Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 17486/90

by J.L.

against the Netherlands

The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 1 July 1992, the following members being present:

MM. S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber

G. JÖRUNDSSON

A. WEITZEL

J.-C. SOYER

H. G. SCHERMERS

H. DANELIUS

Mrs. G. H. THUNE

MM. F. MARTINEZ

L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 4 October 1990 by

J.L. against the Netherlands and registered on 26 November 1990 under

file No. 17486/90;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Dutch national born in 1937. Before the

Commission, he is represented by T.J. van Veen, a lawyer practising in

Ede.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

In the course of an inquiry concerning fiscal and related

offences, a search of the applicant's house was carried out on 3

December 1984. The search began at 7.45 a.m. and ended at 10.30 a.m.

The investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) left the house at 9.35

a.m.

It appears that the applicant was convicted and sentenced by the

Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Arnhem on 22 October 1984.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the Court of Appeal

(Gerechtshof) of Arnhem. He submitted that the house-search had not

been properly carried out because the investigating judge had left the

house one hour before the end of the search. Thus, the evidence

obtained by the search - the essential evidence against him - had not

been properly obtained and he should therefore be acquitted.

On 24 January 1989, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of

the Regional Court, convicted the applicant of forgery and repeated

deliberate incorrect declarations for taxation purposes and gave him

a 3 months' suspended sentence. In reply to the applicant's

submissions relating to the house-search, the Court of Appeal stated:

"Blijkens het proces-verbaal van de huiszoeking op 3

december 1984 was de rechter-commissaris aanwezig bij de

aanvang van de huiszoeking te 07.45 uur, heeft hij

voorwerpen in beslag doen nemen en heeft hij voorts de

bewoner tot tweemaal toe gehoord, waarna hij het pand te

09.35 uur heeft verlaten, terwijl de huiszoeking te 10.30

uur is beëindigd.

Naar 's-hofs oordeel kan onder deze omstandigheden niet

gezegd worden, dat de huiszoeking niet onder leiding van de

rechter-commissaris heeft plaatsgevonden. Anders dan de

raadsman heeft betoogd brengt de leidinggevende taak van de

rechter-commissaris niet steeds mede, dat hij voortdurend

c.q. zowel bij de introductie, het inbeslag nemen als bij

de afsluiting aanwezig is. In casu is de rechter-

commissaris gedurende bijna twee van de bijna drie uur

durende huiszoeking aanwezig geweest, terwijl niet

aannemelijk is geworden dat de grenzen van de wettelijke

bevoegdheden zijn overschreden, dan wel dat daarbij

onzorgvuldig is gehandeld."

"According to the report on the house search of 3 December

1984, the investigating judge was present at the beginning

of the search at 7.45 a.m., ordered the seizure of items

and questioned the occupant twice, after which he left the

house at 9.35 a.m., whereas the search ended at 10.30 a.m.

In the Court's opinion it cannot be said in these

circumstances that the search did not take place under the

direction of the investigating judge. Contrary to the

lawyer's opinion, the supervisory function of the

investigating judge does not require his constant presence,

i.e. from the beginning of the seizure to the end. In the

present case, the investigating judge was present during

almost two hours of a search which lasted nearly three

hours, whereas it cannot be established that the limits of

the relevant legal powers were exceeded, or that in this

respect the search was otherwise irregular."

On 1 May 1990 the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) rejected the

applicant's appeal on points of law. As to the alleged illegality of

the search, the Supreme Court stated:

"5.3.1. Een redelijke wetsuitlegging noopt ertoe aan te

nemen dat in het eerste lid van art. 112 Sv tot uitdrukking

wordt gebracht dat een huiszoeking dient te geschieden

onder leiding van de rechter-commissaris, welke leiding

mede ten doel heeft te waarborgen dat bij de huiszoeking de

grenzen van de wettelijke bevoegdheden niet worden

overschreden.

5.3.2. Dit in aanmerking genomen behoeft de omstandigheid

dat de rechter-commissaris na met de huiszoeking te zijn

aangevangen niet steeds ter plaatse blijft doch zich naar

elders begeeft terwijl intussen opsporingsambtenaren - in

tegenwoordigheid van de officier van justitie of van de

hulpofficier die hem vervangt - de tot de huiszoeking

behorende handelingen verrichten, niet uit te sluiten dat

de huiszoeking nochtans geschiedt 'door den rechter-

commissaris', aangezien immers de moderne

communicatiemiddelen het mogelijk maken enerzijds dat de

vorenbedoelde personen onderscheidenlijk de persoon bij wie

de huiszoeking geschiedt zich tijdens de huiszoeking tot de

rechter-commissaris wenden ten einde diens beslissing in te

roepen, anderzijds dat de rechter-commissaris desgewenst

nadere instructies met betrekking tot de huiszoeking kan

blijven geven, een en ander als ware hij ter plaatse

aanwezig.

5.4. Gelet op 's Hofs oordeel dat niet aannemelijk is

geworden dat bij de huiszoeking de grenzen van de

wettelijke bevoegdheden zijn overschreden dan wel dat

daarbij onzorgvuldig is gehandeld en in aanmerking genomen

dat door of namens de verdachte niet is gesteld dat hij

redenen heeft gehad om zich tijdens de huiszoeking tot de

rechter-commissaris te wenden ten einde diens beslissing in

te roepen, heeft het Hof het verweer kunnen verwerpen."

"A reasonable interpretation of the first paragraph of

Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would suggest

that a house search has to be carried out under the

direction of the investigating judge, which direction is

inter alia meant to guarantee that the limits of the

relevant legal powers will not be exceeded during the

search.

Taking this into account, the fact that the investigating

judge is not constantly on the spot after the beginning of

the search but goes elsewhere, whereas the investigators

continue the search measures in the meantime, in the

presence of the public prosecutor or the assistant

prosecutor who stands in for him, does not mean that the

search has not nevertheless taken place 'under the

direction of the investigating judge', since in any case

modern means of communications make it possible, on the one

hand, that the above-mentioned persons or the person whose

property is searched can apply to the investigating judge

during the search in order to obtain a decision from him

or, on the other hand, that the investigating judge, if

required, can go on giving instructions with regard to the

search, in both cases as if he were present on the spot.

The Court of Appeal could reject the objection, as it was

of the opinion that it was not established that the limits

of the relevant legal powers were exceeded or that the

search was for this reason negligently performed, and as it

was not submitted by or on behalf of the defendant that he

had some reason to apply to the investigating judge during

the search in order to obtain a decision from him."

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains that the house search to which he was

subjected on 3 December 1984 is contrary to Article 8 of the

Convention. He claims that the interference with his right to respect

for his home was not in accordance with the law because the search had

not been carried out under the direction of the investigating judge

throughout.

2. Claiming that his conviction was mainly based on the evidence

obtained by the house search, the applicant further complains that he

has not been proved guilty according to law since the search had not

been properly carried out because the investigating judge was not

present throughout the search. He invokes Article 6 para. 2 of the

Convention.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains that the search to which he was subjected

on 3 December 1984 is contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention guarantees to everyone,

inter alia, the right to respect for his home.

The question arises whether the applicant has exhausted the

domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention. The mere fact that the applicant has submitted his case to

the various competent courts does not in itself constitute compliance

with this rule.It is also required that the substance of any complaint

made before the Commission should have been raised during the

proceedings concerned (No. 10307/83, Dec. 6.3.84, D.R. 37 pp. 113-120;

No. 10563/83, Dec. 5.7.85, D.R. 44 p. 113). In this respect the

Commission notes that the applicant failed to invoke Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention before the national courts although he

invoked the alleged illegality of the search.

However, the Commission does not find it necessary to determine

whether, in these circumstances, the applicant can be considered to

have complied with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, since his

complaint relating to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention is in any

case inadmissible for the following reason.

The Commission considers that the search interfered with the

applicant's right to respect for his home within the meaning of Article

8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention. It must therefore examine

whether this interference was justified under Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

The Commission recalls that it is primarily the task of national

authorities to interpret domestic law, but that the Convention organs

have a limited jurisdiction to control the manner in which it is done

(cf. No. 10689/83, Dec. 14.5.84, D.R. 37 p. 225).

In its judgment of 1 May 1990 the Supreme Court examined the

applicant's claim that the search was illegal and considered that the

search had taken place in accordance with Section 112 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure.

The Commission is of the opinion that the Supreme Court's

interpretation of Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must

be considered as an authoritative interpretation of Dutch law on this

point. The interpretation cannot be regarded as arbitrary or

unreasonable. It follows that the interference with the applicant's

right under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention was in

accordance with the law. The Commission further considers that the

interference complained of was necessary in a democratic society for

the prevention of crime.

The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the interference

with the applicant's right under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

was justified under para. 2 of this provision.

It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. Invoking Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, the

applicant also complains that he has not been proved guilty according

to law since the search had not been carried out in accordance with the

requirements of the law.

Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention which lays down

the principle of presumption of innocence has been interpreted by the

Commission as requiring firstly "that court judges in fulfilling their

duties should not start with the conviction or assumption that the

accused committed the act with which he is charged" (cf. No. 988/60,

Austria v. Italy, Yearbook 6 p. 785; No. 5523/72, Dec. 5.10.74,

Collection 46 pp. 99,106). In other words this provision is primarly

concerned with the attitude of mind of the judges at the outset of the

trial, but not with the way in which the evidence has been obtained,

the latter falling to be examined as an element of fair trial,

guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

However in view of its above finding under Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention, the Commission finds no indication that the applicant's

trial has in any way been unfair.

It follows that this part of the application must also be

rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber

(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)

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L. v. THE NETHERLANDS

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