TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD AND ANDREW NEIL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 18897/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1403
Document date: October 12, 1992
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Application No. 18897/91
by TIMES NEWSPAPERS Ltd and Andrew NEIL
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
12 October 1992, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, Acting President
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Sir Basil HALL
M. F. MARTINEZ
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. K. ROGGE, Deputy to the Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 30 September 1992
by TIMES NEWSPAPERS Ltd and Andrew NEIL against the United Kingdom and
registered on 3 0ctober 1991 under file No. 18897/91;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are
1. Times Newspapers Ltd., publishers of The Sunday Times, a national
Sunday newspaper published in the United Kingdom ;
2. Andrew Ferguson Neil, editor of The Sunday Times, a British
citizen.
They are represented before the Commission by Messrs. Theodore
Goddard, Solicitors, London.
This is the third application which the applicants have brought
in relation to the litigation arising out of the intended publication
of the memoirs of Peter Wright, a former member of the British Security
Service MI5, in a book entitled "Spycatcher". The full facts
concerning that litigation are set out in the judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights in the case of The Sunday Times v. the United
Kingdom (No. 2) (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 26 November 1991, Series
A No. 217). The first application (No. 13166/87, Comm. Report 12.7.90)
concerned injunctions imposed on the Observer and Guardian newspapers,
and subsequently, The Sunday Times itself, preventing the applicants
publishing further extracts from "Spycatcher". The Court held in its
aforementioned judgment that the imposition of injunctions as of
30 July 1987 by the House of Lords was in violation of the applicants'
rights under Article 10 of the Convention, but not of their rights
under Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention. The second application
(No. 14644/89, Comm. Report 8.10.91) concerned the ultimate order of
the House of Lords on 13 October 1988 requiring the applicants to
account for the extra profit made from their publication of the
extracts from "Spycatcher" on 12 July 1987. The Committee of
Ministers, agreeing with the Commission, held on 15 May 1992 that the
applicants' rights under Articles 10, 13 and 14 of the Convention had
not been violated (Resolution DH(92)15). In the present case the
applicants complain of the findings of the domestic courts that they
were in contempt of court in publishing the first "Spycatcher" extracts
and obliging them to pay the Attorney General's costs in bringing the
contempt proceedings.
The facts of the present case, as submitted by the applicants and
which may be deduced from documents lodged with the application, may
be summarised as follows:
"Peter Wright, a former member of the British Security Service
MI5, sought to publish his memoirs in a book entitled
'Spycatcher'. The book contained several allegations of
misconduct on the part of MI5. Much of the material in the book
had already been disclosed by other authors or in television
programmes, including a Granada Television interview with Mr.
Wright in 1984. 'Spycatcher' was first to be published in
Australia in 1985 but the United Kingdom Government, represented
by the Attorney General, instituted proceedings in the Australian
courts to prevent publication. In June 1986 the Observer and
Guardian newspapers published short reports about some of the
allegations in the book. The Attorney General instituted
proceedings against these newspapers for breach of confidence in
the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice of England and
Wales. Temporary injunctions restraining further such reports
were granted from 11 July 1986 until the matter was finally
decided on the merits by the House of Lords on 13 October 1988"
(No. 14644/89, Comm. Report 8.10.91, para. 17).
In the meantime, on 27 April 1987, a major summary of certain of
the allegations in "Spycatcher", allegedly based on a copy of the
manuscript, appeared in the United Kingdom national daily newspaper The
Independent. Later the same day reports of that summary were published
in The London Evening Standard and the London Daily News. The next day
the Attorney General applied to the Queen's Bench Division of the High
Court for leave to move against the publishers and editors of these
three newspapers for contempt of court, that is conduct intended to
interfere with or prejudice the administration of justice. Leave was
granted on 29 April. In this application the Attorney General was
acting independently in his capacity as "the guardian of the public
interest in the due administration of justice".
The Vice-Chancellor, Sir Nicolas Browne Wilkinson, decided to
hold a hearing on the preliminary issue of law "whether a publication
made in the knowledge of an outstanding injunction against another
party (ie the injunctions against the Observer and Guardian newspapers)
and which if made by that other party, would be in breach thereof,
constitutes a criminal contempt of court upon the footing that it
assaults or interferes with the process of justice in relation to the
said injunction". The Vice-Chancellor held on 2 June 1987 "that since
the respondents were neither parties to the actions nor subject to the
injunctions, their conduct in publishing the memoirs with the knowledge
of the outstanding injunctions did not constitute a criminal contempt
of court". The Attorney General immediately lodged an appeal against
this preliminary ruling.
On 12 July 1987 The Sunday Times, which had purchased the British
newspaper serialisation rights from Mr. Wright's Australian publishers
and had obtained a copy of the manuscript from Viking Penguin
Incorporated in the United States, printed in its later editions, in
order to avoid the risk of proceedings for an injunction, the first
instalment of extracts from "Spycatcher". It explained that this was
timed to coincide with publication of the book in the United States,
which was due to take place on 14 July. On 13 July the Attorney
General also commenced proceedings against the applicants for contempt
of court on the ground that the publication frustrated the purpose of
the original injunctions in July 1986.
On 14 July 1987 Viking Penguin Incorporated published
"Spycatcher" in the United States of America ; some copies had, in
fact, been put on sale on the previous day. It was an immediate
best-seller. The British Government, which had been advised that
proceedings to restrain publication in the United States would not
succeed, took no legal action to that end either in that country or in
Canada, where the book also became a best-seller.
A substantial number of copies of the book were then brought into
the United Kingdom, notably by British citizens who had bought it
whilst visiting the United States or who had purchased it by telephone
or post from American bookshops. The telephone number and address of
such bookshops willing to deliver the book to the United Kingdom were
widely advertised in that country. No steps to prevent such imports
were taken by the British Government, which formed the view that
although a ban was within their powers it was likely to be ineffective.
They did, however, take steps to prevent the book being available at
United Kingdom booksellers or public libraries.
On 15 July 1987 the Court of Appeal announced that it would
reverse the preliminary ruling of the Vice-Chancellor in the
Independent case. Its reasons, which were handed down on 17 July, were
basically as follows: the purpose of the original injunctions was to
preserve the confidentiality of the "Spycatcher" material until the
substantive trial of the actions against the Observer and Guardian ;
the conduct of The Independent, The London Evening Standard and the
London Daily News could, as a matter of law, constitute a criminal
contempt of court because publication of that material would destroy
that confidentiality and, hence, the subject matter of those actions,
and therefore interfere with the administration of justice.
The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Donaldson, in one of the
judgments given by the Court of Appeal, commented on the fragile nature
of the subject matter of the litigation:
"Confidential information is like an ice cube. Give it to the
party who undertakes to keep it in his refrigerator and you still
have an ice cube by the time the matter comes to trial. Either
party may then succeed in obtaining possession of the cube. Give
it to a party who has no refrigerator or will not agree to keep
it in one, and by the time of the trial you just have a pool of
water which neither party wants. It is the inherently perishable
nature of confidential information which gives rise to unique
problems."
There was no doubt that the information held by Mr. Wright was
confidential and that until the litigation over the injunctions against
the Observer and Guardian had been determined on the merits other
publishers were not free to print "Spycatcher" material, for to do so
would deprive the Attorney General of a part of the rights which he was
asserting in those actions and to that extent the publications by The
Independent, The London Evening Standard and the London Daily News made
it impossible for the courts to do justice between the parties. The
Master of the Rolls rejected the idea that the Attorney General was
seeking to widen the law of criminal contempt, albeit in accordance
with established principles. He held as follows:
"The law of contempt is based upon the broadest of principles,
namely, that courts cannot and will not permit interference with
the due administration of justice. Its application is universal.
The fact that it is applied in novel circumstances ... is not
a widening of its application. It is merely a new example of its
application."
He made the following summary:
"(1) Confidential information, whatever its nature - personal,
financial, technical or security - has one essential common
characteristic. It is irremediably damaged in its confidential
character by every publication and the more widespread the
publication, the greater the damage. (2) If a prima facie claim
to confidentiality can be established, but this is opposed by a
claim of a right to publish, whether on grounds of the public
interest or otherwise, these opposing and wholly inconsistent
claims must be evaluated and balanced the one against the other.
(3) The public interest in ensuring that disputes are resolved
justly and by due process of law may require a different balance
to be struck at different stages. Thus, pending the trial of the
action, the balance will normally come down in favour of
preserving confidentiality, for the very obvious reason that,
this is not done and publication is permitted, there will be
nothing left to have a trial about. (4) It is for the courts,
and not for either of the opposing parties, to decide where, in
the public interest, that balance lies. (5) Third parties -
strangers to the action - who know that the court has made orders
or accepted undertakings designed to protect the confidentiality
of the information pending the trial, commit a serious offence
against justice itself if they take action which will damage or
destroy the confidentiality which the court is seeking to protect
and so render the due process of law ineffectual. (6) If such
third parties, having a legitimate interest in so doing, wish to
contest the court's decision to protect the confidentiality of
the information on any grounds, including in particular that they
have special rights or interests of which account has not been
taken, they should apply to the court which will hear them and
make any modification of its orders which may be appropriate.
This is a well-established procedure which works speedily and
well in the context of ex parte orders, such as those made in the
exercise of the Mareva and Anton Piller jurisdictions. Similarly
they should apply to the court if they have doubts whether the
action which they contemplate taking is lawful. (7) It is for
the courts, and not for third parties, to decide whether,
balancing competing public and private interests including those
of the third parties, confidentiality should continue to be
preserved at any particular time."
The Court of Appeal remitted the case to the High Court for it
to determine whether the three newspapers had acted with the specific
intent of so interfering.
By the time the case came before Mr. Justice Morritt in the High
Court in April 1989 The Sunday Times had been joined as a defendant
together with two other newspapers, The Sunday Telegraph and News on
Sunday for "Spycatcher" articles they had published on 26 July and
2 August 1987 respectively. On 8 May 1989 Mr. Justice Morritt found
The Independent, The Sunday Times and News on Sunday to be in contempt
of court and imposed a fine of £50,000, plus costs, in each case ; the
motions against the other newspapers were dismissed. He held that the
actus reus of the criminal contempt had to be considered as at the time
it was committed in the light of the purpose of the original
injunctions against the Observer and Guardian newspapers. It could not
be examined with the knowledge of hindsight after the worldwide
publication of "Spycatcher". At the material time, therefore, the
purpose of the original injunctions had been to preserve the
confidentiality of the material in the possession of Mr. Wright. That
confidentiality was partially destroyed with each publication from
"Spycatcher", notwithstanding that it was also partially destroyed by
other publications. Moreover such partial destruction constituted an
interference with the administration of justice despite the fact that
it had no effect on the eventual outcome of the trial on the merits
when it was decided not to grant permanent injunctions against
publication of the "Spycatcher" material.
As regards the mens rea, or intention to commit the offence,
Mr. Justice Morritt was satisfied that The Sunday Times had knowingly
perpetrated contempt of court in publishing the "Spycatcher" extracts
on 12 July 1987. He noted that on 2 March 1987 the Treasury Solicitor,
having heard about The Sunday Times' plans to serialise "Spycatcher",
had by letter advised the newspaper that it was subject to the same
obligations as the Observer and Guardian newspapers. He had enclosed
a copy of the injunctions against those newspapers. The following day
the legal adviser to The Sunday Times had replied to the Tre
Solicitor stating that it was the newspaper's intention to serialise
the Australian lawyer's account of the trial so that their article
would be more about the Australian litigation rather than the book.
Moreover he had contended that the newspaper was not bound by the
Observer and Guardian injunctions. After the institution of contempt
proceedings against The Independent, The Evening Standard and the
London Daily News the Treasury Solicitor had again warned The Sunday
Times.
The Sunday Times' editor, Mr. Neil, went about obtaining the
serialisation rights over the book and an advance copy of it in order
to publish before his competitors did so. The Vice-Chancellor decided
the preliminary contempt of law issue on 2 June 1987. On 7 July 1987
Mr. Neil flew to New York and obtained a copy of "Spycatcher". On
9 July 1987 he received legal advice from senior counsel that neither
he nor his newspaper would be liable for contempt of court if they
published information covered by the Observer and Guardian injunctions.
On 10 July 1987 the Treasury Solicitor again sent a warning letter in
view of the contempt proceedings against the other newspapers and the
Attorney General's pending appeal against the Vice-Chancellor's
preliminary ruling. The Sunday Times nevertheless went ahead with the
publication of the "Spycatcher" extracts on 12 July 1987, but did not
include them in the first edition of the day in order to avoid giving
advance warning to the Attorney General which would no doubt have
prompted him to seek an interlocutory injunction against the newspaper.
The applicants refused to undertake not to publish any further extracts
from "Spycatcher" and on 16 July 1987 the Attorney General obtained an
interlocutory injunction restraining further publication.
The applicant, Mr. Neil, acknowledged in the contempt proceedings
that he knew of the Observer and Guardian injunctions and that he
regarded "Spycatcher" as "banned in Britain", but he was satisfied with
the legal advice which he had received. He had, therefore, intended
putting "Spycatcher" into the public domain regardless of the
consequences. Mr. Justice Morritt held that Mr. Neil realised that the
inevitable consequence of publishing the extracts was to damage or
destroy the confidentiality of the material possessed by Mr. Wright and
he thereby interfered with the administration of justice in the
proceedings between the Attorney General and the Observer and Guardian
even if he genuinely, but wrongly, believed he would not be in contempt
of court. The judge, therefore, concluded that the Attorney General
had established beyond reasonable doubt that the publication of the
"Spycatcher" extracts by The Sunday Times was a contempt of court. The
applicants appealed against this judgment.
On 27 February 1990 the Court of Appeal, consisting of three
judges, unanimously dismissed the applicants' appeal against the
finding that they had been in contempt, agreeing with the judgment of
Mr. Justice Morritt, but it concluded that no fines should be imposed.
This was because, firstly, the Vice-Chancellor had given his
preliminary ruling that the other newspapers were not in contempt of
court, even though the applicants knew that his ruling was subject to
an appeal ; secondly the applicants had received legal advice that they
would not be in contempt if they published the "Spycatcher" extracts
and, thirdly, the publication of the whole book in the United States
of America was imminent, thus largely destroying any confidentiality
in Mr. Wright's material. The circumstances were, therefore,
exceptional and did not justify a fine.
Whilst Article 10 of the Convention does not form part of English
law it was accepted by at least one appellate judge that it was
relevant to the interpretation of principles of law which might be
unclear and where there is no binding authority. It was assumed that
the English law of contempt was in conformity with Article 10 of the
Convention and accepted that the burden of proof was upon the Attorney
General, in order to restrain disclosure of Government secrets, to show
that the information was confidential and that it was necessary in the
public interest not to publish it (pp. 40, 47-49 of the judgment of
Lord Justice Ralph Gibson).
It was emphasised that on the critical date of 17 July 1987, when
The Sunday Times published the "Spycatcher" extracts, the object of the
original injunctions against the Observer and Guardian had not yet been
thwarted by the publication of the book in the United States of
America. The fact that the book was published there two days later was
relevant to the assessment of the sanction which was to be imposed, but
not to the determination of the contempt itself committed by The Sunday
Times. The imminent publication on 14 July did not justify The Sunday
Times' action. Lord Justice Nicholls commented: "There is about The
Sunday Times case a large element of hindsight. On 12 July the
pressing social need that there should be no publication of 'Wright
material' still existed".
On 11 April 1991 the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords
unanimously dismissed the appeal by the applicants against the Court
of Appeal's decision on the issue of contempt of court. It was held
that the purpose of the original injunctions granted by Mr. Justice
Millett in 1986 against the Observer and Guardian was the prevention
of publication of material from "Spycatcher" pending the trial of the
actions for breach of confidence; that the consequence of such
publication by the applicants was to nullify, at least in part, the
purpose of that trial because it placed in the public domain material
which it was claimed by the Attorney General in those actions should
remain confidential; and that, accordingly, the conduct of the
applicants constituted the actus reus of impeding or interfering with
the administration of justice in the confidentiality actions, and since
mens rea in respect of such conduct had been conceded by the
applicants, the necessary elements to constitute contempt of court had
been established.
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook confirmed the lower court's ruling that
the aim and purpose of the law of contempt is to prevent interference
with the due administration of justice. He held that the Attorney
General was not seeking to widen the law of criminal contempt. The
Attorney General's submissions were deemed to be based upon long
established common law principles and in applying those principles to
the novel facts of the present case the offence of contempt had been
established.
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton emphasised the inherent jurisdiction of
the courts to ensure the effective administration of justice by
punishing contempt of court, a notion which has been "developed by the
common law over centuries. It is as essential as it is ancient, for,
unless litigants can be assured that the rights which it is the duty
of the courts to protect can be fairly determined and effectively
protected and enforced, the system of justice necessarily ceases to
command confidence and an essential foundation of the structure of
civilised society is undermined". He held, as regards Article 10 of
the Convention, that the contempt proceedings were "clearly necessary
for maintaining the authority of the judiciary" in view of the need to
uphold the temporary injunctions against the Observer and Guardian
newspapers pending the determination of the merits of the Attorney
General's claim on the merits against these newspapers.
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle concluded in a similar vein as
follows:
"It only remains to consider whether the public interest in the
freedom of the press should in this case override the interests
of the administration of justice. The importance in a democracy
of a free press cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, there are
occasions where that importance must give way to other
considerations. National security is one such consideration.
The importance of affording to an accused a fair trial is
another. In my view the public interest in enabling justice to
be done unimpeded between party and party is another. As I have
already remarked, it is only in a limited type of case that
freedom of the press is likely to be affected by possible
interference with the course of justice and I consider that in
these cases the public interest in having justice done unimpeded
between parties must prevail over that interest in the freedom
of the press.
For all the foregoing reasons I have no doubt that the appeal
should be dismissed."
Whilst the applicants were no longer liable to pay a fine for
their contempt of court they remained liable to pay the Attorney
General's legal costs, as they were the losing party in the
proceedings. To date the Attorney General's costs claim amounts to
£27,744.80. The costs bill has not yet been finalised or settled.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain of a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention, read on its own and together with Article 7 of the
Convention. They submit, inter alia, that the finding that they were
in contempt of court was neither prescribed by law, within the meaning
of Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention, nor an offence for the
purposes of Article 7 of the Convention as of 12 July 1987, when they
published the "Spycatcher" extracts, because at that time there was no
judicial precedent to establish "that the performance by a third party
of an act which other named persons had been enjoined from performing
could amount to contempt of court by the third party unless that third
party was aiding and abetting the person so enjoined or was privy or
party to a breach of the order by the party so enjoined". They rely
for this proposition on the decision of the Vice-Chancellor in the
present case on 2 June 1987 and claim that it was reflected in the
Court of Appeal's decision of 17 July 1987 not to impose a fine upon
them.
THE LAW
The applicants complain of a violation of Article 10
(Art. 10) of the Convention, read on its own and in conjunction with
Article 7 (Art. 7) (Art. 10+7) of the Convention, in respect of the
House of Lords' judgment against them on 11 April 1991.
1. As regards Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention provides as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary."
a) Interference with freedom of expression
The applicants claim that the House of Lords' decision on
11 April 1991, upholding the finding of contempt of court, was an
interference with their freedom of expression, ensured by Article 10
para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention, by the very finding itself, by
virtue of the imposition of the Attorney General's bill of costs and
by the binding nature of the decision with its repercussions and
inhibiting effect on freedom of expression in the future in analogous
cases.
The Commission agrees with the applicants that there has been an
interference with their freedom of expression in the present case.
b) Prescribed by law
One of the applicants' main contentions is that the interference
with their freedom of expression was not prescribed by law within the
meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention.
According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights
two requirements flow from the expression "prescribed by law": that the
law be both adequately accessible and foreseeable (Eur. Court H.R., The
Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A No. 30, p. 31,
para. 49).
On the question of accessibility, the Commission has examined the
various domestic court judgments in the present case and notes that,
apart from the preliminary ruling of the Vice-Chancellor on 2 June
1987, these courts have unanimously concluded that the principles of
criminal contempt of court have been long established in common law.
As Sir John Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, held in the Court of Appeal
on 17 July 1987: "The law of contempt is based upon the broadest of
principles, namely, that the courts cannot and will not permit
interference with the due administration of justice. Its application
is universal. The fact that it is applied in novel circumstances ...
is not a widening of its application. It is merely a new example of
its application" (p. 5 above). The domestic courts reviewed a wealth
of previous legal authorities and, in the absence of any evidence of
arbitrariness in the judgments in the present case, the Commission is
satisfied that the law concerning the offence of criminal contempt of
court was adequately accessible at the material time.
On the question of foreseeability, the Commission notes that the
applicants had warning of the risks they were running from an early
stage in the "Spycatcher" proceedings. They were aware from the day
of the imposition of the temporary injunctions against the Observer and
Guardian newspapers in July 1986 that the key issue in the "Spycatcher"
litigation with the Attorney General was to preserve the
confidentiality of the material held by Peter Wright, a former member
of the British Security Service, MI5. As of 2 March 1987 they had been
advised by the Treasury Solicitor that they were under the same
obligations as the Observer and Guardian newspapers to preserve that
confidence until the courts had determined the merits of the Attorney
General's claim. After the institution of proceedings against The
Independent, The London Evening Standard and the London Daily News for
contempt of court in April 1987 by the Attorney General, the Treasury
Solicitor repeatedly warned the applicants that in the Government's
view they would risk similar proceedings if they sought to publish any
"Spycatcher" material. Although the applicants were advised that the
Government's view of the law of contempt was wrong, the Commission
finds nevertheless that the applicants were fully aware of the risks
involved in publishing such material and chose deliberately to do so
in circumstances intended to escape prior Government detection. The
Commission concludes from the applicants' awareness of these risks that
the relevant law was sufficiently accessible. The interference in the
present case was accordingly "prescribed by law", within the meaning
of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention.
c) Legitimate aim
Interference with freedom of expression may only be justified if
it pursues a legitimate aim such as protecting the interests of
national security, preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence or maintaining the authority of the judiciary.
The applicants have not suggested that the contempt of court
proceedings against them did not pursue a legitimate aim.
The Commission refers to the judgment of Lord Oliver of Aylmerton
in the House of Lords on 11 April 1991 in the present case that the
contempt proceedings were "clearly necessary for maintaining the
authority of the judiciary", an essential part of which being the
protection of the rights of litigants until the dispute between them
has been fairly determined by the courts (p. 8 above ; cf. also Eur.
Court H.R., The Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A
No. 30, pp. 33-35, paras. 54-57). Moreover, the Commission does not
lose sight of the fact that there were important background elements
to the present case, namely the protection of information received in
confidence and the protection of national security (see No. 14644/89,
Times Newspapers Ltd and Neil v. the United Kingdom, Comm. Report
8.10.91, paras. 42-43).
The Commission finds, therefore, that the contempt of court
proceedings against the applicants pursued the legitimate aim of
maintaining the authority of the judiciary.
d) Necessary in a democratic society
The key issue in the present case is whether it was necessary in
the circumstances for the House of Lords to find the applicants in
contempt of court for publishing the "Spycatcher" extracts on 12 July
1987. The Commission refers to the general principles of necessity in
the domain of press freedom and the State's margin of appreciation
under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention as set out in the previous
applications brought by the present applicants concerning the
"Spycatcher" litigation (Eur. Court H.R., The Sunday Times (No. 2)
judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A No. 217, pp. 28-30,
paras. 50-51; No. 14644/89, Comm. Report 8.10.91, paras. 44-49 ;
cf. also Eur. Court H.R., The Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979,
Series A No. 30, pp. 35-38, paras. 58-62).
The applicants submit that the interference with their freedom
of expression by the contempt of court finding met no pressing social
need and was disproportionate to any legitimate aim pursued for three
reasons :
- the imminent publication of "Spycatcher" in the United States of
America,
- the lack of proportionality in imposing liability upon them for
contempt of court by reference to the purpose of an injunction
granted against third persons, and
- the absence of any effect of their publication of the
"Spycatcher" extracts on the ultimate outcome of the Attorney
General's claim on the merits for permanent injunctions against
the Observer and Guardian, to which proceedings they were
subsequently joined as defendants.
However, the Commission agrees with the remark of Lord Justice
Nicholls in the Court of Appeal's judgment of 27 February 1990 in the
present case that "there is about The Sunday Times case a large element
of hindsight" (p. 8 above). As in application No. 14644/89 brought by
the applicants, the Commission finds that the crucial date in the
"Spycatcher" proceedings which materially changed the circumstances of
the litigation was 14 July 1987, when the book went on sale in the
United States and became an instant best-seller (Comm. Report 8.10.91,
paras. 55-56). Up to that time the confidentiality of the "Spycatcher"
material was, arguably, worth preserving ; after that date there was
nothing confidential left to protect. So two days before, on 12 July
1987, the day when the applicants achieved their scoop in publishing
extracts from the book, there was an arguable case that they had
contributed to the partial destruction of the confidentiality of
material which was still the subject of pending litigation in the
courts. The Commission considers therefore that subsequent events,
including the ultimate failure of the Attorney General's claim against
the Observer, Guardian and Sunday Times for permanent injunctions, are
irrelevant to the issue before the Commission. The question remains
whether it was proportionate in the circumstances to impose obligations
on the applicants which flowed from injunctions imposed on other
newspapers, to which proceedings the applicants had not been a party
until they themselves became involved in publishing "Spycatcher"
material.
The Commission has had regard to the special perishable nature
of the subject matter of the "Spycatcher" litigation : confidential
information. The Master of the Rolls aptly likened such information
to an ice cube in need of refrigeration until such time as the matter
comes to trial (p. 5 above). The applicants were aware of this but
deliberately sought to break that confidentiality regardless of the
consequences, albeit believing that it was in the public interest (p. 7
above, Mr. Justice Morritt's judgment of 8 May 1989). Given the
State's margin of appreciation in this area, the Commission finds
nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in the conclusion of the domestic
courts that the applicants thereby interfered with the administration
of justice in the proceedings between the Attorney General and the
Observer and Guardian newspapers, of which proceedings the applicants
had full knowledge. The Commission again refers to the findings of the
Master of the Rolls:
"Third parties - strangers to the action - who know that the
court has made orders or accepted undertakings designed to
protect the confidentiality of the information pending the trial,
commit a serious offence against justice itself if they take
action which will damage or destroy the confidentiality which the
court is seeking to protect and so render the due process of law
ineffectual. If such third parties, having a legitimate interest
in so doing, wish to contest the court's decision to protect the
confidentiality of the information on any grounds, including in
particular that they have special rights or interests of which
account has not been taken, they should apply to the court which
will hear them and make any modification of its orders which may
be appropriate. This is a well-established procedure which works
speedily and well in the context of ex parte orders, such as
those made in the exercise of the Mareva and Anton Piller
jurisdictions. Similarly they should apply to the court if they
have doubts whether the action which they contemplate taking is
lawful. It is for the courts, and not for third parties, to
decide whether, balancing competing public and private interests
including those of the third parties, confidentiality should
continue to be preserved at any particular time" (p. 6 above).
Similarly the Commission considers that there was nothing
unreasonable or arbitrary in the House of Lords' conclusion in the
present case that "the public interest in having justice done unimpeded
between parties must prevail over that interest in the freedom of the
press" (p. 9 above, the judgment of Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle). The
Commission also notes that there was no prior restraint on the
publication of the "Spycatcher" extracts by the applicants and that the
sanction of finding them in contempt of court, with liability for
costs, was of a minor nature.
The Commission concludes that the decision of the House of Lords
of 11 April 1991, finding the applicants in contempt of court, was
proportionate to the legitimate aim of maintaining the authority of the
judiciary in order to protect the rights of other parties in pending
"Spycatcher" litigation in England. The House of Lords' judgment could
therefore be regarded as necessary within the meaning of Article 10
para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. As regards Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention
The relevant part of Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention
provides as follows:
"No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence under national or international law at the time when it
was committed."
The applicants contend that they could not have been guilty of
an offence of contempt of court when publishing the "Spycatcher"
extracts on 12 July 1987 because at that time third parties could not
be bound by an injunction imposed on a person unless they were aiding
and abetting that person to break it. However the Commission has held
above (p. 11) that the offence of criminal contempt for which the
applicants were found guilty was prescribed by law within the meaning
of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention. For the reasons
described above in reaching that conclusion, the Commission considers
that the constituent elements of the common law offence of contempt of
court were sufficiently clear as of 12 July 1987. The fact that the
established legal principles involved were applied to novel
circumstances does not render the offence retroactive in any way:
"... it is not objectionable that the existing elements of the
offence are clarified and adapted to new circumstances which can
reasonably be brought under the original concept of the offence"
(No. 8710/79, Dec. 7.5.82, D.R. 28 p. 77, at pp. 79-82, paras.
4-10).
The Commission finds, therefore, that the offence of contempt of
court existed at the time it was committed by the applicants and that
the present case discloses no appearance of a violation of Article 7
(Art. 7) of the Convention. It follows that this part of the
application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission by a majority
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Deputy to the Secretary Acting President
to the Commission of the Commission
(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)
LEXI - AI Legal Assistant
