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ESBESTER v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 18601/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1537

Document date: April 2, 1993

  • Inbound citations: 13
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 1

ESBESTER v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 18601/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1537

Document date: April 2, 1993

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 18601/91

                      by David ESBESTER

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

2 April 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                 J.A. FROWEIN

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 F. ERMACORA

                 G. SPERDUTI

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           Sir   Basil HALL

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 G.B. REFFI

                 M. NOWICKI

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 26 March 1991 by

David Esbester against the United Kingdom and registered on 25 July

1991 under file No. 18601/91;

      Having regard to:

-     the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

the Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 13 and

28 May 1992 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant

on 13 August 1992;

-     the hearing held on 2 April 1993;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a British citizen born in 1940 and resident in

London.  He is a clerical officer by profession. He is represented

before the Commission by John Wadham of Liberty. The facts as submitted

by the parties may be summarised as follows.

      On 11 June 1990, he was offered a post as Administrative Officer

at the Central Office of Information (hereinafter "the COI") "subject

to the satisfactory completion of our enquiries into your age, health

and other matters".

      By letter dated 19 July 1990, the COI informed the applicant that

"having completed our inquiries ... we are unable to offer you an

appointment."  No further explanation was given.

      At the time of his application, the second applicant had been a

member of the Communist Party of Great Britain for many years.  He had

also been active in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), anti-

apartheid and various anti-deportation campaigns.  In 1977, he had been

arrested and fined £15 for obstruction of the police at the Grunwick

industrial dispute and in 1984 arrested and cautioned after a CND

demonstration.

      The applicant unsuccessfully attempted to discover the reasons

for the refusal of the post at COI through his Member of Parliament.

      On 1 November 1990, the applicant submitted an application to the

Security Services Tribunal alleging that the Security Services had

provided "vetting information" on him to the COI with the result that

their offer of employment was withdrawn.

      On 14 January 1991, the Tribunal Secretary replied that his

complaint had been investigated and that no determination in his favour

had been made.

Relevant domestic law and practice

The Security Service

      The Security Service Act 1989 places the Security Service

on a statutory basis.

      It provides inter alia:

      "1. (1) There shall continue to be a Security Service (in this

      Act referred to as "the Service") under the authority of the

      Secretary of State.

      (2) The function of the Service shall be the protection of

      national security and, in particular, its protection against

      threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the

      activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended

      to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political,

      industrial or violent means.

      (3) It shall also be the function of the Service to safeguard the

      economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed

      by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British

      Islands.

      2. (1) The operations of the Service shall continue to be under

      the control of a Director-General appointed by the Secretary of

      State.

      (2) The Director-General shall be responsible for the efficiency

      of the Service and it shall be his duty to ensure

           (a) that there are arrangements for securing that no

           information is obtained by the Service except so far as

           necessary for the proper discharge of its functions or

           disclosed by it except so far as necessary for that purpose

           or for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious

           crime; and

           (b) that the Service does not take any action to further

           the interests of any political party.

      (3) The arrangements mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above shall

      be such as to ensure that information in the possession of the

      Service is not disclosed for use in determining whether a person

      should be employed, or continue to be employed, by any person,

      or in any office or capacity, except in accordance with

      provisions in that behalf approved by the Secretary of State.

      (4) The Director-General shall make an annual report on the work

      of the Service to the prime minister and the Secretary of State

      and may at any time report to either of them on any matter

      relating to its work.

      3.   (1) No entry on or interference with property shall be

      unlawful if it is authorized by a warrant issued by the Secretary

      of State under this section.

      (2) The Secretary of State may on an application made by the

      Service issue a warrant under this section authorizing the taking

      of such action as is specified in the warrant in respect of any

      property so specified if the Secretary of State

           (a) thinks it necessary for the action to be taken in order

           to obtain information which

                 (i) is likely to be of substantial value in assisting

                 the  Service to discharge any of its functions; and

                 (ii) cannot reasonably be obtained by other means; and

           (b) is satisfied that satisfactory arrangements are in

           force under section 2(2)(a) above with respect to the

           disclosure of information obtained by virtue of this

           section and that the information obtained under the warrant

           will be subject to those arrangements."

The Security Service Tribunal

      The Act also provides for a tribunal, known as the Security

Service Tribunal, to deal with complaints:

      "5. (1) There shall be a Tribunal for the purpose of

      investigating complaints about the Service in the manner

      specified in Schedule 1 to this Act...

      (4) The decisions of the Tribunal and the Commissioner under that

      Schedule (including decisions as to their jurisdictions) shall

      not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any

      court."

      Schedule 1 to the Act provides, inter alia:

      "1.  Any person may complain to the Tribunal if he is aggrieved

      by anything which he believes the Service has done in relation

      to him or to any property of his; and, unless the Tribunal

      consider that the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, they shall

      investigate it in accordance with this Schedule.

      2. (1) The Tribunal shall investigate whether the complainant has

      been the subject of inquiries by the Service.

      (2) If the Tribunal find that the Service has made inquiries

      about the complainant but that those inquiries had ceased at the

      time when the complaint was made, they shall determine whether,

      at the time when the inquiries were instituted, the Service had

      reasonable grounds for deciding to institute inquiries about the

      complainant in the discharge of its functions.

      (3) If the Tribunal find that inquiries by the Service about

      the complainant were continuing at the time when the complaint

      was made, they shall determine whether, at that time, the Service

      had reasonable grounds for deciding to continue inquiries about

      the complainant in the discharge of its functions...

      4. (1) If and so far as the complainant alleges that anything has

      been done by the Service in relation to any property of his, the

      Tribunal shall refer the complaint to the Commissioner who shall

      investigate whether a warrant has been issued under section 3 of

      this Act in respect of that property and if he finds that such

      a warrant has been issued he shall, applying the principles

      applied by a court on an application for judicial review,

      determine whether the Secretary of State was acting properly in

      issuing or renewing the warrant.

      (2) The Commissioner shall inform the Tribunal of his conclusion

      on any complaint so far as referred to him under this paragraph.

      5. (1) Where the Tribunal determine under paragraph 2 or 3 above

      that the Service did not have reasonable grounds for the decision

      or belief in question, they shall

           (a) give notice to the complainant that they have made a

           determination in his favour under that paragraph; and

           (b) make a report of their findings to the Secretary of

           State and to the Commissioner.

      (2) The Tribunal shall also give notice to the complainant of any

      determination in his favour by the Commissioner under paragraph

      4 above.

      (3) Where in the case of any complaint no such determination as

      is mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) or (2) above is made by the

      Tribunal or the Commissioner the Tribunal shall give notice to

      the complainant that no determination in his favour has been made

      on his complaint.

      6. (1) Where the Tribunal give a complainant notice of such a

      determination as is mentioned in paragraph 5(1) above the

      Tribunal may

           (a) if the determination is under paragraph 2 above, order

           inquiries by the Service about the complainant to be ended

           and any records relating to such inquiries to be destroyed;

           (b) if the determination is under that paragraph or

           paragraph 3 above, direct the Secretary of State to pay to

           the complainant such sum by way of compensation as may be

           specified by the Tribunal.

      (2) Where the Tribunal give a complainant notice of such a

      determination as is mentioned in paragraph 5(2) above the

      Tribunal may

           (a) quash any warrant in respect of any property of the

           complainant which the Commissioner has found to have been

           improperly issued or renewed and which he considers should

           be quashed;

           (b) if the Commissioner considers that a sum should be paid

           to the complainant by way of compensation, direct the

           Secretary of State to pay to the complainant such sum as

           the Commissioner may specify."

      Pursuant to Schedule 2, the Tribunal consists of 3-5 members each

of whom must be a barrister, solicitor or advocate of not less than ten

years' standing. Members are appointed for a period of five years by

Her Majesty by royal warrant and may be removed from office by Her

Majesty on an address presented to her by both Houses of Parliament.

      Pursuant to para. 9(1) of Schedule 1, the Tribunal is limited as

follows:

      "9. (1) No complaint shall be entertained under this Schedule if

      and so far as it relates to anything done before the date on

      which this Schedule comes into force."

The Security Service Commissioner

      Pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, the Prime Minister appoints as

a Commissioner a person who holds or has held high judicial office. He

has the role, inter alia, of keeping under review the exercise by the

Secretary of State of his powers under Section 3 to issue warrants.

      Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, matters may be referred

to the Commissioner by the Tribunal:

      "7. (1) If in a case investigated by the Tribunal under

      paragraph 2 above they consider that the Service may not be

      justified in regarding all members of a particular category as

      requiring investigation they shall refer that matter to the

      Commissioner.

      (2) If in any case investigated by the Tribunal -

           (a) the Tribunal's conclusions on the matters which they

           are required to investigate are such that no determination

           is made by them in favour of the complainant; but

           (b) it appears to the Tribunal from the allegations made by

           the complainant that it is appropriate for there to be an

           investigation into whether the Service has in any other

           respect acted unreasonably in relation to the complainant

           or his property,

      they shall refer that matter to the Commissioner.

      (3) The Commissioner may report any matter referred to him under

      this paragraph to the Secretary of State who may take such action

      in the light of the report as he thinks fit, including any action

      which the Tribunal have power to take or direct under paragraph 6

      above."

      The Commissioner makes an annual report to the Prime Minister on

the discharge of his functions and the report is then laid before

Parliament.

Police Special Branches

      Each of the police forces in England and Wales has its own

Special Branch.  Except for the Metropolitan Police Special Branch,

which has responsibilities in relation to Irish Republican extremism

and terrorism throughout Great Britain, the responsibility of each

Special Branch relates only to the area of the force of which it is a

part.  The Special Branch is not a separate police force.  Members of

the Special Branch of any police force in England and Wales are police

officers with the same powers and under the same duties at law as all

other police officers in the force.

      The status and functions of police Special Branches are set out

in Home Office Guidelines on the Work of a Special Branch.

      The special functions which most commonly fall to be undertaken

by the Special Branch of a police force include the provision of

assistance to the Security Service in carrying out its task of the

protection of national security.  As is further noted, a large part of

this effort is devoted to the study and investigation of terrorism,

including the activities of international terrorists and terrorist

organisations and, in this regard, the police Special Branches provide

information to the Security Service about extremists and terrorist

groups.

      The Guidelines contain express provisions concerning the

maintenance and use of records by police Special Branches.  It is

emphasised that, because of the particular sensitivity of the

information concerned, it is important that only information relevant

to the special functions of the Special Branch should be recorded.

The Guidelines similarly contain instructions concerning access to

information held by Special Branches, requiring that it should be

limited to those who have a particulars need to know and that under no

circumstances should information be passed to commercial firms or to

employees' organisations.

      As appears from Schedule 1 to the Police (Discipline) Regulations

1985 specific provision is made for the unauthorised disclosure of

information: by paragraph 6(a), taken with Regulation 4(1) of the

Police (Discipline)(Senior Officers) Regulations 1985, it is a

disciplinary offence for any member of a police force, including

members of police Special Branches, to communicate without proper

authority to any person any information which he has in his possession

as a member of a police force.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains that information as to his private life

was kept on secret files by MI5 and/or police special branches and/or

the Police National Computer and/or the Government Communications

Headquarters (GCHQ).  He submits that it is at very least reasonably

likely that the intelligence services have compiled and retained

information about his private life and this, taken with the existence

of practices permitting secret surveillance, constitutes an

infringement of Article 8 para. 1 of the Convention.  The use of this

information in the course of negative vetting procedures is an

additional interference, especially since he did not have the

opportunity to refute the information in question.

      The applicant further submits that the interference was not in

accordance with law since there is no law governing the compilation and

use of information by police Special Branches, the Police National

Computer or GCHQ.  While the Security Service Act 1989 was passed in

response to applications before the Commission, he submits that it only

covers the activities of MI5 and in any case fails to offer an adequate

definition of the function of the Security Service.  Further, the

Security Service Tribunal set up by the Act does not provide adequate

protection from abuse.

      The applicant submits that the interference fails to satisfy the

other criteria of Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention.  In particular,

the Tribunal does not offer adequate and effective protection against

abuse since it only has jurisdiction over the Security Service and

cannot consider the correctness of the Security Service decisions on

whether the Service was justified in retaining the records of its

enquiries.  Moreover, its jurisdiction is further limited where

inquiries are made by the Service on the ground that a person is a

member of a category of persons regarded by the Service as requiring

investigation.  The Tribunal is also prevented from giving reasons for

its decisions.

      The applicant also complains that he had no effective remedy in

respect of his complaints, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 24 May 1990 and registered on

25 July 1991.

      On 12 December 1991 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government and to ask for written

observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.

      The Government's observations were submitted on 13 and 28 May

1992 after one extension in the time-limit and the applicant's

observations in reply were submitted on 13 August 1992 also after one

extension in the time-limit.

      On 12 October 1992, the Commission decided to invite the parties

to make submissions at an oral hearing.

      At the oral hearing which was held on 2 April 1993, the parties

were represented as follows:

For the Government:

Mrs. Audrey GLOVER          Agent

Mr. Nicolas BRATZA, QC      Counsel

Mr. James EADIE             Counsel

The Government were assisted by five advisers.

For the applicant:

Mr. Andrew NICOL            Counsel

Mr. John WADHAM             Solicitor, Liberty

THE LAW

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

      The applicant complains that information concerning his private

life has been compiled, retained and disclosed by the Security Service,

police Special Branches, the Police National Computer or GCHQ. He

invokes Articles 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides as

relevant:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private ...

      life...

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with

      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

      rights and freedoms of others."

      The Government, in line with their policy of not disclosing

information about the operations of the intelligence services, have

neither confirmed nor denied the applicant's allegations.

      The Commission recalls that a security check does not per se

constitute an interference with the right to respect for private life

guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.  An interference

with this right occurs when security checks are based on information

about a person's private life (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Leander

judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 22 para. 45).

      The Commission notes that the applicant has no concrete proof to

support his allegation that the any of the intelligence services,

including the Security Service, compiled and continue to retain a file

of personal information about him.  The Commission recalls however that

"an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be a victim of

a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures ...

without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to

him" (Eur. Court H.R., Klass judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no.

28, p. 18 para. 34).

      Similarly, in the Malone case, the Court agreed with the

Commission that the existence of laws and practices permitting and

establishing a system for effecting secret surveillance amounted in

itself to an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention, apart from any measures actually taken

against him (Eur. Court H.R., Malone judgment of 2 August 1984, Series

A no. 82, p. 31 para. 64).

      The Commission has held that this case-law cannot be interpreted

so broadly as to encompass every person in the United Kingdom who fears

that the Security Service may have compiled information about him.  An

applicant however cannot be reasonably expected to prove that

information concerning his private life has been compiled and retained.

It is sufficient, in the area of secret measures, that the existence

of practices permitting secret surveillance be established and that

there is a reasonable likelihood that the Security Service has compiled

and retained information concerning his private life (see e.g.

Application No. 12015/86, Dec. 6.7.88, D.R. 57 p.108).

      In the present case, the Commission notes that the applicant was

refused a post in the Central Office of Information after  initial

approval had been given subject to satisfactory completion of

"enquiries". He was informed by the COI that "having completed our

inquiries... we are unable to offer you the appointment". In these

circumstances the Commission finds that the applicant's assertion that

a security check was carried out and involved reference to information

concerning matters falling within the sphere of "private life" is a

reasonable inference from the facts. Such a check would appear to fall

within the ambit of the Security Service and/or police Special

Branches. There is nothing to indicate any possible involvement by GCHQ

or the Police National Computer.

      Against the above background, the Commission finds that the

existence of practices permitting secret surveillance has been

established and that the applicant has established a reasonable

likelihood that the Security Service and /or police Special Branches

have compiled and retained a file concerning his private life, which

was referred to in the course of the security check.  It follows that

there has been an interference with the applicant's rights to respect

for his private life guaranteed under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of

the Convention.

      The Commission must next determine whether this interference is

justified under the second paragraph of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention, namely whether it was "in accordance with the law" and if

so, whether it was necessary in a democratic society or one or more of

the reasons specified.

"in accordance with the law"

      This expression has been interpreted by the Court as importing

three requirements - the interference must have some basis in domestic

law, the law in question must be accessible to the individual concerned

and its consequences for him must also be foreseeable. The Court has

further held that the requirement of foreseeability in the special

context of employment "vetting" in sectors affecting national security

cannot be the same as in many other fields. In the LEANDER case (Eur.

Court H.R., Leander judgment, loc. cit.) it stated:

      "Thus, it cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to

      foresee precisely what checks will be made in his regard by the

      Swedish special police service in its efforts to protect national

      security.  Nevertheless, in a system applicable to citizens

      generally, as under the Personnel Control Ordinance, the law has

      to be sufficiently clear in its terms to give them an adequate

      indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions

      on which the public authorities are empowered to resort to this

      kind of secret and potentially dangerous interference with

      private life (ibid., p. 32, para. 67)...

      In addition, where the implementation of the law consists of

      secret measures, not open to scrutiny by the individuals

      concerned or by the public at large, the law itself, as opposed

      to the accompanying administrative practice, must indicate the

      scope of any discretion conferred on the competent authority with

      sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the

      measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection

      against arbitrary interference (see the above-mentioned Malone

      judgment, Series A no. 82, pp. 32-33, para. 68)."

      The Commission finds that the interference in the present case

had a valid basis in domestic law, namely, the Security Service Act

1989 which placed the Security Service on a statutory footing for the

first time.

      The applicant has submitted however that the domestic law

nonetheless lacks the requisite accessibility and foreseeability. In

this context he refers to the only partially defined term of "the

interests of national security" and the fact that the guidelines

produced by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 2 (3) of the

1989 Act governing the Director-General's supervision of the use of

information obtained by the Security Service are unpublished.

      The Commission considers however that the principles referred to

above do not necessarily require a comprehensive definition of the

notion of "the interests of national security". Many laws, which by

their subject-matter require to be flexible, are inevitably couched in

terms which are to a greater or lesser extent vague and whose

interpretation and application are questions of practice. The

Commission notes that the exercise of the Security Service's functions

are subject to express limitations and to the supervision of a tribunal

and commissioner appointed pursuant to the 1989 Act. The guidelines

referred to in section 2 (3) of the Act relate only to the

administrative implementation of preceding provisions, which expressly

limit the use of information by the Service to that necessary to fulfil

its functions.

      In light of the above, the Commission considers that in the

present case the law is formulated with sufficient precision to enable

the applicant to anticipate the application of vetting procedures and

to the likely nature of the involvement of the Security Service and

police Special Branches with regard to the collection, recording and

release of information relating to himself.

"necessary in a democratic society ..."

      The Commission recalls that the notion of necessity implies that

the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, tin

particular that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

Regard must also be had on this context to the margin of appreciation

of the respondent state which in the area of assessing the requirements

of and means of pursuing interests of national security has been held

by the Court to be wide (Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment loc. cit.

p. 25 paras. 58-59).

      The aim pursued by the interference in the present case was the

"interests of national security". The Court has acknowledged the

necessity for states to collect and store information on persons and

to use this information when assessing the eligibility of persons for

posts of importance for national security. It is however crucial given

the potential seriousness of resulting invasions of a person's private

sphere that there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse

(Eur. Court H.R., Klaas judgment, loc. cit., p. 23 para. 50).

      The Government have pointed to the framework of supervision set

up under the 1989 Act.

      The applicant contends that the protection offered is inadequate

and ineffective. He alleges, inter alia,  the following defects:

      - the wide scope of the term "interests of national security";

      - the fact that the Tribunal does not give reasons for its

      failure to make a determination in favour of an applicant;

      - the fact that the Tribunal is prohibited from examining

      inquiries which ceased before the 1989 Act came into force (see

      para. 9(1) of Schedule No. 1);

      - the limited scope of the Tribunal's inquiries, in particular,

      since it cannot examine whether the information if true renders

      the person concerned a security risk;

      - the inability of the Commissioner to make binding decisions.

      The applicant has also submitted that in comparison with the

other systems whose security legislation has come under the scrutiny

of the Convention organs there is significantly no element of

Parliamentary or judicial control. He also has drawn attention to the

framework of legislative controls provided for in the Canadian and

Australian systems which are alleged to provide much greater respect

for the rights of the individual.

      The Commission however finds reference to other systems of

limited relevance. One particular system may be more ideal or more

sophisticated than another. The task of the  Commission is however to

determine whether the system under examination in the concrete case

before it passes the threshold imposed by the Convention guarantees.

      The Commission has already stated above that the term "national

security" is not amenable to exhaustive definition and since sufficient

indication is given of the scope and manner of exercise of the

functions of the Security Service, considers that no problem arises in

this respect. As regards the lack of reasons for the decisions of the

tribunal, the Court considered a similar problem in the KLAAS case

(Eur. Court H.R. Klaas judgment, loc. cit. p. 27 paras. 57-58) but

found that the State could legitimately fear that the efficacy of

surveillance systems might be jeopardised if information is divulged

to the person concerned.

      As regard the applicant's assertion that the Tribunal is barred

from investigating matters arising before the Act came into force, the

Commission notes that the provision refers specifically to the

Tribunal's examination of enquiries which have ceased. The Commission

notes that it does not purport to extend to the Security Service's use

of information already collected and accepts the Government's assertion

that the Tribunal could have examined the vetting procedure if applied

to the applicant since it would have taken place after the Act came

into force.

      The Commission has examined the applicant's remaining complaints

against the background of the 1989 Act as a whole. It notes that the

Tribunal consists of lawyers of ten years' experience and who act in

an independent capacity. While they do not have jurisdiction to

substitute their opinion for that of the Security Service, it has a

supervisory role which includes examination of whether the Service had

reasonable grounds for a particular belief or decision.  It must also

refer to the Commissioner cases where it finds that the Service is not

justified in treating a person as a legitimate object of enquiry merely

on the ground that he is member of a particular group and where it

considers that the  Service has acted unreasonably with respect to a

complainant. The Commissioner is a person who holds or who has held

high judicial office and he may make recommendations concerning

complaints to the Secretary of State in addition to making an annual

report to the Houses of Parliament.

      As regards any possible involvement of the police special

branches, the Commission recalls that their role is to support the

Security Service and that they pass on to the Service any relevant

information. The use of such information would then appear to fall

within the ambit of supervision of the Tribunal and Commissioner.

      In the absence of any evidence or indication that the system is

not functioning as required by domestic law, the Commission finds that

the framework of safeguards achieves a compromise between the

requirements of defending democratic society and the rights of the

individual which is compatible with the provisions of the Convention.

Consequently it concludes that the interference in the present case was

necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national

security.

      It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention

      The applicant complains that he has no effective remedy for his

complaints and invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which

provides that:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

      national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been

      committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

      The Commission recalls however that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not

require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation

of the Convention.  It only applies if the individual can be said to

have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court

H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p.23,

para. 52).

      The Commission finds that the applicant cannot be said, in light

of its findings above to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of his

Convention rights.

      It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission            President of the Commission

     (H.C. KRÜGER)                          (C. A. NØRGAARD)

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