Lexploria

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 22978/93

by Amal KORIEH

against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in

private on 2 March 1994, the following members being present:

MM. S. TRECHSEL, President

H. DANELIUS

G. JÖRUNDSSON

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

MM. F. MARTINEZ

L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

M.A. NOWICKI

I. CABRAL BARRETO

J. MUCHA

D. SVÁBY

Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 3 September 1993 by

Amal KORIEH against Sweden and registered on 22 November 1993 under file

No. 22978/93;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

The applicant is a Syrian citizen, born in 1961 at Damascus and,

presently, a resident of Syria. Before the Commission she is represented

by Mr. C.M. Lilienberg, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.

The applicant grew up in Syria and lived there with her parents,

sisters and brothers. She commenced her studies at the university in

Damascus in 1979. In 1983 she had to leave the university because she was

not a member of the Baath Party and refused to become a member.

Furthermore, she was informed that the Syrian authorities suspected her

of sympathising with the Christian militia and of being against the

Syrian regime. She began to work as an agronomist as she thought this

would enable her to continue her studies. However, this proved to be

impossible and she therefore applied for a scholarship to study in France

and a visa. She received both and she left Syria in December 1984 to

pursue her studies in France. There she stayed with a brother. She

submits that since she left her job in Syria without permission the

Syrian authorities issued a prohibition against her leaving the country.

However, the applicant was not informed thereof until after she had

actually left for France.

In 1986 her parents left Syria and settled in Sweden where they

obtained a permanent residence permit. They were later joined by two of

their daughters in 1988 and a son in 1990. The latter has not, however,

obtained a permanent residence permit yet.

On 3 September 1990 the applicant arrived in Sweden from France on

a visa valid until 30 September 1990. On 9 October 1990 she requested

asylum. She submitted to the Swedish authorities that she feared being

compelled to 15 years' house arrest or similar punishment if returned to

Syria, that she would be prohibited from working there and that she would

be sentenced to a fine of approximately 300,000 SEK. She also submitted,

as a humanitarian consideration, that her parents and siblings were

living in Sweden, and that it was an Islamic tradition that an unmarried

woman should live with her parents for which reason she would end up in

a difficult social situation upon return to Syria.

While the applicant's request for asylum was being considered, her

father died on 4 December 1991 of a heart disease and one of her sisters

died on 22 November 1992 of a liver disease.

On 21 February 1992 the National Immigration Board (Statens

Invandrarverk, hereafter "SIV") rejected the applicant's request for

asylum. SIV considered that the circumstances as described by the

applicant did not disclose that the requirements for obtaining status as

a refugee in accordance with Chapter 3, section 1, subsections 1 and 3,

of the Aliens Act (utlänningslagen) were fulfilled. SIV stated

furthermore that the applicant's family situation was not of such a

character that it could constitute a valid reason for granting her a

residence permit. The applicant was refused leave to return to Sweden

before 1 March 1994 without prior permission from SIV.

The applicant appealed against the decision to the Aliens Board

(utlänningsnämnden) and referred to the period of time she had stayed in

Sweden and to the fact that a brother had in the meanwhile been granted

a permanent residence permit which increased her attachment to Sweden.

She also submitted that the death of her father and her sister was yet

another humanitarian reason to let her stay in Sweden.

However, the Aliens Board upheld the decision of SIV on

22 March 1993. The applicant could not be regarded as a refugee within

the meaning of the Aliens Act. Furthermore, the attachment to her family

or other humanitarian grounds were not sufficient to obtain a residence

permit. The applicant has returned to Syria.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains that her expulsion from Sweden violated her

right to respect for her family life within the meaning of Article 8 of

the Convention.

She claims that she went to Sweden to join her family. In Syria it

is a tradition that women live with the parents until their marriage. She

has no family in Syria and she maintains that it is impossible for her

family to return to that country.

THE LAW

The applicant complains that by expelling her from Sweden the

Swedish authorities have violated her right to respect for her family

life. She invokes Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides as

follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family

life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the

exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law

and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the

country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection

of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others."

The Commission recalls that the Convention does not guarantee a

right to enter or reside in a particular country. However, the Commission

has held that, in view of the right to respect for family life ensured

by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the exclusion of a person from

a country in which his or her close relatives reside may raise an issue

under this provision of the Convention (cf., for example, No. 13654/88,

Dec. 8.9.88, D.R. 57 p. 287).

In such circumstances the Commission first examines whether such a

degree of dependency existed between the applicant and her relatives as

to give rise to the protection envisaged by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention.

The Commission notes that the applicant lived with her family in

Damascus until 1984 and again in Sweden from 1990 until she was expelled

in 1993. During the applicant's stay in France from 1984 to 1990 she

lived with one of her brothers.

In these circumstances, the Commission would not exclude that there

was a family life between the applicant and her family within the meaning

of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention. Consequently, the

applicant's expulsion may be considered as an interference with her right

to respect for family life.

The question which remains to be examined is whether this

interference was justified under the second paragraph of Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention, i.e. whether it was in accordance with law,

had a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society in order

to achieve the aforesaid aim.

The Commission recalls that the decision of the Swedish authorities

not to grant the applicant a residence permit and to expel her was taken

in accordance with the Swedish Aliens Act which inter alia aims at

regulating the right of aliens to take up residence in the country.

Having regard to the close connection between the policy of

regulating immigration and considerations pertaining to the economic

well-being of the country and the public order, the Commission considers

that the decision not to grant the applicant asylum and to expel her was

taken in pursuit of legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 8 para.

2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention, i.e. the economic well-being of the

country and the prevention of disorder.

What remains is accordingly to examine whether the interference was

"necessary". In this connection the Commission recalls, as already

indicated above, that the Convention does not in principle prohibit the

Contracting States from regulating the entry and length of the stay of

aliens, and the Commission's function is not to pass judgment on

immigration or residence policies as such. It only has to examine the

interference complained of and to weigh the legitimate aims pursued

against the seriousness of the interference with the applicant's right

to respect for her family life (cf. Eur Court H.R., Berrehab judgment of

8 March 1985, Series A no. 138, p. 16, para. 29).

In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant, at

the age of 23, left her family home in Syria in order to pursue her

studies in France. She remained there for six years before joining her

parents who had moved to Sweden in the meantime. Furthermore, when she

applied for asylum in Sweden her application did not concern a person who

already lived there lawfully, but an alien seeking a permanent residence

permit for the first time. In such circumstances the Commission does not

consider the applicant's contention of a difficult social status in Syria

as a unmarried woman to carry any decisive weight. Furthermore, the

applicant's wish to reside permanently in Sweden was not based on any

legitimate expectations. As regards the extent of the interference, the

Commission also notes that the applicant is now 32 years old, having left

the family home already in 1984, and that she had managed to live without

her parents, for six years in France.

In these circumstances the Commission finds that respect for the

applicant's family life does not outweigh the general interest of the

economic well-being of the country and the prevention of disorder. The

interference with the applicant's right under Article 8 para. 1

(Art. 8-1) of the Convention was therefore justified under para. 2 of

Article 8 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

If follows that the application must be rejected as being manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber

(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)

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KORIEH v. SWEDEN

KORIEH v. SWEDEN

LEXI