NIELSEN v. DENMARK
Doc ref: 19028/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1371
Document date: September 9, 1992
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 19028/91
by Hans Richard NIELSEN
against Denmark
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
9 September 1992, the following members being present:
MM. J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President
C. A. NØRGAARD
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J. C. SOYER
H. G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission.
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 1 October 1991 by
Hans Richard NIELSEN against Denmark and registered on 14 November 1992
under file No. 19028/91;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant is a Danish citizen, born in 1959. He is at present
serving a prison sentence of indefinite duration (forvaring) at
Herstedvester prison, Denmark.
A. The particular facts of the case
On 24 April 1990 the applicant was arrested, suspected of having
assaulted and threatened a woman. He denied the charges. By indictment
of 17 August 1990 the applicant was charged with attempted homicide and
his case was therefore, in accordance with Danish law, brought before
the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret) sitting with a
jury. By judgment of 13 December 1990 the applicant was found guilty
of assault and of having threatened another person, contrary to
Sections 244 and 266 of the Penal Code, whereas the Court did not find
that the facts disclosed a violation of Section 237 in conjunction with
Section 21 of the Penal Code (attempted homicide). Having regard to the
applicant's previous convictions of a similar nature he was
subsequently sentenced to imprisonment of indefinite duration and to
pay damages to the woman in question.
The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court
(Højesteret) requesting the Court to impose a sentence of fixed
duration. He did not base his appeal on other grounds. Although the
applicant maintained his innocence he could not, under Danish law,
appeal against his conviction as such as the evaluation of evidence in
respect of the question of guilt or innocence in jury trials in Denmark
is finally determined by the jury and the professional judges of the
High Court (cf. Chapter 82 of the Administration of Justice Act
(Retsplejeloven)).
By judgment of 24 May 1991 the Supreme Court upheld the sentence
of imprisonment of indefinite duration.
B. Relevant domestic law
Chapter 82 (Sections 940-961) of the Administration of Justice
Act concerns the possibilities of appeal to the Supreme Court against
judgments pronounced by the High Court as a first instance court.
Section 943 provides that an appeal may be based on the allegation that
procedural rules have been disregarded or applied wrongly, the latter,
however, provided objections were lodged timely before the lower
instance. Section 945 furthermore provides that in addition to the
above an appeal may be based on the allegation that the court has
wrongly decided a matter which lies outside the jury's competence to
decide upon, that the jury's finding, upon which the judgment is based,
is wrong due to an incorrect instruction from the presiding judge as
to the legal aspects of the case (urigtig vejledning i loven), that the
questions put to the jury suffer from errors or are based on an
incorrect interpretation of the Penal Code and, finally, that the
sentence goes beyond the limits of the law or is obviously
disproportionate to the offence.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the
Convention. He complains that his conviction by the High Court of
Western Denmark cannot be reviewed by a higher tribunal and maintains
that Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 should be interpreted so as to leave
the choice of review of either the conviction or the sentence to him.
THE LAW
Relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the Convention
the applicant complains of the fact that his conviction by the High
Court of Western Denmark sitting with a jury cannot be reviewed by a
higher tribunal.
Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) reads as follows:
"1. Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal
shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed
by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the
grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law.
2. This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to
offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases
in which the person concerned was tried in the first instance by
the highest tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against
acquittal. "
The Commission recalls first of all that at the time of deposit
of the instrument of ratification of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention
Denmark made the following reservation:
"... Article 2, paragraph 1 (Art. 2-1) does not bar the use
of rules of the Administration of Justice Act according to
which the possibility of review by a higher court - in
cases subject to prosecution by the lower instance of the
prosecution (`politisager') - is denied
a. when the prosecuted, having been duly notified, fails
to appear in court;
b. when the court has repealed the punishment; or
c. in cases where only sentences of fines or
confiscations of objects below the amount or value
established by law are imposed."
The present case, however, does not concern a case "subject to
prosecution by the lower instance of the prosecution" but was of such
a nature that it was tried in the High Court sitting with a jury. It
follows that the Danish reservation does not prevent the Commission
from examining the issues raised by the applicant.
Whereas Article 14 para. 5 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights guarantees that "everyone convicted of a crime
shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by
a higher tribunal according to law," Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2)
to the Convention states that everyone has the right to have his
conviction or the sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. This could
be understood to imply that the States under this provision have a
choice and may limit the review guaranteed for everyone either to
concern the sentence alone or conviction and sentence. However, the use
of the word "or" could also be interpreted as referring to the possible
choice by the individual concerned, taking into account that some
national systems permit an application for review to be limited to the
sentence.
The Commission notes that the explanatory report on Protocol
No. 7 to the Convention refers to proceedings where the accused has
pleaded guilty to explain the use of the word "or" in Article 2 para. 1
(Art. 2-1). This would support the view that the provision does not
give a choice to the State. Whereas the second sentence of Article 2
para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2-1) requires that the exercise of the
right to a review by a higher tribunal shall be governed by law, the
Article does not specify its scope or actual implementation. As the
reference to the grounds for the review to be governed by national law
clearly shows the States have a discretion as to the modalities for the
exercise of the right of review. It is this part of the Article which
gives States the possibility to limit the review in several ways.
Indeed different rules govern review by a higher tribunal in the
member States of the Council of Europe. In some countries such review
is in certain cases limited to questions of law, such as the "recours
en cassation" (in French law) or "Revision" (in German law). In others
there is a right to appeal against findings of fact as well as on
questions of law; and in some States a person wishing to appeal to a
higher tribunal must in certain cases apply for leave to appeal.
Having regard to this the Commission does not find it necessary
to determine the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) in
general. Assuming that a review within the meaning this provision
guarantees to everyone the right to bring before a higher tribunal his
conviction or sentence or both such examination by this tribunal may
be a limited review, provided the limitations under the law would not
make such a review meaningless.
In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant
could under Danish law appeal against the judgment of the High Court
of Western Denmark to the Supreme Court. Such an appeal could be based
on the allegations that procedural rules were disregarded or applied
wrongly. The applicant could also have based his appeal on allegations
that the High Court had wrongly decided matters which fell outside the
jury's competence, that the jury had received wrong instructions as to
the legal aspects of the case, or that the questions put to the jury
suffered from errors or were based on an incorrect interpretation of
the Penal Code. Finally, the applicant could, and did, base his appeal
on the allegation that the sentence was disproportionate to the offence
committed.
This shows that the limitation of the review was in line with the
typical rules governing the procedures before Supreme Courts which sit
only to control the legality of the judgment of the trial court. The
Commission, therefore, considers that the exercise of the applicant's
right to review as provided for under Danish law satisfied the
requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the Convention.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) n(J.A. FROWEIN)