Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 16832/90

by Oleg KOZLOV

against Finland

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 28 May 1991, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

J.A. FROWEIN

S. TRECHSEL

E. BUSUTTIL

A. WEITZEL

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G. H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 9 July 1990

by Oleg KOZLOV against Finland and registered on the same day under

file No. 16832/90;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having regard to the written observations submitted by the

Government on 9 January and 2 April 1991 and by the applicant on

27 February, 20 March and 20 May 1991;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

The applicant is a citizen of the Soviet Union, born in 1970.

Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Markku Fredman, a lawyer

practising in Helsinki.

Particular circumstances of the case

In 1987 the applicant began his studies at the university of

Saratov in the Soviet Union. In 1988 he was called up for military

service. In the Soviet Union there is no right to exemption from

military service on the ground of conscientious objections. Having

served for two weeks, the applicant notified the authorities that he

could not continue his military service because it caused him moral

and ethical problems. The applicant was then detained in two

different military hospitals for three and a half months, during which

he was subjected to ill-treatment such as injections of inter alia

sulphuric substances. The medical treatment caused him pain and side

effects such as problems with his eyesight, hearing and faculty of

speech. As a protest the applicant went on hunger strike.

When the applicant was released from the hospital the

authorities put a stamp in his military passport stating that he was

mentally ill. As a result of this he was not allowed to continue his

studies, to work, to choose his domicile, to obtain a passport or a

driving licence, to marry and to found a family or to participate in

public elections, either as a voter or as a candidate.

On 19 June 1990 the applicant hijacked a Soviet aircraft on

its way to Murmansk. The plane landed in Helsinki, where the

applicant gave himself up and was arrested. During the hijacking

nobody was killed or hurt.

Having been arrested, the applicant, on the same day, lodged a

request for political asylum in the United States of America.

On 20 June 1990 he requested political asylum also in Finland. He

asked for leave to submit supplementary documents from the Soviet

Union before the decision regarding asylum was made, in particular so

as to enable his mother in the Soviet Union to send him his military

passport.

On 21 June 1990 the applicant was remanded for trial by the

City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätten) of Helsinki suspected of

having hijacked a civil aircraft. The City Court decided that the

trial would take place before the District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus,

häradsrätten) of Vantaa on 17 July 1990.

On 28 June 1990 the Soviet Government requested the

applicant's extradition to the Soviet Union, referring to the 1974

Bilateral Agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union on the

Prevention of Hijacking of Civil Aircraft (hereinafter "the 1974

Agreement") and a warrant of arrest issued by the K.G.B. The

applicant, however, submits that no such warrant was presented to the

Finnish Government, but only a document according to which the

applicant should be "kept in custody" (according to the translation by

the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland) or "kept under

supervision" (according to the translation by the Central Criminal

Police (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen) of Finland). The

document was issued by the K.G.B. in Latvia and confirmed by the local

"prokurator".

On 29 June 1990 the Ministry of Justice asked the Supreme

Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) to give its opinion

regarding the extradition matter.

On 2 July 1990 the Finnish Ministry of the Interior rejected the

applicant's request for asylum, stating that according to the United

Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees he had no right

to asylum, since this Convention was not to be applied to a person

suspected of having committed a serious non-political crime outside

the country he has fled from. Furthermore, the applicant had not

presented any plausible reasons supporting his request. The decision

was not subject to appeal.

Subsequently the applicant shut himself up in his cell for a

week, until the police entered into the cell by breaking the door by

force.

On 3 July 1990, the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees submitted an opinion to the Ministry of the Interior which,

however, was of a general character and did not deal specifically with

the applicant's case.

On 6 July 1990 the applicant's lawyer lodged a new request for

political asylum in Finland, referring to his previous request that he

be permitted to submit further evidence.

On 10 July 1990 the Supreme Court delivered its opinion to the

Ministry of Justice regarding the extradition. It reads, in its

relevant parts:

"In the present case, there are no circumstances which would

suggest that Kozlov, in Finland, has not been guaranteed his

human rights under the United Nations Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights,

neither do the provisions in these Conventions, having regard

to the facts of the case, constitute an obstacle to the

extradition of Kozlov to the Soviet Union.

Thus, the request for extradition in regard to the (applicant's)

offence of having hijacked an aeroplane may lawfully be granted ..."

The Supreme Court found, however, that extradition could

not be granted in regard to the applicant's offence of having

illegally left the Soviet Union.

On 13 and 16 July 1990 the applicant was examined separately

by a chief physician, a psychiatrist and a psychologist and found to

be mentally healthy.

On 17 July 1990 the applicant was brought before the District

Court of Vantaa in order to be tried for the hijacking offence.

The public prosecutor, at the request of the Ministry of Justice,

requested leave to present the charges in two weeks, referring to lack

of time for preparing the case and to the priority given to the

extradition proceedings. This request was granted by the District

Court. It referred to the 1974 Agreement, the fact that the examination

of the extradition request was still pending, the serious character

and the public importance of the case, and the fact that the prosecutor

had received the criminal investigation documents only on 11 July 1990

and had thus not been given enough time to consider whether the

investigations were sufficient to prepare an indictment. The District

Court furthermore noted that under Finnish law the sentence for the

offence would amount to not less than two years' imprisonment and that

there was a risk that the applicant would abscond.

On 23 July 1990 the applicant's lawyer contacted the applicant's

brother in the Soviet Union by telephone. The latter promised to take the

applicant's military passport to the Embassy of Finland in Moscow,

together with a written account by members of the applicant's family.

Nothing was subsequently heard of in this matter.

On 24 July 1990 the applicant's second request for political

asylum was refused.

On the same day the Ministry of Justice decided to extradite

the applicant to the Soviet Union under the conditions that without

the consent of the Finnish Ministry of Justice he would not be

prosecuted or punished for any offence other than the hijacking

committed prior to his extradition, nor be further extradited to a

third country. The Government further stated their wish that they be

allowed to monitor the investigations and proceedings in the

applicant's case in the Soviet Union. The extradition decision was

not subject to appeal.

On 26 July 1990 the applicant slashed himself with a razor

blade in his cell.

On 27 July 1990 the applicant was handed over to the Soviet

authorities.

In August the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Soviet

authorities for permission for its representative to see the

applicant. This was not granted.

From 21 June to 24 July 1990 the applicant was detained under

the Coercive Criminal Investigation Means Act (pakkokeinolaki 450/87,

tvångsmedelslagen 450/87). From 24 July to 27 July 1990 he was

detained under the Extradition Act (laki 456/70 rikoksen johdosta

tapahtuvasta luovuttamisesta, lag 456/70 om utlämning för brott).

The applicant has submitted an undated opinion of Amnesty

International from the summer of 1990 which deals with all Soviet

hijackers who were arrested in Finland and Sweden at that time. It

reads, in its relevant part:

"Over many years Amnesty International has urged the Soviet

authorities (to) bring their domestic legislation into line with

their international commitments on human rights by, among

other things, recognizing the right to conscientious

objection to military service and the right of Soviet

citizens to leave and enter their own country. Amnesty

International would be gravely concerned if, on his return

to the USSR, XXX faced prosecution or imprisonment on these

grounds.

In considering the extradition of XXX to the USSR,

therefore, Amnesty International calls on the

Finnish/Swedish authorities to obtain guarantees from the

Soviet government that he will not be prosecuted on charges

related to his exercise of these human rights."

The Government submitted that following the extradition they

had been informed by the Soviet authorities that a forensic mental

examination had been conducted on the applicant in Latvia and that he

had been found to be "mentally sound". The applicant, however,

claimed to have suffered from mental disorders affecting his criminal

responsibility and requested a new examination. In late September

1990 the applicant was remanded for the second examination, which,

however, had not yet been completed by 21 December 1990. The trial

was expected to be held in January 1991. The Government stated that

they would send an observer to the trial, which whould be open to the

public.

The applicant's lawyer submitted that by late February 1991 he

had not received any information as to the date of the applicant's

trial. He further submitted that for several months he had not

received any information from the Government regarding the proceedings

following the extradition. He finally submitted that the Government

seemed to have uncritically accepted the information given by the

Soviet authorities and contested that the applicant had asked for a

second examination of his mental state.

According to information subsequently provided by the

applicant's lawyer, the applicant was considered mentally sound at the

end of the second psychiatric examination which was concluded in

December 1990. The trial took place on 11-13 March 1991. On

14 March 1991, the Court convicted the applicant of unlawful seizure of

aircraft and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment with "hard

discipline".

The lawyer further stated that he had attended most of the

trial which in his view had not satisfied normal requirements as to

fairness and the rights of the defence. During the trial the applicant

had been placed in a cage with metal bars and his defence counsel had

been sitting five metres away from him, so that they could not

communicate with each other during the proceedings. Requests by the

applicant's counsel to hold the trial in the Latvian language and to

obtain translations of documents from the mental examination in

Finland had not been granted. The applicant's counsel had been

interrupted twice by the President of the Court and had been fined for

contempt of court after he had asked for the President to be replaced

on account of lack of impartiality.

Relevant domestic law and practice

According to the 1974 Agreement a person suspected of having

hijacked a civil aircraft registered in one of the two countries and

which has landed in the other country shall be returned to the country

of registration if the suspect is a citizen of that country.

Extradition based on the 1974 Agreement is regulated by the Act on

the Returning in Certain Cases of Persons Guilty of Hijacking Civil

Aircraft (laki 336/75 siviili-ilma-aluksen kaappaukseen

syyllistyneiden henkilöiden palauttamisesta, lag 336/75 om återförande

i vissa fall av personer som gjort sig skyldiga till kapning av civilt

luftfartyg; hereinafter "the 1975 Act"), as well as by the Extradition

Act. In extradition cases which fall under the 1975 Act Sections 13

to 25 and 34 of the Extradition Act are, insofar as they are

applicable, to be applied.

Section 16 para. 1 of the Extradition Act reads:

"If the person whose extradition is requested, during

the investigation or in a petition submitted to the

Ministry of Justice before the decision, alleges that

lawful conditions for the extradition are not fulfilled, the

Ministry shall, if the extradition request is not immediately

rejected, before its decision ask for the opinion of the

Supreme Court. The Ministry may also otherwise ask for an

opinion, if necessary."

Section 17 of the Extradition Act reads:

"The Supreme Court examines, having regard to Sections 1-10

or other provisions in international treaties binding upon

Finland, whether the request for extradition may be granted.

If the Supreme Court finds an obstacle to the extradition

the request may not be granted."

Under Section 12 para. 4 of the Extradition Act the Government

may, when granting an extradition request, state the conditions under

which the extradition shall take place. However, in cases which fall

under the 1975 Act the Government may only state conditions in order

to prevent the extradited person from being prosecuted or punished for

any offence other than the hijacking committed prior to his extradition

or the further extradition of the person to a third country.

According to Chapter 1, Section 21, of the Act on Pre-Trial

Means of Coercion the Court shall, when remanding a suspect for trial

and provided the examination of the charges has not already started,

decide when the trial will take place. It has to take place within

four weeks, but the Court may for particularly weighty reasons

postpone the trial for two weeks at a time, provided this is requested

by the prosecutor before the day of the trial. The postponement is

not subject to ordinary appeal. However, under Finnish law it is

possible to lodge an extraordinary appeal (kantelu, klagan) on the

basis of an alleged procedural fault by the Court.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains that the denial of asylum in Finland

and his extradition to the Soviet Union violated Article 3 of the

Convention. He submits that, already during his detention in the military

hospital, he has been subjected to treatment contrary to this

provision. He further refers to the unjustified diagnosis according

to which he is mentally ill. He submits that the Goverment, when

deciding to extradite him, failed to demand the revocation of this

unjustified classification by the Soviet authorities. Therefore, he

now risks remaining in a mental institution. Mental hospitals and

psychiatry have recently been used in the Soviet Union to suppress

dissidents. The latitude applied in sentencing hijackers on previous

occasions as well as the legal practice regarding hijacking have been

inhuman, while the enforcement of sanctions has been both degrading

and inhuman. The recent positive developments in the Soviet Union

have not yet reached the military, prisons or mental hospitals.

2. The applicant alleges that in view of the fact that the

warrant for his arrest was issued by the K.G.B., his extradition

exposed him to a serious risk that his case would not be tried by a

tribunal in conformity with the conditions laid down in Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention. He submits that the judicial procedures in

the Soviet Union fail notoriously to meet the standards laid down in

Article 6 of the Convention. Subsequently, he has added that the

trial which took place on 11-13 March 1991 was unfair and did not

respect the rights of the defence.

3. The applicant alleges that he was not promptly informed

about the nature and the ground for the charges against him. He

alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (a) of the Convention.

4. The applicant alleges that because of the postponement of

the trial in Finland he was not tried within a reasonable time. He

complains of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

5. The applicant finally alleges that the grounds given for

the postponement of the trial in Finland violated Article 18 of the

Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 9 July 1990 and registered

on the same day.

On 10 July 1990, following the applicant's request for an

interim measure, the Commission decided under Rule 36 of its Rules of

Procedure not to indicate to the Government that they suspend the

decision on the applicant's extradition pending the Commission's

examination of the admissibility of the case.

Following the extradition decision the applicant, on

24 July 1990, requested that the Commission indicate to the Government

that they suspend the enforcement of this decision pending the

Commission's examination of the case. On 25 July, the request was

rejected by the President of the Commission.

On 5 October 1990 the Commission decided that notice of the

application be given to the respondent Government and that the parties

be invited to submit written observations on the admissibility and

merits of the application.

After an extension of the time limit, the Government's

observations were submitted on 9 January 1991. The applicant's

observations in reply were submitted on 27 February 1991.

The applicant submitted further observations on 20 March and

20 May 1991 and the Government on 2 April 1991.

THE LAW

1. The applicant alleges that the denial of asylum in Finland and

his extradition to the Soviet Union violated Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention.

Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads:

"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment."

The Government submit that the complaint is manifestly

ill-founded. Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention could only come

into play on the basis of objective facts indicating an imminent risk

of ill-treatment in the receiving country. It is up to the applicant

to produce prima facie evidence to show that he has serious and

substantial grounds for fearing treatment contrary to Article 3

(Art.3) of the Convention. It is commonly recognised that the human

rights situation in the Soviet Union has dramatically improved during

the latter half of the 1980's. This has inter alia been reflected in

the treatment of prisoners of conscience. Moreover, there is a marked

change in the field of forensic psychiatry in the Soviet Union. The

fact that the applicant, at the time when he was extradited, risked a

criminal prosecution and trial, including forensic mental

examinations, in the Soviet Union does not in itself raise an issue

under Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there was no reason

to assume that the applicant, when extradited, would be tortured or

otherwise ill-treated in the Soviet Union.

The Government further submit that the 1974 Agreement, as

implemented in the applicant's case, does not in itself constitute a

violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The wording of the

1974 Agreement admittedly does not mention the substance of Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention. However, it is obvious that the

subsequent human rights commitments of Finland prevail over the

provisions of the 1974 Agreement.

The Government further submit that, although the 1974

Agreement allows no reservation to be made in regard to capital

punishment, which is authorised by the Latvian Penal Code, it does not

rule out such reservations where they are necessitated by

international or other commitments of the extraditing State. As the

hijacking did not result in any casualties or serious bodily injuries

the applicant does not face the risk of capital punishment. The

Government on this point refer to the Supreme Court's opinion on the

extradition, in which the exclusion of capital punishment was

specifically discussed.

The Government further refer to the sentences inflicted in the

Soviet Union on two other aircraft hijackers extradited in the course

of 1990 from Sweden and Finland, respectively. They were sentenced to

three and four years' suspended imprisonment, respectively. These

sentences must be considered lenient.

As to the applicant's allegation that he has previously been

diagnosed in the Soviet Union as mentally ill, while he was found to

be mentally sound in the examination carried out in Finland, the

Government contend that this does not constitute any evidence of abuse

of psychiatry. Furthermore, it is hardly possible for an extraditing

country to state demands as to how an extradited person's mental state

should be diagnosed in the future. The same goes for the legal

classification of an extradited person's mental state at the time of

the suspected offence, as the question of criminal responsibility is

to be decided within each legal system. It would be improper, if not

impossible, for the extraditing country to dictate specific conditions

in this respect. Accordingly, the most that can be done by the

extraditing State is to ensure that the subsequent proceedings in the

receiving State are adequately monitored, in order to preclude a

possible risk of abuse. The Government contend that to this end it

has made all necessary efforts.

The applicant submits that the Government's decision to

extradite him appears to be an expression of support for the Soviet

leadership. As to the allegedly lenient sentences inflicted on other

hijackers he submits that his situation is different, as he would face

trial in Latvia, where the Soviet Union has recently used force

against Latvia's democratic institutions. He finally submits that the

omission of capital punishment from the 1974 Agreement indicates

glaring contradictions between the 1974 Agreement and the Convention.

The Commission first recalls that according to its established

case-law the right to asylum and the right not to be expelled or

extradited are not as such included among the rights and freedoms

mentioned in the Convention but that the expulsion or extradition of a

person may nevertheless, in certain exceptional circumstances, raise

an issue under the Convention and in particular under Article 3

(Art. 3). In the Soering case, the European Court of Human Rights

stated as follows (Eur. Court H.R., Soering judgment of 7 July 1989,

Series A No. 161, pp. 35-36, para. 91):

"In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a

fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3), and hence

engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention,

where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that

the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of

being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment in the requesting country. The

establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an

assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the

standards of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention."

The Commission also recalls that according to the Court's

case-law ill-treatment, including that in connection with punishment,

must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the

scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The assessment of this

level depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature

and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of

its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in

some instances, the sex and state of health of the victim

(above-mentioned Soering judgment, p. 39, para. 100). The Commission

furthermore recalls that for punishment or treatment associated with

it to be "inhuman" or "degrading", the suffering or humiliation

involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of

suffering or humiliation inherent in a given form of legitimate

punishment (Eur. Court H.R., Tyrer judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A

No. 26, pp. 14-15, paras. 29-30).

The Commission has examined the applicant's submissions and

the documents in support of his application. It notes that the

existence of a risk of ill-treatment in a case of extradition should

be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known

or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of

the extradition. However, regard can also be had to information which

has come to light after the extradition, as such information may be of

value in confirming or refuting the appreciation made by the

Contracting State or the well-foundedness of the fears of the

extradited person (Eur. Court H.R., Cruz Varas and Others judgment of

20 March 1991, para. 76, to be published in Series A).

In the present case, the Commission considers that the

information which was available to the Finnish Government at the time

of the extradition with regard to the personal situation of the

applicant and the development in the Soviet Union did not show that

the applicant, upon his extradition, would run a substantial risk of

being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention. The information which has subsequently been provided by

the applicant's lawyer about the applicant's trial, conviction and

sentence cannot be considered to show that the applicant has been, or

is likely to be, submitted to treatment or punishment of such gravity

as to be deemed "inhuman" or "degrading" within the meaning of Article

3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicant alleges that his extradition would expose him to

a serious risk of not having his case tried by a tribunal in

conformity with the conditions set out in Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. After the trial had taken place, he

alleged that the requirements of fairness and the rights of the

defence had been disregarded in various respects.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, in its

relevant parts:

"In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

established by law ..."

The Government submit that the complaint is manifestly

ill-founded. The applicant has not substantiated his allegation that

the involvement of K.G.B. in his case would render his trial unfair.

The Government admit that the criminal procedure in the Soviet

Union may not be in full harmony with the requirements under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention. However, such harmony cannot be required

as a condition for extradition from a Contracting State to another

country. The Government refer to the Commission's decision in

Application No. 10308/83 (Dec. 3.5.83, D.R. 36 pp. 209-235 at 232), in

which it was expressly held that non-compliance in the receiving State

with the guarantees laid down in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention

would not in itself make the extradition appear as inhuman treatment.

In any case, there was no reason to doubt that the applicant's trial

would satisfy the minimum standards laid down in the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the Soviet Union is a

party.

According to the information available to the Government, the

applicant was expected to face a normal criminal trial in the Soviet

Union. This would be open to the public, the press and observers from

international human rights organisations. Moreover, the applicant had

been granted legal representation in the Soviet Union. His lawyer

before the Commission would be notified of the date and place of the

trial as soon as the Government received this information.

The applicant submits that criminal cases which are

investigated by the K.G.B. are decided by the Supreme Court as the

first and only instance. Such proceedings are also less public than

those of other courts.

The Commission recalls that in the Soering case the Court did

not exclude that an issue might exceptionally arise under Article

6 (Art. 6) by an extradition decision in circumstances where the

fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair

trial in the requesting country (above-mentioned Soering judgment, p.

45, para. 113).

In the present case the Commission finds that the information

available to it as to the situation prevailing in 1990 in regard to

the system of criminal justice with which the applicant would be

confronted upon his extradition is not sufficient to conclude that the

applicant's case is of that exceptional character.

It follows that this part of the application is also

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3. The applicant alleges that he was not promptly informed about

the charges against him. He alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 3

(a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention, which reads:

"3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the

following minimum rights:

(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he

understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him; ..."

The Government submit that already during the first

interrogation by the police on 19 June 1990 the applicant was informed

about the charges against him. The application for a detention order

which was presented before the City Court of Helsinki on 21 June 1990

contained a description of the suspected offence and the alleged facts

of its commission. On the latter occasion the applicant admitted the

factual description of the charges. Subsequently, on 13 July 1990,

the applicant appeared before the District Court of Vantaa. On both

occasions he was assisted by legal counsel and an interpreter.

The Commission first notes that, in view of the circumstances,

the applicant must have been immediately aware of the nature of the

charges against him. Moreover, on 21 June 1990, that is two days

after his arrival in Finland, a hearing was held before the District

Court of Helsinki which remanded him for trial. At this hearing, the

applicant was present as well as his lawyer and an interpreter.

There can be no doubt that on that occasion the applicant received

full information about the charges against him.

In these circumstances, the Commission finds no violation of

Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4. The applicant alleges that because of the postponement of the

trial in Finland he did not receive a trial within a reasonable time.

He alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

The Government submit that the complaint is manifestly

ill-founded. They submit that the reasonableness of the length of the

proceedings must be considered as a whole. In the present case, the

especially weighty reasons for the postponement of the trial as stated

in the District Court's decision were the need to allow the prosecutor

enough time to prepare the indictment on the one hand, and the

uncertainty of the pending extradition request on the other. The

pre-trial investigations were further complicated due to the

applicant's own behaviour, notably the fact that he barricaded himself

in his cell for a week, refusing all co-operation with the

authorities. The police record and other investigation material were

not ready for the prosecutor until 11 July 1990. Moreover, had the

indictment been presented in the District Court it would have been

difficult, from the point of view of judicial independence, for the

executive branch to interfere in the trial by making an extradition

decision. On the other hand, the delay of the extradition decision

was partly due to the fact that the Government wanted to study

carefully the impact of their commitments under the Convention. In

the present case criminal proceedings were discontinued as soon as the

authorities were informed about the extradition decision. On 24 July

1990 the legal basis for the applicant's detention was changed, as he

was henceforward detained under the Extradition Act. Thus, the period

to be taken into consideration when determining whether the length of

the criminal proceedings exceeded the requirements under Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention runs from 21 June to 24 July

1990. Such a length does not amount to a violation of Article 6 para.

1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length

of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down

in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and

the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities (see, as

the most recent authority, Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of

20 February 1991, to be published in Series A). In the present case

the Commission notes that, while a procedure for prosecution in

Finland was initiated, it was interrupted by the applicant's

extradition to the Soviet Union.

In the light of the case-law of the Convention organs the

Commission finds no violation of the applicant's right to a trial

within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5. The applicant finally alleges that the District Court's

decision to postpone the trial was based on the prosecutor's statement

that he had not had enough time to prepare the indictment, this being

an interpretation of the Convention detrimental to the applicant. The

applicant alleges a violation of Article 18 (Art. 18) of the

Convention which provides:

"The restrictions permitted under this Convention to

the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any

purpose other than those for which they have been

prescribed."

The Government submit that the complaint is incompatible

rationae materiae with the provisions of the Convention, as it seems

to be based on the assertion that the prosecutor's real motive for

invoking the Convention in order to have the trial postponed was to

deprive the applicant of his legitimate rights. On the contrary, the

request was made in the applicant's interest, as the prosecutor

argued that in the short time available it would have been difficult

for him to prepare an indictment which would have satisfied the

requirements under Article 6 paras. 3 (a) and (b) (Art. 6-3-a, 6-3-b)

of the Convention. In any case, the effect of the prosecutor's

argument appears to have been marginal, as the Court in its decision

disregarded his reference to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article

18 (Art. 18) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application in manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Deputy Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(J. RAYMOND) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

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KOZLOV v. FINLAND

KOZLOV v. FINLAND

LEXI