Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 14234/88 Application No. 14235/88

by OPEN DOOR COUNSELLING LTD. by DUBLIN WELL WOMAN CENTRE & Others

against Ireland against Ireland

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 15 May 1990, the following members being present:

MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

J. A. FROWEIN

S. TRECHSEL

F. ERMACORA

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. WEITZEL

H. G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

G. BATLINER

Mrs. G. H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ

Mrs. J. LIDDY

Mr. L. LOUCAIDES

Mr. H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission,

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 19 August 1988

by OPEN DOOR COUNSELLING LTD. against Ireland and registered on

23 September 1988 under file No. 14234/88;

Having regard to the application introduced on

15 September 1988 by DUBLIN WELL WOMAN CENTRE AND OTHERS against

Ireland and registered on 22 September 1988 under file No. 14235/88;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The first application (No. 14234/88) is brought by Open Door

Counselling Ltd., which is represented by Mr. James Hickey,

solicitor, of the firm of Amorys, Solicitors, Dublin.

The second application (No. 14235/88) is brought by the

following applicants:

- Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.;

- Ms. Bonnie Maher, born in 1945, a citizen of the United States

of America, who works as a trained counsellor for the Dublin Well

Woman Centre Ltd.;

- Ms. Ann Downes, born in 1960, a citizen of Ireland, who also

works as a counsellor for the Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.;

- Mrs. X, born in 1950, a citizen of Ireland, who is a

television producer and is married with three children.

- Miss Y, born in 1970, a citizen of Ireland, who is, at present,

unemployed.

The applicants in the second application are represented by

Mrs. Mary Robinson, S.C., of counsel and Barbara Hussey and Co.,

solicitors, Dublin.

The first applicant company was engaged inter alia in

non-directive counselling of pregnant women in Dublin and other parts

of Ireland. The second applicant company was established in 1977 to

provide a broad range of services relating to counselling and

marriage, family planning, procreation and health matters. The

services offered by the Centre relate to every aspect of women's

health, ranging from smear tests to breast examinations, infection

testing, screening, gynaecological problems, contraception,

infertility, artificial insemination and non-directive counselling of

pregnant women. The Centre employs doctors, nurses and counsellors

and operates two clinics in Dublin.

The facts which are not in dispute between the parties are as

follows:

The applicant companies were defendants in proceedings in the High

Court which were commenced on 28 June 1985 as a private action brought

by the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd.

(SPUC) which was converted into a relator action brought at the suit

of the Attorney General by order of the High Court of 24 September

1986 (the Attorney General at the relation of the Society for the

Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling

Ltd. and the Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.).

The plaintiff sought a declaration that the activities of the

applicant companies in counselling pregnant women within the

jurisdiction of the court to travel abroad to obtain an abortion were

unlawful having regard to Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution. The

plaintiff further sought an order restraining the defendants from such

counselling or assistance.

No evidence was adduced at the hearing of the action which

proceeded on the basis of certain agreed facts which were admitted by

each of the two defendants. The relevant agreed facts concerning the

second applicant company may be summarised as follows:

a. it counsels in a non-directive manner pregnant

women resident in Ireland;

b. abortion or termination of pregnancy may be one of

the options discussed within the said counselling;

c. if a pregnant woman wants to consider the abortion

option further, arrangements will be made by the

applicant to refer her to a medical clinic in

Great Britain;

d. in certain circumstances, the applicant may arrange

the travel requirements of such pregnant woman;

e. the applicant will inspect the medical clinic in

Great Britain to ensure that it operates at the

highest standards;

f. at those medical clinics abortions have been performed

on pregnant women who have been previously counselled

by the applicant;

g. pregnant women resident in Ireland have been referred to

medical clinics in Great Britain where abortions are

performed for many years including the months of November

and December 1984.

The first applicant company agreed in substance to all of

the above facts with the exception of point (d).

The parties also agreed on the meaning of the concept of

non-directive counselling which was subsequently described by the

Supreme Court as follows (judgment of 16 March 1988, Mr. Justice

Finlay C.J., p. 6):

"It was submitted on behalf of each of the Defendants that

the meaning of non-directive counselling in these agreed

sets of facts was that it was counselling which neither

included advice nor was judgemental but that it was a

service essentially directed to eliciting from the client

her own appreciation of her problem and her own considered

choice for its solution. This interpretation of the phrase

'non-directive counselling' in the context of the activities

of the Defendants was not disputed on behalf of the

Respondent. It follows from this, of course, that

non-directive counselling to pregnant women would never

involve the actual advising of an abortion as the preferred

option but neither, of course, could it permit the giving of

advice for any reason to the pregnant women receiving such

counselling against choosing to have an abortion."

On 19 December 1986 Mr. Justice Hamilton found that the

activities of the defendants in counselling pregnant women within the

jurisdiction of the Court to travel abroad to obtain an abortion or to

obtain further advice on abortion within a foreign jurisdiction were

unlawful having regard to the provisions of Article 40.3.3° of the

Constitution of Ireland. This provision provides as follows:

"The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and,

with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,

guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as

practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."

An injunction was therefore granted "... that the Defendants and each

of them, their servants or agents, be perpetually restrained from

counselling or assisting pregnant women within the jurisdiction of

this Court to obtain further advice on abortion or to obtain an

abortion."

The High Court made no order relating to the costs of the

proceedings, leaving each side to bear its own legal costs.

The defendants appealed against the decision of the High Court

to the Supreme Court which delivered judgment on 16 March 1988

rejecting the appeal.

The Supreme Court noted that the appellants did not consider

it essential to the service which they provided for pregnant women in

Ireland that they should take any part in arranging the travel of such

women who wished to go abroad for the purpose of having an abortion or

that they arranged bookings in clinics for such women. However, it was

considered essential to the service they sought to provide that they

should be at liberty to inform such women who wished to have an

abortion outside the jurisdiction of the court of the name, address,

telephone number and method of communication with a specified clinic

which they had examined and were satisfied that it was one which

maintained a high standard.

As regards the central issue in the case, the Supreme Court

found as follows:

"... the essential issues in this case do not in any way

depend upon the Plaintiff establishing that the Defendants

were advising or encouraging the procuring of abortions.

The essential issue in this case, having regard to the

nature of the guarantees contained in Article 40.3.3° of the

Constitution is the issue as to whether the Defendants'

admitted activities were assisting pregnant women within the

jurisdiction to travel outside that jurisdiction in order to

have an abortion. To put the matter in another way, the

issue and the question of fact to be determined is: were

they thus assisting in the destruction of the life of the

unborn?

I am satisfied beyond doubt that having regard to

the admitted facts the Defendants were assisting in the

ultimate destruction of the life of the unborn by abortion

in that they were helping the pregnant woman who had

decided upon that option to get in touch with a clinic in

Great Britain which would provide the service of abortion.

It seems to me an inescapable conclusion that if a woman was

anxious to obtain an abortion and if she was able by

availing of the counselling services of one or other of the

Defendants to obtain the precise location, address and

telephone number of and method of communication with, a

clinic in Great Britain which provided that service, put in

plain language, that was knowingly helping her to attain her

objective. I am, therefore, satisfied that the finding

made by the learned trial Judge that the Defendants were

assisting pregnant women to travel abroad to obtain further

advice on abortion and to secure an abortion is well

supported on the evidence ...".

Mr. Justice Finlay C.J. indicated in the judgment of the Court

that the phrase in Article 40.3.3° "with due regard to the equal right

to life of the mother" did not arise for interpretation in the case

since the applicants were not claiming that the service they were

providing for pregnant women was "in any way confined to or especially

directed towards the due regard to the equal right to life of the

mother ...".

The Supreme Court also found that there was no constitutional

right to information about the availability of abortion outside the

State. The Court stated as follows:

"The performing of an abortion on a pregnant woman

terminates the unborn life which she is carrying. Within

the terms of Article 40.3.3° it is a direct destruction of

the constitutionally guaranteed right to life of that

unborn child.

It must follow from this that there could not be an

implied and unenumerated constitutional right to information

about the availability of a service of abortion outside the

State which, if availed of, would have the direct consequence

of destroying the expressly guaranteed constitutional right

to life of the unborn. As part of the submission on this

issue it was further suggested that the right to receive and

give information which, it was alleged, existed and was

material to this case was, though not expressly granted,

impliedly referred to or involved in the right of citizens

to express freely their convictions and opinions provided by

Article 40.6.1° (i) of the Constitution, since, it was

claimed, the right to express freely convictions and opinions

may, under some circumstances, involve as an ancillary right

the right to obtain information. I am satisfied that no right

could constitutionally arise to obtain information the purpose

of the obtaining of which was to defeat the constitutional

right to life of the unborn child."

The Court upheld the decision of the High Court to grant an injunction

but varied the form of the order as follows:

"And it is ordered that the Defendants and each of them,

their and each of their servants or agents be perpetually

restrained from assisting pregnant women within the

jurisdiction to travel abroad to obtain abortions by

referral to a clinic, by the making for them of travel

arrangements, or by informing them of the identity and

location of and the method of communication with a specified

clinic or clinics or otherwise."

In a further hearing before the Supreme Court on

3 May 1988 the costs of the Supreme Court appeal were awarded against

the defendants, making them liable for costs amounting to £42,166.71.

Following the judgment of the Supreme Court the first

applicant company ceased to operate.

In a subsequent case concerning abortion information contained

in a students' publication the Supreme Court issued an interlocutory

injunction restraining students from "publishing or distributing or

assisting in the printing, publishing or distribution of any

publication produced under their aegis providing information to

persons (including pregnant women) of the identity and location of and

the method of communication with a specified clinic or clinics where

abortions are performed" (Society for the Protection of Unborn

Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Stephen Grogan and Others, judgment of

19 December 1989).

Mr. Justice Finlay C.J. (Griffin J and Hederman J concurring)

considered that the reasoning of the Court in the case brought against

the applicant companies applied to the activities of the students

(loc. cit., p. 11):

"I reject as unsound the contention that the activity

involved in this case of publishing in the students' manuals

the name, address and telephone number, when telephoned from

this State, of abortion clinics in the United Kingdom, and

distributing such manuals in Ireland, can be distinguished

from the activity condemned by this Court in the Open Door

Counselling case on the grounds that the facts of that case

were that the information was conveyed during periods of

one-to-one non-directive counselling.

It is clearly the fact that such information is conveyed to

pregnant women, and not the method of communication which

creates the unconstitutional illegality, and the judgment of

this Court in the Open Door Counselling case is not open to

any other interpretation."

COMPLAINTS

Article 10 of the Convention

The applicant companies and the two applicant counsellors

complain under Article 10 of the Convention that there is an

unjustifiable interference with their right to impart specific

information about abortion clinics in Britain to pregnant women who

seek this information in the context of non-directive pregnancy

counselling. They contend that this interference is not prescribed by

law and is disproportionate to the aims pursued since there are no

restrictions on pregnant women travelling to Great Britain in order to

obtain an abortion and there has been no reduction in the number of

Irish women having abortions in Great Britain.

The applicants X and Y complain that, as women of

child-bearing age, they have a right to receive information relating

to abortion clinics operating lawfully in Britain whether this

information is imparted in the context of a counselling service in the

event of pregnancy or of a broader information service on issues

relevant to women.

Article 8 of the Convention

The first applicant company complains that the judgment of

the Supreme Court constitutes a violation of the right to privacy

guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.

The applicants X and Y maintain that the denial to them of

access to information concerning abortion in Great Britain also

constitutes an unjustifiable interference with their right to respect

for private life. They submit that they have a right to such

information either as part of a general information service on women's

health questions or in the context of non-directive pregnancy

counselling in the event of either applicant being pregnant.

Article 14 of the Convention

The first applicant company complains that the decision of the

Supreme Court discriminates against women contrary to Article 14 of

the Convention since it is only women who are directly affected by the

denial of assistance and information. It is contended that there is no

legitimate justification for this difference in treatment or,

alternatively, that there is no reasonable relationship of

proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be

realised.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

Application No. 14234/88 (Open Door Counselling Ltd.)

was introduced on 19 August 1988 and registered on 22 September 1988.

Application No. 14235/88 (Dublin Well Woman Centre and

Others) was introduced on 15 September 1988 and registered on 22

September 1988.

The applications were first considered by the Commission on 14

March 1989 when it was decided to join them pursuant to Rule 29 of the

Commission's Rules of Procedure. It was further decided, pursuant to

Rule 42 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, to bring the applications to the

notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit

before 2 June 1989 joint observations on the admissibility and merits

of the applications insofar as they raised issues under Article 10 and

(as regards Application No. 14235/88) Article 8 of the Convention.

The Government's observations were subsequently submitted on

15 September 1989 following extensions of the time limit until

1 September 1989. The applicants' observations in reply were

submitted on 9 November 1989.

The Commission next considered the applications on

5 February 1990 and decided, in accordance with Rule 42, para. 3 of

its Rules of Procedure, to invite the parties to appear before it at a

joint hearing on the admissibility and merits of the applications

insofar as they raised issues under Articles 8 and 10 of the

Convention.

The hearing took place in Strasbourg on 15 May 1990 and the

parties were represented as follows:

Respondent Government

Mr. Peter E. Smyth Agent

Mr. Dermot Gleeson SC Counsel

Mr. James O'Reilly SC Counsel

Mr. John F. Gormley Adviser,

Office of the Attorney General

Ms. Emer Kilcullen Adviser,

Department of Foreign Affairs

The applicants

Mrs. Mary Robinson SC Counsel

Mr. Frank Clarke SC Counsel

Ms. Barbara Hussey Solicitor (Hussey & Bates)

Ms. Rita Burtonshaw Adviser ) Dublin Well Woman

) Centre Limited

Ms. Mary McNeaney Adviser )

THE LAW

The applicant companies and the two applicant counsellors

complain that they are unable to impart specific information about

abortion clinics in Great Britain to pregnant women who seek this

information. In addition, two women of child-bearing age, X and Y,

complain that in the event of becoming pregnant they will be denied

access to accurate advice and information concerning abortion

facilities in Great Britain.

All of the applicants invoke Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention. The first applicant company also invokes Articles 8

(Art. 8) and 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention. Finally, the two women of

child-bearing age also complain of an interference with their right

to respect for private life contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention.

Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention

The Government submit that the applications should be rejected

on the grounds that none of the applicants is a "victim" within the

meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention. They contend:

(1) that the applicant companies as legal persons have no capacity to

enjoy human rights such as the right to impart information or the

right to privacy;

(2) that the applications are an attempt to test Irish law in

abstracto against the provisions of the Convention since none of the

applicants are pregnant women who can claim to have been directly

affected by the Supreme Court injunction and the applicants have not

been able to identify such a pregnant woman.

Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1), first sentence, states as follows:

"The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-

General of the Council of Europe from any person,

non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming

to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting

Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that

the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been

lodged has declared that it recognises the competence of the

Commission to receive such petitions. ..."

As regards the Government's first plea, the Commission notes

that the applicant companies fall clearly within the category of

"non-governmental organisation" within the meaning of Article 25

para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention. Moreover, they were parties to the

proceedings before the Irish courts and were and continue to be

directly affected by the Supreme Court's injunction. The Commission

further recalls that Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention applies to

"everyone" whether natural or legal persons (see, as the most recent

authority, Eur. Court H.R., Autronic AG judgment of 22 May 1990,

Series A, no. 178, para. 47). Accordingly, it is open to these

applicants as corporate bodies to complain that they are "victims" of

interferences with Convention rights arising out of the facts

underlying the applications (see No. 6538/74, Dec. 21.3.75, D.R. 27, at

p. 95).

As regards the Government's second plea under Article 25 (Art. 25),

the Commission observes that the applicant companies and the two

applicant counsellors are prevented by the Supreme Court injunction

from imparting specific information about abortion clinics in Great

Britain. They can thus claim to be "victims" of a violation of their

rights under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.

It is true that neither of the women of child-bearing age is

pregnant. However, the Government have not shown that they would be

entitled, under the legal situation prevailing in Ireland, to receive

such information in advance of any pregnancy. Moreover, information

concerning abortion is a matter which may fall within the field of

both Articles 8 (Art. 8) and 10 (Art. 10) respectively. The

Commission does not consider that applicants must be pregnant before

they can complain of the legal regulation in this area (see

No. 6959/75, Dec. 19.5.76, Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic

of Germany, D.R. 5, at p. 115).

The Commission therefore finds that the applicants are not

seeking to challenge in abstracto the compatibility of Irish law with

the provisions of the Convention and can, for the above reasons, claim

to be "victims" within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1),

first sentence, of the Convention.

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention

Six months rule

The Government further submit that the applications should be

rejected on the basis of the six months rule contained in Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention. They maintain that the applicants in the

course of their pleadings have presented a much wider and factually

different complaint to the Commission than that which was the subject

of litigation before the courts.

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention states as follows:

"The Commission may only deal with the matter after all

domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally

recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six

months from the date on which the final decision was taken."

The Commission notes that all of the applicants' complaints

under the Convention were raised in the petitions filed with the

Commission on 19 August 1988 (Open Door Counselling Ltd.) and on

15 September 1988 (Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd. and Others). The six

months rule in Article 26 (Art. 26) does not prevent the applicants from

developing their legal submissions in respect of these complaints in

the course of their written and oral submissions to the Commission. In

particular, they have not sought to make new complaints in the guise

of legal submissions.

The final decision being that of the judgment of the Supreme

Court dated 16 March 1988 the applications comply with the six months

rule.

Exhaustion of domestic remedies

The Government further contend that the applicants have not

exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention. They submit (1) that the applicants did not seek to raise

before the courts any issue relating to the "equal right to life of

the mother" contained in Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution. In this

regard they note that the applicants make numerous submissions

concerning the impact of the Supreme Court ruling on the health of

women in Ireland; (2) that the applicant counsellors present to the

Commission a complaint which is factually different from that decided

on agreed facts by the courts; (3) that the applicants seek to rely

on United States constitutional case-law which was not pleaded before

the Irish courts; (4) that the applicant women of child-bearing age have

not pursued any domestic remedies relating to their personal rights to

marital and individual privacy which have been recognised by the

courts in Ireland.

The Commission recalls that the only remedies which Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention requires to be exhausted are those that

relate to the breaches alleged and that the existence of such remedies

must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice,

failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and

effectiveness. Moreover, it falls to the Government to establish that

remedies satisfy these conditions (see, inter alia, Eur. Court H.R.,

Johnston judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, p. 22,

para. 45).

In addition the Commission observes that a distinction must be

drawn between an applicant's complaints and the legal submissions made

in support of his complaints. An applicant is not required to show

that he has formulated the same legal submissions or arguments before

national courts as those presented to the Commission. It is

sufficient that he raises before the national courts the substance of

any complaint made before the Commission (see, inter alia, Eur. Court

H.R., Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 20,

para. 41; Campbell and Cosans judgment of 25 February 1982, Series A

no. 48, p. 18, para. 40).

As regards the Government's first plea under Article 26 (Art. 26),

the Commission notes that the complaint concerns restrictions on the

imparting of information and that the applicant companies have clearly

raised the substance of this complaint before the Irish courts. They

have therefore exhausted their domestic remedies in this regard.

As regards the Government's second and third plea, the

Commission considers that it is open to the applicants to develop

their arguments in respect of Convention complaints which have been

raised in substance before the national courts and that these

submissions do not amount to fresh complaints in respect of which they

had not exhausted domestic remedies.

Finally, as regards the Government's fourth plea, the

Commission notes that the complaint concerns access to information and

does not consider that the Government have shown that these applicants

would have any prospects of success in asserting privacy rights,

having regard to the high level of protection afforded in Ireland to

the constitutional right to life of the unborn child (see p. 5 above).

Accordingly the Commission does not consider that the

applicants' complaints fall to be rejected for failure to exhaust

domestic remedies.

Articles 8 (Art. 8), 10 (Art. 10) and 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention

The applicant companies and the two applicant counsellors

contend that the Supreme Court injunction against them constitues an

unjustified interference with their right to impart specific

information about abortion clinics to pregnant women who seek this

information, contrary to Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention. They

maintain that such an interference is not prescribed by law since

the restriction could not have been foreseeably derived from Article

40.3.3° of the Constitution. They submit that the interference is

disproportionate to the aims pursued since there are no restrictions

on pregnant women travelling to Great Britain in order to obtain an

abortion and there has been no reduction in the number of Irish women

having abortions in Great Britain. They also contend that the effect

of the injunction has been to significantly increase the risk to life

and health of such pregnant women. In addition, two Irish women of

child-bearing age who seek to have access to accurate advice and

information in the event of becoming pregnant complain of an

interference with their right to receive information protected by

Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention. They further complain that

the denial to them of access to information constitutes an

unjustifiable interference with their private life, contrary to

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

The first applicant company also complains that the decision

of the Supreme Court constitutes a violation of the right to privacy

guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. The applicant company

contends that the Supreme Court's decision effectively finds that the

right to life of the foetus is absolute and superior to all rights of

the mother. In addition, the first applicant company complains under

Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention that the decision of the

Supreme Court discriminates against women since it is only women who

are directly affected by the denial of assistance and information.

The Government submit, with respect to the applicants'

complaints under Article 10 (Art. 10) that the restriction in the present cases

was foreseeable and thus prescribed by law since the right to life of

the unborn is part of the common law of Ireland, is embodied in

statute law and is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of

Ireland. They further submit that, having regard to the wide margin

of appreciation to which the State is entitled in the area of

abortion, the interference is necessary in a democratic society for

the protection of the rights of others (i.e., the unborn) as well as

the prevention of crime and the protection of morals. They stress in

this context, with particular reference to Articles 2 (Art. 2) and

17 (Art. 17) of the Convention, the finding by the Supreme Court that

the activities of the applicants, especially the provision of

information concerning the location, address and telephone numbers of

clinics, amounted to assisting in the destruction of the life of the

unborn. They maintain, with reference to Article 60 (Art. 60) of

the Convention, that it is not open to the Convention organs to

question the higher protection of the rights of the unborn under

Irish law, which have been fully endorsed by a recent constitutional

referendum.

In addition, the Government submit that the interference with

the private rights of the two applicant women of child-bearing age is

justified as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of

the rights of the unborn, as well as for the prevention of crime and

the protection of morals.

Finally, the Government contend that it is not open to the

first applicant company to complain of an interference with a right to

privacy under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention or of

discrimination under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

The Commission considers, in the light of the parties'

submissions, that the applications as a whole raise complex issues of

law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which depends

on an examination of the merits of the applications.

It concludes, therefore, that the applications cannot be

regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention and no other ground for declaring

them inadmissible has been established.

For these reasons, the Commission

DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS ADMISSIBLE

without prejudging the merits of the case.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H. C. KRÜGER) (C. A. NØRGAARD)

Menu

OPEN DOOR COUNSELLING LTD ; DUBLIN WELL WOMAN CENTRE and OTHERS v. IRELAND

OPEN DOOR COUNSELLING LTD ; DUBLIN WELL WOMAN CENTRE and OTHERS v. IRELAND

LEXI