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FIRST CHAMBER

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 17259/90

by L.T.

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

1 April 1992, the following members being present:

MM. J.A. FROWEIN, President of the First Chamber

F. ERMACORA

G. SPERDUTI

E. BUSUTTIL

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

Sir Basil HALL

Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. M. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

Mr. M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the First Chamber

assisted by Mrs. S. DOLLE

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 18 May 1990 by

L.T. against the United Kingdom and registered on 4 October 1992 under

file No. 17259/90 ;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1953

and detained in H.M. Prison Long Lartin, Worcestershire.

The facts of the present case as submitted by the applicant, and

which may be deduced from the documents submitted with the application,

may be summarised as follows:

In the judgment of the Full Court of Appeal in this case the

following is stated: "The applicant was convicted of murder at Lewes

Crown Court on 12 July 1988, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The

victim was a 57 year old lady. At 4 o'clock on the afternoon of 3

April 1987, her daughter went to her flat to visit her. There was no

reply. Looking through the window the daughter saw her mother hanging

from the hot tap of the hand basin in the bathroom by a belt from her

raincoat, which was tied tightly round her neck. She had been

asphyxiated and great violence had been used upon her. She had been

sexually assaulted. There was medical evidence as to violence and also

some evidence, although not of a very precise nature, from the doctors

as to the time of death. In the deceased's living room the police

found a packet of cigarettes bearing the applicant's fingerprints and

a box of matches which came from the public house at which the

applicant was a regular visitor but which the deceased did not

frequent. The applicant's fingerprints were also found on a door frame

in the deceased's house, and fibres found on the deceased's clothing

matched those on the jumper which the applicant had been wearing at the

relevant time. The applicant confessed to three people that he had

murdered the deceased, the first two confessions being made before the

deceased's body was discovered. In interviews the

applicant denied killing the deceased. He said that his confessions

were of pure fantasy and a sick joke. He explained the presence of his

fingerprints by saying that he had been to the house on one occasion

and must have left his fingerprints on the door frame. He said that

he had parted with a packet of cigarettes and some matches at the

request of the deceased. So far as the fibres were concerned, he had

an explanation for them, namely, that the sweater he was wearing had

been worn by somebody else briefly and may have come in contact with

the deceased's clothing on that occasion. The main plank of the

defence case was the calling of some witnesses who claimed to have seen

the deceased alive after the time when the applicant was said to have

confessed to murdering her. The principal ground of appeal was that

the learned Judge did not properly direct the jury as to the timings

and, particularly, as to the relationship between the defence evidence

and the evidence given by the doctors as to possible time of death.

There also complaint that the learned Judge did not correctly

direct the jury as to the standard of proof."

The applicant was refused leave to appeal by a single judge and

then by the Full Court of Appeal on 12 March 1990. The latter held,

after considering the grounds of appeal submitted personally by the

applicant as well as grounds drafted by his counsel, that there was no

merit in the appeal application. The applicant's ancillary

applications were therefore also rejected, namely his request to be

present at the appeal hearing and his request for further legal aid.

He had been legally aided up to the submission of the grounds of

appeal.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains that his arrest, conviction and sentence

were wrongful and that his trial and leave to appeal hearings were

unfair and biased. In particular he complains that during the

proceedings the law of evidence was corrupted and perverted by the

judges, allegedly by omissions, distortions and misrepresentations of

the evidence and the facts of the case. He also complains that he was

refused leave to appeal, legal aid and leave to call witnesses for an

appeal. The applicant invokes Article 5 para. 1 (a) and (c) and para.

4, Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 (particularly subparagraph (d)), and

Articles 14, 25 and 60 of the Convention.

THE LAW

The applicant alleges that he was wrongfully arrested, convicted

and sentenced and that, as a result, he suffered breaches of Articles

5 and 6 (Art. 5, 6) of the Convention during the trial and leave to

appeal proceedings.

The relevant parts of Articles 5 and 6 (Art. 5, 6) of the

Convention provide as follows:

Article 5 (Art. 5)

"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.

No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following

cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a

competent court;

...

c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the

purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on

reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it

is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an

offence or fleeing after having done so;

...

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or

detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the

lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a

court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful."

Article 6 (Art. 6)

"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against

him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within

a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

established by law ...

...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

minimum rights:

...

c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his

own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal

assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so

require;

d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to

obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf

under the same conditions as witnesses against him;..."

The Commission has examined the case-file as it has been

submitted by the applicant, but finds nothing in it which might cast

doubt on the lawfulness of the applicant's arrest, in accordance with

Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention, or the lawfulness

of his detention after conviction by a competent court (by the Lewes

Crown Court on 12 July 1988), in accordance with Article 5 para.1 (a)

(Art. 5-1-a) of the Convention. The applicant's right under Article

5 para. 4 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention to challenge the lawfulness of

his detention was ensured by the trial and leave to appeal processes

themselves (cf. Eur. Court H.R., De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of

18 November 1970, Series A No. 14, p. 40, para. 76).

The Commission also finds that the applicant has not submitted

any evidence to substantiate his claim that he did not have a fair or

impartial trial pursuant to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention. There is no suggestion that the applicant or his

representatives did not have a full opportunity to put the defence case

or challenge that of the prosecution. The summing up of the evidence

by the trial judge to the jury, which summary was strongly criticised

by the applicant, on the face of it shows no bias by the judge, given

the nature and weight of the evidence against the applicant.

As regards the refusal of the applicant's application for leave

to appeal, the Commission refers to the special nature of these

proceedings described by the European Court of Human Rights in its

Monnell and Morris judgment. Such applications are normally dealt with

on the basis of the trial papers and written grounds of appeal, without

hearing oral argument from the parties. There is no right to legal aid

in order to appear or to be represented before the Court of Appeal,

although legal aid at the trial will normally be extended, as in this

case, for the preparation of the grounds of appeal for the leave to

appeal application. On an application for leave to appeal the Court

of Appeal does not re-hear the case on the facts and no witnesses are

called, even if the grounds of appeal involve questions of fact. The

issue for decision in such proceedings is whether the applicant has

demonstrated the existence of arguable grounds which would justify

hearing an appeal. The principle of equality of arms is respected in

that the prosecution, like the accused, is not represented at these

proceedings (Eur. Court H.R., Monnell and Morris judgment of 2 March

1987, Series A No. 115, pp. 12-14 and 22-24, paras. 23-27, 57 and 62).

It seems that the applicant's leave to appeal application was

disposed of in the manner described above. The Commission finds that

the refusal of leave to appeal itself raises no issue under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention. Moreover, it finds nothing untoward in the

subsequent refusal of legal aid, the proceedings having ended. The

Commission notes that the applicant had legal aid for the written

presentation of his leave to appeal application. The subsequent

refusal did not, therefore, infringe Article 6 para. 3 (c)

(Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention. The applicant also complains that the

Court of Appeal refused leave to hear witnesses, but the papers

submitted by the applicant do not show that any request to hear

specific witnesses was made.

In the light of these considerations and the particular

circumstances of the case, the Commission finds that the applicant's

complaints under Articles 5 and 6 (Art. 5, 6) of the Convention are

unsubstantiated. It follows that this part of the application is

manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

Finally the applicant complains of discrimination, contrary to

Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, as well as an infringement of

the right of individual petition under Article 25 (Art. 25). He also

invokes Article 60 of the Convention. However, the Commission finds

that the applicant's complaints under these provisions are also

unsubstantiated and therefore rejects them as being manifestly ill-

founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber

(M. de SALVIA) (J.A. FROWEIN)

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T. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

T. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

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