F.H. v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 17090/90 • ECHR ID: 001-1522
Document date: March 31, 1993
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 17090/90
by F.H.
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 31 March 1993, the following members being present:
MM. J.A. FROWEIN, President of the First Chamber
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the First Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 16 January 1990
by F.H. against Austria and registered on 19 August 1990 under file No.
17090/90;
Having regard to:
- the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
24 June 1992 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 30 July 1992;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The particular facts of the case
The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1941. He is
detained at Graz Prison and is represented before the Commission by Mr.
R. Soyer, a lawyer practising in Vienna. The facts of the case as
submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows:
On 5 January 1989 the Innsbruck Regional Court (Landesgericht)
ordered the applicant's detention on remand on suspicion of serious
fraud offences, involving transactions with bills of exchange,
fraudulent sale of a worthless cleaning business and failure to repay
loans. He had been arrested on 3 January 1989. After an initial
extension of the time permitted for detention, to 5 November 1989, the
Innsbruck Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) on 31 October 1989
extended the permitted period of detention to one year, that is, to 5
January 1990. An application for release which the applicant had made
was unsuccessful, and an appeal was also unsuccessful, the Innsbruck
Court of Appeal giving its decision on 21 December 1989.
According to the Government, on 29 December 1989 the Innsbruck
Regional Court forwarded the case file to the Innsbruck Court of Appeal
with a request for the detention on remand to be reasonably extended.
The applicant submits that the copy of the prosecuting authority's
request which he received was dated 8 January 1990. The request was
granted on 9 January 1990 on the grounds that the case was complicated,
that a high maximum sentence was involved, that an accountant's report
had to be prepared and that there was a high degree of suspicion
(Article 180 para. 1 (3) (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
- Strafprozeßordnung). The period of permitted detention was extended
to 16 months, that is, to 5 May 1990.
On 2 May 1990 the prosecuting authority applied for a further
extension of the permitted period of detention, this time to twenty
months. The Regional Court forwarded the application to the Court of
Appeal on the same day. On 15 May 1990 the Innsbruck Court of Appeal
granted the extension, that is, detention was now permitted to 5
September 1990. The Court considered that it was authorised to take
a decision as to an extension of time after the permitted period had
expired, and referred to a previously decided case (7 BS 47/90
Innsbruck Court of Appeal).
On 28 June 1990 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) rejected
the applicant's request for compensation made under Section 2 sub-
section 1 (a) Criminal Compensation Act 1969 (Strafrechtliches
Entschädigungsgesetz). The Court noted that the applicant had
complained only of the period between 5 and 9 January 1990, and not of
the substantive reasons for his detention on remand. The Court,
referring to a decision it had taken in 1972 (SSt 43/38), found that
the mere fact that the decision to extend the applicant's detention on
remand had been taken a few days too late could not affect the
procedural and substantive lawfulness of his detention on remand. The
Court continued that the purpose of the relevant part of Article 193
para. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung) was
merely to ensure that an initial application for extension of the
permitted period of detention on remand was not made too early.
The applicant's trial was opened before the Innsbruck Regional
Court on 28 June 1990, when it had to be adjourned for further evidence
to be taken. On 14 November 1990 the applicant was convicted by the
Innsbruck Regional Court and sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment. The
period spent in remand was deducted from the period he would actually
serve. The applicant did not appeal.
Relevant Domestic Law
Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 193
(German)
"(1) Sämtliche am Strafverfahren beteiligten Behörden sind
verpflichtet, darauf hinzuwirken, daß die Haft so kurz wie
möglich dauere.
...
(4) Auf Antrag des Untersuchungsrichters, Vorsitzenden oder
Staatsanwaltes kann der Gerichtshof zweiter Instanz wegen
besonderer Schwierigkeiten oder besonderen Umfanges der
Untersuchung bestimmen, daß [die Haft], wenn es sich ... um ein
Verbrechen handelt, das mit einer fünf Jahre übersteigenden
Freiheitsstrafe bedroht ist, bis zu zwei Jahre dauern dürfe; die
Entscheidung darüber, daß die Haft länger als ein Jahr dauern
dürfe, darf erst innerhalb der letzten sechs Wochen des ersten
Haftjahres getroffen werden.
(5) Die zeitliche Beschränkung der auch oder ausschließlich aus
einem anderen Grund als dem der Verdunkelungsgefahr verhängten
Untersuchungshaft entfällt mit dem Beginn der Hauptverhandlung."
(Translation)
(1) All authorities involved in criminal proceedings are obliged
to ensure that detention is as short as possible.
...
(4) The court of second instance may, on the application of the
investigating judge, the presiding judge or the prosecuting
authority, determine that [detention on remand] may, ... in cases
concerning a crime with a maximum sentence of over five years,
be extended to up to two years if the complexity or scope of the
investigation makes it necessary; the decision that detention on
remand may continue beyond the period of one year may only be
taken within the last six weeks of the first year of detention.
(5) Detention founded on a reason other than the risk of
collusion alone is subject to no time-limit as soon as the trial
has begun."
Criminal Compensation Act, Section 2, sub-section 1 (a)
(German)
"Der Ersatzanspruch besteht, wenn
(a) die Anhaltung des Geschädigten von einem inländischen Gericht
gesetzwidrig angeordnet oder verlängert ... worden ist."
(Translation)
"A claim for compensation exists when
(a) the detention of a person seeking compensation has been
unlawfully ordered or extended by a domestic court ..."
COMPLAINTS
The applicant alleges a violation of Article 5 para. 1 of the
Convention by virtue of the two occasions on which his detention on
remand was retroactively authorised. He also considers that all
detention subsequent to the decision of 9 January 1990 was unlawful
because it was based on an initially unlawful decision.
The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1 in
respect of the length of the proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 16 January 1990 and registered
on 29 August 1990.
On 13 January 1992 the Commission decided to invite the parties'
observations on the admissibility and merits of the issues arising
under Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention.
The Government submitted their observations on 24 June 1992 and
the applicant submitted his observations in reply on 30 July 1992.
THE LAW
1. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 5 para. 1
(Art. 5-1) of the Convention in respect of the two periods of detention
from 5 until 9 January and from 5 until 15 May 1990. Article 5
(Art. 5) of the Convention provides, so far as relevant, as follows.
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it
is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an
offence or fleeing after having done so..."
In connection with the question whether the applicant's detention
during these two periods was "in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law" and "lawful" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1)
of the Convention, the Government refer principally to a decision of
the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) which, in a decision of 20
September 1972 (11 Os 124/72, SSt 43/38), found that the expiry of the
time limits set by Article 193 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Strafprozeßordnung) did not, as a matter of law, have any impact on
the legal requirements for detention. The Supreme Court in that case
noted that Article 121 para. 3 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure
(which makes express provision for the suspension of time limits where
an application for extension of detention on remand has been submitted
before the expiry of the time limit) had not been repeated in the
Austrian legislation, but that the aim, that failure to observe the
time limits did not lead to any consequences as to the substantive
justification for the detention, was the same.
The Government underline that in each case the request for an
extension of the detention on remand was made before the time limit
expired, and recall that the question of lawfulness of detention is,
in the first place, a matter for decision by the domestic authorities.
They also refer to the Winterwerp case (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of
24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, p. 21 para. 49) where an interval of
two weeks between the expiry of the earlier order and the making of the
succeeding order was found not to be unreasonable or excessive. As to
the effect of the failure to take the decision to extend the
applicant's detention on remand beyond one year within the final six
weeks of that year, they submit that the aim of the final phrase of
Article 193 para. (4) of the of Code of Criminal Procedure is to
prevent a decision being taken after six months' detention, and that
failure to comply can have no effect on the lawfulness of the
detention.
The applicant contests the relevance of the Supreme Court's
judgment of 20 September 1972. He points out that it relates to the
time limit in Article 193 para. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
not that in Article 193 para. (4), and considers that the Supreme Court
there clearly envisaged the possibility of violation of constitutional
rights where time limits had not been observed.
In connection with the Winterwerp case, the applicant points out
that the repeated failure to respect the time limits in his case is an
indication that the detention was unreasonable and excessive. He
further points out that in the Wassink case (Eur. Court H.R., judgment
of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 185, p. 12 para. 27) the European
Court of Human Rights interpreted strictly the legal requirements for
detention. As to the final phrase of Article 193 para. 4 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, he submits that it was the clear intention of
the legislator to provide for a particularly strict test after expiry
of a year's detention, such that failure to comply with the formalities
at this juncture must in any event render subsequent detention
unlawful.
The Commission finds that this complaint raises questions of fact
and law which require an examination of the merits. It cannot
therefore be declared manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground for
declaring it inadmissible has been established.
2. The applicant also considers that his detention subsequent
to 9 January 1990 was unlawful and hence in violation of Article 5
(Art. 5) of the Convention because of the failure to decide within the
six weeks provided for in Article 193 para. (4) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
Apart from the period 5 - 15 May 1990 with which it has dealt
above, the Commission finds that the detention on remand subsequent to
9 January was both "lawful" and "in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law" in that the decision of the Innsbruck Court of
Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) of 9 January 1990 gave a basis in law for
"up to 16 months", that is, to 5 May 1990, and the decision of the same
Court of 15 May 1990 provided a legal basis from that date until the
opening of the applicant's trial on 27 June 1990.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. Finally, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention by reason of the length of the proceedings.
The Commission finds that the proceedings against the applicant
must be taken as having begun on 3 January 1989, when he was arrested.
The proceedings ended on 14 November 1990, when the applicant was
convicted.
The Commission notes that the case involved a complex commercial
fraud and that the proceedings as a whole lasted less than two years.
Having regard to the criteria established by the case-law of the
Convention organs on the question of "reasonable time" within Article
6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention - the complexity of the case,
the applicant's conduct and that of the competent authorities - and
having regard to all the information in its possession, the Commission
finds that the length of the proceedings in the present case did not
exceed the "reasonable time" referred to in Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE as regards the lawfulness of
the applicant's detention from 5 to 9 January 1990 and from 5 to
15 May 1990, without prejudging the merits, and
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (J.A. FROWEIN)
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