of removal is taken are - according to the quoted
preparatory works - the age of the child, the degree of
development, character and emotional ties, the time the child
has been cared for away from the parents, the living conditions
it has and those it would come to and the parents' contacts with
the child during the period they have been separated.
From the investigation in the present case it appears that no
appropriate preparations have been made to reunite parents and
children. The time after the Supreme Administrative Court's
decision to terminate the care seems to have been spent
litigating instead.
The issue whether a prohibition on removal under Section 28 of
the Social Services Act is needed in this case, must therefore
be examined without considering the effect of preparations
that have already been carried out. The Supreme Administrative
Court's decision must therefore concern the kind of temporary
prohibition on removal that, according to what has been
stated above, can be issued awaiting that more appropriate
preparations are carried out.
From the investigation - above all the opinion given by the
National Board of Health and Welfare and the medical
certificates quoted in it - it clearly appears that for the
time being, before any preparations have been made, there is a
risk which is not of a minor nature of harming Helena's and
Thomas' physical and mental health by separating them from
their foster homes. Accordingly, there are sufficient reasons
for a prohibition on removal under Section 28 of the Social
Services Act.
As concerns the length of a prohibition on removal the Supreme
Administrative Court, in a previous decision (cf. RÅ 1984
2:78), has stated inter alia the following: If, when the
prohibition is issued, it is already possible to assess with
sufficient certainty that there will be no such risk after a
specific time - at which some measures will have been taken or
the effect of them will have had time to occur - the
prohibition must be valid only until that time. If, on the
other hand, it is uncertain when the child, without a risk
which is not of a minor nature, can be moved to its parents,
the prohibition should be valid until further notice and the
question of a removal be raised again at a later stage, when
it is easier to assess the risk of harming the child's health.
An application of this rule would in the present case lead to
a prohibition on removal valid until further notice. However,
the circumstances of this case are different from those of the
previous case, as no appropriate preparations to reunite
parents and children have been made because of the conflict
between the Social District Council, on the one hand, and the
parents and their counsel, on the other hand. Furthermore, it
must be presumed in this case that only by fixing a time limit
can the parties - without any further litigation - be made to
co-operate in making appropriate preparations in the interest
of the children. If within a certain time limit there are no
such preparations, or if their result is not acceptable, the
Social Council may take up the question of a prolonged
prohibition based on the then existing circumstances.
Against this background the Supreme Administrative Court finds
that the prohibition on removal should be valid until 30 June 1988.
The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment of
24 March 1988, has found that Sweden in one respect has
violated Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This violation
concerned the implementation of the care decision and inter
alia the fact that the children were placed in foster homes so
far from their parents. The issue in this case is another,
namely when and on what conditions the children can be
reunited with their parents in view of the fact that the
Supreme Administrative Court on 18 June 1987 decided that the
care be terminated. A prohibition on removal as mentioned
above is therefore not in conflict with the judgment of
24 March 1988."
In the meantime, on 8 December 1987, the applicants requested
that their children be allowed to visit them without the foster
parents being present. The Chairman of the Social District Council on
18 December 1987 rejected the request. On 21 December 1987 the Social
Council was informed about the decision in respect of which it did not
take any specific measures. The applicants appealed against the
decision to the County Administrative Court. On 8 March 1988 the Court
decided not to examine the appeal. The Court considered that, as
Section 28 of the Social Services Act does not regulate parents' right
to access during the time a prohibition on removal is in force, other
provisions in the Act must be applied. The Court referred to Section 22
third paragraph of the Act which provides that the Social Council shall
encourage an individual's contact with his relatives and home
environment. As decisions taken according to that section are not
among those enumerated in Section 73 of the Act, which can be appealed
against, the Court concluded that no appeal lies against a decision on
access while a prohibition on removal is in force.
The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal
which, by a decision of 29 April 1988, confirmed the decision of the
County Administrative Court. The Court stated that the Chairman's
decision was not a decision under Section 28 of the Social Services
Act and that it did not belong to any of the other categories of
decisions against which an appeal lies and which are enumerated in
Section 73 of the Act.
The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court
alleging inter alia that the Chairman's decision of 18 December 1987
was unlawful and that it was in violation of Article 13 of the
Convention, as they had no right to appeal against it. The Court
granted leave to appeal and on 18 July 1988 rejected the appeal. Like
the lower courts it found that the decision of the Chairman of the
District Council was not a decision under Section 28 of the Social
Services Act and that it could not be appealed against according to
Section 73 of the Act. The Court noted that there are no special
provisions regulating the possibilities to appeal against arrangements
made in a foster home when a prohibition on removal is in force. The
Court recalled that the parents had other remedies than administrative
appeals at their disposal in these situations. They could request
that the children be returned to them in accordance with the rules
laid down in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code and they could also under
certain conditions lodge a municipal appeal. The Court considered
that the decision of the Chairman of the Social Council of 18 December
1987 was null and void, there being no legal provision authorising the
Social Council to restrict access while a prohibition on removal is in
force. The Court furthermore found that no appeal based on general
principles of administrative law lies against the decision and that
the European Convention on Human Rights does not give the applicants a
right to appeal.
On 15 August 1988 the applicants lodged a municipal appeal with
the Administrative Court of Appeal against the Chairman's decision of
18 December 1987. In a decision of 10 October 1988 the Court stated
that such an appeal could not be made against that decision. The
Court found that the appeal must also be considered to be directed
against the fact that the Social Council did not take any specific
measure when informed about the Chairman's decision. In this respect
the appeal was not lodged within the stipulated time limit and was
consequently rejected.
A request made by the applicants on 10 August 1987 that Helena
and Thomas be returned to them in accordance with the rules laid down
in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code was rejected by the County
Administrative Court of the County of Gävleborg, after a hearing on
1 March 1988, by two separate judgments of 15 March 1988. The Court
found that there was a risk, which was not of a minor nature, of
harming the children's mental health by separating them from the
foster homes.
The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal
of Sundsvall which in a judgment of 11 July 1988 rejected the appeal.
The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court which on
23 September 1988 refused leave to appeal.
On 17 March 1988 the applicants requested that Helena and
Thomas be allowed to attend their grandmother's funeral on 25 March 1988.
The Chairman of the Social Council rejected the request on 21 March 1988.
The reason given was that the grandmother had been a rather unknown
person to the children.
On 5 April 1988 the Social District Council decided that the
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 24 March 1988 did
not oblige the Council to amend its previous decisions in the case.
On 7 April 1988 the applicants made a request that the
children be allowed to attend a special ceremony on 12 April 1988 at
which the grandmother was buried. The Head of the social authority in
Gothenburg decided on 11 April 1988 to reject the request as being
incompatible with the children's best interest.
On 2 August 1988 the applicants made a request to the Social
Council that Helena and Thomas be allowed to come to Gothenburg on
5 August 1988, or at the latest on 8 August 1988, to spend the remainder
of the summer holidays with their parents. From the letter to the
Council it appears that the children had already visited their parents
in Gothenburg once during the summer holidays. They were accompanied
by the foster mothers and met their parents for a few hours in a park
on 22 July 1988. The applicants' request was rejected by the Head of
the social authority on 8 August 1988.
On 28 September 1988 the applicants requested the Social
District Council of Gunnared to revoke the prohibition on removal.
They invoked the Commission's Report of 14 July 1988 in the Eriksson
case. The Social Council rejected their request on 18 October 1988.
The applicants appealed to the County Administrative Court, which on
12 December 1988 rejected the appeal. The Court referred to the
Supreme Administrative Court's judgment of 30 May 1988 and stated that
no such appropriate preparations to reunite the applicants with Helena
and Thomas, as mentioned in that judgment, had been made. The Court
found that there was still a risk of harm to the children if the
prohibition on removal was to be revoked.
The applicants made a further appeal to the Administrative Court
of Appeal, which on 22 December 1988 rejected the appeal. The Court
noted that Stig Olsson had met the children on 11 and 12 October 1988
in their foster homes and in their schools and that the children had
visited the applicants' home together with their foster mothers on
16-17 December 1988. The Court nevertheless considered, for the same
reasons as the County Administrative Court, that the prohibition on
removal should not be revoked.
The applicants were refused leave to appeal by the Supreme
Administrative Court on 14 February 1989.
On 28 September 1988 the applicants also requested access to
Helena and Thomas for a medical examination. The purpose of the
examination was to obtain a medical certificate to be used in the
proceedings before the Commission. On 18 October 1988 the Social
District Council decided to ask for an opinion from the National Board
of Health and Welfare as to whether the request should be granted. In
an opinion dated 27 February 1989 the Board advised against granting
the request. The Board considered that a further examination of the
children might be harmful and that it would not be helpful in the
proceedings. The Social District Council decided on 21 March 1989 to
reject the applicants' request.
On 20 December 1988 the Social District Council adopted a plan
for the applicants' meetings with their children in December 1988 and
February, April and June 1989. The applicants were opposed to this
plan.
On 27 June 1989 the Social District Council decided to issue a
new prohibition on removal concerning Helena and Thomas, valid until
further notice. The Council also rejected a request that the children
spend their summer holidays with their parents in Alingsås and that
they visit their parents every weekend unaccompanied by their foster
parents.
The applicants appealed to the County Administrative Court,
which in a judgment of 4 September 1989 confirmed the prohibition on
removal but limited it in time until 31 March 1990. The Court
stressed the responsibility of the Social Council to implement the
courts' judgments but concluded that the investigation showed that
there was still a risk of harm to the children if they were to move
from the foster homes. Referring to the decision of the Supreme
Administrative Court of 18 July 1988 the County Administrative Court
rejected the appeal insofar as it concerned the applicants' access to
their children.
The applicants made a further appeal to the Administrative
Court of Appeal. The Social District Council also appealed requesting
that the prohibition on removal be valid until further notice. By a
judgment of 23 January 1990 the Administrative Court of Appeal confirmed
the judgment by the County Administrative Court but extended the time
limit for the prohibition on removal until 1 August 1990. The
applicants lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court
which refused leave to appeal on 8 March 1990.
On 28 July 1989 the applicants requested the Parliamentary
Ombudsman (justitieombudsmannen) to examine the Social District
Council's handling of their request for access to Helena and Thomas in
their home in Alingsås.
The applicants' counsel, in her capacity as a member of the
Municipality of Gothenburg, filed a municipal appeal against the Social
District Council's decision of 27 June 1989 insofar as it concerned
the applicants' access to Helena and Thomas. The applicants could not
make such an appeal themselves as they are no longer domiciled in the
municipality in which the decision was taken. The applicants' counsel
also filed a municipal appeal against the Social District Council's
decision of 20 December 1988 to adopt a plan for the applicants'
meetings with their children.
In a judgment of 8 January 1990 the Administrative Court of
Appeal found that the Social District Council's decision to restrict
the applicants' access to their children was unlawful. The Court
revoked the decision in that part. In a separate judgment of the same
date the Court found that the adoption of a plan for the applicants'
access to their children formed part of the measures the Social
Council considered to be necessary in order to arrange a removal of
the children from their foster homes to the applicants without any
risk of harm to them. The plan was not a formal decision as regards
the applicants' right of access, especially since it stated that the
applicants could visit their children according to their own wishes. On
8 March 1990 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicants'
counsel leave to appeal against the latter judgment. The Social Council
appealed against this first judgment to the Supreme Administrative
Court (proceedings still pending).
The Social District Council decided on 31 October 1989 to
institute proceedings before the District Court of Alingsås for a
transfer of the custody of Helena and Thomas to their respective foster
parents. The reason for the decision was the considerable time the
children had spent in their foster homes, their strong relations with
their foster parents, Helena's unwillingness to move to her parents,
Thomas' special need of stability and the fact that a reunification of
the applicants and their children had not been possible in spite of the
considerable efforts made by the social authority. A preliminary
hearing before the District Court was held on 27 February 1990.
The following appears from the case file as concerns the
applicants' access to their children in 1989:
- a request of 23 March 1989 that the applicants visit their
children on 1-2 April 1989 was rejected by the social authority for
lack of time to organise the visit;
- a request was made that a visit by the parents be organised on
8-9 April 1989 or 15-16 April 1989;
- a request of 16 April 1989 that the children be allowed to
participate in the celebration of their grandfather's birthday on
22 April 1989 was rejected on 21 April 1989;
- a request of 10 May 1989 that the children be allowed to
participate in the celebration of their brother Stefan's eighteenth
birthday on 10 June 1989 was rejected on 31 May 1989;
- a request of 19 July 1989 that the children visit their
parents on 28 July-1 August 1989 was rejected on 21 July 1989;
- a request of 8 September 1989 that the children visit their
parents on 15-17 Septpember and 29 September-1 October 1989 was
rejected, as regards the first visit, because of lack of time to
organise it, and as regards the second visit, on the ground that the
children did not wish to visit their parents;
- a request of 6 October 1989 that the children visit their
parents during the weekend of 13-15 October 1989 and every following
weekend was rejected on 11 October 1989.
On 16 November 1989 the applicants requested, firstly, that
the children visit them every weekend, starting with the weekend of 24-
26 November 1989. Secondly, they requested that the applicants and
their son Stefan visit the children on 25-26 November 1989 in one of
the foster homes without the foster parents being present. Thirdly,
the applicants requested that their counsel be allowed to meet the
children for a day or a half-day to give them information about their
parents and their brother and to explain to them why they were taken
into care and why their parents do not wish to visit them in their
foster homes in the presence of the foster parents. The Head of the
social authority acknowledged receipt of the applicants' letter on
20 November 1989 and informed them that the social welfare officer in
charge of their case would contact them as soon as possible with a view
to planning a suitable arrangement for their next meeting with their
children.
On 21 December 1989 the applicants reported the officer in
charge of their case to the Public Prosecution Authority (Ã¥klagarmyn-
digheten) of Gothenburg for misuse of power and asked for her
immediate arrest. The reason for this action was her failure to
comply with their request of 16 November 1989. The applicants made a
similar request on 21 December 1989. On 30 January 1990, the
Prosecution Authority discontinued the criminal investigation finding
no indication that any criminal offences had been committed.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain that they have been the victims of a
breach of Article 8 of the Convention as a result of the prohibition
on removal that was issued by the Social Council, despite the fact
that the public care of their children had terminated. They allege
that, instead of preparing Helena and Thomas for their return to the
applicants, the social authorities use the prohibition on removal to
tie the children closer to the foster homes and to obstruct their
return to the applicants.
The applicants also maintain that the judgment of the Supreme
Administrative Court of 30 May 1988 violated their rights under
Article 8 of the Convention, as the time limit for the prohibition on
removal was 30 June 1989, at which time Helena would be twelve years
old and could no longer be moved from her foster home against her own
will.
2. The applicants also complain about the decisions of the
Chairman of the Social Council not to let their children visit them in
their home in private and not to let their children attend their
grandmother's funeral. They allege that the decisions are unlawful
and they do not have any effective remedy against them. They invoke
Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention.
The applicants also complain that the refusal of their
request that the children be returned to them according to Chapter 21
Section 7 of the Parental Code amounts to a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention.
3. The applicants further complain about the decision of the
District Court to appoint a guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas
without hearing the applicants and without informing them of the
decision so that they could appeal against it. They maintain that when
the guardian ad litem was dismissed he had already acted to the
applicants' detriment by applying for legal aid for the children and
for an official counsel to be appointed for them.
The applicants allege that this constitutes a violation of
Article 6 of the Convention as they had no possibility to have the
original appointment of CÃ… as guardian ad litem examined by an
impartial tribunal and as the request to have CÃ… dismissed was not
examined by the Court of Appeal within a reasonable time. The
applicants further allege that Swedish law, which does not require the
Court to inform the parents of proceedings to appoint a guardian ad
litem, as well as its application in the present case, violates
Article 8 of the Convention. The applicants also allege a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention.
4. The applicants also complain that the length of the proceedings
concerning the termination of the public care and the proceedings
concerning their request that the children be returned to them
according to Chapter 21 Section 7 of the Parental Code exceeded a
reasonable time. The first-mentioned proceedings commenced in 1983,
when the applicants made a request that the care be terminated, and
were closed on 18 June 1987, when the judgment of the Supreme
Administrative Court was given. The last-mentioned proceedings
commenced in 1987, when the applicants requested that the children be
returned, and on 23 September 1988 the applicants' request for leave to
appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court. The applicants
invoke Article 6 of the Convention.
5. The applicants allege that the refusal of the Supreme
Administrative Court to grant their request for a hearing in the
proceedings concerning the prohibition on removal constitutes a
violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
6. The applicants finally allege that Sweden violates Article 53
of the Convention by not abiding by the judgment of 24 March 1988 of
the European Court of Human Rights. Helena and Thomas are still in the
foster homes. The applicants maintain that the Swedish authorities
obstruct the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in every
possible way and that they never intended to let Helena and Thomas
return to the applicants.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 23 October 1987 and
registered on 3 December 1987.
On 14 December 1988 the Commission decided to invite the
Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and
merits of the application.
The Government's observations, after an extension of the time
limit to 28 April 1989, were received by letter dated 27 April 1989
and the applicants' observations in reply were dated 13 June 1989.
The Government submitted further observations on 14 September 1989
and the applicants on 27 September 1989.
The applicants submitted further observations by letters dated
6 and 13 October 1989, 6, 16, 17 and 22 November 1989, 6, 20 and
21 December 1989, 25 and 31 January 1990 and 13, 21, 23, 28 February 1990,
29 March 1990 and 9 April 1990.
On 16 February 1990 the Commission granted legal aid to the
applicants.
THE LAW
The applicants allege that the authorities, through various
actions and proceedings, obstruct the return of their children from the
foster homes and prevent the applicants' access to their children. The
applicants allege violations of a number of rights guaranteed to them by
Articles 8 (Art. 8) and 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. They also allege
violations of Articles 13 (Art. 13) and 53 (Art. 53) of the Convention.
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) first sentence of the Convention reads:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time before an independent and impartial tribunal ..."
The Government admit a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in that the restrictions of the applicants' access to their
children after the care order was lifted were not "in accordance with
the law" as required by Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the
Convention. The Government further admit a violation of Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention on the ground that the applicants
had no access to court for determining the question of access to their
children. In all other respects, the Government submit that the
application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
The Commission considers that the facts of the case raise a
number of issues in particular under Articles 8 (Art. 8) and 6 (Art. 6) of
the Convention. After an examination of the application in the light
of the parties' submissions, the Commission considers that the
application raises questions of fact and law which are of such a
complex nature that their determination requires an examination on the
merits.
The application cannot therefore be considered manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of
the Convention. As no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has
been established, the application must be declared admissible.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE
without prejudging the merits of the case.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
