Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 17811/91

by Mihail VARFOLOMEJEV

against Finland

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 2 September 1991, the following members being present:

MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President

J.A. FROWEIN

S. TRECHSEL

F. ERMACORA

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. WEITZEL

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G. H. THUNE

Sir Basil HALL

MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ

C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 3 August 1990

by Mihail VARFOLOMEJEV against Finland and registered on 15 February

1991 under file No. 17811/91;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the

Rules of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a citizen of the Soviet Union, born in 1969

and resident in Nikolski near Leningrad. Before the Commission he is

represented by Mr. Ulf Månsson, a lawyer practising in Helsinki.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

In 1986 the applicant was called up for military service. In

the Soviet Union there is no right to exemption from military service

on the ground of conscientious objection. The applicant refused

military service, referring to his pacifist views and the Soviet

military involvement in Afghanistan. As a result he was threatened

with punishment and subsequently taken from his home to a mental

hospital, where he was detained for 17 days. At the hospital he was

diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic. At his discharge he received a

medical certificate prescribing that he was to remain under constant

supervision by his family and that, whenever necessary, he could be

re-detained.

The authorities subsequently, without hearing the applicant,

put a stamp in his military passport stating that he was an invalid of

the first degree. As a result he was not allowed to work, to

study, to marry, to found a family, to vote or to participate in

political activities, nor could he be granted a passport for

travelling abroad.

In order to obtain work the applicant subsequently forged his

military passport to indicate that he was an invalid of the third

degree.

On 24 June 1990 the applicant hijacked a Soviet aeroplane on

its way from Tallinn to Helsinki demanding that it land in Sweden.

The plane landed in Helsinki, where the applicant gave up and was

arrested. He was found to have been unarmed during the hijacking.

The applicant immediately lodged a request with the Ministry

of the Interior that he be granted political asylum in Finland,

referring to his treatment in the Soviet Union. He further presented

his military passport, alleging that the forgery of his invalidity

classification could easily be noticed.

On 25 June 1990 the Soviet Government, referring to the 1974

Bilateral Agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union on the

Prevention of Hijacking of Civil Aircraft (hereinafter "the 1974

Agreement"), requested the applicant's extradition, as he was

suspected of having hijacked an aeroplane as well as having illegally

left the Soviet Union. In an annex to the request issued by a K.G.B.

official it was stated that the applicant suffered from paranoid

schizophrenia and was an invalid of the first degree.

On 27 June 1990 the applicant was remanded for trial by the

City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätten) of Helsinki suspected of

having hijacked an aeroplane. The Court had regard to the applicable

penalty for hijacking, the risk that the applicant might abscond and

the need for ensuring his presence at the trial. The City Court

decided that the trial would take place before the District Court

(kihlakunnanoikeus, häradsrätten) of Vantaa on 24 July 1990.

On 2 July 1990 the Ministry of Justice asked the Supreme Court

(korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) to give its opinion on the

extradition request.

On 3 July 1990 the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees submitted an opinion to the Ministry of the Interior on

the considerations UNHCR would normally take into account in cases

such as the applicant's. It stated inter alia

"... As to exclusion, hijacking is generally regarded as a

serious crime. However, there have been cases where the

refugee status of an applicant has been recognized even

where the applicant hijacked a plane to leave the country of

origin. These cases have differed in their factual

situations but have in common the absence of any serious

violence accompanying the hijacking and the fact that the

hijacking was the only available means of escaping

persecution on the grounds of political opinion. In other

words, hijacking is not always a serious crime or a

non-political crime in the sense meant in the exclusion

clauses. It is not automatically a bar to refugee status.

Where there is a well-founded fear of persecution on

political grounds, where escape from persecution was not

reasonably possible by any other means and where no violence

or serious danger to others accompanied the act, the

hijacking of a plane in order to leave [the country of origin]

should not render an otherwise clearly includable person

excluded from refugee status..."

Between 5 an 9 July 1990 the applicant, at his own request, was

examined separately by a specialist in internal medicine, another

doctor, a psychologist and a social worker. The examination was

directed by a Chief Psychiatrist. The applicant was considered

mentally healthy, and there was no indication that he had previously

suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. However, he was found to suffer

from a personality disturbance with passive-aggressive features.

On 24 July 1990 the District Court, at the prosecutor's

request, postponed the trial to 6 August 1990 stating that under

Sections 2 and 7, para. 3, of the Act on the Returning in Certain Cases

of Persons Guilty of Hijacking Civil Aircraft (laki 336/75

siviili-ilma-aluksen kaappaukseen syyllistyneiden henkilöiden

palauttamisesta, lag 336/75 om återförande i vissa fall av personer

som gjort sig skyldiga till kapning av civilt luftfartyg; hereinafter

"the 1975 Act") the presentation of charges in Finland was a

subsidiary measure in relation to the extradition proceedings and

would thus come into play where no extradition was granted. As the

examination of the extradition request was still pending there was a

particularly weighty reason for the postponement of the trial. It

further had regard to the serious character and the public importance

of the case and the fact that the prosecutor had received the

pre-trial records only on 18 July 1990, the short time not allowing

him to consider the evidence and to prepare the indictment.

On 2 August 1990 the Ministry of the Interior rejected the

applicant's request for asylum, stating that he had not submitted any

plausible evidence showing that he had been persecuted in the Soviet

Union because of his political views, or was in need of protection.

Furthermore, according to the United Nations Convention Relating to the

Status of Refugees he had no right to asylum, since this Convention

was not to be applied to a person suspected of having committed a

serious non-political crime outside the country he has fled from. The

decision was not subject to appeal.

On 6 August 1990 the District Court, at the prosecutor's

request, postponed the trial to 17 August 1990, as the examination of

the extradition request was still pending and the applicant could in any

case have been detained under the Extradition Act (laki 456/70

rikoksen johdosta tapahtuvasta luovuttamisesta, lag 456/70 om

utlämning för brott) pending the outcome of the extradition procedure.

Having regard to the risk that the applicant might abscond, the

District Court further rejected his request to be released from

detention on remand.

On 9 August 1990 the Supreme Court delivered its opinion on

the extradition request, noting inter alia that under the applicable

provision in the Estonian Penal Code the applicant could not be

sentenced to capital punishment, as the hijacking had caused no

casualties. It further found that

"having regard to the facts submitted neither the [United

Nations] Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nor the

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms constitute an obstacle to the

extradition of Varfolomejev to the Soviet Union".

The Supreme Court found, however, that extradition could not

be granted in regard to the applicant's offence of having illegally

left the Soviet Union.

On 17 August 1990 the District Court, at the prosecutor's

request, again postponed the trial, this time to 31 August 1990. The

applicant's request to be released from detention on remand was

rejected. The District Court referred to the reasons stated in its

decision of 6 August 1990.

On 20 August 1990 the Ministry of Justice decided to

extradite the applicant to the Soviet Union under the condition that

without the consent of the Finnish Ministry of Justice the applicant

could not be prosecuted or punished for any offence other than the

hijacking committed prior to his extradition, nor be further

extradited to a third country. The extradition decision was not

subject to appeal. Previously, an agreement had been reached with the

Soviet authorities that a Finnish psychiatrist would be allowed to

participate in a possible mental examination to be conducted on the

applicant in the Soviet Union.

On 23 August 1990 the applicant was handed over to the Soviet

authorities. Subsequently, he was taken to a prison in Tallinn on the

basis of a previous decision to remand him for trial. A Finnish

psychiatrist participated in a subsequent mental examination

conducted on the applicant, at which he was again found to be

mentally healthy.

The trial took place on 7 and 8 January 1991 before the Court

of the Region of Meri. The applicant was convicted of hijacking and

sentenced to four years' suspended imprisonment. He was immediately

released. The minimum penalty applicable on the hijacking offence

was five years' imprisonment, but the Court made an exception in the

applicant's case, having regard to the extenuating circumstances, that

is his detention in the mental hospital, the incorrect psychiatric

diagnosis and the invalidity classification. It was further noted

that the applicant had been deprived of his human rights such as the

right to work and to study. The public prosecutor appealed against

the judgment to the Supreme Court of Estonia. On 15 April 1991 the

judgment was upheld after a hearing, at which the prosecutor argued

that the applicant's diagnosis of 1986 should be considered valid.

The applicant's invalidity classification has not been revoked

by the Expert Commission for the Establishment of Fitness for Work.

He is being paid invalidity pension, which he refuses to receive.

Relevant domestic law and practice

According to the 1974 Agreement a person suspected of having

hijacked a civil aeroplane registered in one of the two countries and

which has landed in the other country shall be returned to the country

of registration if the suspect is a citizen of that country. However,

according to Article 11 of the 1974 Agreement the provisions of the

Agreement are without prejudice to the rights and considerations of

a Contracting State in matters regarding inter alia the right to

asylum. Extradition based on the 1974 Agreement is regulated by the

1975 Act, as well as by the Extradition Act. In extradition cases

which fall under the 1975 Act Sections 13 to 25 and 34 of the

Extradition Act are, insofar as they are applicable, to be applied.

Under Section 2 of the 1975 Act measures shall be taken

immediately upon a request for extradition. Under Section 7 para. 3

of the same Act the Ministry of Justice shall, provided that it does

not allow an extradition, refer the matter to the prosecutor for the

purpose of presenting charges.

Section 16 para. 1 of the Extradition Act reads:

"If the person whose extradition is requested, during

the investigation or in a petition submitted to the

Ministry of Justice before the decision, alleges that

lawful conditions for the extradition are not fulfilled, the

Ministry shall, if the extradition request is not immediately

rejected, before its decision ask for the opinion of the

Supreme Court. The Ministry may also otherwise ask for an

opinion, if necessary."

Section 17 reads:

"The Supreme Court examines, having regard to Sections 1-10

or other provisions in international treaties binding upon

Finland, whether the request for extradition may be granted.

If the Supreme Court finds an obstacle to the extradition

the request may not be granted."

Under Section 12 para. 4 of the Extradition Act the Government

may, when granting an extradition request, state the conditions under

which the extradition shall take place. However, in cases which fall

under the 1975 Act the Government may only state conditions in order

to prevent the extradited person from being prosecuted or punished for

any offence other than the hijacking committed prior to his extradition

or the further extradition of the person to a third country.

According to Chapter 1, Section 21, of the Coercive Criminal

Investigation Means Act (pakkokeinolaki 450/87, tvångmedelslagen

450/87) the Court shall, when remanding a suspect for trial

and provided the examination of the charges has not already started,

decide when the trial is to take place. It has to take place within

four weeks, but the Court may for particularly weighty reasons

postpone the trial for two weeks at a time, provided this is requested

by the prosecutor before the day of the trial. The postponement is

not subject to ordinary appeal. However, under Chapter 1, Section 27

para. 2 of same Act it is possible to lodge an extraordinary appeal

(kantelu, klagan) on the basis of an alleged procedural fault by the

Court.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains that the denial of asylum in Finland

and his extradition violated Article 3 of the Convention. He submits

that, although he has always been mentally sound, he has already been

detained against his will in a mental hospital and subjected to

inhuman and degrading treatment. Abuse of psychiatry in order to

suppress dissidents still exists in the Soviet Union, according to

inter alia Amnesty International. When asylum was refused it was

known to the Finnish authorities that the psychiatric diagnosis and

the invalidity classification were still considered valid in the

Soviet Union, although a mental examination in Finland had shown that

the applicant was not, and had never been, mentally ill. The

Government took a great risk that he could again be subjected to

treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, as they did not

stipulate, as a condition for the extradition, that the diagnosis as a

paranoid schizophrenic and the invalidity classification be revoked.

Moreover, the revocation as such of the diagnosis does not guarantee

that the invalidity classification will be changed, as a decision in

the latter regard is made by completely separate authorities.

Especially having regard to the situation in the beginning of 1991, of

which there were clear indications already at the time of the

extradition, there were no guarantees that the abuse of psychiatry in

the Soviet Union would end.

2. The applicant further complains that the District Court's

decisions to postpone his trial and to keep him remanded for trial,

although no charges had been presented, violated Article 5 paras. 2, 3

and 4, and Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (a) of the Convention. The

pre-trial investigation was concluded and the records were ready for

examination already on 12 July 1990. However, no charges were

presented before the District Court, although the applicant continued

to be detained on remand. The applicant furthermore claims

compensation from the Government under Article 5 para. 5 of the

Convention.

3. The applicant finally complains that the reasons invoked by

the prosecutor in support of the requests for a postponement of the

trial violated Article 18 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 3 August 1990 and registered

on 15 February 1991.

On 3 August 1990 the applicant requested that the Commission

under Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure indicate to the Government

that the decision on the extradition or, alternatively, the

enforcement of such a decision, be suspended.

On 20 August 1990 the Acting President of the Commission

decided to reject the request.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that the denial of asylum and his

extradition violated Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, which reads:

"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment."

The Commission recalls that according to its established

case-law the right to asylum and the right not to be expelled or

extradited are not as such included among the rights and freedoms

mentioned in the Convention but that the expulsion or extradition of a

person may nevertheless, in certain exceptional circumstances, raise

an issue under the Convention and in particular under Article 3 (Art.

3). In the Soering case, the European Court of Human Rights stated as

follows (Eur. Court H.R., Soering judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A

No. 161, pp. 35-36, para. 91):

"In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a

fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3), and hence

engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention,

where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that

the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of

being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment in the requesting country. The

establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an

assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the

standards of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention."

According to the Court's case-law, ill-treatment, including

that in connection with punishment, must attain a minimum level of

severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention. The assessment of this level depends on all the

circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the

treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its execution, its

duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the

sex and state of health of the victim (above-mentioned Soering

judgment, p. 39, para. 100). For punishment or for treatment

associated with it to be "inhuman" or "degrading", the suffering or

humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable

element of suffering or humiliation inherent in a given form of

legitimate punishment (Eur. Court H.R., Tyrer judgment of 25 April

1978, Series A No. 26, pp. 14-15, paras. 29-30).

The Commission further recalls that the existence of a risk of

ill-treatment in a case of extradition should be assessed primarily

with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been

known to the Contracting State at the time of the extradition.

However, regard can also be had to information which has come to light

after the extradition, as such information may be of value in

confirming or refuting the appreciation made by the Contracting State

or the well-foundedness of the fears of the extradited person (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Cruz Varas and Others judgment of 20 March 1991, para. 76,

to be published in Series A as No. 201).

In the present case the Commission observes that the

Government, in their extradition decision, noted the Supreme Court's

opinion according to which under Estonian law the applicant could not

be sentenced to death. Moreover, the Government noted the Supreme

Court's finding that the Convention did not hinder extradition. It

appears from the file that an agreement had been reached with the

Soviet authorities that a Finnish psychiatrist be allowed to

participate in a possible mental examination in the Soviet Union.

This agreement was subsequently complied with by the Soviet

authorities to which the result of the examination carried out in

Finland had been submitted. It further appears from the file that the

Government, in connection with the extradition, requested to receive

information regarding the further proceedings in the applicant's case

following his extradition. Thus, the Government took considerable

care in order to preclude a real risk that the applicant would be

exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.

In view of the above the Commission considers that the information

available to the Finnish Government at the time of the extradition

with regard to the personal situation of the applicant and the

development in the Soviet Union did not show that the applicant, upon

his extradition, would run a substantial risk of being exposed to such

treatment. The information which has subsequently been provided by

the applicant's lawyer about the applicant's trial and present

situation is not such as to refute the appreciation made by the

Government at the time of the extradition.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicant further complains that the decisions to postpone

his trial and to keep him remanded for trial, although no charges were

presented, violated Article 5 paras. 2, 3 and 4, and Article 6 paras.

1 and 3 (a) (Art. 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 6-1, 6-3-a) of the Convention. He

furthermore claims to be entitled to compensation from the Finnish

Government under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention.

(a) The Commission has first considered the complaint under

Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention, which reads:

"Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a

language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest

and of any charge against him."

Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention contains the

elementary safeguard that any person arrested should know why he is

being deprived of his liberty. Whilst the information in this regard

must be conveyed "promptly" it need not be related in its entirety by

the arresting officer at the very moment of the arrest. Whether the

content and promptness of the information conveyed were sufficient is

to be assessed in each case according to its special features (Eur.

Court H.R., Fox, Campbell and Hartley judgment of 30 August 1990,

Series A No. 182, p. 19, para. 40, with further reference).

The Commission considers that, in view of the circumstances,

the applicant must have been immediately aware of the reasons for his

arrest, as well as of the nature of the charges against him.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(b) The Commission has secondly examined the complaint under

Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, which reads:

"Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the

provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be

brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised

by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to

trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.

Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for

trial."

The Commission does not find it necessary to consider whether

the possibility to appeal under Chapter 1, Section 27, second

paragraph of the Coercive Criminal Investigation Means Act constitutes

a remedy which the applicant should have used in order to exhaust

domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention, as the complaint is manifestly ill-founded for the

following reasons.

The applicant was brought before the City Court of Helsinki on

27 June 1990. Thus, he was brought "promptly before a judge" (cf.

Eur. Court H.R., Brogan and Others judgment of 29 November 1988,

Series A No. 145-B, p. 33-34, para. 62).

As regards the reasonableness of the applicant's detention

pending trial the period to be considered under this provision started

on the day of the arrest, that is 24 June 1990, and ended not later

than 23 August 1990. The Commission observes that, when postponing

the applicant's trial and maintaining his detention on remand, the

District Court of Vantaa had regard, on the one hand, to the

subsidiary role of the domestic criminal proceedings in relation to

the proceedings regarding the extradition request, and, on the other,

to the risk that the applicant might abscond, as well as to the

gravity of the offence and the public importance of the case. In

these circumstances the length of the applicant's detention cannot be

regarded as unreasonable for the purposes of Article 5 para. 3

(Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(c) The Commission has thirdly examined the complaint under

Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention which reads:

"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or

detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the

lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a

court and his release ordered if the detention is not

lawful."

The Commission observes that the City Court of Helsinki on

27 June 1990 remanded the applicant for trial. The District Court of

Vantaa on 24 July, 6 August and 17 August 1990 decided to continue the

detention on remand. At least on the two last-mentioned occasions the

applicant challenged the lawfulness of his detention. Furthermore,

there is no indication that the applicant could not have challenged

the lawfulness of his detention before the City Court on 27 June 1990

and before the District Court on 24 July 1990. Thus, he was entitled

to take proceedings with a view to having the lawfulness of his

detention being decided speedily.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(d) The applicant further claims compensation from the Finnish

Goverment in accordance with Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the

Convention which reads:

"Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in

contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have

an enforceable right to compensation."

The Commission does not consider it necessary to examine

whether the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies in respect of

this complaint, as it has found no violation of Article 5 paras. 2, 3

and 4 (Art. 5-2, 5-3, 5-4) of the Convention. Consequently, no

violation can be found under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the

Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

(e) The applicant further complains of violations of Article 6

paras. 1 and 3 (a) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-a) of the Convention.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, insofar

as it is relevant:

"In the determination ... of any criminal charge against

him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing

within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial

tribunal established by law..."

Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention reads:

"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

minimum rights:

... to be informed promptly, in a language which he

understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him;"

The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length

of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down

in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and

the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities (see, as

the most recent authority, Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of

20 February 1991, para. 30, to be published in Series A as No. 198).

In the present case the Commission notes that, while a

procedure for prosecution in Finland was initiated, it was interrupted

by the applicant's extradition to the Soviet Union. In the light of

the case-law of the Convention organs the Commission finds no

violation of the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time

within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

Furthermore, there is no substantiation of the applicant's complaints

under Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3. The applicant finally complains that the reasons invoked by

the prosecutor in support of the requests for a postponement of the

trial violated Article 18 (Art. 18) of the Convention which reads:

"The restrictions permitted under this Convention to

the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any

purpose other than those for which they have been

prescribed."

The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article

18 (Art. 18) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission

(H.C. KRÜGER) (C.A. NØRGAARD)

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VARFOLOMEJEV v. FINLAND

VARFOLOMEJEV v. FINLAND

LEXI