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ZUKRIGL v. AUSTRIA

Doc ref: 17279/90 • ECHR ID: 001-1763

Document date: May 13, 1992

  • Inbound citations: 12
  • Cited paragraphs: 1
  • Outbound citations: 11

ZUKRIGL v. AUSTRIA

Doc ref: 17279/90 • ECHR ID: 001-1763

Document date: May 13, 1992

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 17279/90

                      by Walter ZUKRIGL

                      against Austria

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

13 May 1992, the following members being present:

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL, Acting President of the First Chamber

                 F. ERMACORA

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

           Sir   Basil HALL

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   M. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

           Mr.   M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the First Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 31 July 1990 by

Waler Zukrigl against Austria and registered on 10 October 1992 under

file No. 17279/90;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1933.  He is

represented before the Commission by Mr. W. Dietrich, a lawyer

practising in Vienna.

      The facts of the application, as submitted by the applicant, may

be summarised as follows.

      The applicant is a homosexual, aware of his sexuality since his

youth.

      In early 1986 the applicant met and became friends with a boy

who, at the time, was not yet 18 years old.  The applicant's homosexual

feelings towards the boy were reciprocated.  Because of the provisions

of Section 209 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) the applicant was

not permitted to - and did not - have sexual relations with his friend.

      The applicant introduced two constitutional complaints with the

Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), one concerning the

wording of Article 209 up to 31 December 1988, and one concerning the

new wording which was in force from 1 January 1989.

      The Constitutional Court rejected the first constitutional

complaint( concerning the old wording of Section 209) on the grounds

that the applicant no longer stood under any threat of being prosecuted

under that provision as it was no longer in force.  As to the second

constitutional complaint, concerning the current wording of Section

209, the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 3 October 1989, found

that the applicant had locus standi to make the complaint as he was a

person who was actually affected by the provision.  Only a

constitutional complaint could remedy the alleged interference with the

applicant's rights.

      The Constitutional Court continued:

(Translation)

      "The appellant especially sees a violation of equal rights

      in the passage of the law he challenges in its allegedly

      treating men and women differently, in a way that is not

      justified on any relevant grounds, with respect to

      homosexual activities with young people under 18.  It is

      claimed that if the legislature has in mind the protection

      and the safeguarding of the undisturbed sexual development

      of young people, there is no difference at all between the

      development of male and female sexuality.  It is also

      asserted that if in order to justify exemption from

      punishment for female homosexual acts involving under-age

      partners a position is taken up which is based on whether

      the effects of such acts are harmful, this standpoint

      cannot be given up when it comes to judging homosexual

      contacts with male under-age persons.

      The Constitutional Court continues to hold the view it has

      consistently expressed in previous cases that the scope

      given to the ordinary legislature by the constitution with

      respect to the passing of legislation applies both to the

      aims it is seeking to achieve and to the choice of the

      methods serving to achieve those aims.  The ordinary

      legislature is free to decide - while taking into account

      either desired side-effects or those it is prepared to

      accept - what instruments it considers suitable in order to

      achieve its aims and then actually applies in a given

      situation.  In this connection it is only barred from

      exceeding the limits imposed by the constitution, for

      example by violating the requirement to be objective (which

      results from the principle that everyone must be treated

      equally) by choosing completely unsuitable means of

      achieving an aim or by choosing means which, although

      basically suitable, lead to a distinction being made for

      which no valid reasons can be given.  The development of

      the criminal law in the last few decades has shown that the

      legislature is striving to apply the system of criminal

      justice in a significantly more restrictive way than before

      - in pursuance of the efforts it is undertaking in

      connection with its policy on the treatment of offenders,

      which have become known under the general heading of

      "decriminalisation".  This means that it only leaves

      offences on the statute book or creates new offences if

      such punishment of behaviour harmful to society is still

      found absolutely necessary and indispensable after the

      strictest criteria have been applied.  The criminal

      provision which has been challenged is included in that

      group of acts considered unlawful in order to protect - to

      an extent thought to be unavoidable - a young, maturing

      person from developing sexually in the wrong way

      ("Homosexual acts are only offences of relevance to the

      criminal law inasmuch as a dangerous strain must not be

      placed by homosexual experiences upon the sexual

      development of young males ...").  Seen in this light, it

      is the conviction of the Constitutional Court that from the

      point of view of the principle of equality contained in

      Article 7 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Law and

      Article 2 of the Basic Constitutional Act those legislating

      on the criminal law cannot reasonably be challenged for

      taking the attitude, by reference to authoritative expert

      opinions coupled with experience gained, that homosexual

      influence endangers maturing males to a significantly

      greater extent than girls of the same age, and conclude

      that it is necessary to punish under the criminal law

      homosexual acts committed with young males, as provided for

      under s. 209 of the Penal Code.  This conclusion was also

      based on their views of morality, which they wanted to

      impose while duly observing current policy on criminal

      justice, which aims at moderation and at restricting the

      punishment of offences (while carefully weighing up all the

      manifold advantages and disadvantages).  Taking everything

      into account, we are dealing here with a distinction which

      is based on factual differences and therefore

      constitutionally admissible from the point of view of

      Article 7 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Law, in

      conjunction with Article 2 of the Basic Constitutional Act.

      The Constitutional Court thus endorses the legal view held

      by the Supreme Court, which did not raise any

      constitutional doubts concerning the legal rule contained

      in the earlier version of s. 209 of the Penal Code, the

      basic conception of which was comparable with respect to

      the different treatment of under-age males and females.

      This has already been demonstrated in several judgments

      (cf. OGH 15 September 1981, 9 Os 144/81 = EvBl. 1982 No.

      35; 23 April 1986, 9 Os 38/86; see also OGH 10 September

      1981, 13 Os 115/81 = EvBl 1982 No. 65m; 24 August 1982, 9

      Os 114/82 = SSt. 53/50).  The restriction contained in the

      Juvenile Court Law 1988 (Federal Law Gazette 599) of the

      group of offenders to (male) adults also raises no doubts

      with respect to the constitutional law.  The Constitutional

      Court basically shares the view expressed by the Federal

      Government, the gist of which is that this is only an

      expression of the basic legal idea that the strict,

      rigorous means of punishment available under the criminal

      law must be handled sparingly and with proper restraint.

      Contrary to the appellant's view, the criminal provision

      which is challenged cannot violate Article 8 of the

      European Convention on Human Rights simply because the

      interference with private and family life, which it is

      claimed has taken place, is quite obviously a legislative

      measure for the protection of the rights of others which is

      admissible under Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention,

      namely the protection of the undisturbed development of

      persons affected by criminal acts.

      It therefore follows that the application to annul s. 209

      of the Penal Code (Federal Law Gazette 60/1974, as amended:

      Federal Law Gazette 599/1988) had to be dismissed as

      ill-founded."

(Original)

      "Die Gleichheitswidrigkeit der angegriffenen Gesetzesstelle

      erblickt der Einschreiter insbesondere darin, daß sie

      Männer und Frauen in bezug auf homosexuelle Handlungen mit

      Jugendlichen in sachlich nicht gerechtfertigter Weise

      unterschiedlich behandle.  Habe der Gesetzgeber den Schutz

      und die Sicherung der ungestörten sexuellen Entwicklung

      junger Menschen vor Augen, so bestehe kein Unterschied in

      der Entwicklung männlicher und weiblicher Sexualität

      überhaupt.  Werde zur Rechtfertigung der Straflosigkeit

      weiblicher homosexueller Kontakte zu jüngeren Partnerinnen

      eine Position bezogen, die sich an schädigenden Wirkungen

      orientiere, könne dieser Standpunkt bei der Beurteilung

      homosexueller Kontakte zu männlichen jüngeren Personen

      nicht aufgegeben werden.

      Der Verfassungsgerichtshof hält an seiner in ständiger

      Rechtsprechung vertretenen Auffassung fest, daß die dem

      einfachen Gesetzgeber verfassungsmäßig eingeräumte

      rechtspolitische Gestaltungsfreiheit sowohl für die

      angestrebten Ziele als auch für die Auswahl der zur

      Zielerreichung dienlichen Mittel gilt: Der einfache

      Gesetzgeber kann frei entscheiden, welche Instrumente er -

      under Berücksichtigung erwünschter oder in Kauf genommener

      Nebenwirkungen - in der jeweils gegebenen Situation zur

      Verwirklichung seiner Zielsetzungen geeignet erachtet und

      anwendet.  Verwehrt ist ihm hiebei nur die Überschreitung

      der von Verfasssungs wegen gezogenen Schranken, so die

      Verletzung des aus dem Gleichheitssatz erfließenden

      Sachlichkeitsgebots, indem beispielsweise zur

      Zielerreichung völlig ungeeignete Mittel gewählt werden

      oder die vorgesehenen, an sich geeigneten zu einer sachlich

      unbegründbaren Differenzierung führen.  Die Fortentwicklung

      der Strafrechtsordnung in den letzten Jahrzehnten zeigt

      nun, dass der Gesetzgeber das Justizstrafrecht - in

      Verfolgung seiner unter dem Überbegriff

      "Entkriminalisierung" bekannt gewordenen

      kriminalpolitischen Bestrebungen - deutlich restriktiver

      als zuvor einzusetzen trachtet, Straftatbestände also nur

      dann bestehen läßt oder neu schafft, wenn eine derartige

      Pönalisierung sozialschädlichen Verhaltens auch nach

      strengsten Kriterien unbedingt geboten und unerläßlich ist.

      Die angefochtene Strafnorm zählt zu jener Gruppe von

      Unrechtstatbeständen, die dem Schutz des heranreifenden

      jungen Menschen vor sexueller Fehlentwicklung - im

      unumgänglich befundenen Umfang - dient ["Homosexuelle

      Betätigung ist strafrechtlich nur insofern relevant, als

      die sexuelle Entwicklung männlicher Jugendlicher nicht

      durch homosexuelle Erlebnisse in gefährdender Weise

      belastet werden soll...").  So betrachtet kann dem

      Strafgesetzgeber aber nach Überzeugung des

      Verfassungsgerichtshofs unter dem Aspekt des

      Gleichbehandlungssatzes der Art. 7 Abs. 1 B-VG und 2 StGG

      nicht mit Grund entgegengetreten werden, wenn er - unter

      Berufung auf maßgebende Expertenmeinungen in Verbindung mit

      Erfahrungstatsachen den Standpunkt einnehmend, daß eine

      homosexuelle Einflußnahme männliche Heranreifende in

      signifikant höherem Grad gefährde als gleichaltrige Mädchen

      - auf dem Boden und in Durchsetzung seiner

      Wertvorstellungen mit Beachtung der eingeschränkten,

      maßhaltenden Ziele der vorherrschenden Strafrechtspolitik

      (bei sorgsamer Abwägung aller vielfältigen Vor- und

      Nachteile) ableitet, es sei mit einer strafrechtlichen

      Ahndung homosexueller Handlungen an jungen Menschen

      männlichen Geschlechts, wie in § 209 StGB festgelegt, das

      Auslangen zu finden.  Denn es handelt sich hier  - alles in

      allem genommen - um eine Differenzierung, die auf

      Unterschieden im Tatsachenbereich beruht und deswegen aus

      der Sicht des Art. 7 Abs. 1 B-VG iVm Art. 2 StGG

      verfassungsrechtlich zulässig ist.  Der

      Verfassungsgerichtshof tritt damit im Ergebnis der

      Rechtsmeinung des Obersten Gerichtshofs bei, der - wie

      schon in mehreren Entscheidungen dargelegt (vgl. OGH

      15.9.1981 9 Os 144/81 = EvBl. 1982 Nr. 35, 23.4.1986, 9 Os

      38/86;  s. auch OGH 10.9.1981 13 Os 115/81 = EvBl. 1982 Nr.

      65m 24.84.1982 9 Os 114/82 = SSt. 53/50) - die in ihrer

      Grundkonzeption vergleichbare Strafnorm des § 209 StGB

      (frühere Fassung) aus dem Blickwinkel der unterschiedlichen

      Behandlung von männlichen und weiblichen Minderjährigen

      verfassungsrechtlich nicht in Zweifel zog.  Doch auch die

      hier relevierte, mit dem Jugendgerichtsgesetz 1988, BGBl.

      599, verfügte Einschränkung des Täterkreises auf

      (männliche) Volljährige begegnet keinen verfassungs-

      rechtlichen Bedenken.  Der Verfassungsgerichtshof teilt

      dazu im wesentlichen die Auffassung der Bundesregierung,

      die (sinngemäß) zutreffend darauf hinweist, daß hierin nur

      der rechtspolitische Grundgedanke zum Ausdruck komme, die

      einschneidenden strengen Mittel des Kriminalrechts in

      sachgerechter Weise zurückhaltend und sparsam zu handhaben.

      Gegen Art. 8 EMRK wieder kann die angefochtene Stafnorm

      entgegen der Meinung des Antragstellers allein schon

      deshalb nicht verstoßen, weil der behauptete Eingriff in

      das Privat- und Familienleben ganz offenkundig eine nach

      Art. 8 Abs. 2 EMRK zulässige gesetzgeberische Maßnahme

      zum Schutz der Rechte anderer ist, nämlich zum Schutz der

      ungestörten Entwicklung der von den Straftaten betroffenen

      Personen.

      Daraus folgt aber, daß der Antrag, § 209 StGB, BGBl.

      60/1974 idF BGBl.  599/1988, als verfassungswidrig

      aufzuheben, als unbegründet abzuweisen war."

Relevant provisions of domestic law

Up to 31 December 1988:

(Translation)

      s. 209.  A male person who after attaining the age of

      eighteen fornicates with a youth of the same sex shall be

      sentenced to detention of between six months and five

      years.

(Original)

      § 209.  Eine Person männlichen Geschlechtes, die nach

      Vollendung des achtzehnten Lebensjahres mit einer

      jugendlichen Person gleichgeschlechtliche Unzucht treibt,

      ist mit Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu fünf

      Jahren zu bestrafen.

From 1 January 1989:

(Translation)

      s. 209.  A male person who after attaining the age of

      nineteen years fornicates with a person of the same sex who

      has attained the age of fourteen years but not the age of

      nineteen years shall be sentenced to detention of between

      six months and five years.

(Original)

      § 209.  Eine Person männlichen Geschlechtes, die nach

      vollendung des neunzehnten Lebensjahres mit einer Person,

      die das vierzehnte, aber noch nicht das achtzehnte

      Lebensjahr vollendet hat,  gleichgeschlechtliche Unzucht

      treibt, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu

      fünf Jahren zu bestrafen.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant alleges that the continued existence of Article 209

of the Criminal Code constitutes an unjustified interference with his

right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the

Convention.  He also considers that the fact that Article 209 only

applies to relations between men, and not to relations between women,

violates Article 14 in connection with Article 8 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant alleges violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the

Convention by virtue of the existence of legislation which makes it a

criminal offence for a man over the age of 19 to have homosexual

relations with a boy between the ages of 14 and 18.  Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:

      1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

      family life, his home and his correspondence.

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with

      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

      rights and freedoms of others.

      The applicant in the present case has not been prosecuted under

the new version of Section 209 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch).

The Commission must accordingly consider whether he may claim to be

"the victim of a violation" of Article 8 (Art. 8) within the meaning

of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.

      The Commission recalls that in its judgment in the Marckx case

the European Court of Human Rights held the following:

      "Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention entitles

      individuals to contend that a law violates their rights by

      itself, in the absence of an individual measure of

      implementation, if they run the risk of  being directly

      affected by it."  (Eur. Court H.R., Marckx judgment of 13

      June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 13, para. 27).

      The Commission has had regard to the jurisprudence of the Court

according to which the very existence of legislation may continuously

affect the exercise of a right under the Convention (cf. Eur. Court

H.R., Dudgeon judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, p. 18,

para. 41) even in the absence of an individual measure of

implementation (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Johnston and Others judgment of

18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, p. 21, para. 42) and even where the

risk of such an implementation is minimal (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Norris

judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142, p. 16, para. 33).

      Moreover, the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof)

found, for the purposes of Austrian law, that the current text of

Section 209 of the Criminal Code  (Strafgesetzbuch) affected the

applicant in the enjoyment of his rights.  Having regard to the above

jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and to the finding

of the Constitutional Court, the Commission finds that the applicant

may claim to be a victim of a violation within the meaning of Article

25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.

      To the extent that the applicant is required to exhaust domestic

remedies in connection with a complaint concerning the effect of a

provision on his right to respect for private life, the Commission

finds that, by putting his complaint to the Constitutional Court, the

applicant has exhausted domestic remedies according to the generally

recognised rules of international law.

      Having regard to the above-mentioned Dudgeon and Norris judgments

of the Court, and to the Commission's Report in the case of Modinos v.

Cyprus (No. 15070/89, Report 3.12.91), the Commission finds that the

existence of Article 209 of the Criminal Code amounts to an

interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life

as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, that

the interference is "in accordance with the law", and that the aim of

the interference is the "protection of the rights and freedoms of

others" and the "protection of morals".

      As to the question of necessity, the Commission recalls that the

Convention organs have on three occasions considered the

criminalisation of homosexual activities between consenting male adults

as not "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention (Dudgeon and Norris

judgments and Modinos case,  referred to above).  The present case,

however, relates not to a prohibition on homosexual acts between

consenting male adults, but rather to legislation fixing an age of

consent to homosexual activities, with a separate age of criminal

responsibility for the relevant offences (cf. No. 7215/75, Comm. Report

12.10.78, D.R. 19 p. 66, paras. 139-158).

      It is, in the first place, for the domestic authorities to assess

whether a pressing social need exists for an interference with the

rights set out in Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, and

that in making this assessment, a margin of appreciation is left to the

States (cf. Norris judgment, referred to above, p. 20, para. 45 with

further references).

      The Commission recalls that it has already considered that there

was a realistic basis (in 1978) for the conclusion that young men in

the age-bracket 18-21 who are involved in homosexual relationships

would be subject to substantial social pressures which could be harmful

to their psychological development (No. 7215/75, referred to above,

para. 154).  In that case, the Commission found that the United Kingdom

Government had not gone beyond its obligations under the Convention in

attempting to strike a balance between the conflicting interests

involved.

      In the present case, the age of "consent" is lower than in the

previous case concerning the United Kingdom, and the age at which

criminal responsibility will be imputed for breach of the respective

provisions is higher in Austria than in the United Kingdom.  Although

it appears from the extensive documents submitted by the applicant that

attitudes in general may have evolved since 1978, the Commission finds

nothing in the present case to distinguish it from Application No.

7215/75, save that the Austrian legislation is less restrictive.

      The interference with the applicant's right to respect for his

private life can therefore be considered "necessary in a democratic

society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 14 of the

Convention in connection with Article 8 (Art. 14+8).  He points out

that Section 209 of the Criminal Code relates only to male homosexual

behaviour, and considers that the fact that female homosexual behaviour

is not included amounts to an unjustified distinction in the enjoyment

of Article 8 (Art. 8) rights, contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention.  Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides as

follows:

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any

      ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,

      political or other opinion, national or social origin,

      association with a national minority, property, birth or

      other status."

      This issue is also canvassed in the Commission's Report in

Application No. 7215/75, (Comm. Report 12.10.78, D.R. 19 p. 66, paras.

166-170).  In addition, in the present case, the Constitutional Court

has discussed, in the context of the principle of equality before the

law, whether a discrimination was involved.  The Constitutional Court

noted that the reason why female homosexuality had been excluded from

the scope of Section 209 was because it was the policy of the

legislator only to impose criminal sanctions in cases where such

penalty was absolutely necessary, even using the strictest criteria.

It further noted that the legislator had considered that there was

considerably more danger of homosexual influence on adolescent males

than girls of the same age.  Accordingly, although there was a

difference in treatment, the Constitutional Court found that the

existence of Section 209 did not raise constitutional problems.

      Bearing in mind both its previous Report in Application No.

7215/75 (referred to above) and the reasons set out in the

Constitutional Court's decision of 3 October 1989, the Commission finds

that the application of Section 209 of the Criminal Code to males but

not to females does not constitute discrimination against the applicant

within the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber    Acting President of the First Chamber

      (M. De SALVIA)                        (E. BUSUTTIL)

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